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
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
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THE NEW ENGLANDER.

Editors, **GEORGE P. FISHER, TIMOTHY DWIGHT,**
WM. L. KINGSLEY.

THE NEW ENGLANDER is published quarterly in New Haven, Conn. For twenty-seven years it has been a recognized exponent and defender of those views respecting politics, public affairs, education, social improvement, religious doctrine and life, which have given character to New England. It has, also, from the first, included in its plan the discussion of questions of public interest in literature, science, and philosophy.

It disclaims allegiance to any party in theology or politics, and signifies the independence with which it acts by adopting as its motto the Horatian line "*Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri.*"

The editors and principal contributors, from the beginning, have been officers and graduates of Yale College. The reviews and essays which have found a place on its pages are among the best fruits of that type of thought and opinion which the education given at Yale is adapted to foster. In this sense, it will continue to represent the Institution.

The plan of the New Englander remains unchanged. During the year 1870, it will continue to discuss as heretofore the various questions of the day, as they arise; especially the national finances, the acquisition of territory, the reconstruction of society at the South, the true theory of political rights, the rightful functions of the State, and its relation to education, religion, and the church, the proper sphere of legislation in repressing vices like intemperance, and the character of our laws on the subject of divorce. It will not be inattentive to the various assaults of rationalism against revealed religion, or to the position of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, or to any topics which have a bearing on Christian Doctrine or Christian Life.



New Books as they appear will be examined in the spirit of impartial but courteous criticism, and particular efforts will be made to render critical notices valuable for their fullness and thoroughness.

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WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY,
NEW HAVEN, CONN.



COURT OF YALE COLLEGE.



EXPLANATION OF THE PLAN.

THE Divinity Hall, which is now nearly completed, stands on the corner of College and Elm streets, opposite the northwest corner of the Public Square, and between the buildings of the Academical Department, with the Library, Art Building, etc., and the Sheffield Scientific School.

Ground Floor.—The principal entrance, E, which connects with the main hall or corridor, H, ten feet wide, is on Elm street, and fronts the grounds and buildings of the Academical Department of Yale College. There is also another entrance, on College street, C, on the right of which is the Janitor's room, I, and near this a lift, D, which connects with all the stories above. Beyond this to the right, and on a level with the street, is a passage-way, P, for vehicles into the yard in the rear. The large rooms on this floor, each about 30 feet square and 17 feet high, are for public purposes, viz.: a Reference-Library and Reading Room, A, and three Lecture Rooms, L, L, L. The access to the rooms above is by a flight of stairs, S, near each extremity of the corridor.

Upper Floors.—In the second, third, and fourth stories, each room used for a study, S, is provided with a bed-room, B, lighted by a window and having a closet. A few of the rooms have two bed-rooms attached to them, but in general, provision is made for each student, at this advanced stage of his education, to room alone.

Heating, Bath-rooms, etc.—The building is expected to be warmed throughout by steam and lighted by gas. Bath-rooms, W, and other conveniences are placed in each of the upper stories.

The original plan contemplates also a Chapel on Elm street, nearly on a line with the front of the building, and a wing at the northern extremity of the edifice, having accommodations for boarding.

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NEW ENGLANDER.

No. CX.

JANUARY, 1870.

ARTICLE I.—THE CHINESE MIGRATION.

THE immigration of the Chinese, now in progress, marks an epoch in the history of the world, as well as of our own country. For the first time since the dispersion of the human family, over four thousand years since, the two great streams of migration, one flowing eastward, the other westward, after belting the globe, now meet and mingle. What a history has each to tell to the other? What a freightage of experience has each to bring for common participation and profit? What shall be the hue and current of the united streams, as they now flow on together? If, indeed, it be together; for this is an element of the complex problem which this great providential movement offers for solution to every reflecting mind. The immediate preparations in history for this event, the characteristics of the two peoples that now intermingle, the condition of the country which they now seem destined jointly to occupy, all are most significant and suggestive. They indi-

cate the event as a culminating stage of human history; they point forward to a new scene in the world's drama.

Scarcely a quarter of a century has passed since the Chinese wall of seclusiveness, self-conceit, and contemptuous hate of foreigners began to be broken down. The iniquitous opium war with Great Britain resulted in the treaty of August 29th, 1842, opening four ports additional to that of Canton to foreign trade, which was followed by another treaty with the United States in 1844, according still greater advantages than had been obtained by the British. This concession extorted from the Chinese by the fear with which the capture of the suburbs of Canton, of Amoy, and of Ningpo, and the irresistible progress of the British force till Nanking was threatened, had inspired them, was but the first effective blow against this self-conceit and seclusiveness; and was followed by the Anglo-French invasion, which, by a formidable demonstration before Peking itself, wrung from the Chinese Emperors the treaties of 1858 with the western powers. This is the epoch of the effectual breaking down of this old barrier to progressive China. It is the epoch of a new impulse in the whole interior life of China. The lesson had been learned that there was a better civilization, more powerful governments, higher intelligence, more advanced arts, higher, richer culture every way among the long despised barbarians; and the desire is awakened not only of a freer commerce with other nations, but of the introduction of the arts, the sciences, the culture generally of the West. The mind of China is revolutionized. A new spirit takes possession. In the city of Peking itself, an imperial college, manned by western scholars and teachers, is established for the instruction of the Chinese in foreign science and arts. The government enters into the circle of nations, and under the lead of an American diplomatist forms commercial treaties of the liberal type of the West with all its leading powers. The change of the last quarter century in Chinese ideas, and the consequent change in the whole direction of its pursuits and destiny, is most wondrous. It is such a *renaissance* as can hardly be paralleled in history. And a most noticeable feature in this wonderful change is, that the people

of the United States seem to have furnished the warmth and the light in which this new life has started. In every movement, even where the British, or the French, or the Russians have been the active instruments of change, the results attained have all borne a strikingly American character and bearing, overshadowing and outreaching all others. All the movements of the last twenty-five years show most clearly that America is selected by providence to be the cynosure of the future destiny of China.

Exactly fitting to this providential preparation in China, is the movement on the western continent. The Mexican war, a worthy parallel of the opium war in China, was terminated by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in February 2d, 1848, and its result was the cession of the Pacific coast to the United States. The discovery of gold immediately after drew into the newly organized territory an immense migration from the eastern coast, as well as turned towards it Chinese cupidity and restlessness. Cities grew up as by magic; wealth accumulated; commerce flourished; and, at last, a continental railway made the communion of life, and interest, and hope, and destiny between the Atlantic and Pacific settlements complete.

But another strange event, more remarkable than all, was most divinely ordered to prepare for the coming era. The civil war originating itself in that same unrighteousness which ever keeps human society restless, resulted in establishing throughout the nation the principle of the equality before the law of the races of men. But for this revolution, it is apparent the yellow race, like the black and the tawny races, could come in to share our political and social destinies with no promise of good to them or to us. Most gratefully do we recognize the full and final establishment of this eminently wise and humane principle, under the orderings of an ever watchful providence, just at this crisis of our history.

Not less suggestive and interesting are the characteristics of the races that now begin to mingle. They are the two most advanced, or, shall we say, least degenerate races of the whole human family. The great Caucasian group is well represented

by the American people, predominantly Anglo-Saxon, indeed, but tempered by a wholesome infusion of other Indo-European blood ; foremost in enterprise and freshness of life, equally far advanced at least in all human culture, above all most thoroughly and vitally charged with the spirit of the one highest, even Christian civilization. Its characteristic principles, in a word, are personal independence, and freedom, and responsibility ; popular sovereignty ; the brotherhood of man ; and subjection to Christ. It is the best representative of the proper Christian civilization. The Chinese, like the Caucasian group of peoples, has ever in its migration moved along over the same belt of latitude, occupying the milder half of the temperate zone, and has never been subject to the deteriorating influences of severe climatic conditions that have so reduced the brown and the black races. Their physical characteristics—stature, figure, facial features—come far nearer to the Caucasian type than the other branches of the human family. Their mental and moral characteristics are also more closely approximated to the higher Indo-European standards. This closer affinity in physical and moral condition makes the mingling of the two races less repulsive and more promising of advantage, while the contrast that still exists is such as to interest more that generous Christian philanthropy which would by the diffusion of its own spirit elevate others to an equal participation in its blessings. The Chinese are, relatively to the American people, wanting in the spirit of personal freedom and independence ; they have not risen to the conception or the desire of that social order which comes from personal elevation and the hearty fraternization of all men, and through those principles from popular sovereignty ; they are the faithful depositaries of that primeval social principle, the patriarchal, and the narrow circuit of the family has never with them enlarged into that of the nation, much less that of the race ; fathers, ancestors, absorb their regard, their reverence, their esteem, their care, not brothers or neighbors, not children ; and their religious faith and practice is cold, and lifeless, or worse, perhaps, as it leaves the religious nature to waste itself in a low, degrading superstition, and gives no quickening impulse to morality. The Chinese mind needs, if it is too religiously dead to crave, the

life and warmth, and saving power of the gospel. These two races, the Caucasian and Mongolian, having had their training from the time of the Dispersion, alike under those favorable climatic conditions which have been so salutary in preventing the degradation that has fallen upon the other races, are now the two leading races in every respect—in spiritual elevation, social condition, in extent and numbers. They, together, number nearly nine-tenths of the human family; they occupy the great part of the temperate zone. They are well represented in their best types by the English-speaking branch of the one, and by the Chinese branch of the other. They are the destined heirs of the middle kingdoms of the American and Asiatic continents. There is here, however, a wide contrast to be taken into our account in approaching the problem before us. The population of China has already well nigh reached its maximum of density. It is writhing under the distresses of repletion. Starvation, pestilence, infanticide, are the prominent terrible symptoms of this diseased condition. It must have relief by depletion. Our own land, on the contrary, is craving occupancy. Its vast unoccupied territory, designed for man, waits and desires his coming. It is capacious enough to receive and comfortably maintain even the hundreds of millions that overcrowded Asia may, in the next century, spare for its relief and for our advantage.

Such are the providential preparatives for the great movement which is now beginning. It is at present to be regarded as a merely germinal movement. Not for what it is, but for what it reasonably promises to be, does it attract our interest and invite our study. Less than two hundred thousand Chinese probably are now in the country. They are almost exclusively in the Pacific States. They are migrating to our shores at the rate of over a thousand a month. One-third return to lay their bones in their ancestral soil, or reëmbark, with family, and kindred, and neighbors, for the new land of hope. The immigrants are nearly all adult males. They come for employment and for gain, with expectation for the most part of returning to enjoy their acquisitions in their native homes. They have been chiefly coolies or laborers, procured in China

by labor brokers, who hire them for a stipulated employment, price, and term, and contract their service thus procured to employers here. These employers know only the brokers, so far as the pay is concerned. The laborer, also, looks only to them for his stipulated wages. They come ignorant and indifferent where their service is to be rendered; careful only to get the remuneration, and to be returned dead or alive to their paternal home. Perhaps one in fifty is thus returned to his family only as a corpse, with the portion of the hire he has lived to earn. Chiefly laborers, and pressed at home with unendurable poverty, they are yet, as we are assured on credible testimony, universally educated, so as to be able to read and write in their own language. As one studies their faces while they sit by fifties or hundreds on the construction platform car of the railroad waiting for the passenger train to pass, one remarks at once a degree of intelligence decidedly above that of like laborers on eastern works. Quiet, patient, docile, courteous, they are yet cheerful and quick to take a joke and show a fondness for inoffensive sport and amusement. With less of muscle, they are lithe, and ready, and persistent, and so are acceptable and profitable as laborers beyond most others. More recently a higher class have joined in the immigration. Merchants of a high order, with large commercial experience and skill, and representing large wealth, have established themselves in the Pacific cities. The Chinese are eminently a commercial people, enterprising, sagacious, and commercially upright. Some of them in San Francisco stand among the foremost in all the qualities that fill out our ideal of an accomplished trader.

The United States law of February 19th, 1862, humanely protects, so far, perhaps, as legislation can, against the atrocities which have characterized the Coolie traffic to Peru, the Chincha Islands, and Cuba. While permitting free, voluntary migration, it prohibits, under heavy penalties, the importation of Chinese laborers without certificate of the free assent of each immigrant given to an American consul. If corruption on the part of the American officer in China can be effectually prevented, it is very questionable whether any further attempt at protection of this kind can be made which will not violate

fundamental principles of personal liberty, and of commercial freedom.*

It is understood that contracts for laborers in large numbers, as for instance it is said five thousand for service in South Carolina, five thousand for Louisiana, have been made and are still in negotiation with prospect of indefinite increase. While our domestic legislation should solicitously protect against any abuses to which this vast system of hired labor may be liable, it is difficult to see how the negotiations for its introduction on a large scale and by professional middle-men offend against morality or philanthropy. As for the treatment to which they shall be subject when here, the same policy and the same means will obviously be required which the condition of the freedmen and of the Indians have demanded.

It is well known that the Chinese have been subjected to outrages in the Pacific States in legislation, in judicial administration, in society, paralleled only by those endured by negroes and Indians in the more Eastern States. But a change for the better is now recognized. The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution has annulled the State legislation which excluded the Chinese from giving testimony; and now "the equal protection of law" is guaranteed to every person of whatever race or color, and no State "can deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" but in violation of this most just, most humane, and most timely ordinance of the national will. The working of the fifteenth amendment when adopted will still further tend to the complete elevation of these oppressed races within our territory to an equal participation in all our civil and political rights and privileges. The influx of men of high social standing, men of intelligence, culture, wealth, is fast turning contempt into respect; and interest too is dictating a more humane and liberal policy. The brutal treatment dealt out to the Chinese heretofore has worked, we think, as a happy providential check to a too rapid immigration. This check re-

* We notice that Senator Williams has introduced a bill into the United States Senate, prohibiting all importations of Chinese under contracts of service. There is danger in such legislation of trespassing on higher principles.

moved, we may assuredly expect that the immigration will be greatly increased. It is difficult indeed to imagine a limit to the extent of this movement. China can easily spare, without disadvantage, tens of millions of its crowded population within the next decade. With assurance of employment and protection, and with provision of means of transportation, such a flood of immigration would be by no means improbable. But the same providential control, which has so conspicuously determined the past in reference to the time and extent of the migration will, beyond a doubt, still shape this movement as to mode and degree to the best results. This fact, however, we do well to set distinctly before our view, that the flood-gates to a well nigh measureless heathen migration are opened upon us. Only the want of facilities of transportation and of means of subsistence can reasonably be expected to check or confine it. It is too late in human history to think of prohibitory legislation; and prevention by social abuse the Christianity of our day will not allow. Of these four or five hundred millions of pinched and famished and uneasy people, is it extravagant to suppose that a number equivalent to a fourth or a tenth of its annual increase should avail themselves of an outlet and a proffered home of abundance? The Chinese, let it be borne in mind, have little notion of nationality, little love of country; they are still in the patriarchal, tribal stage of development. Family ties are the dominant ones. When homes can be established in America to which ancestral remains can be securely gathered, and about which capabilities can be easily acquired for settling the natural family increase, and the characteristic passion and ambition of the Chinese are thus promised fullest gratification, the check to migration will not be from behind. Ships in plenty, means to pay the passage charges, open and inviting domiciles here,—in the want of these must be found the chief or only hindrances. Koopmanschaaps enough will rise up to supply these wants just so fast as the brokerage will pay; just so fast in other words as the demand for labor of the kind and cost which this supply furnishes shall manifest itself in this country. And this brings us to the consideration of the first of these several problems which this epoch in our history is presenting to us,

and which we wish in the conclusion of this Article to suggest, in order that the reflecting and considerate philanthropist and Christian may more intelligently interpret the particular facts bearing on this subject, which the immediate future will from day to day and from month to month reveal to us.

The first of these problems, a fundamental one in some respects, is the *industrial* or *economical problem*. The fitness of the Chinese to meet our industrial wants, the extent of these wants, and the checks against an over-supply—against a pernicious glut in the market—are the three points of leading importance in the solution of this problem.

The Chinese, then, are in general well fitted to meet our present industrial condition. They have been proved to be admirably fitted to the lighter labor of the household,—neat, trustworthy, ready, proverbially economical, careful of their employers' interest as of their own,—in short, the very best class of domestics. They have been proved to be efficient laborers in the heavy work of constructing and repairing railroads, of sinking mines, and clearing forests, equal to any heavy labor that should be put on human shoulders. The construction of the Pacific railroad has shown their superiority here to those of any other nation. In mining too, the patient, economical, persistent Chinaman works out large returns from mines which the unstable, wasteful, impatient white quits in desperate disgust. In agricultural employments, they bring an experience, with their capacity for manual labor, that promises the best results in general tillage, by their economy of manures, and their careful attention to the details of culture as varied by the season, atmospheric changes, and vegetable growth; and in the special production of silk, of tea, and of the smaller fruits. The introduction of Chinese husbandry into our agricultural pursuits can hardly fail of great advantage. In factories, they have been found to be equally desirable, rendering enterprises that were just failing from unproductiveness, profitable and successful. As clerks, also, in all the diversities of commercial and financial industry they have been proved to be accurate, attentive, quick, and faithful.

The existing demands for labor in our country can hardly be over-estimated, even if regarded in the same light in which the all-wise providence of God seems to have viewed this whole matter of the settlement of our western world, that may seem to us so tardy. There are wants that are felt to be immediately pressing; and this felt pressure is the providential monition that the time for supplying it has come. Labor generally on the Pacific coast is enormously high, and out of all proportion to prices in other parts of the country, and especially other parts of the world. Domestic labor in San Francisco receives several times the amount of compensation yielded it in the Atlantic cities. So labor in the field, in mines, or railroads, in factories, is most disproportionately expensive. The fact shows a scarcity; it is a providential call for supply. Then there is a continent to be subdued to man. A belt extending across the entire breadth of our country from North to South for near a thousand miles beyond the still unoccupied lands of the great Missouri valley, remains a sterile wilderness yet to be reclaimed to the occupancy and improvement of man. The Mormon migration, which itself is to be reckoned among the remarkable providences of the times, has shown at once how practicable and how desirable it is that all those now barren plains within the reach of irrigation and with a temperature favorable for vegetation should be entered by the patient, inexpensive, persistent labor of a Chinaman. All along the ranges of mountains that bound on the East and on the West these immense plains reaching from the Mexican to the British possessions, are inexhaustible deposits of the precious and of the baser metals requiring to be taken out and refined for use. These valleys also are to be traversed by railways. Here are three different fields well nigh limitless in extent, now open and calling for cultivation which none but foreign labor can enter and fill. Then there are the lesser fields, yet immense, open to labor from abroad, and clamorously seeking it in our Southern plantations and our Western valleys. The providentially ordained equilibrium of labor is far from being reached; and there must be movement till it is fully established.

What shall check the rushing of the ample supply to meet this vast demand? It is to be found mainly in the providentially-ordained friction incident to every social as to every physical movement. The experience which is derived from the migration to the Indian Archipelago, and also to our own shores, sufficiently demonstrates that this movement must be slow and gradual. Time is necessary to convey the requisite information to the future emigrant, to effect what is necessary for his breaking up and removal, to provide means and facilities of passage, to negotiate places of employment, to prepare fields for labor. There is a friction all along the course checking all impetuous movement. The simple fact that labor of all kinds in California, where, as we should naturally suppose, first supplies must be arrested, is now at a higher price than in the Eastern States, is most significant in regard to the rate of progress which this movement, although in truth at present only germinal, is likely to make. But slowly, and in a steadily increasing ratio, we may reasonably and hopefully expect to see this immense demand for labor supplied from this ample source. The resistance that is here and there presented to this supply is futile as it is narrow-minded and selfish. The abuses heaped on the unprotected stranger, the strikes, incendiarisms, and other outbursts of revenge on employers, have thus far only reacted on the silly perpetrators. In railroad labor, the battle has been fought and apparently ended. In the mines, the strife is still in progress. But the issue is certain. Here and there John Chinaman slips in and quickly does the meaner work—becomes the servant of servants; and the spirit of exclusiveness is appeased in the gratification of the passions of pride and mastery. The wedge once entered, resistance lessens, while the driving force ever increases. Elsewhere capital asserts its independence; it discharges intractable workmen or stops operations to drive them away; overawes by demonstrations of moral or of physical strength; in one way or another works its sure way to the most advantageous modes of promoting its enterprises. The opposition to the influx of human labor is as unreasonable as that to the introduction of labor-saving machinery; while besides it offends against the broadest principles of morality and philanthropy. If the law of our

being is, work in order to eat and so to live; then to rebel from work is to violate that law, and is essentially homicidal. In this country, at the present time, opposition to the introduction of foreign labor is in the worst form of the dog-in-the-manger spirit. It is too brutish to succeed; and is suffered in providence only as a part of that needful friction in moderating the impetuosities incident to all great movements among men.

A second problem which this migration presents to our consideration is *the political problem*. As already indicated, the era of this migration is most providentially ordained to be that of the settlement of those great principles of equality before the law, both civilly and politically, asserted in the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution. It will be most interesting to the reflecting to watch the phases of the application of these principles to each of the three colored races, to which they have a more special reference. That there will be resistance in divers ways in the interest of demagogues and of political partisanship, combined with whatever help can be borrowed from the interests of labor and of irreligion and even of theory and speculation, is to be expected. It will be the imperative duty of every patriot and philanthropist to watch with unceasing vigilance every demonstration of this resistance, to guard against it, and to overcome it to the full protection of those for whose benefit these wise and beneficent ordinances were designed. Let it be met in every form with a wise but prompt and earnest reprobation.

There will obviously be two stages in the working out of this problem. The first is the stage of weakness, when some interest of selfishness, of trade, of labor, of party, or of creed, will seek to overwhelm and crush and enslave. Its cry will be natural inferiority and providential destination to servitude; and ignorance and moral weakness, as well as physical inferiorities, will be pleaded, as also the alleged unfitness for political rights and privileges and the danger from allowing suffrage to such a mass of ignorant foreigners. We have become too familiar with these kinds of clamor to be much intimidated or moved by them. It will suffice here merely to throw out the

suggestion that, although naturalization and citizenship, under the fifteenth amendment, are to be guaranteed alike to all persons, of whatever race or color and in whichever of the States or Territories of the Union, on the same terms and conditions, citizenship comes only by the gradual process of birth and growth under our own institutions, and naturalization only under the safeguards of federal legislation. It is a most suggestive fact to be brought to mind in this connection, that, although by the unrighteous discriminations of California statute law, the Chinaman is taxed oppressively in his mining products so long as he remains not naturalized or forbears to declare his intentions to become naturalized, not an instance is known of an effort to escape the tax in this easy way. There is no danger, then, now imminent, of our political destinies being swayed by a sudden incursion of Chinese voters.

The second stage will be that of power, when, as in our Eastern cities, suffrage that may be clannish can be corruptly bargained for political ends. That this danger is real, although distant, must be confessed. It should keep us vigilant and on the alert. The preventives must be found in the diffusion, so far as practicable, of the foreign element among the proper American communities. The separation into distinct quarters in cities, into distinct villages and districts, is to be deprecated; and the tendencies in this direction are to be arrested or checked. Free labor and employment in all the various departments of our industry will be a great hindrance to this gregarious tendency. Then sympathy, free inter-communication in all the channels of social intercourse, education, religious teaching, are obvious moral protectives against this apprehended evil. It will be the duty of every American citizen to seek to Americanize, as of every servant of Christ to seek to Christianize them.

Let it be remembered, what we have stated before, that the Chinese mind is yet in all its habits of thought, and feeling, and acting, thoroughly imbued with the proper patriarchal or tribal sentiment. It has not yet developed itself into the proper spirit of nationality. It is in this respect ages behind the spirit of the Caucasian race. It will require time to grow up into this stage of human development. It will be slow to

enter into our political movements and to participate in the control and management of our interests as a nation. As already intimated, it has no aspiration in this direction. The enlargement, it is true, may possibly come quickly. With them the prophecy may be fulfilled that nations shall be born in a day. This bursting of the shell, this emergence from the family or tribal condition into that of a full nationality, in whatever way, at whatever speed, by whatever influences, with whatever modifications, will be matter for close study, as of rich instruction. It invites our vigilant and our docile contemplation. The extreme conservatism of the Chinese, their love of antiquity, and their tenacity of the old and traditional, have, with their self-conceit and contempt of other peoples, received a heavy, perhaps fatal blow in the collision of the last thirty years with the West. The Burlingame treaties have ushered China into the family of nations. The spirit of the West has penetrated to the very heart of the empire. Peking has, within the last few weeks, received back to its new Imperial College for Western Literature and Science, a representative of American learning and philanthropy—we refer to Rev. Dr. W. A. P. Martin, a contributor of two Articles on China to the last volume of this journal—with a significant warmth of welcome. The progress towards a proper cosmopolitan sentiment has been marvelous during the last few years, and prepares us for almost any development in the future, however rapid. But we have no sympathy with late British croakings that are foreboding disintegration from the introduction among us of this unwieldy mass of ignorance and barbarism. If it does not assimilate itself to our political institutions, then our politics will not be vitiated by their being within our territory any more than by the importation of so many cattle. If the spirit of family enlarges into the proper feeling of nationality, it will be because their minds have been expanded and liberalized, and so prepared to participate in our political life. There is no central power, as in the Romish priesthood, to unify their political action, and thus make them a serviceable tool of party; and so far, at least, there is less ground of apprehension.

The third problem which offers itself for solution in the study of this migration, is *the moral and religious problem*. What is to be the result, if there are to be poured in upon us, as is possible if not probable, millions of heathens, with their low morality and their idolatrous religion? To answer this question satisfactorily, we must know the character and working of Chinese morality and religion, and must weigh in comparison with it the power of a pure, active Christianity, as the two come in contact. Chinese morality is heathen, and is of a lamentably low degree, as measured by a Christian standard. It is yet high, as compared with that of most heathen peoples. Chinese immorality is not of the coarser, more brutal kind. The Chinese are courteous in manners, peaceable and orderly, patient of injury, and submissive to authority. They are kind in their household life. Even the infanticide that prevails is not from any brutal instincts, but originates only in the driving necessity of want; and the concubinage that is equally prevalent is of the old patriarchal type, rather than of the low harem pattern of the Turk. The sacredness of the proper family life is maintained; and this fountain of personal and social virtue is kept for a heathen community comparatively pure. Filial duty is inculcated with great assiduity, and the fruit is seen in the universal respect shown to parents and superiors, and the care which even the aged and the infirm ever receive. Cupidity is a universal trait. It leads to gambling, which everywhere prevails; it runs, also, into trade, and makes the Chinese an intensely commercial people. Hence their fondness for such pursuits as fishing and mining; and their readiness for any trading adventure. They are superstitious, and especially afraid of evil spirits, against whose machinations they employ all the arts and devices of heathenism. They have but the faintest notion of a supreme God, the old worship of Shangte as the creator of all things having fallen away. Confucius never inculcated any duty to any power higher than that of the head of the family or of the State. Tauism and Buddhism enter into the religion of the Chinese as a people only as by their divers specific teachings they cater to the underlying superstition that is characteristic. The real religion of the Chinese is confined to

the worship of ancestors and heroes and of those spirits or agencies which may bring good or inflict evil. Their morality and their religion alike are grounded not in a love of truth as truth, but in a desire of good or fear of evil. They are not skeptical, for they do not apply reason to matters of religion, even in the way of speculation; they are indifferent as to creeds. They crave good; and what meets this want, even their conservatism will not reject. Buddhism, although imported, they embraced without reluctance.

Such a condition certainly is not forbidding to the introduction of Christian ideas. The family sentiment is a good soil in which to root evangelical theism. The promises of the gospel meet their cravings for good. The revolution of the last quarter century in the feeling towards foreigners, the awakening of a desire for Western learning and Western culture, are auspicious. The success which has attended the efforts to evangelize the Chinese in San Francisco and other Pacific cities, during the last twelve months, is most encouraging. The practical solution of this problem, it would seem, will depend not on any untowardness of the Chinese mind for receiving the gospel, but on the wisdom, the fidelity, and the zeal of American Christianity. Let the inhuman oppression which has characterized some of the legislation of the Pacific States, and the brutal treatment dealt out to the unprotected foreigner by the insolent and rude under the sanction and with the countenance of such legislation, give place to humane and equal laws, and to kind, courteous demeanor on the part of the white population; let the narrow-souled selfishness that would exclude them from our industries and arts be put away; let the tendency to settle in districts by themselves be arrested by this change of treatment; and so make the flood of migration diffuse itself into our families, our factories, our mining camps, meeting everywhere a kind, humane, Christian spirit; let a wise but earnest missionary work be begun and energetically sustained in the form of Sunday Schools, itinerant missionaries, and caste-discarding churches, and we have little to fear. The issue is plainly left to the determination of the practical Christianity of our land and age.

The call to this evangelical labor, we are happy to see, has

been heeded; and already the American Missionary Association, which has received so good a training in its great work for the freedmen, and at the same time such rich encouragement, has adopted this field of Christian effort, with a determined purpose. The American Home Missionary Society, also, has assumed a promising work in the same direction. Let these and all similar efforts be seconded by a steady Christian support, and we need not fear to have our eyes shocked by Joss temples or idolatrous rites in our free but, we trust, ever to remain predominantly Christian land.

The fourth problem brought to us by this migration, in its peculiar character and promise, is *the ethnological problem*. Ethnology as a science can have no valid and sufficient basis except in the principle of the common origin and destiny of mankind. It must found itself on a singleness of nature; and its races, whether three or four or five or eleven or sixty, must be varieties, not species. Neither color nor size of skull nor facial angle nor habitation nor condition nor language, nor any or all combined, are sufficient to justify generic or specific difference. Of one blood, of one paternity, even divine, the breath of God in body of clay being the one characteristic, men are for one—even for God of whom man is. His destiny as a race is to become God-like. The ultimate unification of the race can be only in universal conformity to the one highest standard of human perfection in character and in condition. This ideal of character we assume to be that given us in Christ—the son of God, the son of man; and this ideal of condition is the subjection of nature to the uses of man; the true brotherhood of the race realized in domestic affection, in social sympathy and beneficence, in political equality and freedom, in cosmopolitan liberality and courtesy; and, the crown and seal of all, the reciprocated love of God in Christ—devotion to Him in service, trust, and love, with the fullness of His favor streaming back into all the currents of experience, gladdening and perfecting all. This, we maintain, must be the introduction and the conclusion in any valid exposition of ethnological science—one origin, one nature, one destiny for man, as the offspring of God and the redeemed of Christ.

And the body of the science must necessarily be the condition of the races, in their dispersion; their departure in individuals or varieties from the primitive type; the modifications in condition and destiny through personal freedom or determining influences of society or of situation; the stages of progress, also, in the redemptive recovery and restoration to the primitive blessedness of perfect communion and fellowship with God.

We have recognized the Chinese immigration as marking an epoch in human history. The period of the dispersion and the attendant confusion of tongues has now ended. The providential ends of that dispersion and confusion have been attained. The human race has diversified itself to the utmost limits allowed by its essential nature and the earthly condition to which it is subject. One step lower in deterioration than the Hottentot and Esquimaux would take it out of the realm of humanity into the brutal. The redemptive power of the gospel can now reveal itself in its work on the most widely-diversified character and condition possible or conceivable. It can prove its power to "save to the uttermost;" to "gather into one all things in Christ."

The earth has been compassed, and its remotest bounds have been touched by the scattering tribes and families of man. The period of the scattering has passed. The era of reunion is signalized in the landing on our Western shores of the great eastward migration. It symbolizes the moral reunion of the one human family. The characters of providential design and ordering are so manifold, so clear and significant, that we cannot hesitate in our conclusion. The world of man begins its return homeward from its long scattering; and the voice of prophecy sent up from all the developments of passing history is that Jesus, who died for this end, is now, in a sense new and emphatic, "gathering together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad." The most marvelous workings of divine providence in preparing our own land and nation, as already referred to, and also in preparing the Chinese people for this era during the last half century, and especially the last quarter-century, can have but one interpretation. China, already in its very birth-progress into a

true nationality, is waiting and ready for the higher, broader spiritual regeneration. The gospel has now free course into all her broad territories; it is glorified in the conversion of the individual immigrant to its saving truth. The convert turns missionary. Aheong carries back over the waters, pacific in a new sense, to his countrymen the saving creed he himself has received; and among the effective missionaries of the gospel to China are doubtless those to be prominent who have embraced the faith in their wanderings on our shores. The immigrant, so far as received with Christian kindness, yields to the Christianizing influences to which he is here introduced. The testimony is: "they are gradually, with an unmistakable progress, leaving the dress, language, food, and paganism of China, and adopting [those that are] American and Christian." The hopes of the general evangelization of the Chinese empire are strengthened by the clear effects of this immigration. And China evangelized, the grand consummation will seem to be at hand. Three-fifths of the whole race will then represent the spread of Christianity. The hundred millions of India are already reached by Christian influences. The few comparatively scattered among the islands have also received the gospel. Africa, hardly explored, waits for the divine law. But the grand fact now appears that, with the evangelization of China is accomplished the general enlightenment of the great part of the race.

The physical fusion of the races, the amalgamation of the several varieties of the human family is a part of this ethnological problem the solution of which it may be wise to leave to the future. The moral and religious harmony does not necessarily involve such a fusion of blood and family. What time may effect under the mollifying, humanizing influences of an enlightened Christianity in wearing down differences that now repel such unions, in assimilating complexion, feature, and general physical structure as well as moral habits, tastes, and pursuits, and so unifying the varieties of the race into one indistinguishable species, we need not trouble ourselves with attempts to divine. It is enough to know that caste and Christianity are utterly irreconcilable; that, as the latter prevails, the former disappears. The remotest shades

of color will, in the diversifications of individuals, of families, of neighborhoods, soften and blend, and the lines of race-distinction, now so marked, will fade out and disappear.

Nor does the ultimate harmony of the races at all necessarily imply that again, as of old, all the world shall be "of one lip." The highest ideal of a perfected humanity is a richly-diversified unity; manifold individual and specific differences harmonized in a common Christianized manhood. A monotony of language and of literature, as of art and pursuit, is neither desirable nor, under the diverse allotments of providence and the diverse gifts of grace, attainable. But an intercommunication by speech which can be reached at the cost of that exertion which is itself helpful or even necessary to development, may reasonably be looked for. And in this connection should be noted the important fact that the English and the Chinese, while they are by far the most extensively spoken of all the dialects among men, are wonderfully approximated to each other. Of all inflected languages, the English is most monosyllabic, and at the same time most assimilative of foreign elements; to its character in this respect the monosyllabism of the Chinese has made a significant advance in its free admission of its so-called dissyllabic "clam-shell" formations. What is more, perhaps, both languages observe, to an uncommon degree, the logical order in the structure of the sentence; and also admit most freely the use of form-words to denote the different relations of thought. We recognize accordingly a linguistic harmony which evinces the races to be of one common nature, and in the wide contrast that appears in the different vocal symbols chosen to denote the objects of thought, only the specialization which is incident to all development. The parent of all speech, thought to be communicated, is the same in both in its characteristic form, as to its essential nature, as are also the governing principles of its expression. "Pigeon English" may be the immature fruit of the first mingling of dialect; but the ultimate result can hardly be other than the enriching of both languages and of both literatures. They are both too fixed in character and too widely diffused in extent to admit essential corruption by adopting elements that cannot be assimilated.

Nor yet does this final harmonizing of the races involve necessarily a uniformity in the organization of political society throughout the nations; nor in social institutions and manners. This would be a result incompatible with the manifold diversification which the long scattering has occasioned. The general harmony of this diverse, excluding conceit, contempt, and hate between the nations, with the practical recognition of the noble sentiment of Humboldt, that "none are in themselves nobler than others," will be only the richer by reason of the manifold peculiarities of pursuit, and custom, of government, and laws.

This, then, we regard as the ethnological significance and interest attached to this migration. The human family, at first, one in its origin, one in social organization—the patriarchal—one in language, with the utmost simplicity in pursuits; then, under the wise orderings of Providence, broken and scattered to different abodes with consequent diversities of tongue, yet ever in families to preserve ever the evidence of their oneness in origin, in order that our nature might cover all the habitable parts of the earth and have fit opportunity for the largest, richest diversification; now, at last, in this our day, the scattering and the diversification having reached their limits, begins the great harmonizing of these diversified developments which, when consummated, the race will have fulfilled the destiny assigned it. These are the three distinguishable stages of all vital progress and development: first, the primeval simplicity; secondly, the richest possible diversification; and thirdly, the harmonizing of this diverse into the primitive oneness, not now simple, but rich in all the developed capabilities of the one nature.

The grand import and significance of this migration is, that it marks the epoch of this last stage of human progress. On our shores, in our days, this change from the diversifying to the harmonizing, begins; verily, "on us the ends of the worlds (dispensations) have met." Harmonizing is thus to be the law of the coming ages. Institutions, laws, customs, arts, sciences, languages, henceforth must bow to the sway of this principle, and be characterized by it.

Slowly, almost imperceptibly to the superficial study, will the change be, even as the development of the bud into flower and subsequent fruit. But the time has come for the fruit-formation. The time and season of the ripening, it is not ours to know. But to enter heartily, intelligently, with a docile, obedient spirit, into this consummation of providence and of grace, is our high lot and privilege.

ARTICLE II.—THE LIFE OF A JESUIT FATHER OF
OUR OWN DAY—FATHER DE RAVIGNAN.

The Life of Father de Ravignan, of the Society of Jesus.
By FATHER DE PONLEVOT, of the same Society. Translated
at St. Benno's College, North Wales. New York: The
Catholic Publication Society, 126 Nassau Street, 1869.

IN the new and independent aspect which the French Roman Catholic Church has of late assumed, our attention has been drawn to the life of one of those three great Catholic preachers who in these last years have made the pulpit of Notre Dame in Paris so illustrious. We have read this biography with great interest, although in some respects it is unsatisfactory. While drawn out quite fully in detail, it still has an appearance of unreality, like many other Roman Catholic, and, as to that, Protestant, religious biographies. We are permitted to see much, but not all; and that which we are not allowed to see is what contains the gist of the matter. The book professes to give an account of "the principles of conduct and maxims of perfection" which governed the life and formed the character of this eminent Jesuit preacher; and, as to that character, judging from the book itself (and we do not have at hand other means of judgment) it was assuredly one of concentrated power, lofty aim, and extraordinary, though austere, piety.

Gustave Xavier de Ravignan was born in Bayonne, France, Dec. 1, 1795, of noble race. Some of his ancestors in the time of Henry IV. were Protestants. His childhood was one of precocious intelligence and gravity. His academic life was passed in Paris; and though he was inclined to a diplomatic career, he finally took up the study of jurisprudence as a profession. While pursuing his studies, news came of the landing of Napoleon on the coast of Provence, and he enlisted at once in the royal volunteers. He received the appointment of lieutenant of cavalry, and participated in one engagement,

where he behaved bravely, but his military career was brief; he returned to the peaceful pursuits of his vocation, and was made counselor of the Royal Court of Paris. While pursuing his professional studies, he was a devout Catholic, and belonged to a society of young men who met to pray under the auspices of the Virgin Mary. One day, while in company, the Roman Catholic religious orders were attacked, and especially the Jesuits. Young de Ravignan immediately took up the argument for them, and exclaimed, "I mean to be a Jesuit myself some day."

This intention he very soon carried into execution. He had, in the mean time, received the important appointment of Deputy Procureur du Roi, and the most brilliant prospects opened before him of rising rapidly to the highest ranks of the magistracy, when suddenly, in the year 1822, he entered the Seminary of Saint Sulpice, at Issy, to prepare himself for the career of a religious. His mother and family were filled with distress at this entire change in all his reasonable and high worldly prospects, but their almost passionate letters and entreaties could not alter his resolution. The letter of M. Bellart, the Procureur Général, to his young deputy before he had taken the irrevocable vows, is worthy of perusal, and contains some truths put in a strong, sensible, and impressive way. We should like to quote the whole of this excellent letter. He says: "You are taking a serious step, one which will impose upon you the most difficult duties, much privation beyond the power of man to endure, to all which you must make up your mind to bow your neck to-day, to-morrow, for years, forever, your whole life through, without murmurs, and above all without regrets. I can understand courage—great courage—kept up for a certain time; but there is something terrible in an engagement to renounce all to which nature most strongly calls us. In a moment of fervor, of enthusiasm, our imagination sometimes represents to us as permanently as possible, something which we are enabled to do only by virtue of a present grace, and of a strong determination which has not yet had time to evaporate. But if the grace leave you, if the determination prove no longer strong enough for the struggle—if it turn out, after prolonged endurance, that no

good has been done by the lengthened sacrifice of all the affections which are intended to be ornaments of the career of a good man who lives a Christian life, and of all the inclinations created and placed in us by God, who has given them to man on the sole condition of yielding to them no more than His holy laws allow! What if after this long endurance the result is nothing but a fall, with risk of the salvation of the soul! Consider, my dear Ravignan, how disastrous would be such an end, and reflect well while it is yet in your power."

The Seminary life at Issy was, however, but an outer vestibule to the noviciate. "The Abbé de Ravignan aimed at complete self-renouncement; he had withdrawn from the world and consecrated himself to God, and his heart still cried with St. Francis Xavier, *amplius, amplius*, more, O Lord! yet more!" He wrote of his new vocation: "I had some prejudices against the society of Jesus. Pascal, and the traditions of the Parliaments, deceived me and many others; and I must confess that the truth about the Jesuits came upon me in some sort against my will. I have no need to recount in this place by what path it pleased divine Providence to lead me forward, nor what interior struggle I went through in my conscience, a struggle known to God alone."—"I was led to the determination to become a Jesuit by the very points which are most misunderstood, most distorted, and most attacked in the Institute of the Society."

He entered the Jesuit noviciate at Montrouge, using these words in presenting himself to the Superior: "I am a poor man come to ask your hospitality. I have nothing but myself to offer; be good enough to receive me for charity." He had already in his zeal taken the four famous vows of the Jesuit order before the canonical time—viz: those of poverty, chastity, obedience, and entire submission to the will of the Pope, to do and go as he may command. "He made haste to go down into the mystic tomb where, as St. Paul expresses it, one must put off the old man to put on the new. He disappeared as though dead; and for ten years the world saw him no more, heard not his name, spoke not of him."

We cannot follow him through all that decade of religious incarceration, where by deeper and deeper steps into that living tomb, he was to become in truth, in Jesuit phrase, *perinde cadaver* to the world and human joys and affections. During his Novitiate of two years, and his Scholasticate of four years, his attention to the strictest rules of his order were almost unexampled; he forgot nothing and omitted nothing, and allowed no weakness of body to deter him from any act which he held to be his duty. He gained for himself the sobriquet of "*Iron bar*." He looked upon the religious life as a conflict, in which he unceasingly fought against himself, and judged that a bold beginning ensured a more complete victory. He submitted to all the enjoined austerities to complete this breaking down of his nature, and a terrible iron-shirt is mentioned which marked the sacred signs on the living flesh in characters of blood. His biographer says:—"He understood the regulation of the flesh in the gospel sense; he reduced his body to servitude in order to set his spirit free; and he suffered martyrdom that he might continue to be an Angel, and might become an Apostle." After having spent six years in preparation, two in practical spiritual exercises, and four in the study of the sciences, he was ordained to the priesthood in 1828, and went to the Professed House in Paris, where he continued four years longer, chiefly in the practice of the severe duties and spiritual requirements of his House, now and then preaching to other religious communities, teaching in theology and sacred rhetoric. The last year of his probation was one of redoubled austerity and attention to religious exercises, making the *Exercitia Spiritualia* of St. Ignatius his almost sole companion—his Bible in fact. He said to his students:—"The Book of the Exercises is the spiritual arsenal where you will find the heavenly arms which have been prepared for you. It is a present bestowed by God on the society." He said, again, speaking of St. Ignatius Loyola:—"O my blessed Father! wise is thy work and enticing, great and of much profit; the Spirit of God inspired thee. Happy is he that loves and relishes this Book with which heaven inspired our father. He will find there an unfailing spring of consolation, a prolific source of good, a remedy of all evils, be they

the greatest to which the soul of a religious is exposed." His biographer also remarks:—"He received from on high a marked grace, the gift of understanding the Book of Exercises. From this time, that book became his manual, and served him instead of a whole library. He was filled with it; and we may express his view and our own, by saying that he was the Son of the Exercises, for by means of them he formed himself, and by means of them he accomplished all his other works."

At the age of forty he appeared for the first time in a pulpit of importance, that of Amiens. In like manner it is said that Bourdaloue entered the Society at sixteen, and first appeared in the pulpit at thirty-six. The Jesuit system aims at quality rather than quantity; it looks to thoroughness of preparation, on the principle that the well-fitted instrument will do more execution in a short time, than a poor instrument in ever so long a time. The motto of the founder of the Jesuit order was "Whatsoever we do for the glory God and the good of souls, must be done not in a slovenly manner, but in the most perfect manner."

But he was soon called to a more conspicuous field. The eloquent Lacordaire had established and rendered celebrated the so-called "Conferences" at Notre Dame; and when his fiery career was ended, the man chosen to succeed him and carry on his work of periodical preaching at Notre Dame, was F. de Ravignan. This fact itself testifies to the extraordinary ability of the Jesuit father as a pulpit orator. His eloquence, however, was of a different kind from that of his brilliant Dominican predecessor, as it was from that of the glowing Carmelite, Father Hyacinthe, who succeeded him. His power consisted in a forgetfulness of himself, an impassibility, a plain masculine logic. There was a lack of the poetic element. He chose the road that expressed the thought and nothing more. His style was a little rough, and wanting in polish; but there was constant advance; he mastered audiences by the majesty of his thought and his intellectual force. There was at first a cadence and slowness of utterance in his speaking, but when he became fully roused he shot forth each word like an arrow, and his whole soul seemed to dart forth with it. He had at times great and vehement energy, which produced

the more effect from its contrast to his usually calm style. His attitude was noble and modest, his forehead high and as it seemed, glowing; his eye bright with something of a heavenly look; and much is said of the impressiveness of his first appearance in the pulpit; his silent, recollected posture, and his sign of the cross before beginning. Immense audiences of three and four thousand, principally composed of men, were invariably attracted by his bold, argumentative, and forensic oratory, which addressed the intellect, and aimed at practical results. His weight and holiness of character added to the effect.

Father de Ravignan's own ideas upon sacred oratory and preaching, a short summary of which is given in the work, are of exceeding interest to students and preachers. In theological education he did not insist so much upon extent of erudition as upon depth of knowledge. He aimed to produce effective preachers rather than learned scholars. "What is pulpit eloquence?" he asked; "It is the power of spoken words to draw souls to their Creator." He counseled his pupils to be on their guard against metaphysical preaching, which is a shoal full of peril to one first leaving the schools. He insisted upon clearness as the first condition in every discourse. "We must have some coloring," he said; "but not every one is at will a painter. Here again St. Paul is our master. What images there are in his epistles! Our Lord speaks by images: in his discourses the deepest thoughts come clothed in sensible forms, the language becomes popular without ceasing to be noble." He advocated the French mode of memoriter preaching—of a true kind however. "He quoted the saying of Demosthenes, placing all the force of speech in action, and another of Massillon: "my best sermon is the one I know best;" and he drew from this conclusion that we ought to know some sermons by heart, and added: "I know very well the trouble of learning by heart; but the more trouble the better—trouble is just what we ought to have. This wretched fear of taking trouble it is that does all the harm. Would you like me tell you something of the truth of which I am deeply convinced? Sloth is what chiefly palsies talent and hinders success. I remember a very sensible remark made

to me by a speaker of experience: he said that we must let a speech rot—yes, *rot* in the memory. Beware of losing the power of learning by heart; nothing can supply the want.” He said to young preachers:—“Give yourselves full scope; the more you give way the more you will draw others with you; if you yourselves have motion, you will set the others on the swing.”

His brilliant and arousing “Conferences” were followed by quiet “Retreats,” in which all who were awakened and interested withdrew with him to a retired place, to receive guidance and direction in religious things, or to enter upon the regular course prescribed in the Book of Spiritual Exercises. Many conversions are said to have followed his efforts—as far as we can learn principally conversions of Protestants to Roman Catholicism—some thirty or forty of these every year during the ten years of his public preaching.

But we will not follow further step by step the career of this distinguished Jesuit father and preacher. Issuing periodically from his solitary retreat to thunder in the throne of Notre Dame with his serious and lofty eloquence; now and then mingling in the agitating questions of the day as the astute champion of the Jesuit order; holding interviews with kings, with the present emperor of France, and with the chief men of the state, numbering among his converts Marshal de St. Arnaud, and other noted men, as well as hundreds of “schismatics and heretics,” brought back to the Catholic unity; devoted above all to severe spiritual exercises, studies, and contemplations; this faithful servant of the Church, of Mary, and of the society of Jesus, found rest from his labors, having hastened his death by self-exposure in his efforts to bring a poor Protestant woman into the fold of the Catholic Church. He died in the triumph of the Catholic faith on the 26th of Feb. 1857, and was buried from Notre Dame with extraordinary honors, Mgr. Dupanloup, the Bishop of Orleans, pronouncing a most affecting and eloquent discourse upon his memory. We have room to quote but a sentence or two toward the close of this oration. “Weep not, then, for him. He is living, and soon we shall see him again; yes, we shall again see the bright, deep, pure glance of his eye; we shall again see his calm and

noble forehead. I saw him not many days since; he was already wrapped in the arms of death, and rays of glory seemed to shine forth from the pale forehead; the brightness of immortality glowed from the depths of those eyes which seemed to lose their lustre; behind them I saw the splendor of the glory of heaven You will once more hear his frank, generous, firm, and tender voice. You will see him open those lips, so full of love, which have so often pronounced over you the words of pardon. You will again meet, and will understand better than here below, that great heart which beat strong and generous in his feeble breast; which broke it before the time; that heart which lives, and which by my mouth says to you, I live; *Ego vivo*; and you, my friends, my children, you too shall live, if you will. I live! *Ego vivo, et vos vivetis*. The life I lead is no longer the life of death and misery, which is no true life; I live a life in grace and justice; and, if you will, you shall one day live these with me.' *Ego vivo, et vos vivetis*."

When a self-sacrificing and holy man lives and dies, let him be called by any name, even one it may be of obloquy, and we claim the privilege of sharing with others in rendering him honor. If he preached Christ in far other methods than those we hold to be true, we will rejoice in so far as he has preached Christ to sinful men. There are such characters, the products of peculiar religious periods, from all along through the early ages of the church, and through the mediæval ages, whom we revere as righteous servants and preachers of Christ, who, nevertheless, preached an exaggerated Christianity, under even gross forms of superstition and error. The soul that is consecrated to Christ and holiness is the rare treasure, wherever found. In the sermons of Augustine himself, how much there is of the mystical, the falsely philosophical, and at times the frivolous in thought and meaning, mingled with profound and sublime ideas! These men, really rooted in the love of Christ, pushed through all the corruptions of their times, and their oftentimes highly falsified systems of Christianity, into the clear atmosphere of the universal love of God and man. They were true disciples of Christ, partakers of his sufferings on earth, and partakers also of his resurrection and triumph.

In spite of their dead and false systems they took hold of the living God.

We may thus be allowed to add a humble tribute of praise and admiration to the lofty character and self-sacrificing piety of Father de Ravignan, without so much honoring the system which is said to have produced him. Though it may be an injustice, we cannot help separating him from much of that elaborate and peculiar mode of religious culture which belongs to the society of Jesus, and giving the credit of his good and great qualities rather to Jesus himself who wrought in him. We have heard it even reported from high authority, that Father de Ravignan revolved at one time the question whether he should seek a dispensation to leave the society. We give it only as a report. And we bring no railing accusation against that world-renowned and powerful society itself, which checked and drove back the Reformation, and has proved ever since the strongest support of the Papal church. It has its bright and dark sides. As far as the biography itself reveals to us anything of the outward or inward life of Father de Ravignan, it is that of a devoted servant of the society, of a Jesuit of the Jesuits. He said—"The Church of God, and my mother the Society, hold a large place in my mind and heart." He was a superior of the Jesuit Professed House in Rue de Sévres in Paris, and he thoroughly identified himself with the history of that body; and, as its chosen champion in France, he composed, with his usual force of reasoning, a defense of "The Existence and Institute of the Jesuits." He is represented as clinging to Ignatius, as seeing him in vision, and holding spiritual communion with him of a mysterious nature.

We have, therefore, to accept Father de Ravignan, thus set before us, as an example of what the Jesuit system of training, on its own showing, can produce in this modern age of Christianity. We are thus enabled to note the profound influence and the far-reaching sagacity of that system of training. We have the impression, whether it be true or false, that the book is quite unique in its ample revelation of the more interior workings of that complicated and hitherto jealously hidden system—it is so at all events to us, and that forms its

chief interest. It is an apology for Jesuitism of the strongest kind, viz: the life of a powerful and good man. Be it so. We accept it as such, and are thankful for what it has taught us, while we are still unsatisfied, and unconvinced of the claims of a system which operates in a manner in which it confessedly does. We see, however, the sagacity of a system which chooses an instrument with consummate knowledge, and shapes it with exquisite skill. If the instrument is not consumed in its fires and broken in its welding, it will come forth a strong, sharp instrument. If the instrument is a good instrument, and one chosen by the Spirit of God, it will not be destroyed, perhaps not seriously injured, by a wrong system of training, and may draw good from it. But, the question is, can a human system, which, in exceptional cases, does not materially damage an immortal nature stronger than itself, but which, by its own showing, is, in many important respects, opposed to the inspired system of training in the spiritual life, be defended?

The New Testament of our Lord Jesus Christ, we confess it with no disdainful feeling toward a society which numbers so many saints, missionaries, and martyrs, seems to us like the blessed sunshine compared to the cavernous gloom revealed in this book and in this life. The terrible system of self-inspection, accompanied by the austerities of an ascetic and monastic age, is not, and cannot be, we believe, the gospel way of spiritual perfection. We have spoken of Father de Ravignan's devotion to the Book of Exercises of St. Ignatius. It is said, "he had but one book with him during his retreats. He could not even understand how a Jesuit could need anything more, except, perhaps, the New Testament and the Imitation of Christ." Now, what is this Book of Exercises? It is a book which lays claims to inspiration, and which forms the only door into the Society of Jesus. Its disciples assert, that by an implicit obedience to its precepts, conversion from sin to holiness in a few weeks, or, in some cases, days, is absolutely secured. It is a book of dry directions, of military rules, with little of scriptural language and thought, or even of devotional matter; by the following of whose prescriptions with an unreasoning fidelity, and under the supervision of a skilled

director, the imagination is turned on a few objects, and those the most terrible; the thoughts are forced into one narrow channel; the senses are repressed, as it were extinguished; the most interior operations of the mind are inspected and annotated; the gradual recurrence of wrong desires is reduced day by day to a mathematical point, till one after another the evil inclinations of the mind are abolished, and the man becomes holy and perfect. By his own efforts, with the help of the book, or in obedience to it, the man does this work. It is a perfect self-immolation. It is the deliberate suicide of every natural desire and affection, and a literal death to the interests of the common life of humanity. We see the noble De Ravignan disregarding and cutting himself suddenly off from his widowed mother, his brothers and his relatives, sequestering himself for ten years, and then emerging from his solitude after his mother had died, a man of iron will, of impenetrable mind, a religious without apparently an earthly tie, another man from the warm-hearted youth who entered the seminary, his mind fixed on the one idea, or *eidolon*, of serving the society and converting men to the true church. He is, it is true, less a man of the cloister than at first, and mingles more frequently with men and the powerful of the earth, but still his heart is "in his beloved cell." The bold-minded thinker, who dared even to be influenced for a while by the sophisms of Pascal, has become a machine, submitting his free-will to a system, doing nothing spontaneously, reducing his life to one word—*obedience*. We yield him all that is said of him; we give our warm admiration to the heroic devotion and self-abnegating purity of his character; but we ask again, is the process which is said to have made him what he was, a process in harmony with nature, reason, and true Christianity? Is it not one, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, calculated to produce a fictitious piety?

God has placed us on this earth to serve him in the way he has already indicated in the constitution of our natures, and with just those powers and susceptibilities with which he originally endowed us. We are to be true subjects of his governments, loyal in every part; we are to be also the loving and joyful children of his will. We have but one master of our

souls, and that is the Creator and Redeemer of our spirits ; by serving him and not a human legislator of souls, we come into spiritual freedom. We are not to be taken out of the world, but to be kept, and to keep ourselves, from its evil. In the using and developing of all the powers, and affections, and desires of our being—regulating, educating, purifying, strengthening them, and not repressing or killing them—we are to best serve and glorify him who made us in his image. True religion is the very germ in us of this purified nature. The nature we have, cleansed of its corruptions, is to be made like the human nature of Christ—the perfect man. The old Procureur du Roi, we believe, reasoned well. A man, even an apostle, has duties to his parents, his brethren, the State, and the world, which he cannot repudiate at will. The Saviour did not do so with the vast, spiritual responsibilities pressing upon him. He was seen at the market-place and the gatherings of the people. He went into their houses ; he feasted with the publican and sinner ; he loved to sit down with the Bethany household ; he wept with the sisters of Lazarus ; he yearned for human sympathy ; he commended his mother to the care of the beloved disciple amid the sombre shadows of the cross ; he was rooted in the common human heart ; he was swayed by “ the enthusiasm of humanity.”

It may be replied by the Roman Catholic, that all men are not called upon to attain the same degree of spiritual perfection ; that some are to aim at extraordinary holiness, and to be set apart, in order that they may be “ apostles ” to their fellow-men. But did Christ make such a distinction as this in the requirements of human piety ? Is one Christian called upon to be holier than another Christian ? And how did Christ himself train his apostles ? He did not send them into the caves of Engaddi or tombs of Gadara, to spend ten years in spiritual exercises and contemplations, but he commanded them to go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature ; and he would be ever with them by his Spirit to help and guide. At the moment of the apostle Paul’s conversion, he asked : “ What wilt thou have me to do ? ” and his work was immediately assigned him. They were not to be enlightened by inspecting their own darkness, but by the

illuminating influences of the Holy Spirit ; they were not to be holy by efforts to rid themselves of their sins, but by following Christ, by doing his words, by walking in his spirit, by giving themselves up to the power of his heavenly love ; by gazing upon his perfection until they grew into the same pure and heavenly image. They were to look out of themselves, not into themselves.

The different and almost opposite methods of training Roman Catholic and Protestant ministers, and the lives and influence, social, moral, and spiritual, of these, in the communities where they live and in the world, are fairly brought before our notice and judgment in a book like this, which sets before us one of the best examples, we presume, which the Romish system could offer us. The education of candidates for the ministry, in our Theological Seminaries, is to be compared with the same training in the Retreats and Noviciates of the Jesuit Fraternity ; and we are not sure but that some most valuable hints, especially in the eminent attention bestowed upon spiritual culture as the chief thing, might not be gained in studying the Jesuit system. The life of a good Protestant minister, going among his people constantly and freely, mingling with the world of men, now and then, perhaps, drawn even into a political discussion, distinguished by no peculiar badge or dress from his fellow-citizens, living very much as other men do—this life is to be measured and weighed with that of the Jesuit Father or Priest, issuing periodically from his solitary cell to preach and administer the offices, to appear and disappear like an angel on a mount, rather than a man on the earth ; and we are also to measure the actual results, the *fruits* of the two systems—of the life of Father de Ravignan, and, let us say, the life of Dr. Chalmers—for both were men of superior, though perhaps unequal power, and both, we believe, were influenced by the motive of doing the most good and of glorifying God. Let the two systems, then, be judged by their fruits. They are now fairly on trial in this country ; for here, as elsewhere, the Jesuit is the educating and controlling mind in the Roman Catholic Church. Which of the two systems is most in consonance with our free institutions ? Which of them most truly agrees with the spirit of

the present age of the world, and the advance of Christian truth? Which of them, above all, is most in harmony with the gospel of Christ?

We have not attempted to investigate or discuss the history and position of Father de Ravignan, in reference to the different parties represented in the Roman Catholic Church at this most interesting crisis of its affairs. From all we learn, he was an Ultramontanist, in close union with his order as giving implicit submission to the decisions of his church, in upholding the infallible authority of the Holy Father, in accepting the Papal dogma of the Immaculate Conception, in holding strongly to the worship and mediatorship of the Virgin Mary, as the peculiar refuge and divinity of the Society of Jesus. We should be led to suppose from some of the opinions which he expresses, and the positions he assumed, that he had very little sympathy with Gallicanism, or the present Liberal Catholic party in France.

We would, however, heartily recommend this work, upon which we have briefly commented in no carping and uncharitable spirit, but with real interest and desire to come at the truth, to the reading of theological students and ministers of the gospel, as a book from which they may highly profit and learn much.

ARTICLE III.—FATHER HYACINTHE.

Discourses on various occasions by the Reverend Father HYACINTHE, late Superior of the Barefooted Carmelites of Paris, and Preacher of the Conferences of Notre Dame. *Translated* by LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON, Pastor of a Church of Christ, in Brooklyn, N. Y. With a Biographical Sketch. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son. 1869. 12mo. pp. xliv., 198.

It is not a very long time since the American public first heard of the grand sensation which a new preacher had begun to make in Paris. Afterwards the name of "Father Hyacinthe" was reported occasionally by returning travelers, or by Paris correspondents of the newspapers. He was the successor of Lacordaire and Ravignan in the pulpit of Notre Dame; and the fame of his eloquence was a new honor to the Church which boasts of Massillon and Bourdaloue, and to the language of Fenelon. Hardly anything more was known of him on this side of the Atlantic, till his speech before a Peace Society in Paris, on the 10th of July last, awakened throughout the civilized world a new interest in the man and in his destiny. The consequences of that speech have made him still more conspicuous; and when the telegraph announced his sudden embarkation for a visit to the United States, there could not but be a demand for some translated specimens of his preaching. In answer to that demand the volume before us has been given to the American public.

Unfortunately for the compiler and translator, Father Hyacinthe is not an author, but only an orator—not a writer of sermons to be read, but only a preacher. Reports of his discourses—sometimes revised by him—have been published in French journals, especially in the monthly *Revue Correspondant*, but we believe that no collection of the great preacher's sermons has been published in his native country. Consequently, the translator of this volume is under the

necessity of saying in his preface, "The only principle of selection and arrangement has been to take all the published works of Father Hyacinthe which I could find, in the order in which they came to hand, and bring them out in one volume, while waiting for an arrival from Paris for the materials of another."

This little volume, therefore contains,

1. A compendious but authentic biography of Father Hyacinthe (Rev. Charles Loyson), terminating with his letter to the General of his order, Sep. 20, 1869.
2. His Speech before the Peace League at Paris, July 10, 1869.
3. The Notre Dame Lectures (or "Conferences") Advent, 1867.
4. A Sermon preached to an American lady (a member of the Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, N. Y.) on the occasion of her public renunciation of Protestantism, and first communion in the Roman Catholic Church, July 14, 1868.
5. A Charity Sermon for the sufferers by the South American earthquake, preached at the church of La Madeleine, Paris, March 11, 1869.
6. An Appendix, entitled "Men and Parties in the Catholic Church in France," translated from an article by Dr. De Pressensé in the Paris "Revue Chretienne" for September and October, 1869;—an article in which "the foremost man of French Protestantism" illustrates the position and relations of the last great preacher in the pulpit of Notre Dame.

The compiler and translator of the work before us is not unknown to the readers of the New Englander. Remembering his relation to this journal, we do not write to commend his performance. His task of compilation was very simple, merely to collect such of Father Hyacinthe's discourses as were within his reach. Whether the work of translation is well done or ill done, let others judge. It is for us to say no more than that one who, having a competent knowledge of French, is accustomed to use the English language in public discourse, and especially in preaching, ought to be censured if his translation of such sermons as these is not spirited as well as faithful. Our concern in this Article is with the orator and not with the translator. We purpose nothing more than to show, chiefly from the work on our table, who and what the man is whose protest—though he refuses to be called a Protestant—rings like the strokes of the hammer with which Luther nailed those memorable theses to the door of the church in Wittenberg.

Those who were old enough to take notice of public events at the time of the last vacancy in the succession from Numa

Pompilius, have not forgotten what a sensation was produced by the accession of Pius IX. to the Roman pontificate, and what a movement followed. It was understood that the new Pope was not only kind in his feelings and gentle in his manners, but liberal in his views of government. His first official acts were testimonies of his clemency and good-nature, conciliating the favor of his subjects, and were followed by measures that testified his desire to reform abuses both in his secular government and in the government of the Church. A liberal Pope,—a reforming Pope,—the manifest fact startled all Europe; and Pius IX. was for a time the most popular man in Italy, nay in Christendom. France, and especially Paris, shared as much as Italy itself in the strange excitement; for among the French clergy there had long been a party of thinkers dissatisfied with the conflict between Rome and the nineteenth century. Lamennais had indeed made shipwreck of his faith; but his associates, Montalembert, Lacordaire, and others like them, had never given up entirely their devout endeavor to make Christianity, as represented by the Roman Catholic Church, efficient in the political and social regeneration of their country. The measures of the new Pope were quite accordant with the ideas of these men, and were accepted as evidence that a new era was at hand. Gioberti—perhaps the greatest Italian thinker of the present century—who having been chaplain to the King of Sardinia, and Professor of Theology at Turin, had been banished from his native country for the liberality of his views on political themes, but in his exile and poverty at Brussels had made himself famous throughout Europe as a theologian, a philosopher, and a patriot—hastened to Paris that he might be in a position to observe and promote the new order of things which was so evidently beginning in Italy.

It was in that year, 1846, that Charles Loyson, born of a family which had risen in the preceding generation to some literary distinction, and carefully educated in liberal studies by his father, who was the head of an academy in the little city of Pan, came to Paris and entered the Seminary of St. Sulpice, to prepare himself for the priesthood. He was at that time in his twentieth year—just at the age when great

events, like those which were taking place in Italy, make the deepest impression on a susceptible mind. He had lived till then at home, quite secluded from the outside world, his father's house being, as he describes it, a sort of "family convent." An uncle of his, whose name he bears, and who died fifty years ago, had been the associate and dear friend and the compeer in genius of such men as Guizot, Cousin, and Royer-Colard, in their youth, and had left in his writings, as well as in the memory of his life, a testimony for liberty against absolutism and for Christian order and civilization against the reveries of atheistic democracy. From the beginning of his studies in the seminary, the young candidate for the priesthood could not but be in sympathy with those devout and generous souls who, though trained to believe that the Roman Catholic communion is the veritable and only Church of Christ, believe also that where the spirit of Christ is, there is liberty; that, therefore, the Church of Christ ought to be, everywhere and always, the antagonist rather than the ally of oppression; and that as Christ is the light of the world, so his Church ought to be the leader of the world's progress.

After five years in the seminary at Paris, Charles Loyson was admitted to the priesthood, and became a member of that society of priests which takes its name from the parish of St. Sulpice, and which exists for the education of the secular clergy in France. He was immediately employed as a professor of theology, first for three years in the Sulpitian Seminary at Avignon, then for two years in that at Nantes; and after that he was for one year vicar of the seminary in which he himself had been trained. These eleven years having been completed, he withdrew from his connection with the society and returned for one year to his old home. "His thought was, in the repose of home, to ripen, by a few months of reflection, the fruits of so many years of unintermitted and laborious study." In 1859, he passed from the ranks of the "secular" into those of the "regular" clergy, and became Brother Hyacinthe, a monk of the order of Barefooted Carmelites. The name of that order intimates the severity of its ascetic rules, and distinguishes it from the Carmelites of "the milder observance," who, in addition to other carnal indulgences, are permitted to wear shoes and stockings instead of being limited to sandals.

All this time the priest and professor, Charles Loyson, seems not to have been a preacher nor to have lifted up his voice in any public assembly. But the Carmelite order, though characteristically contemplative, is also active, and some of its monks have been eminent preachers. In 1861, Brother Hyacinthe, with the shaved head, the sandaled feet, and the white woolen robe of a Carmelite monk, began his career as a preacher, being then thirty-four years of age. His first preaching was at Lyons; and immediately he began to be famous. The next year, and the year after that, he gave courses of sermons in other provincial cities; and it was not till 1864 that he made his appearance as a preaching friar in Paris. There his first sermons were in the famous and fashionable Church of La Madeleine; and such was their effect that the Archbishop (Darboy) made haste to place him in the pulpit of the metropolitan cathedral, for a work to which no man since Lacordaire (at that time the last illustrious name in the roll of great French preachers) had been found competent. He was called to renew the "Advent Conferences of Notre Dame"—the yearly course not of sermons in form, but of religious discourses without texts prefixed, which Lacordaire in his time had made so effective, but which, after his retirement from the pulpit, had ceased to be effective, and had even been discontinued. Accepting that call, he gave his first series of conferences in the Advent season of 1864, and continued to perform the service at the same season through the four succeeding years.

A glance at the distinct yet logically related subjects of those five courses (each consisting of six lectures) is enough to show that the preacher began his work with a definite conception of what is the disease of France and the age. In the first course, he asserted and vindicated against the atheism, conscious or unconscious, gross or refined, which infects so much of modern thought, that foundation truth of all knowledge, "a Personal God." For the next year his theme was, "Religion the basis of morality." Advancing from these "first principles," he exhibited, in the lectures of 1866, "the relations of Christianity to Domestic Society or the Family;" in those of 1867, "the relations of Christianity to Civil So-

ciety or the State;" and in those of 1868, "the relations of Christianity to Religious Society or the Church." It is easy to understand that, handling such subjects as these, and handling them in a way to command the attention not of believers only, but of unbelievers; not of the devout only, but of the inquiring and speculative; not of habitual church-goers only, but of all Paris—speaking, too, out of a heart in full sympathy with the yearning of the age for freedom, and from the position which he had learned to take when Pius IX. was trying to be a reformer and a patriot—it was a matter of course that he had adversaries among the clergy of his own communion. Everybody knows that, whatever may be true in the United States, there are in Europe monks, priests, bishops, and cardinals, who believe devoutly that all things ought to have continued as they were before the French revolution. Those old names, Gallican and Ultramontane, are not the names to represent the two chief parties or opposing tendencies which divide the Roman Catholics of France to-day. The old Gallicanism would have made the national Church of France, like that of England, a dependency of the crown, and not much more; while the old Ultramontanism was the only form in which a Roman Catholic could assert the divine right of the Church to administer the law of Christ, or could conceive of the Church as independent of the secular power. But to-day the imminent questions among Roman Catholics, in France and everywhere else, are of another sort. There is, indeed, a Gallican remnant (p. 170); but Lacordaire, Montalembert, and Lamennais himself were Ultramontanes, when they claimed for the Church and the Pope the leadership in the great movement for liberty against absolute power in the government of nations. So intense was the Ultramontanism of Lacordaire and Lamennais that the one retracted his published opinions at the mandate of the Pope, and the other could not cease to be an Ultramontane without ceasing to be a Christian. The comprehensive question, to-day, is not how to adjust the relations between the Pope and the secular government, but how to adjust the relations between the Church and the nineteenth century; and on that question there are, if not two parties definitely formed, two opposite modes of

thinking. On the question of religious liberty—on the question of popular education in common schools—on the question whether the Church and the State ought to be everywhere separate and mutually independent—on many such questions earnest Roman Catholics hold opposite opinions. Some men who are truly Christian Catholics—liberal in their recognition of human rights, and in their opposition to those methods of government which Christendom has outgrown—liberal, too, in their readiness to recognize Christian character, “the fruit of the Spirit,” whenever they find it—are trying to be, at the same time, Roman Catholics. On the other hand, there are those who hold with all their hearts the old opinions, who would burn John Huss again to day if they had him in their power, who would arraign Galileo again before the inquisition, and would bring back the Bourbons into every country from which they have been expelled. These conservatives were from the first the adversaries of Father Hyacinthe.

Against the machinations of those adversaries, he was protected by the fidelity and liberality of his great patron, the Archbishop of Paris, and partly, we may presume, by the *esprit de corps* of the Carmelite Order. His letter of September 20, to the General of the Order (whose headquarters are of course at Rome) becomes completely intelligible only when we recollect the state of parties in the Roman Catholic communion at Paris. He begins by saying to his very Reverend Father: “During the five years of my ministry at Notre Dame, Paris, notwithstanding the *open attacks and secret misrepresentations* of which I have been the object, your confidence and esteem have never for a moment failed me.”

At this point, then, we propose to inquire more exactly, what is it in this great preacher which made him the object of open attack and secret misrepresentation? The discourses in the volume before us will enable intelligent readers to judge for themselves concerning the character of his preaching and the tendency of his influence in the Church. What is the substance and drift of his discourses? Does he preach anything which Rome has anathematized? Does he, at any point, contradict the formulas of his own Church, or deviate from them? Is he a Rationalist, like Renan, who once stood at the threshold

of the priesthood? Is he a revolutionary fanatic like Lamennais? Is he a Calvinist or a Lutheran in disguise, waiting for the most favorable opportunity to declare himself? The discourses before us give the materials for a sufficient answer to such questions; and the position of Father Hyacinthe, including his relations to the Roman Catholic Church and to organized Protestantism, is at once so important and so inadequately understood, that such questions are worth answering.

1. The "late Superior of the Barefooted Carmelites of Paris," as seen in these Discourses, is an earnest and loyal member of the Roman Catholic Church. We are not under the necessity of inferring this from the official dignity of the author, nor from the fact that the conferences were given in the great cathedral of Paris, at the invitation and with the full approval of the Archbishop. Let him speak for himself:

"When I behold the Pontiff of the Catholic Church, the father of redeemed humanity—let me call him by his name, that sweet name that grows in glory as it grows in experience of trial—when I behold Pius IX, I see upon his gentle and majestic brow three crowns not to be disjoined. In primeval times, when as yet there was no universal Pope, these three crowns were worn by the pontiff of every dwelling; he was father, king, and priest." * * * "Now, from the head of the father of the family, these two crowns, of priest and of king, have fallen off. The priestly crown has passed, in part at least, in the constitution of religious society, to the Catholic hierarchy. The royal diadem has passed altogether, in the organization of civil society, to the chiefs of the State." pp. 26, 27.

"For this cause [for having defended the divine institution of marriage against the attacks of secular powers] I bless thee. O my Church! Church Catholic, Church of the Middle Ages, and of the great Pontiffs Gregory VII. and Innocent III. ! Not alone for the sanctity of thy sacrament hast thou contended; thou hast been the defender of the liberty of our consciences, the purity of our morals, the peace and dignity of our homes The Church has defended the family; and because the soul of the family is, so to speak, concentrated in the wife, a priceless treasure in a frail vessel, it is especially over woman that it extends its protection; woman, with whom the Church has affinities so affecting and sublime that it were vain to attempt to sunder them; woman, whose liberty is always appealed to when the design is to oppress or corrupt her: the Church defended her against the violence of the powerful in days of yore, as it now defends her against the barbarity of sophists." pp. 29, 30.

"All life is in the bread; maternal life, as in its substance; intellectual life, as in its instrument; religious life, as in its symbol. [He has been speaking of agriculture, the bread-producing power, as an element of civilization.] And to behold the crowning glory of the bread we must follow it to the Catholic altar where, in the hands of Christ, by the most amazing of mysteries, it becomes the

eternal food of the soul and the august center of the religion of the human race—the bread of God which giveth life unto the world.” p. 113.

“Nowhere in Catholic Christendom do I find this fearful confusion [the confusion in the same hands of political and religious power, both of which come from above, but separately and differently]. If you point me to Rome, I do not find there the confusion of these two powers, but the exceptional alliance of them, in a place which is itself exceptional like a miracle. Beneficent alliance! League of the liberty of conscience, never to be untwined since it unites there what there is need to separate everywhere besides! Never has the necessity of it shone more conspicuously than at this hour. [December, 1867!] Already hast thou received the witness of French blood,” &c. p. 44.

These excerpts, all taken from the conferences on the relation of Christianity to civil society, are sufficient without the additions which might be made from the sermon on “the profession of the Catholic faith.” Incidental utterances like these, thrown out in the fervor of public discourse, are enough to show that it was no empty affectation on his part to say, in the opening of the first of these conferences, “I find in my heart two passions” [impelling me to speak on a theme involving political agitations]: “The first is the passion—the burning passion—of love for the holy, Catholic, apostolic, and Roman Church, our mother, the mother of Europe and America, the mother of the great civilization of the West. And then, beside her, with her, within her, the passion of love to France, which has always been, and shall ever be, her eldest daughter.” Evidently enough, the machinations against Father Hyacinthe during the five years of his ministry at Notre Dame, “the open attacks and secret misrepresentations” of which he was the object, were not because he was wanting in loyalty to the Roman Catholic Church. He was then, and, so far as we know, he is still, not only a Catholic (whether in the large sense or in the Anglican sense), but a *Roman* Catholic; not only a Roman Catholic, but a Papist who sees in Pius IX. “the father of redeemed humanity;” not only a devout believer in transubstantiation as “the most amazing of mysteries,” but a believer, also, in the temporal power of the Pope and in French intervention to uphold that power by bayonets against the will of the Roman people. Even while he insists on the separation of spiritual authority from civil power, he insists also that at Rome the two must be united in the person of the Pope.

2. Yet we cannot but observe that, as we become acquainted with him in this volume, he gives due prominence to those really catholic truths which (if the current opinion of Protestants is correct) are ordinarily, in Roman Catholic ministrations, overshadowed by the peculiarities of Romanism. We find here very little about the invocation of saints or their intercession for their worshipers, very little about works of supererogation, very little about purgatory or the efficacy of masses for the dead, but much about those great verities of the Christian revelation which the Church Catholic held before the Reformation, and which the Reformers did not surrender. The truths which are the foundation of all Christian thinking are the foundation of his thinking. On this point, instead of culling sentences from the lectures on the relation of Christianity to civil society, we refer only to the sermon on the South American earthquakes :

“Doubtless suffering and death, in the inferior races, are older than the sin of Adam, and stand in no direct connection with the moral system.” * * *
 “But when Adam appeared, born at once of the ruddy clay and of the breath of God, the earth kept silence before him : the sacred tie that binds together the physical and moral laws was drawn fast in his consciousness. Therein perfect innocence and perfect happiness had stricken covenant, and amid the peace of Eden was heard only the song of nature at rest with man, of God in a sabbath which bade fair to be eternal. This sabbath-day—how came it to an end ? How came nature to be in revolt against its king ? How was death with its attendant plagues able to intrude into this upper world from which it had been warned away ? ‘By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin.’ You have heard the stern language of St. Paul, you have recognized the cardinal doctrine of original sin. It is, then, simply a matter of logical consistency—it is simply following out the Bible to its conclusions—when, notwithstanding those laws of science which are mistakenly offered in evidence against us, we persist in seeing, in the evils which rest in common upon all our race, in the disasters which smite individuals or isolated countries, the various applications of one constant law of the moral system—that death is the punishment of sin.” pp. 141, 142.

“Guilt is universal : so, also, will punishment be, at least in the future life, unless penitence should avert it before the hour of justice comes. But the thunderbolts which, in this life, from time to time break through the sheltering clouds of loving kindness, do not always smite the guiltiest, do not necessarily spare the most innocent. Why, then, do they smite at all, since they do but obey His will who sendeth forth the lightnings that they may go upon His errands, and returning, answer, Here we are ! Why ? I don’t know, brethren ; I don’t know ; and nobody else knows any better than I do. An inscrutable Providence presides over the judgments of God in the regions of space and time. ‘His judgments,’ says the psalm, ‘are a great deep ;’ and it was on the verge of this deep

that one gazed down from the third heaven, and as if with swimming brain, cried out, 'O the depth!'

"We talk of sin, and of sins. The word of God answers back to us and speaks of *the* sin, the one sin, the sin of the world. 'Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world!' Our faults are not separable and independent; there is not one of them but has somewhat to do—is somehow mysteriously implicated—with the transgressions of the race; just as, in its turn, the collective weight of human guilt lies on each several conscience, and oppresses and burthens it from the cradle upwards. Doubtless conscience is an individual matter." * * * "But face to face with this individual conscience, there appears a universal—if I may use the word—a humanitarian conscience. Over against the responsibility proper to each, is set the responsibility common to all." * * *

"Solidarity—the universal community of interests! It is the great law which positive science establishes everywhere in nature—which a generous statesmanship demands everywhere in society. Why might it not be, under forms more mysterious, but not less real, the law of the moral and religious world?"

"In this way, without having recourse to any narrow or obsolete ideas, we explain the great Bible doctrine of the unity of mankind in the apostasy and in the atonement. There is something more than the man; there is humanity—humanity which falls as one in Adam, and in every one of the sons of Adam; humanity that is lifted up as one in Jesus Christ, and in every one of the brethren of Jesus Christ." pp. 141—145.

All this is undoubtedly Catholic doctrine and Roman—though it is what some men try to refute as Calvinism—as if Calvin invented all this and none but his followers accepted it. Here are those old doctrines of what we have learned to call "the evangelical system"—the primitive apostasy and ruin of the human race in the apostasy of its first parents; the universality of human guilt; the atonement by "the Lamb of God," whom the preacher elsewhere speaks of as "the Son of God made man;" the certainty of punishment in the future life for the impenitent; the sovereignty of God in his providence over men. Throughout the volume, this style of religious thought, which we recognize as evangelical, predominates over the distinctively Roman style; the simply Scriptural thought is rarely if ever overshadowed by the traditional exaggeration; the common-sense, practical view of the Christian life is more conspicuous, as it is in reality more sublime, than the mystical enthusiasm which is the parent of asceticism. For example, having said that, as men of serious thought, "we need and must have a great object, worthy of ourselves and God," he asks, "But what shall it be? On an earth once trodden by the feet of Christ, amid the course of

ages that are illuminated from his cross, is there for the soul of man and for all the race, any other object than God's salvation?" Then, fixing the thought of his hearers on the "salvation of souls," he says: "But how? For the vast majority — almost the entire mass of men — salvation is not achieved in the deserts and in ecstatic visions, but in the midst of society. It is realized by faithfulness to the duties of family and civil life, to all those holy obligations which bind us to our fellow-men; by the practical effort of a life which turns heavenward in prayer for light and strength, and then turns back to earth for wealth and liberty, and above all, for righteousness." As we read, we are reminded of what De Tocqueville said, thirty years ago, about the influence of American civilization on the religion of Roman Catholic citizens. "There are no Roman priests who show less taste for the minute individual observances, for extraordinary or peculiar means of salvation, or who cling more to the spirit and less to the letter of the law, than the Roman Catholic priests of the United States. Nowhere is that doctrine of the Church which prohibits the worship reserved to God alone from being offered to the saints, more clearly inculcated or more generally followed."* The philosophic Frenchman's generalization may have been too hasty, but his language shows that he had at least conceived the possibility of a Roman Catholic priest preaching to Roman Catholic hearers with honest loyalty to the peculiarities of Romanism, yet without making those peculiarities so prominent as to overshadow the greater truths of essential Christianity.

Can it be thought that this characteristic of Father Hyacinthe's ministry was the occasion of his becoming the object of open attacks and secret misrepresentation? We must say that this common-sense Christian thinking is very unlike what we find in some Roman Catholic books—for example, in the *Life of Father Ravignan*; and we can easily understand that men, whose religion has practically more of Mary in it than of Christ, whose prayers are offered, proximately, more to canonized saints than to the Father of lights, and in whose habitual thoughts the simple truths of Scriptural Christianity

* *Democracy in America*, vol. II, p. 47.

are overgrown and choked by the traditional enthusiasms which Rome has shaped and hardened into dogmas, might be shocked beyond measure to hear in the church of La Madeleine, or in the cathedral of Notre Dame, such sermons as we read in this volume, and might make haste to report the preacher at Rome as verging toward heresy.

3. Father Hyacinthe's catholicity of doctrine very naturally affects his habitual judgment of what Christ's Catholic Church is. In his view, very freely expressed, the true Church of Christ—that Church outside of which there can be no salvation—includes many who are not in any outward and visible communion with the Roman Catholic Church. Of this, the sermon on "the profession of the Catholic Faith" is a sufficient illustration. An American lady, whose name the newspapers have freely mentioned in connection with her story—a member of the Plymouth Church in Brooklyn—had been convinced of her Protestant errors by seeing at Rome "that temple of St. Peter, the most vast and splendid ever reared by man to his God," which "images the universal brotherhood of the children of God upon the earth" (p. 128), and had determined to be a Roman Catholic. She chose to make her new profession at Paris, and to have a sermon on the occasion from the most celebrated preacher of the Roman Catholic world. She gave him for his text, Ps. lxxxix., 1: "I will sing of the mercies of the Lord forever." Preaching from this text Father Hyacinthe tells her, "I will endeavor to speak of the designs of God in your past, your present, and your future." Expatiating first on the mercies of her past life, he says, "Born as you were in the midst of heresy, you were no heretic. No, thank God, you were no heretic; and nothing shall force me to apply to you that cruel—that justly cruel name, against which all my knowledge of your past makes protest." (p. 24) He alleges the authority of Augustine in support of his position that the member of Plymouth Church, who was in the act of renouncing her Protestantism, had never been a heretic, and then asks, "What were you then?" Answering his own question, he says, "This is just what you were: a noble, womanly nature, seeking the truth in love, and love in the truth; more than that, you were a Christian—yes,

a Catholic." (p. 125.) He tells her, "Before coming to us, you were a Christian by baptism, validly received; and when the hand of the minister sprinkled the water on your brow with those words of eternal life, 'I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,' it was Jesus Christ himself who baptized you. 'The hand is nothing,' says Saint Augustine, 'be it Peter's or Paul's, the hand is nothing—it is Christ that baptizes.'" (p. 126.) "You were a Christian, also, by the gospel, as well as by baptism. The Bible was the book of your childhood, and you learned from it the secrets of this divine faith which belongs to every age because it comes from eternity, with the accents of that Anglo-Saxon tongue which belongs to every land because it prevails throughout the world by virtue of its civilizing force." * * * "When we read over again together that gospel which separated our ancestors, I was pleasantly surprised, at every page, to find that we understood it in the same sense, and that, consequently, when you read it outside of the Church, you did not read it without the spirit of the Church." (pp. 125, 126.) And then he tells her, "You had prayer; an inward thing, invisible, unspeakable, and yet real above all things besides—and preëminently the language of the soul to God, and of God to the soul, the direct and personal communion of the humblest Christian with his Father in heaven."

The language, then, which he uses in the "prefatory letter" addressed to the translator of this volume, is hardly more explicit than his language in the sermon on "the profession of the Catholic faith." In the "letter," he says, "I have never deemed that the Christian communions separated from Rome were disinherited of the Holy Ghost, and without a part in the immense work of the preparation of the kingdom of God. In my intercourse with some of the most pious and learned of their members, I have experienced, in those depths of the soul where illusion is impossible, the unutterable blessing of the communion of saints. Whatever divides us externally in space and time, vanishes like a dream before that which unites us within,—the grace of the same God, the blood of the same Christ, the hopes of the same eternity." * * * We are all laboring in common for the upbuilding of that Church of the Future which shall be the Church of the Past in its

original purity and beauty, but shall have gathered to itself, besides, the depth of its analyses, the breadth of its syntheses, the experience of its toils, its struggles, and its griefs through all these centuries." (p. 13.)

Was it for such a judgment, and such a feeling as this, that the great preacher at Notre Dame was regarded as a man to be circumvented and suppressed? On the contrary, has not "the Catholic World" expressed the same judgment and feeling? Has it not expressly repudiated as "erroneous" "the notion of Catholic doctrine which conceives of it as requiring one to believe that there is no true faith or holiness outside of the visible communion of the See of Peter." (Catholic World, Vol. V., p. 111.) Has not Archbishop Manning of Westminster written a letter to Dr. Pusey about the workings of the Holy Spirit in the Church of England?

4. If this book should be put into the hands of one of those Protestants who believe that one distinctive feature of the Roman Catholic religion is a violent antipathy to the Bible, he would probably be surprised at finding that the preacher refers often to the Bible, and refers to it in a way that shows how thoroughly he has studied it and how highly he appreciates it. Father Hyacinthe must seem to such a reader quite unlike the ideal Roman Catholic of anti-papal literature. It is true that he quotes the apocryphal books not unfrequently, and that when he quotes the canonical books, he does not quote from our translation. But the use which he makes of the Latin Bible in his sermons, is very much like the use which Protestant preachers, in this country and in Great Britain, ordinarily make of the English Bible. He quotes it sometimes for authority, sometimes for illustration only, and sometimes by mere allusion. Thoroughly acquainted with it in his own studies and devotions, he assumes that his hearers are also familiarly acquainted with it. What he said about the Bible in his famous "speech before the Peace League," would not have been out of place if uttered from the anniversary platform of the American Bible Society.

"We must record and expound to the world, which does not understand them as yet, those two great books of public and private morality, the book of the synagogue, written by Moses, with the fires of Sinai, and transmitted by the prophets to the Christian Church; and our own book, the book of grace, which

upholds and fulfills the law, the gospel of the Son of God. The decalogue of Moses, and the gospel of Jesus Christ." * * *

"This is what we need to affirm by word and by example, what we need to glorify before peoples and kings alike. [*Prolonged applause*]. Thank you for this applause. It comes from your hearts, and it is intended for these divine books. In the name of these two books, I accept it. I accept it, also, in the name of those sincere men who group themselves about these books, in Europe and America. It is a most palpable fact, that there is no room in the daylight of the civilized world except for these three religious communions, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism!" pp. 9, 10.

That speech—especially the passage about the Bible and the three religious communions of the civilized world—was made the occasion of an agitation at Paris, and of reports and machinations at Rome, which brought upon the orator a rebuke and censure from the General of the Carmelite Order. It should be remembered, however, that the agitation was raised not ostensibly against his commendation of the Bible, but chiefly by means of a perversion of his language—as if he had said (what he did not say) that "the three religious communions" which he named were equal in his regard, or equal in rightful authority. Whatever dishonor some Roman Catholics (or all) may put upon the Bible indirectly by exalting the authority of their Church, and however they may make it void through their traditions, no intelligent adherent of that Church—be he ever so illiberal—would dare to acknowledge himself offended by Father Hyacinthe's most eloquent tribute to the Bible. Indeed, the orator had expressed himself in similar terms, more than once, from the pulpit of Notre Dame, as we see in the Conferences of 1867. For example, "I have told you before, I am not ashamed of the Bible. Anti-religious prejudice may deny its inspiration, but it cannot contest its historical authority. I take the Bible, which one of the deepest thinkers of our age has called 'the book of humanity,' the Bible, which is not the history of a political organization or of a religious sect, but the history of the great race of man; I open its first book," &c. p. 20. Again,—and these things, be it remembered, were said not in a *concio ad clerum*, but in advent conferences addressed most emphatically *ad populum* :—"We read the gospel, and we do well, but we do not read the Old Testament as much as we ought—the history of that people Israel, of whom Moses

says, in language full of mysterious significance, that it is the measure and the type after which the other nations have been formed." [Deut. xxxiii., 8.] p. 53. There may be a party at Paris and at Rome—probably there is—sufficiently illiberal and timid to be frightened at the "dangerous tendency" of Father Hyacinthe's habit of freely commending the Bible to his hearers. But surely he has never said anything stronger in that direction than what the "Catholic World" has said to the American public. Our readers know something about that monthly issued by the Catholic Publication Society, with the particular approval of the Archbishop of New York, the Cardinal Prefect of the Propaganda, and of Pope Pius IX. Of such a work we may be sure that nothing inconsistent with the soundest loyalty to Rome can be found in it. Yet the Catholic World says, "the Bible is the work of God as the firmament of heaven is his work. It has the precedence of dignity over tradition, decrees of councils, theology, science, literature, every other work in which man concurs with the spirit of God, because in the production of the Bible the Spirit of God has concurred with the spirit of man in a higher and more immediate manner." * * * "We believe that the books of Scripture are intelligible, and a perfect mine of intellectual, spiritual, and moral treasure. This is true, eminently, of the sacred books as they are studied in their original languages. It is no less true, however, that its most important treasures of knowledge are equally open to those who can read the best versions. No book has ever been so many times well translated as the Bible." * * * "It is, therefore, without doubt, a most excellent and profitable exercise for good, plain people, able to read and understand the English Bible, to read it continually and attentively." * * * "We have no fear of any intelligent, instructed Catholic being injured by reading the Bible. Nor do we consider the very general and high esteem of king James's version among English-speaking Protestants, and their familiarity with it, as an evil, or as an obstacle to the spread of Catholic doctrines." Catholic World, Vol. V., pp. 117, 118. Surely, if we should even hint that Father Hyacinthe's free speaking in commendation of the Bible had anything to do with his being

brought into disgrace at Rome, Father Hecker would cry out with a more grieved and injured tone than ever, "*Is it honest?*"

5. The reader of these discourses, watching to find what it is in them which could give offense to the most sensitive Roman Catholic, may be impressed with the fact that while the author is a monk, preaching in what he calls "these glorious rays of the monastic habit," he is, nevertheless, a man with all the instincts and sympathies of unperverted manhood. He does not indeed disparage the celibate life which is so often represented by writers of his Church as the highest sort of Christian life. He even claims for the monastic orders great honor in consideration of their service in the middle ages (p. 62), and he holds that there is still a part for them to perform in the progress of Christianity. Thus he says:

"Suffer me to disengage from my poor person the sublimity of the monastic state, and to greet in the true monk not some dead fossil of the unreturning past, but the boldest and most far-sighted forerunner of the ultimate future. He is the man who, without despising what there is of grand and noble in this world, loving it, on the contrary, and keeping heart of hope for all its interests, warms with enthusiasm for a loftier form of goodness that is yet to come, but which is brought nigh to him by faith. He looks far beyond these most solid realities to the boldest and most splendid Utopias, and ever, as humanity grows impatient of its voyage and longs to land ere it has reached the port, he seems to point forward to some invisible shore and say, 'Not yet! not yet!'" p. 121.

Yet, on the other hand, our preacher finds the true home of religion not so much in the cloister as in the family. He is deeply penetrated with the primeval truth, recovered and vindicated by the gospel, that the family is a divine institution, and that all the affections and relations that constitute the family are hallowed by God's benediction. What he calls "the law of love in the family," is in his view the first element of civilization. He says:

"I have spoken before now about love in the family—quite too much about it, some people say. I am only sorry that I have not said more. To exhibit the indissoluble union between love and the family is the noblest and most needed task that any earnest man, and especially any priest, can set himself. For my part, I have never been able to put myself into the position of those theologians, with neither heart nor genius, who ignore this sentiment of the human soul, and are afraid, apparently, to pollute their lips by uttering its name.

I make bold to declare that it is such men as these who have prepared the way for the dynasty of those conscienceless writers who, separating, after their fashion, passion from duty, extol love without comprehending its true dignity, and inflict upon it that supreme outrage of confounding it with caprice and lust. Except when it fixes its individual gaze on heaven, and becomes virginity, love cannot blossom, save in the sanctuary of home, with that two-fold bloom, so beautiful and yet so serious and holy—marriage and parentage.” * * * “As the best and worthiest service to humanity is attained by serving it in one’s own country, so one may best serve and love his country in his family. There, most of all, is played the drama of human life, intense and ravishing as the best passions of the heart, grave as duty, active as the pursuit of interest (which is itself a duty), calm and recollected as study and prayer.” * * * “Doubtless the life of a great nation is at the polls and in the legislature; but far more than this, it is at the fireside. Where shall we find philosophers to teach us this—authors and artists to depict it—where, above all, the men to live it? Ah! look beyond the Alps, at our little neighbor Switzerland, home of toilsome industry and of the household of simple, honest, happy life!—home, too, of free, traditional democracy! And here, poor French democracy, despising the family, despising religion, here thou art lying yet, after eighty years, crying, helpless, in thy bloody swaddling clothes!” pp. 109, 110.

This is certainly the sort of instruction which France needs, and has needed through long centuries past. But is it not possible that in this exaltation of the sanctity that encircles the domestic relations, as if the family might even be holier than the convent, there was something to startle into jealousy the traditionary sentiment which appropriates the word “religious” as the distinctive designation of those who live in artificial associations and under vows of artificial duty, and virtually denies the equal religiousness of all who serve God, however humbly and devoutly, in the relations which, by the will and wisdom of God, belong to the constitution of human nature. In the presence of that sentiment (which we call traditional because it has no place in the authentic records of Christianity), the monk is “a religious,” and the nun is “a religious,” but the bride and bridegroom, though their vows of mutual love be offered in the fear and love of God—the father and mother, though they be laboring with all diligence and prayer to bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord—the brothers and sisters in a Christian household, though their home be like that in Bethany where Jesus loved to rest—cannot be, in the distinctive sense, “religious,” without substituting for the duties of these natural relations the artificial duties of monastic life. We can

easily conceive that Father Hyacinthe's preaching, so alive with generous human sympathies, so strenuously asserting his right as a minister of Christ to be interested in whatever pertains to the highest welfare of men, and especially so fragrant with thoughts of domestic felicity, might waken the fears and even enrage the fanaticism of many an unfortunate ascetic to whom nothing can seem truly religious that is not unnatural.

6. When we remember the chronic antipathy with which Roman infallibility regards the progress of the physical sciences, another characteristic of these discourses arrests our attention. Most evidently, the author has no fear of anything that science may discover in the sphere of nature. Familiar with the facts of modern science—not as a specialist in any department, but only as a general scholar—he is the more ready to encounter and baffle the infidelity that allies itself with science. Thus in his first series of conferences (not given in this volume), he boldly grappled with the philosophy which finds in the universe nothing but matter and impersonal force. He never hesitates to accept the legitimate conclusions of scientific discovery, nor to use them in the service of religion. In his sermon on the South American earthquakes, we find an allusion to geology, which seems as if he had studied Dr. Bushnell's chapter on "Anticipative Consequences." He says:

"This planet itself, on which the work of our great race is wrought, would almost seem less to have been made for us than to have been made against us. From its strange infancy, an incandescent mass or abyss of liquid fire, a huge fire-brand hurtling through space or dashing out its confused waves into the darkness, it has seemed the enemy of life in every form. Then during those six days—God's days, not man's, and therefore not to be measured—for a 'a thousand years in his sight are as yesterday'—it has, with convulsive pangs of labor, produced, and again destroyed, huge forms of being, plants or animals, which never could have subsisted in the same atmosphere with ourselves. Finally, after all these cataclysms, when that strip of earth habitable for man had emerged—I say nothing of the vast deserts that dispute our occupancy of it, nor of the frozen regions which consume it at the poles, nor of the heats that blaze along its tropical shores—I find it so scanty in its length, in its breadth—I was about to say so scanty in its accommodations—that it seems to me less like a peaceful and permanent dwelling, than a frail ship beaten by the storms of three oceans—the sea of waters round about, the sea of air above, the sea of fire underneath! Once already it has foundered in the waves; may it not, peradventure, be sometime swallowed up in the flames? For 'the day of the Lord shall come as a thief in the night, in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with a fervent heat; the earth also, and the works that are therein, shall be burned up.'" pp 152, 153.

Is there remaining in the Roman Catholic Church anything of that conservative spirit which condemned Galileo for believing and teaching the motion of the earth? Are there any monks or priests in Paris who hold that the Church, by virtue of its infallibility, can safely dictate to men of science what they may, and what they must not, discover, in their own sphere of exploration and induction? If there are any such, it is easy to account for a very bitter dislike of Father Hyacinthe, and a relentless opposition to his ministry. Evidently enough, he does not think according to their way of thinking; and to them, therefore, he must seem a very dangerous person. He finds the sphere of religion and of religious knowledge in those regions of thought which are accessible to all thoughtful minds. "Science," he says, "at that stage of development at which it is worthy of the name, is not an absolute necessity of human nature. If man knows his own soul and God, love and duty, labor and death, he knows the answer to those supreme questions which are put to him by consciousness within and by the world without." The answer to those supreme questions is religion; and any religion is true or false, intelligent or unintelligent, in proportion as it answers those questions wisely and distinctly. Science, however worthy of the name, if it be mere science, cannot answer those supreme questions. In some way, right or wrong, they are already answered before science begins. Perhaps the author of the Nineteenth Psalm, though he knew nothing of astronomy, could answer those questions better than La Place. Perhaps the author of the Epistle to the Romans, though he knew nothing of chemistry, could answer those questions better than Huxley. Perhaps the writer of the Fourth Gospel, though he knew nothing of politico-economical science, could answer those supreme questions better than Stuart Mill. Yet Father Hyacinthe puts great honor upon science.

"Contemplative science—what is there that it has not included in its scope? It has scrutinized the invisible, weighed the imponderable, decomposed the molecule, in the laboratories of its physics and chemistry. Queen of the inorganic world, it is extending its conquests, day by day, by means of physiology, into the organic world; and laying hands upon life itself in the currents of blood which it interrogates and directs at its will, it seeks to penetrate those awful secrets which we have been carrying about with us in our own bodies without

daring to explore them. Its realm extends even to higher spheres than this. It takes to itself the name of philosophy, and hovers aloft in the regions of the soul and above the soul it studies the ideas which enlighten it, and, far above the ideas, God who gives them light. Yes! to start from the atom, to go mounting upward, by the blood, by the ideas, by God himself, up to the very topmost height of things, never pausing until, like the dazed eagle, it hangs poised with eye fixed upon the sun—this is the career of science! Ah! I could lift up a lamentation that should not be comforted, were humanity to be bereft of these sublime audacities, of the ravishment of these prolific joys!

“And yet this is not all. Science, as I just hinted, is a prolific mother. She cannot remain cloistered in the sanctuary of contemplation, like a virgin in her calm and luminous beauty. She comes back into the sphere of material activity; she is wedded to productive toil, and they are the parents of power and riches. Into the hands of the laborer from the plough she puts implements and methods that are akin to the miraculous, and bids him, Go, subdue the world, and transform it. And—as in these Titanic wars that are led by genius and waited on by fortune, each day is marked by some resplendent victory—so discovery succeeds discovery, each surpassing that which went before, and science, applied by industry, impels society from triumph on to triumph, toward a future which they do but just dimly descry, and the prospect of which at once enraptures and dismays.

“And then, over the stalwart and naked shoulders of this positive civilization which controls and operates material forces, lo! Art draws nigh to fling its starry and imperial robe—all the glories of painting, sculpture, and architecture—all the harmonies of music and of poetry—falling from heaven, like a transfiguration, upon the stir and din of human toil.” pp. 116—118.

On the whole, it can hardly be wondered at that a monk who is, nevertheless, so human—a recluse, yet so much in the world and of the world while not less evidently above the world—a preacher earnestly Roman Catholic, yet so eagerly accepting all the results of science—was anxiously watched by men who think science ought to be governed by ecclesiastical dictation, was suspected, was denounced at Rome with “secret misrepresentations,” and has at last, by “the intrigues of a party omnipotent at Rome,” been brought under a public censure from the General of his order.

7. But the worst of all indications of Father Hyacinthe’s unsoundness is the fact that he cherishes in his heart a patriotic love of liberty, and frankly commits himself on the side of that great movement toward political reformation which gives character to the nineteenth century. In his speech before the Peace League, six months ago, when France was still fretting against the bit and reins of absolute power, he dared to say :

"It was but the morning twilight of public opinion that was shining in the days of Pascal and Louis XIV. The morning has advanced since then, it approaches its meridian, and everywhere, to-day, it tends to put an end to the caprices of personal government. Personal governments have had their reason and their uses in other ages. A child stands in need of masters and tutors of a very personal sort; but, as St. Paul says, speaking of regenerate humanity, we are no longer children nor slaves; we are entitled to come into possession of the inheritance. It is no time now for personal governments. It is time for the government of public opinion, for the government of the country by itself; and now that all the countries are calling and stretching out the hand to one another, the hour is at hand for the government of mankind by itself." pp. 3, 4.

Strange to say, the "personal government" of France took no offense at those bold words. Doubtless the imperial mind, having recognized the force of public opinion, was meditating that great revolution—not then announced, but now accomplished—a revolution without barricades—a *coup d'état* without violence—which has put an end to personal government in France, at least for the present. But there exists at Paris as well as at Rome (we may say everywhere within the shadow of the Papacy) a party to which those ringing words, prophetic of liberty for all the nations, were an offense. At Rome such words must needs be an offense; for what is the secular government at Rome but "personal government"—the most personal now existing within the limits of Christendom? Nay, the "spiritual" government over the Roman Catholic Church, in the Jesuit theory, in the Pope's own theory, in the theory maintained by the Cardinals and by that entire body of functionaries known as the Roman *curia* or "the Court of Rome," is a purely and absolutely "personal government." The question now coming to a crisis after ages of uncertainty—the question about the personal infallibility of the Pope—is really and simply a question of "personal government." If the infallibility, assumed to be somewhere, resides in the Church represented by its bishops assembled in a council, the Pope is nothing more than a constitutional monarch, responsible in some sort to the great representative body of his subjects; his decisions are binding when they are formally or informally accepted by the Church; and till they obtain such ratification, they are liable to be rejected as erroneous or as exceeding his legitimate powers. But if, on the other hand, the infallibility resides in that individual person who happens to be Pope—if a council

derives its power from him, and if its decisions have no force till he has ratified them—the monarchy of the Pope over the Church is without any limit, and is the very ideal of personal government. No wonder that there was indignation at Rome when the Carmelite monk, speaking with a voice that sounded through the world, declared that the time has come for the government of public opinion, the time for national self-government, and that, inasmuch as all countries are calling and stretching out the hand to one another, the hour is at hand for the government of mankind by itself. Where, then, is the personal infallibility of the Roman pontiff—the government of mankind by the Pope?

Probably Father Hyacinthe had been accustomed to think of the Pope as a constitutional monarch, gathering up and expressing in his administration the “public opinion” of the universal Church, and frankly recognizing a general council as the organ through which, on great occasions, that public opinion—the judgment and feeling of “regenerate humanity”—will declare itself. Doubtless the Ultramontanism of the venerable Count Montalembert—probably that of Bishop Dupanloup—was never anything more than the full belief that the national Church of France is only the Catholic Church in that nation, and is, therefore, dependent not on the “chief of the state” at Paris, but on the chief of the Church at Rome: a belief entirely consistent with the opinion that the Pope is subject to the law instead of being superior to it, and, being personally not infallible, may be instructed, rebuked, and even deposed by a general council. But that which to-day is commonly spoken of as Ultramontanism is a very different thing. The Ultramontanism of the Jesuits, and of all whose opinions they control, recognizes the Pope as personally infallible, the absolute lord over the faith and the conscience of every loyal Catholic. Ultramontanism, therefore, in the now current application of that name, is the sworn votary of personal government in the Church; and why not in the State? Perhaps unconsciously—perhaps with distinct intention, the Barefooted Carmelite touched the very center and sensitive core of the question between parties in the Roman Catholic Church, when he uttered so publicly those incisive phrases about the obso-

lescence of personal government, the power of public opinion, and the self-government of mankind.

Yet that utterance before the Peace League could not have surprised, otherwise than by its boldness, any who were acquainted with the orator's habit of thinking about questions relating to society and government. His theory, while truly philosophical, is founded on the teachings of the Bible. Human society, he tells us, is first domestic; the family with all its rights and sanctities existed before the State—as any rational conception of human nature teaches—as the first book in the Bible, “the book of the beginning, Genesis,” abundantly teaches. “Nothing here of empire or republic, nothing about political society, but from end to end it breathes the pure and fruitful spirit of domestic society. From the marriage bed of Adam and Eve, to the wandering tents of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—everywhere domestic society.” He illustrates Genesis by a description of the patriarchal society existing to this day in “those table-lands of central Asia which have been so well styled the hive of nations.”

“For whom has God made these favored regions? Was it for those savages who, according to Rousseau and the ‘*Contrat Social*,’ everywhere preceded the establishment of social society? Was it for that man monkey which the false science of our generation exhibits to us, struggling through ages of endeavor to free itself from the limitations of brute-existence? ‘For my part,’ remarked an eminent traveler to me, on his return from these distant lands, ‘what I saw over there was a great deal of Abraham.’ And in fact, excepting the purity of the primitive religion, which has decayed among them, it is a marvelous relic of that patriarchal society the simplicity of which is so superior, in grandeur and beauty, to the complicated and scientific organization of our civil society. These are the nomadic shepherds among whom intercourse with nature has developed a remarkable practical sense and meditative intelligence; these are the communities sustained only by tradition and the domestic virtues, among which each father of a family commands in authority and in liberty. . . . Hail, sacred deserts, plains of Tartary, that have poured out again and again your healing floods eastward toward China—westward toward Greece and Russia; peradventure for us, also, ye are guarding the secret of the future! Ah! if we continue to slip along this fatal slope, if we go on in the progress of decay to atheism in doctrine, to materialism in morals, to revolt against all authority worthy of the name, to servitude under every revolutionary despotism; if our posterity follows us into these lower depths—O then, ye plains of Tartary, send forth to us our latest saviors! Trample us beneath the hoofs of your steeds; smite us down with the weapons of your warriors, and then, baptized with the lingering remains of our Christianity, rise up like the Germans and the Huns of yore, and

you will have snatched Europe from the corruption in which it has been dragged by sophists and harlots, by demagogues and tyrants." pp. 21, 22.

This priority of domestic society to civil society is the basis on which Father Hyacinthe maintains that the rights of the family, and the mutual duties of its members, are not created by human legislation, but exist with all their sacredness quite independently of the state; and that the state itself is formed not only by the multiplication of families, but for the protection of those rights which existed in domestic society before civil society began to be. He holds that "when the existence of a central and sovereign power is necessary to the maintenance of justice and peace between domestic communities hitherto independent of each other, this power is ordained of God, 'for there is no power but of God,' and it is not free to the several heads of families to refuse their assent to the institution of it." The underlying reason which has produced and maintained civil society is the need felt by families of a new organization to regulate and protect their rights. Civil society, in his definition of it, is "the union of a certain number of heads of families, in order that the mutual exercise of their rights may be maintained by common arbitrament, and, if necessary, protected by force." This union, however, bears no resemblance to the "social compact" dreamed of by some philosophers; for it is "ordained by Providence, demanded, at a certain stage of development, by human nature, and governed by the absolute principles of justice."

"Absolute principles of justice," then, are superior to the state; Civil society cannot abrogate them; nor may it do anything in contradiction of them. Thus our author comprehends in one condemnation "the absolutism of demagogues" or socialists, and "the absolutism of kings." The family has rights—the individual human being has rights which are not derived (as Bossuet says that every right must be) "from public authority." The right of property, even in land, is one of those rights which are not derived from the state. Human labor appropriates the unappropriated gifts of nature, and thus the right of ownership comes into being.

"Land, that foothold of the family, that basis of the home, is owned by a better title than the concession of the state. It takes hold of the deepest secrets

of human nature, the most absolute necessities of a free and intelligent man. The Columbus of primitive ages, or of newly-discovered regions, I tread some uninhabited land. I gaze upon it in its virgin beauty, its wild uncomeliness, perhaps—no matter, I am charmed by it. I form with it that bond, so full of mystery, which unites person and thing, and in which interest, reason, affection itself are intertwined. Ah! when I have done this, there is no power on earth, though it call itself Louis XIV., which has the right to stand up and say, as this monarch once said, ‘I am the owner, you are the tenant.’ No! the owner is myself. It is all mine, soil as well as crop. You cannot rend that patch of earth from me; neither can you give me a title to it. My right consists in the act of my will which said to this field, this forest, ‘Be mine.’ My right consists in the landmark I have placed, in the hedge I have planted. My right! it is the sweat of my brow, the blood upon my hands, the rude embraces with which my love and labor have seized and fertilized the land. Henceforth that land belongs to the person of man. I hold it in my own right, and God stands by me in the claim.” p. 24.

The conference on “sovereignty in civil society” brings out the preacher’s political philosophy on some points more explicitly against the theories of both sorts of absolutism. It repudiates the corollaries deduced by theorists from the fiction of a social compact constituting civil society and endowing it with rights. It maintains that the supreme power of a government actually existing in any nation—the sovereignty—whether it be the sovereignty of a monarch or the sovereignty of the people—is to be recognized as a fact existing in the providence of God. It maintains, in close agreement with the Apostle Paul [Romans xiii., 1–7], that a government *de facto* is, without any consideration of its historic origin, the depositary of a power which is of God. “The existence of government in civil society is not subsequent to the existence of civil society itself. The two facts are simultaneous and inseparable. Consequently the people cannot be the source of power, since it does not exist as a people except in the presence of power. The Power and the People are twin brothers. Together they come forth from God, the source of all order and all right, and together they return to him.” Father Hyacinthe, therefore, admits and maintains the validity of a monarchical government where such a government actually exists.” “Sovereignty may exist outside of the nation and be exercised over it, or it may exist in the nation and be exercised by it.” He recognizes the undeniable fact that ordinarily nations have come into being not “in the order of ideas”—

not by a peaceful agreement, formal or implied, among families, but by "what has been called the law of the hero." He says, "Instead of nations constituting themselves, I behold mighty and predestinated individuals who create nations, giving birth to them, so to speak, from their own great souls." Referring to ages on the confines of mythology and history, he says, "Such is a Hercules or a Theseus, slaying monsters, dispersing robbers, by their strength and valor becoming the liberators of oppressed families, and the organizers of nascent society. Such is an Orpheus or an Amphion, towering above the multitude by their wisdom and eloquence—a Numa, commanding them by his piety." "Make way, then, for the hero. Let him step in to the unoccupied place, be the instrument of righteousness and peace, and, dying, leave the sovereignty to children and to children's children, an inalienable and uncontested inheritance." This form of sovereignty—supreme power in the hands of a sovereign prince—personal government—"has been the past, it is still the present, of great nations, but it is only one of "the two great forms of sovereignty." The other form of sovereignty is the government of a nation by itself—the supreme power in the hands of a sovereign people. When the preacher says that the first form of sovereignty has been the past, and is the present, of great nations, he abstains from saying that it will be their future, nor does he imply at all that the time for personal government is not passing away. But when he looks for an illusion of the other form of sovereignty, it becomes evident what his feelings are on the question of national self-government.

"I turn now to modern times. I look there for nations formed under our own eyes, or at least under perfect cognizance of their own consciousness. What example shall I take? Shall I go to Switzerland? Shall I question the commonwealth of the Lakes, the people of the glaciers, the sons of William Tell? Shall I tread again the dear paths of Belgium? No! let me cross the ocean and stand in presence of that gigantic nation of which I have spoken. I am no courtier of the United States of America; thanks to my priestly office, I am no one's courtier. I am not even a blind admirer of them; and if this were the proper place, I would warn them that they are slipping down the steep slope of moral decay, and that they will infallibly come, as we have come, to political and social decay. I would call them back to the better spirit of their early age, and to the genuine patriotism of their founders." * * * "Oh, how grand that nation was! how grand it continues still! O people, thou art like the lion's whelp that is gone up

to seize the prey! Thy prey is the wealth of both the hemispheres, thy proud independence, thy vast and fertile continent. Thou hast couched between the two oceans, in the shadow of thy lofty mountains, on the banks of thy rivers that are like seas! Thou hast roared like the lion; and like the lioness thou art slumbering in thy might. Who shall dare rouse thee up? *Quis suscitabit eum?* [Gen. xlix., 9.]

“Well, then, who is it that holds the sovereignty in this nation! None but itself. The very day when it was born in pangs of travail, it grasped the sovereignty in its own bloody and jealous hands, and to this day it has not let it go. There every man is at once citizen and king.” pp. 47, 48.

But the main thing in Father Hyacinthe's doctrine is, that wherever the sovereignty may be deposited it is held only in trust, and is never unlimited. The power, whether of a sovereign prince or of a sovereign people—and of the latter no less than of the former—is limited by right. In the order of ideas, and in the order of facts, rights are prior to government in civil society, and are related to it, and to civil society itself, only in the relation of the end to the means. Government exists to protect rights, not to take them away—to harmonize every man's rights with his neighbor's, not to infringe upon the rights of either. “Political sovereignty no more extends to the substance of human rights when it is vested in the people than when it is vested in a prince; neither can it legitimately tamper with them, whether they be rights of the individual; rights of the family—the primitive society; rights of the church—the superior society; or rights of voluntary associations. Every man has, by his own natural right, the power of associating with his fellows, so long as he does it openly and for objects not incompatible with morality and the public peace. Civil law has only one thing to do in this case; it has not to grant the right but to acknowledge it.” In a word, he holds that the doctrine, which is the basis of all liberty and for which so many Protestant ministers of Christ in this country, only a few years ago, endured reproach and execration—the doctrine of the Higher Law—the doctrine that no sovereignty has a right to do wrong. “When civil authority oversteps these limits, it is guilty of an abuse. It must be warned of it; if need be, it must be resisted”—not by insurrection, but by “moral resistance, a resistance respectful toward the power, energetic against the abuses of power—the

only permissible resistance, and the only effective:" like the resistance which Naboth the Jezreelite made, when Ahab demanded of him "the inheritance of his fathers:"—like the resistance which Elijah made, coming down from Carmel in his "glorious rags" to protest against the crime and to denounce the criminal in the name of God, when the usurper had slain and taken possession. "This is liberty! It is the outcry of every honest man's conscience in the face of the violation of a right. It is the protest of public opinion against the abuse of force and the more perilous abuse of law." pp. 51–54.

Of course the doctrine so eloquently set forth by Father Hyacinthe, that sovereignty in civil society—even the sovereignty of society itself—is always limited, and is liable to protest and rebuke whenever it exceeds its limits—has bearings which the conservative or retrogressive party in the Roman Catholic communion, the party of personal government over the universal church by the absolutism of Papal infallibility, could not but feel. Such thoughts about the limitations of power, about the inalienable right of protest in the name of conscience, and about the power of protest and of public opinion in resistance of wrong, are bolts of light shot through the system of darkness which the Retrogressives hope to impose upon Christendom and the world by establishing the personal infallibility of the Pope. As the Pharisees and hierarchs at Jerusalem felt, instinctively, that Jesus of Nazareth, in his parables about the kingdom of heaven, and in all his discourses, was sowing among the people seed-thoughts which might subvert their cherished dream of dominion over the nations, so these men at Paris and at Rome felt, without reasoning out the sequences of thought, that the doctrines of the Carmelite preacher about liberty and the right of protest against power were full of danger to the whole scheme and theory of personal infallibility. They must keep watch over him; they must try to entangle him in his talk; they must find matter of accusation against him; in one way or another, they must bring the power of personal government at Rome to bear upon him and to silence him. The speech before the Peace League gave them the advantage they had been waiting

for; and, till there shall be some change either in him or in the balance of power between parties in the Roman Catholic Church, he speaks no more from the pulpit of Notre Dame or from any other pulpit. A change in him may introduce him into Protestant pulpits; and a much less probable (hardly supposable) change in the Roman Catholic Church, or in the relations of the French people and government to the Pope, *might* restore him even to the pulpit of Notre Dame—though, on the whole, he has about as good a chance of being invited to preach at the reconsecration of the old Saint Sophia now occupied for Mohammedan worship. We do not believe that any change can take place in him which will induce his now triumphant adversaries to restore to him the functions of which he has been ecclesiastically deprived. He will never consent to wear the fetters which he has broken and trampled on.

Our readers can now judge for themselves concerning Father Hyacinthe's position and his relation to conflicting tendencies and parties in his own communion. That Roman Catholic France, in this latter half of the nineteenth century, has produced such a thinker and preacher—earnest in his convictions, reverent in the habit of his mind, an evangelical believer, yet free and fearless—is a significant fact. We dare not say that this true minister of Christ, so gifted, so modest, and (unless every indication deceives us) so adorned with the graces of the Spirit, does not stand alone to-day—that in the decisive step of leaving his convent, throwing off his monastic dress, and braving the excommunication which he knew must follow, he has the approval or even the sympathy of any who to that hour had been his friends; but the fact of such a man taking such a position, just at this crisis, is nevertheless a great fact. It is a fact of the same sort with the manifestoes against "Papalism" issued by Roman Catholic bishops and theologians in Germany. It is a fact of the same sort with the testimonies which the illustrious Montalembert is giving out as his last utterances before he dies. It is a fact of the same sort with the well known position of such prelates in France as the Bishop of Orleans and the Archbishop of Paris. Father Hyacinthe may find that the step which he has taken

separates him from his party ; he may even find himself condemned and renounced by his former friends, and that they feel their cause to have been weakened by what seems to their grieved hearts to have been his rashness ; but the attention of Christendom has been turned to the fact that within the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church there is a party, like-minded with him, which stood by him and protected him till his Lutherlike act of hurling defiance at Rome and appealing “to thy tribunal, O Lord Jesus !”

But is it so ? Father Hyacinthe still claims that he is not a Protestant but a Catholic, loyal to Rome as the center of unity ; and has he no friends in the communion of the Roman Church ? If he has any friends, who are they ? Will any voice in the ecumenical Council dare to speak for him, or to testify with him “against those doctrines and practices which call themselves Roman, but are not Christian ?” Is there, in that assembly of bishops, one who indulges even an unspoken sympathy with the monk who dared to say, “I have promised monastic obedience—but within the limits of an honest conscience, and of the dignity of my person and my ministry ?” Not one—beyond all doubt, not one. Among the inferior clergy of France—there may be a few—there may be even more than a few—whose regret that he has taken so bold a step is mingled with a profound respect for the artless dignity of the man, and with a glimmer of hope that in consequence of his rashness, deliverance (they know not how) may come to them. Among the laity of Roman Catholic France there may be many whose admiration of him is full of sympathy, and who, whenever he shall lift up his voice again in public—not from the pulpit of the cathedral, but from the platform in unconsecrated halls—not as a Carmelite nor as a priest, but as a Frenchman and a Christian—will be ready to listen and to learn. In Germany there may be even more of sympathy with him than in France ; for the Teutonic nations have always been less tractable than the Latin under the sway of Rome. But is there a Romanist in England—is there even a Ritualist in the Church of England—who looks upon him as any better than a heathen man and a publican ? And how is it in the United States ? Nobody need be told that there has

been no expression here of Roman Catholic respect for the "distinguished visitor." Probably no American Romanist of the sort recognized among their clergy as "good Catholics" has read Father Hyacinthe's letter to the General of his order, without being shocked at its impiety.

Father Hyacinthe, then, is quite dissociated, at least for the present, from the party which begins to be called, and sometimes calls itself, Liberal Catholic. That party can ill afford to lose him, for it has no strength to spare; but it is not easy to stand where he stands, and must therefore let him go. We call it a party, for, though it is not organized with a definite platform of principles and aims, it is more than a merely fluctuating difference of opinion about particular measures. It is not strong if we measure its strength by the number of votes it can give in the ecumenical Council. It is not numerically strong as compared with the great body of the clergy, "secular" and "regular." It is strong in men of thought and learning, strong in the dignity and character of its leaders, strong in the ideas which are its life, and strong in its sympathies with Christian liberty and with the progress of Christian civilization. On the question which the Pope and the Jesuits are now forcing to an issue—the double question of the Syllabus and of Papal infallibility—it is strong in the good will of those enlightened laymen, throughout Europe,—statesmen, scholars, poets, artists—who have not lapsed into indifference to all religious questions, but who know that personal infallibility in the Church means personal government in the State, and that the anathemas of the Syllabus, imposed upon the people by the clergy in the name of the gospel, can hardly fail to make all the intelligent people irreligious. Some of the Liberal Catholics, though knowing that the Encyclical, with its Syllabus, was aimed at them and really came out in reply to Count Montalembert's rousing speeches in their "Catholic Congress" at Malines in 1863, have endeavored to construe that manifesto "in a non-natural sense," and to make themselves believe that the Pope did not mean what he said. But if they had the courage to grasp the fact and to use it, the Encyclical might be an irresistible weapon in their hands. Can an intelligent man of this nineteenth century—be he

ever so confident that infallibility is lodged somewhere—interpret that document honestly, and believe for one moment that the author of it is infallible? That is really the question, and if the Liberal Catholics would courageously put the question in this concrete form—if they would dare to say outright, This proposition of the Encyclical, and that, and that, are notoriously untrue, and the author of them has made it impossible for the Church to believe that he is infallible,—they would have their adversaries at the greatest possible disadvantage. Some propositions are too preposterous to be refuted—so preposterous that any attempt to disprove them gives them a factitious dignity; and the proposition that the Pope's Encyclical and Syllabus of 1864 were dictated by infallibility is of that sort.

Our "Roman Catholic brethren" in the United States are represented by the "Catholic World." We are not aware that any other periodical can be regarded as expressing with so much of official authority and responsibility the opinions, the sympathies, and the aims of American Romanism. How, then, does the "Catholic World" stand in relation to the questions of the nineteenth century? It tries to be, in some sort, Liberal-Catholic. By means of it, Father Hecker and the rest of the Paulists, are endeavoring to make the Roman Catholic system acceptable to the American people. They have in hand the very serious task of proving that their infallible Church, here in the United States and everywhere else, is altogether in favor of civil and religious liberty not only for its own adherents but for all men; and that being infallible, it has never taught or held any contrary doctrine. They have very much misrepresented themselves if they do not believe that freedom of conscience and of religious worship is the proper right of every man, and ought to be proclaimed and secured by law in every well constituted State. They would charge us with being false witnesses against them, if we should impute to them the opinion that their religion ought to be considered the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of other modes of religious worship. We, the people of the United States, hold with remarkable unanimity, that citizens have a right to the fullest freedom in expressing their opin-

ions, whatever they may be, by printing or otherwise; that the Church, be it ever so Catholic, has no power to employ force; that the Church, of whatever name or dogma, should be separated from the State, and the State from the Church; and that civil government is under no obligation to repress religious error by legal penalties. Father Hecker and his collaborators in the *Catholic World*, do not profess—nor so far as we know, do they admit—that in regard to liberty of conscience and of worship, liberty of speech and of the press, the freedom of the Church from State control, and of the State from ecclesiastical dictation, their principles differ from ours or from the principles incorporated into the constitutions and laws of the United States.

Yet, in the Council at Rome, the American bishops, one and all, are as ready as the Italians to accept and affirm the personal infallibility of the Pope, and in so doing to accept and affirm the infallibility of the Encyclical, which calls on all the faithful to condemn all the principles most essential to the American idea (which has become the nineteenth century's idea) of good government. Some persons, reasoning in a common-place way from known principles of human nature, ascribe this remarkable phenomenon to the fact that those American bishops are in no sense representatives of the great communion which they govern, but, being designated as well as consecrated by the Pope, are simply functionaries of his. The Paulists, in the "*Catholic World*," assure us that the Roman Catholics generally in the United States, and in particular those of them who were once Protestants, are eagerly waiting to accept with religious confidence the dogma of Papal infallibility—in other words, the declaration that the Encyclical, with all its denunciation of civil and religious liberty, came from an infallible author. We are willing to believe that not only the bishops and the Paulists, but the Jesuits, and the Redemptorists, and the monastic orders generally, in the United States as in other countries, are the devoted adherents of the Pope—his "regular army," and venerate him as embodying in his person the infallibility of the Church, which is to them the infallibility of God. But we do not believe that the secular clergy—the "militia" of the Church, the priests who

have the charge of congregations, and are in contact with the people—still less do we believe that the more intelligent laymen of their communion are ready to accept a dogma that draws after it such consequences. If the laity could speak and vote in the ecumenical Council of 1870, the decrees and acts of that body would be very unlike what we are likely to see. But that so-called Catholic system which has the Bishop of Rome for its Head-Center, excludes the Christian people from all participation in ecclesiastical affairs. It is an absolute hierarchy ; and its professed infallibility—whether lodged in the Pope or in the Council—is simply hierarchical. Under that system the Christian people have only to accept whatever dogmas the hierarchy may define, and to bear all burdens, however grievous to be borne, which the hierarchy may lay upon their shoulders.

ARTICLE IV.—REVIEW OF THE LIFE OF DR. JOSEPH
ADDISON ALEXANDER.

The Life of Joseph Addison Alexander, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, New Jersey. By HENRY CARRINGTON ALEXANDER. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870. 2 vols. 12mo.

WITHIN the last few months the public have been favored with biographies of two of the eminent men who, for many years, were instructors in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. In the case of both alike the work of recording their history has been delayed for a much longer period than usual—eight years in the one case, and nineteen in the other—and for a longer period than is ordinarily desirable. But it is better that such a work should be done late, than that it should never be done; and, in the reading of these volumes, we feel anew the regret, which we believe many have often felt, that no one has as yet undertaken to give to the world the record of the lives of one and another of those remarkable men, who gave to Yale College its wide reputation in the last generation. The one point, however, to which we have referred, is almost the only one wherein these two biographies resemble each other. Dr. Miller was a man whose whole career, from his early manhood, was connected with the public life of the Church. Dr. Alexander, on the other hand, was a retiring scholar, who mingled little with the outward world, and had little to do with the controversies of his time. As a natural and necessary result of this wide difference between the two men, we find the volumes, which speak of the former, abounding in incident, and largely filled with a wide extended correspondence; but those which have reference to the latter have almost nothing to tell beyond the limited circle of his daily studies and his nearest friends. The life of a scholar, however, possesses a peculiar charm belonging to itself, and the story of it must have, to appreciative minds, something of the same interest

which the experience, while it continued, had to the one who lived it. We are glad to see the biography of this distinguished scholar presented to the world.

Dr. Addison Alexander was one of those fortunate—or, as some would think, unfortunate—men whose whole life is passed in the Academic sphere. He was born, indeed, in Philadelphia, where his father, the celebrated Dr Archibald Alexander, was pastor of one of the Presbyterian Churches. But at the time of the establishment of the Theological Seminary at Princeton, when he was only four years old, the family removed to that place, and from that date (1813) to the date of his death, in 1861, he knew no other home. The influences of a collegiate town and of a professor's house were, therefore, about him from the early opening of his intellectual powers. Books and students were on every side of him. Inviting calls to the scholarly career came to him with more alluring voices in every succeeding year. His nature, too, answered to these calls and influences. His mind seems at once, and eagerly, in his boyhood, to have turned toward the study of language. He had such strong inclinations, and such irresistible enthusiasm, that his friends wisely felt it to be useless to interfere with him, or even to attempt to guide him. They left him alone in the library to follow his own sweet will, and were assured that he was safe in the keeping of one of the best of earthly loves—the love of reading. The future of such a youth can hardly be doubtful. Divine Providence does not give such talents, and such circumstances, and such prophesyings of the coming years, without caring for and bringing to its realization the result so manifestly designed. Somewhere there will prove to be a field for the working of such powers and, in general, it will be within that circle of scholars, among whom the powers have displayed themselves as they were developing. The gifted youth will become, as it were, the child of his own University. He will pass on through his whole career, and, at last, quietly close it in the same peaceful and pleasant retreat where it began. The influence and blessing of his life to the world will become a part of that which gives fame to the great institution, while his life itself will be as happy as it is unpre-

tending and uneventful. This was, in an eminent degree, the case with the subject of these memorial volumes.

The story of Dr. Alexander's life, as one might naturally anticipate after what has been said, can soon be told. He was born on the 24th of April, 1809, and removed to Princeton, as already intimated, in 1813. As he advanced in his boyhood he attended different schools, and came under the instruction, among other teachers, of Robert Baird, who afterwards became so well known to the Christian world. To him he seems to have been indebted for much inspiration and efficient guidance in his linguistic studies. The friendship resulting from their intercourse at this period continued through life, and was alike honorable to both. At the age of fifteen, he had made such progress that he was able to enter the Junior Class in Princeton College. Immediately he took a prominent position among his classmates, and was esteemed by them all as a man of extraordinary powers. "The boys at the Academy," says his biographer, "thought he knew as much Greek as Mr. Baird, and that it was impossible for him to be entangled amidst the intricacies of mathematics; and some of his associates of the college fancied that he was superior, on the score of his attainments, to most of his instructors of the college faculty. This was not only the enthusiastic estimate of youth, but the deliberate and mature judgment of riper years." Such judgments respecting classmates are oftener formed by college students than they are justified by the facts of the case, but occasionally, no doubt, they are true, and, if we look at certain departments of study, they were no doubt true in the present instance. At the graduation of his class, in September, 1826, he shared the first honors of the college with two others. By lot the Valedictory Oration was assigned to him, and thus he was put forward as the speaker for the class. Though only five months beyond his seventeenth birthday, he is said to have acquitted himself on this occasion so well, that several eminent persons at once predicted for him a very brilliant career. A year afterward he was elected to the office of Tutor in the college, but declined it, and devoted himself for a while to private study, after which he engaged in teaching, and, at the same time, in editorial labors. The college, however, was not content to

wait long for his services. In 1830 he became Adjunct Professor of Ancient Languages and Literature, an office for which his previous studies had thoroughly qualified him. About the same time he formed the resolution to prepare himself for the work of the ministry. This resolution he was enabled to carry out even while discharging the duties of his position in the college; and accordingly we find him devoting himself to studies in Systematic Theology, Biblical Criticism, and History—giving the time which he had at command during four days in every week to the first-mentioned branch, and during the remaining two days to the other two branches. It was, at this time, that he may be said to have commenced that work which afterwards became the chief employment of his life. He had, indeed, pursued the study of Greek and of Hebrew at an earlier period. But now he undertook to master these languages much more perfectly, and with the definite object of making himself a thorough Biblical scholar. No doubt his first design in doing this was to gain that knowledge of the Word of God in the original languages, which he felt that every cultivated minister ought to possess. His peculiar linguistic tastes and capabilities, however, soon led him to a point beyond this. The work, which was begun only as a means to a further end, became an end in itself—and he was in a course of preparation; which resulted in the ministerial office being secondary to that of the scholar and teacher. There is very little of incident connected with his life in this professorship, and very little which may afford us any adequate idea of what his success as an instructor was. But, in regard to his method of study, a single extract from his diary, which is quoted with exclamations of wonder by his biographer, will present the young scholar quite distinctly before us:

“This,” he says, “is my Hebrew day. My object, at present, is to obtain as accurate a knowledge as I can of the lexicography and grammar of the language. I choose a passage, therefore, merely to serve as a text, and go over it twice. In Hebrew I do this first in Kennicott, without the points, looking for every word in Gesenius’s lexicon, and reading the whole article upon it carefully. This is my way of studying the passage lexicographically. I then take the pointed text, and analyze it most minutely, reading at large every article in Gesenius’s *Elementarbuch* which has a bearing upon the subject. By pursuing this plan I shall soon have read a large proportion of the lexicon, and grounded

myself pretty completely in the grammar. In this sort of study, the grammar and lexicon are the real objects of attention; the Hebrew passage only serving as an index to the parts to be consulted. In another branch I shall make the exegesis of the passage my chief aim. Even in the former mode, however, I shall be slowly, but surely, gaining a thorough knowledge of some parts of the Bible."

When we consider the fact that he was but twenty-one years of age, at this time, it must be admitted that his earnestness and thoroughness were quite remarkable. It would certainly have been a great mistake, if such a man had turned aside to any work outside of the scholastic life. It seems, indeed, as if there could have been but one future opening before him.

After two years and a half, in April, 1833, he resigned his professorship and sailed for Europe, where he passed the following year. We get little idea of what he accomplished as a student abroad. Indeed he appears to have been resident in Germany only four or five months; too short a time for any considerable results, though his biographer speaks of him, in fond phrase, as returning "laden with the honeyed spoils of European learning." His European experience in general, if we may judge from his diary or letters, was not any more interesting than that of most cultivated young men whom it has been our fortune to know. His affectionate nephew, however, seems ready, almost everywhere throughout the volumes, to supply us with comments suggesting what Dr. Alexander would no doubt have said, had he known that his life was to be written. And if such vivifying suggestions are made to inspire all the words which the great man has left behind him—as perhaps they ought to be—he was as far beyond most other men in respect to this matter, as in respect to many others.

Immediately on his return he became an instructor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. Here he remained, in one capacity or another, during all the rest of his life. At first he declined the office of Adjunct Professor of Oriental Literature, if we understand his biographer correctly, but he substantially performed its duties from the beginning—being associated with Dr. Charles Hodge as his assistant. Whether this course was taken by reason of a modest and self distrustful view of his qualifications, or for the sake of making a trial as to his

success in this department of instruction before committing himself to it, is a point which is not quite clear to us. But, from whatever cause, he deferred his acceptance for three years, until, in 1838, he was inaugurated Professor, with a reputation already established, and with no further doubts in his own mind, or in the minds of others, that he was in the right place. The concluding portion of the first volume of the biography, and the whole of the second volume, are taken up with the narrative of the quiet and uneventful years, which followed this time, and reached to the hour of his death, nearly a quarter of a century afterward. It is a noticeable fact, that his ordination to the ministry was in 1839—nearly nine years after he had first resolved to devote himself to that profession, and four years after he had entered upon his Seminary duties. He had, indeed, preached to a considerable degree, and with very great acceptance. But, as in the case of his professorship, he was slow and cautious in taking upon himself the sacred office. The world had determined his reputation already, before he consented to present himself before it as claiming or holding the stations to which he was invited. From the time of his ordination, however, his two great works were carried on, side by side, and he was hardly less eminent in the branch of the Presbyterian Church to which he belonged as a preacher, than he was as a scholar.

At this point we leave the narrative, because there is nothing further to be referred to, beyond what may readily come before us as we consider his work and his character. Dr. Alexander was, undoubtedly, a scholar quite superior to most of those whom the department of Biblical Literature has called to itself in this country. He had extraordinary powers of acquiring foreign languages; an extraordinary love of learning; an extraordinary memory which enabled him to retain what he had once learned; an extraordinary patience which shrank from no labor necessary to attain the end he had in view; an extraordinary physical constitution which seemed to require no exercise to keep it in health and vigorous action; and an extraordinary freedom from all craving for social intercourse, so that his whole time could be uninterruptedly devoted to books. This wonderful combination of

powers and peculiarities gave him a vast advantage, as compared with other men, in the one thing to which his life was devoted. A man who cares nothing for society, for example, and can live alone, with no desires or calls from the outward world, escapes an incalculable amount of interruption, and saves for study an immense amount of time. So, too, with a man whose bodily organs take care of themselves, no matter how much he neglects them, or a man whose memory never loses what it has had entrusted to its keeping. No wonder that such a man leaves behind him many of his companions, learning ten languages while they are learning two or three. We do not say that he leads a better, or more useful, or happier life; but, if he has such powers, he will surely know more in his own line of study than they will, or than they can. The volumes before us abound in evidences of all these things to which we have alluded. Beyond the immediate and narrow circle of his nearest friends, Dr. Alexander had little to do with the world. He buried himself in the privacy of his own room, where he was able to concentrate his mind upon books from morning till night. Persons who attempted to see him were not, indeed, always rejected. They were sometimes kindly received. But his reputation as a lover of solitude, and as a person of not very uniform graciousness of manner, was such that comparatively few ventured to disturb him. He seems to have been so free from all bodily weakness as to have almost despised any special attention to the care of his health. Except for a certain depression arising from peculiar states of the weather, he was never in any other than full working condition. As for his memory, it is sufficient to call attention to the fact, that, after having read the works of various authors and commentators in preparation for his own commentaries, he was able to lay them all aside, and, keeping their various views fully in mind, to write his volumes in a place removed from his library and his home. His acquiring so largely the knowledge of Arabic in his early years, having commenced the study of it at the age of nine, will show his love of learning; while his patience is indicated by extracts like that quoted above on page 76th, or like the following, with which the biography abounds:

"May 14. Read Acts xxviii., in the Peshito, Vulgate, Luther, Meyer, De-Wette, Erasmus, Calvin, Wolf, Bengel, Wetstein, Lightfoot, Lardner, Winer, Bloomfield, Olshausen, Von Gerlach, Humphrey, Hackett, Trollope, and Lytton."

Or this, when he was but nineteen years old :

"Sept. 30. 1. In Hebrew I have read since the 30th day of June, the last thirty chapters of Jeremiah—the prophecies of Ezekiel, Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obed, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, and thirty-six Psalms—in all, a hundred and sixty-nine chapters.

"2. Italian. The last twenty-eight cantos of Orlando Furioso.

"3. Spanish. Twelve numbers of 'El Mercurio,' &c.

"4. French. The funeral orations on the death of Maréchal Turenne, by Fléchier and Mascaron; the last two acts of the 'Menteur' of Corneille; other plays of the same author, and four comedies of Molière.

"5. Arabic. Sundries in the Koran and Lockmân's Fables.

"6. Persia. Sundries in the Gulistan and the Tooti Namah.

"7. Greek. Homer; Iliad, I., II., XVIII; Odyssey, I., II. Sophocles, the Antigone, several hundred lines.

"8. Latin. The first book of Cicero, de Inventione Rhetorica.

"9. English. Vattel's Law of Nations; the Federalist; the first two volumes of Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind; the first two volumes of Kent's Commentaries on American Law; the third volume of Blackstone's Commentaries (for the third time); and sundries."

What—we feel impelled to ask—might not such a man accomplish should he turn his energies to Biblical learning for more than twenty years? What wide cultivation might he not obtain, in regions which are rarely penetrated by ordinary minds? He soon became a kind of wonder to the view not only of the students who resorted to the Theological Seminary at Princeton, but to all that large circle of clergymen and others who found the center of their intellectual life in that University town. Before the end of his life, we are told by his nephew, that he understood, so thoroughly as to be "perfect master" of them, eight or ten languages; and, to some extent, about twenty-five. "Had he devoted himself wholly to strange tongues—as he did not, in later life, with the same absorbing assiduity as in former years"—the biographer thinks, "he could have mastered as many as any of the famous linguists, with the solitary exception of Mezzofanti." We confess that we are a little sceptical in regard to the "twenty-five" languages—not that we doubt, that he may have looked into them to some slight degree, but that, on

careful investigation, such claims generally prove to have less foundation than they seem to have when stated in a brief sentence. The eulogistic biographer, we may add, counts among the twenty-five, languages which he "probably," and even those which he "possibly," knew, as well as those which he "certainly" had at command—and, if we could reckon "possible" things as "actual" in this matter, we have one or two neighbors, now mainly unknown to fame as linguists, whose reputation would deservedly become a wide-extended one at once. After making all deductions and allowances, however, we are compelled to acknowledge—and we do so most willingly—that he was a man, in this respect, very far beyond most of his American contemporaries.

The question naturally arises as to the results of this extensive learning. We are unable to discover from the volumes before us that any very direct results of his linguistic knowledge, in most departments, were left behind him. It was scarcely to have been expected that they would be. The greater part of every such man's learning dies when he dies, so far as this world is concerned. We are to look for the beneficial effects of it in places which are less manifest to the superficial observer; and, when considered in this way, we may doubtless find in the pages of Dr. Alexander's writings much that he has drawn from his very extended investigations in the literature of various nations. In the department of Biblical learning, however, we may inquire more distinctly and particularly what he did. The sum of his life's work here may be presented in two different points of view. In the first place, he was an instructor for a quarter of a century in a large Theological Seminary. Several hundred students, preparing for the work of the ministry, came under his influence, and were guided in their study of the Scriptures largely by him. How much good was done to these students, and through these students to the world, can never be fully determined in this life. But we may believe that it was not inconsiderable in amount. A theological teacher, in any branch of study in a seminary, is limited in the possibilities of his work. The most which he is able to do—and the most which it is desirable that he should do—is to open the door to a life-long study, to give

his pupils the foundations of knowledge, to show them the true methods of study, and to impart to them such enthusiasm that they shall be borne onward by it in their future course. Even this he cannot accomplish for all, for there are students in theology, as in every other department, who offer little opportunity for an instructor's power or influence. In Dr. Alexander's case, his work was further limited by the fact that his instructions were confined to a portion of the field which he entered. We judge, however, from the account which is given us, that he inspired his students, or the better portion of them, with a love for the studies of his department. We do not know, indeed, that any special results of such love and enthusiasm manifested themselves in after life among those pupils. But, doubtless, in some of them it did continue so far as to influence their private studies, and, in the far greater number of cases where it did not, we must remember that the exhausting demand of two sermons every week is too apt to turn the preacher away from the habits of his student life. Dr. Alexander could not, however, have been a teacher of the best order, because of his unfortunate temper and manner. He was brusque and impatient in his manner; easily excited and irritable; sarcastic and, if we may use a strong word, savage in his expressions; intolerant of slow minds. His temper was hasty; breaking out into indignation suddenly, and oftentimes, apparently, with no very great reason. To be sure, his biographer says he repented very quickly, and, on some occasions, even apologized or asked forgiveness. But no man who ever loses the evenness of his temper, or the kindness and calm dignity of his bearing, is in the highest degree qualified for the position of an instructor of young men, and especially of young men in a professional school. Indeed, the longer we live the more important we believe a patient temper to be in every department of life. Certainly it is of immense importance in every place, where the guidance and influence of others is the chief thing to be aimed at. It is amusing, sometimes, to see the evidence which these volumes incidentally give, as to how far Dr. Alexander erred in this respect—as, for example, in the case of the student who, as he was “whistling a lively tune and keeping time with his feet while ascending the stairs of

the seminary building," met "the dreaded scholar," and was so "amazed" because he met no severe rebuke, that he "stood motionless;" or the case of the members of one of his special classes who, being told by him (in the euphonious phrase of the biographer), "with some distinctness," that he would give them an hour, "understood from his manner that a moment beyond the hour would be counted as an encroachment." "Knowing well his peculiarities," the biographer adds, "they were careful to leave precisely at the striking of the clock, no matter how interesting might be the topic under discussion. They were equally careful never to enter his room a minute before the time, even if they had to stand out in the cold for the clock to strike." A man whose pupils felt and acted thus might be a *good* teacher, but he, certainly, could not be regarded as *in the highest degree* adapted to his office. Geniality, readiness to be interrupted and lay aside his work, forbearance toward those who wearied him, what a young man of our acquaintance once prayed for as "the spirit of gentility," were not among the list of his virtues—at least, they were not virtues which he had so uniformly in exercise as to be generally reputed as possessing them. And yet to some this deficiency was not manifest. These were the men who overcame his reserve, and paid careful heed to all his peculiarities, and interested him by their earnestness in study, and never stayed too long. They found him often very communicative and very stimulating. "No hours of my life," says one of this class of his students, "have been hours of greater intellectual activity and pleasure," than those spent with him. On the whole we may say, from the review of his life, in this regard, as presented in this book, that he was, like many other men, deficient in just that point which prevented his full success, but that, at the same time, he was a man of unusual qualifications for his especial work, an earnest and thorough scholar and, to the best minds, an awakening teacher.

He was a man of restless character as regarded his methods of working and of instruction. Always experimenting, he was never content to be bound by either the old ways or the new. So far, indeed, did he carry this desire for change, that his pupils at times complained of him seriously. They were turned

aside to a new method or plan of study, just as they had become accustomed to the one with which they had commenced their work. But at other times, of course, they gained by reason of the same peculiarity. The love of change was characteristic of him in many things. He seems to have been unwilling to occupy the same room for a very long period of time. He rearranged his library at intervals, and is the first literary man of whom we have ever heard, who was actually grieved on finding that the ladies of his family, who had been superintending the cleaning of his room, had left his papers and books in precisely the same places in which they were before. We are glad to have read his life, if for no other reason, because it assures us that there has lived in the world one man with such feelings. We pardon a good deal of his impatience with his pupils, in view of this willingness that his mother and sister should disturb the fixed order of his room. We hope his example may be of service to every one of his associates in the scholarly life, all over the world.

But we had not intended to allude so much at length to this point. In connection with his love of change we are interested to observe that, after making trial of a variety of methods of instruction for his classes, he comes to the conclusion, that the best course for the teacher is to lecture on some particular topic, and afterwards, on a following day, to question the students with reference to what has been communicated in the lecture.

"I am convinced," he says, "that this is the true method of imparting the most knowledge in a given time. I was formerly pre-judiced against it, as a plan adapted merely to save labor and make superficial scholars. In this I was first shaken by my visit to the German Universities, which made me ask myself how it is that this method of instruction is adhered to in a country principally noted for its love of change. If anything could have been gained by innovation, the Germans would have tried it. I have now removed my doubts by fair experiment, and am persuaded that even in elementary instruction this plan is the best. As for the usual objection to it, that it enables the indolent to dispense with study, and deprives the studious of the advantages which flow from intellectual effort; it is founded on a mere mistake. The only effect of this sort is, to elevate the standard of acquisition by sparing the necessity of hunting after some things, and thus leaving time for the mastering of others. But the great argument in favor of the method is, to my mind, this: that it enables the teacher to direct the student's mind as to what he ought to study. The student of the

Bible, for example, needs to be informed by one who knows, what are the real difficulties of the passage ; not one in ten of which might possibly suggest themselves. When there are different opinions to be weighed, he needs a brief, clear statement of them, and at least an outline of the reasons pro and con. These he can digest and compare in private study. These statements might, indeed, be made after the student has prepared his lesson ; but the result of my experience is that they are then too late. After toiling through a task in which he feels no interest, because he does not know the interesting points of it, he is apt to regard all further illustration as surplusage ; as something added to a thing of which he has already had enough."

This question of the comparative advantages of the system of instruction by lectures, followed by frequent examinations, and of the system of instruction by recitations, is one of much interest. In the case of students who, having completed an academical course, are engaged in professional studies, we are inclined to give much weight to what is suggested in these remarks of Dr. Alexander. Our own experience has produced the same conviction which he here expresses. We believe, however, that a certain intermingling of the two methods is better than either of them by itself. The student needs to be put upon the work of investigating for himself independently of his teacher, to a certain extent ; and yet he needs the guidance of his teacher in just the way, and for just those reasons, which Dr. Alexander indicates. Otherwise there is a vast waste of time and ill-directed effort for the individual student, and of time and patience for the class.

In another respect, however, we think that his course was a mistaken one, and one calculated to repress or extinguish the enthusiasm of his pupils. "He never allowed us," says one of them, "to put questions to him in the class-room. He once told us that those who had questions to ask could write them and place them on the desk, and he would answer them at the next meeting ; but that he could not answer extempore." One of the greatest faults in our methods of instruction in colleges, we believe to be this ; and in professional schools it is far worse than in the less advanced institutions. Valuable time will sometimes, no doubt, be lost by giving the opportunity of asking questions during the lecture or recitation hour. Foolish and unimportant questions will sometimes be suggested by the weaker or less disciplined minds. But

enthusiasm and interest are everything in a professional school ; and nothing tends so strongly to awaken these as the knowledge, on the part of the student, that every suggestion or question from him will be received with willingness and with consideration. If the student is obliged to write what he wishes to inquire about, and to wait till another day for an answer, the spontaneity of the thing vanishes. The result will be that he will keep his inquiries to himself, and gradually will cease to find them rising in his own mind. He will become a mere receptive hearer, and meet the daily lecture as a necessary but wearisome task. Dr. Alexander himself seems to have felt this, at times, and to have adopted the better plan for a season. But in this, and in other respects, he was too much the professor, and too little the elder and more advanced friend, guiding scholars whom he felt to be his associates, though they were a little way behind him in the course. We can hardly blame him for this, for our colleges and seminaries have such an inheritance of old ideas and customs in this regard, that it is almost impossible for most teachers to break away from their influence. The better day is coming, as we believe, but it has not yet arrived. There are signs of promise, and they are increasing in number. When they are fulfilled, we may look for a higher scholarly life among our students, and for a more ennobling and inspiring influence from our instructors. And it is a pleasant thing to think of, that they will be fulfilled, first of all, in the schools for professional training.

The second point of view, in which we may contemplate the results of Dr. Alexander's life-studies, has reference to the works which he published. He was a Biblical scholar for twenty-five years. What did he accomplish in the department of Biblical Literature? The chief results which he has left behind him are his commentaries, on Isaiah and the Psalms in the Old Testament, and on the Acts of the Apostles, the Gospel of Mark, and the earlier portion of the Gospel of Matthew, in the New Testament. So little has been done in our country in the way of preparing original commentaries, that there are but few American works with which to compare these volumes of Dr. Alexander's. His biographer, and cer-

tain persons from whose letters he makes quotations, seem to regard them as deservedly holding the same rank with the best foreign works in the same department. This is the judgment, as we are persuaded, of those only who are unfamiliar with the writings of the great scholars of Germany. Such persons may speak with great confidence, and what they say may have great weight with Christian people generally, but the real value of their opinions is small. Reverend Doctors of Divinity, it must be confessed, are, oftentimes, as little capable of pronouncing upon a question of this kind, as they are upon chemistry; for their use of commentaries has been limited to those in the English language, and even to the inferior class of these. And it is useless to present to the public their declarations on the subject as if they were of any considerable consequence. What is the opinion of scholars in the department, and of those who have the knowledge necessary to a decision, is the question which we ought to ask. The answer to this question is final, so far as any judgment can be. We give all honor to Dr. Alexander for what he did. We remember how little others among his contemporaries in this work have done. But it is idle to attempt to place his writings on an equality with commentaries of the first rank, for they are not of that order at all. Nobody who understands the subject thinks they are, and their author himself, in all probability, did not think so. We have no doubt that they are the best works of the kind to be found in the libraries of many of the clergymen who are referred to in this biography, and very possibly they may be the best which the writer of the biography himself possesses. But, if so, there are others who have better ones, and a great many who, though they may not have them at command, know very well that there are better ones. This honored professor and scholar helped onward, in his day, the cause of Biblical learning. He rendered a service to our part of the world by publishing what he did. But his writings will not be very permanent in their value or their influence. They will not be very widely known a few years hence. We say this, having reference to the extravagant praises of his nephew and his immediate friends. They do injustice to his memory, in this regard, by greatly over-esti-

mating him, and provoke an unfavorable judgment by their very excess of commendation. He who was so intolerant of adulation while he lived—more intolerant of it, even, than of anything else—would be the last person, we are sure, to wish for such unmeasured praise. What was he, then, as a commentator? He was better qualified for the work which he undertook than any other person in his section of the Presbyterian body. He was one of the best who has at yet appeared in our country. But he was, nevertheless, in the second rank rather than the first, as reckoned among those of all nations; and we think we may justly say that his commentaries do not fully equal his powers and his fame.

It is a remarkable fact—which is pressed upon our notice in these biographical volumes—that he confined himself almost entirely to the earlier portion of the New Testament. There is scarcely any evidence, in his diary or correspondence, that the Epistles of Paul occupied his attention. The great Biblical scholar did not give his thoughts upon these epistles to the world—nor, so far as we can judge from the arrangements of the seminary with which he was connected, did he have any opportunity of discussing them before his classes. They were reserved for another department—that of Dogmatic Theology—and for the investigations of another professor whose knowledge of Greek could scarcely be expected to be as thorough as his own. It is significant that, in this great stronghold of a particular theological system, the instructor in New Testament Greek and Sacred Literature is not allowed to interpret Paul's writings. The approach to these writings from the linguistic side is closed as much as possible—but the approach from the dogmatic side is thrown wide open. Exegesis is made subordinate and subservient to doctrinal theology, and the man who is most likely to interpret from the standpoint of the system which he is elected to his office to defend, is the one into whose charge is committed the whole exposition of what the great Apostle to the Gentiles has given to the church. This is a fundamentally wrong plan, as we are sure that all unprejudiced persons will agree. It is but the natural result of such a plan, that the theology of the seminary becomes dogmatic and polemical rather than exegetical and Biblical.

As a preacher, Dr. Alexander occupied a very prominent place in the Presbyterian Church. The uniform testimony of those who heard him is that his sermons were very impressive, very suggestive, very thoroughly the product of his own mind and feelings, and very earnest in their presentation of the truths of the gospel. Like most other men, he did not always reach the level of his own highest efforts. Like most others, also, he was more admired in some places than in others. He never awakened the same enthusiasm in New York as in Philadelphia, and his biographer points to one particular period, of only a few months' duration, when his reception in the latter city was more favorable than at any other time. He was, moreover, a preacher of quite a different order, according to the representation, when in the seminary pulpit at Princeton, from what he was in other towns, or even in other pulpits in the same town. This, indeed, was quite natural, for in the seminary chapel he had an audience composed of students in theology, and a preacher can scarcely lay aside the scholastic and theological style when addressing such a body. In such a place, too, the manner would almost necessarily be as peculiar as the matter. But everywhere there was something to interest and stimulate the minds of educated men. A picture of his appearance and manner in the lecture-room and chapel of the Seminary, and, again, on other occasions in the larger cities, will be conveyed to the reader's mind by the following extract, a portion of which is in the language of one of his old pupils, and the rest in that of his nephew. Some allowance will, of course, be made for the "extreme" style of the latter :

"Often his manner, in entering the room, delivering his lecture, and going out, was automatic, and would not suggest the presence of an audience. He seemed to see no one. His call to prayer, as soon as he reached the desk, waited for no one. He lectured looking on a book and turning the leaves without reading; with rapid, monotonous utterance, regardless of hurrying pens and aching fingers and half-caught sentences below. And he stopped so short at the end of the chapter or the hour, and so unceremoniously left, that we sometimes did not know that he was done till we raised our heads from our greedy notes, and saw him already out of the door."

"This picture," says his nephew, "is as true as it is graphic. The impression made upon this intelligent hearer and fastidious critic, by his preaching, and which is conveyed to the reader in the paragraph now about to be given, one should say, was derived principally from his efforts in the Seminary chapel."

The paragraph alluded to is as follows:

"Even in the pulpit the same singular combination appeared. His body was stationary, his voice was hardly modulated, his gesture not much more than a sea-saw of the right arm, his features were without play; yet body, voice, arm, and face were so full of flaring, impetuous life and real *unction*, that he was always as captivating and eloquent in his manner of preaching as he was fertile, discerning, and brilliant in matter and style."

The biographer adds:

"Sometimes he spoke exactly in the way here described. At other times there was less, indeed scarcely any, animation or visible *unction*. But there were times when the whole force of his genius and fiery emotion broke upon his selectest auditories like a whirlwind, and drove them before him like chaff upon a threshing floor. His grandest exhibitions of this character were in Philadelphia. There he often bound men hand and foot, and carried them whither they would not."

Certainly he was no ordinary man. But in his preaching, as well as in every other department of his life, he seemed very unwilling to become "famous," and shrank from public notice the more as he was led to realize that the world was applauding him. Instances are mentioned where he even rudely rejected the praise that was offered him. He was a genuine lover of truth and learning, who sought retirement more earnestly than anything else, and asked nothing from mankind but to be left alone with his pursuits. We can hardly help admiring his freedom from ambition and the vain desire of applause. This was one of the nobler elements in his nature, as it is in any man's. We do not wonder that his friends cherish him in remembrance for such an uncommon virtue.

We are interested, in comparing his life with that of Dr. Miller so lately published, to observe how little he was involved or interested in the controversies of thirty years ago. Like all the Princeton gentlemen of that time, he finally took the Old School side, and was gratified with their triumph over their opponents of the New School. But from the quietness of his study he looked more calmly on the contending parties. His enthusiasm was for other matters. It is a happy thing in the life of such a man, that his very pursuits have a tendency to draw him away from the turmoil of such strifes. If we may judge from his diary and letters, as given in these volumes, the biographer of Dr. Alexander could not, had he desired to do so, have made a controver-

sial book out of the record of his history. Nor could he have published the record with even a secondary design of preventing the reunion of the two parties, such as the younger Dr. Miller seems unquestionably to have had in preparing the biography of his father.

There are many things remaining which we might notice in connection with this remarkable man. But enough has perhaps been said to turn the attention of our readers to the volumes which his nephew has given to the public. Dr. Alexander was something of a poet—having written a few pieces of considerable merit. He might have made a novelist of some reputation, as his friends think, if he had devoted himself to such a work. He was successful, in their view, whatever he did. But, as we have already intimated, his fondness and aptitude for linguistic studies were so marked, that it would have been scarcely possible for him to lead any other life than that of a scholar in that department of learning. For a short time he was assigned to the Professorship of Ecclesiastical History at Princeton, but, though giving satisfaction to others while he held it, he was never satisfied himself until he was restored to his old and loved employment. The gift of tongues was his gift, and his work was assigned him where that gift could be exercised. In conversation, when he chose to indulge in it, he was brilliant, and full of wit and humor, according to the testimony of those privileged persons who were admitted to his society. With children he was always a favorite, and, while his doors were often shut against the intrusions of grown people, he was ever ready to play with the boys and girls—a faculty or power, if we may so say, which is more admirable and more desirable, oftentimes, than the knowledge of twenty or fifty languages. The tenderness which delights and comforts the little children is better than mental endowments, for it gives to the happiest place in the world its greatest happiness, and is a part of that love which comes from heaven. We confess—after all that we read of this eminent scholar—that nothing makes us feel so confident that he was a man of soul as well as intellect, as this characteristic which is so prominent everywhere throughout his history.

Of the religious life of Dr. Alexander his biographer says,

“It was while at Mr. Patton’s school,” to which he had been invited as a teacher, when he was about twenty years of age, “that his mind first became deeply impressed with religious things, and that he was led, as he and others believed, to put his trust in a crucified Saviour. Indeed the change in his feelings and purposes was, in his own judgment, and in the judgment of his father, owing to his first removal from his father’s house, to which he was attached with a passionate devotion. Of his exercises, previous to conversion, there are no trustworthy memorials. It was hardly to be expected that one whose advantages had been so extraordinary, should not have embraced the truth intellectually at a very early period, and this presumption is rendered almost a certainty by his own subsequent allusions, as well as by a multitude of collateral proofs, of slender weight if estimated separately, but of convincing force when put together and examined in combination. He was remarkable when young for his punctilious morality and outward respect for the great subjects of the gospel. It will be remembered that all the friends of his boyhood testify to his singularly exemplary character, and pronounce him one of the purest and most reputable youths with whom they were ever acquainted. But it will be seen from the diary to which the reader is now to be introduced, that Mr. Alexander himself confessed and bewailed his utter sinfulness, and saw no hope of salvation but in the merits and shed blood of Jesus Christ. The work of restoration was gradual, and unaccompanied by strong terrors or remorse. These solemn records possess a strange and mournful interest, from the fact already mentioned, that, with one or two exceptions, they are the only extant registers of his religious feelings.” It need only be added, that—though, as intimated in this passage, we find very little in his journal of a later date which reveals to the world his deep Christian experience—the whole course of his subsequent life manifested his devotion to the service of God. Those who knew him best will testify with greatest confidence to the earnestness and power of his faith and love.

His early death—before he had passed the prime of his powers—was a loss to the cause of Biblical learning in the

country. Its quietness and silence were like the quietness and silence of his life—a fitting close of such a career.

The biography of Dr. Alexander, which has suggested this brief review of his life, is written, as we have already intimated, by his nephew, Rev. Henry Carrington Alexander of Virginia. This gentleman was one of the boys whom Dr. Alexander so greatly delighted; and, by reason of his near relationship to him, he was acquainted with him for many years. With the admiration which all Princeton students, and especially all the members of his own family, had for the distinguished Professor, we do not wonder that he felt impelled to publish the record of his uncle's singular history. In the accomplishment of this work, he has been successful in presenting an interesting and somewhat vivid picture of his varied powers and characteristics. He has been quite unfortunate, however, in the very limited amount of the most valuable materials from which he could draw in the preparation of his volumes. Dr. Alexander seems to have been a man not merely of retiring character, but of peculiarly reticent habits, so far as the expression of his own inmost feelings and thoughts were concerned. At least, his journal contained almost nothing of this kind of expression. It resembled, as nearly as we can judge from the extracts given us in this book, a pocket diary in which he noted down as briefly as possible what he did each day. The volumes abound in such records as these:

"Dec. 1.—No lecture. Walked. Read Ezekiel xxv., in Chaldee. Read Gieseler, on the History of the Reformed Churches, and made notes thereon. Laid aside Luke, and took up Matthew. Read Erasmus, Calvin, Kuinoel, and Robinson on parts of Matthew i., Coverdale's Bible, Genesis x., and Matthew i., Hansard, 1828."

"Nov. 1 (from his European Journal).—Mr. Sears and I went to several book stores to inquire for Hupfeld's Dissertation and Ewald's Arabic Grammar and Bopp's Sanscrit do. Mr. von Gerlach's servant came to invite us to drink tea there. We went an hour too soon; Tholuck called soon after, but stayed not long. Then came Haversick. Mr. von Gerlach talked about Church and State."

His letters, also, though not quite so meager, are largely

destitute of anything which reveals the inward life. The biographer is, thus, without the very foundation for his story, and is compelled to make it almost wholly out of his own recollections and the letters of others descriptive of the man. Two volumes, of four hundred and fifty pages each, are too long for such a biography. The reader tires of the ever-repeated eulogies of friends and the suggestions as to the probable or possible feelings which the scholar may have had; and by the end of the first volume he comes to feel that the writer ought to stop. A man must have revealed himself very largely, in his opinions, emotions, plans, and hopes, and there must have been much of great interest in those opinions, emotions, and plans, to justify a memorial record of such length. The noting down of items from day to day is not sufficient, no matter who the man was who noted them. The business and ordinary letters of the greatest scholar become wearisome after a while. A memoir of half the size would have been better in this case, as in many others.

Closely connected with the point to which we have just alluded, is another worthy of notice. As the biographer frequently does not find in his uncle's diary and correspondence anything but mere items, he is led to expatiate upon those items in a manner which carries the reader away from Dr. Alexander to what is of no consequence whatever. An illustration of what we mean will be found in the following extract—a paragraph which has no connection with anything that precedes or follows:

“The latter part of April was beautiful. The pastures and grain fields smiled with verdure, the woods were in tender leaf, and the orchards were bending under odoriferous blossoms. The aspect of May was equally lovely. The country had scarcely ever looked so green. A lap of gracefully-sloping meadow and tilled land, now in rich color, might be seen to advantage from the Steadman street corner of the front library lot. On the 27th, Mr. Alexander and one of his brothers returned from a jaunt which had carried them through New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, York, Columbia, and Harrisburg. The General Assembly was in session. A great Whig convention at Trenton was spoken of. Webster, it was thought, would speak.”

This is a specimen selected at random from a large number of precisely similar passages. If the passage had any reference to the surrounding context; if it prepared the way for

the setting forth of Dr. Alexander's views and thoughts on Philadelphia, or on the Whig convention, or on Daniel Webster, or on the doings of the General Assembly of that year, or on college examinations, or on the beauties of spring, or on the comparative loveliness of April and May, or on rich colors and odoriferous blossoms, or even on the Steadman-street corner, we should have read it with deep interest. But when it stands by itself—unconnected with anything, and containing nothing in itself of any value—it becomes a blemish in the book. The rhetorical description in the beginning of the paragraph is wholly out of place as introducing the series of brief statements at the end. Of what interest can it be to any one of the readers of these volumes to know that, in the year 1844, the month of April was peculiarly charming in Princeton or Baltimore, unless it be in connection with the fact that Dr. Alexander's journey was made more pleasant or profitable by reason of the fine weather. But the story of his journey is not given us; and it could not be given, because no record of it had been preserved. We sympathize with the author in the difficulty of his undertaking, but surely he could have saved himself all necessity of introducing such passages as this by shortening the book.

We may cite here another brief paragraph, which resembles the one just referred to, but at the same time shows a further peculiarity of this biography:

"On Saturday the 28th [of March, 1855,] the two brothers were to be seen riding in the cars between Princeton and New York. What they talked about on this particular occasion, I do not know; but I will venture to say that they had a joyous time of it. They often differed and sometimes had vehement [but not unfriendly] discussions.'

At this point the biographer goes on to say that one of the topics on which they differed and respecting which they talked, on some other occasions, was that of style. This paragraph, like the last one which we quoted, has no relation either to the preceding or the following context. The subject of style is not supposed to have been under discussion at that time. All that is known is the single fact that Dr. Alexander and his brother were on the cars, either going from Princeton to New York or from New York to Princeton. The writer of

the memoir, however, "ventures to say that they had a joyous time of it." It is interesting to family friends, we admit, and even in a certain measure to the humane public generally, to be assured that any persons—and proportionally more so that two brothers—and still more that two gentlemen whose services the country could ill afford to spare—have passed over one of the New Jersey railroads in safety, and that they quite probably had a joyous time while doing so. But, after all, if such a journey had no further bearing on their future life; and if we do not even know, but only conjecture, that they were pleased with each other's society, it seems hardly worth while to tell of the matter after an interval of fourteen years. But if there are no letters and no diary, what shall the biographer do, it may be asked? We think it would be better to dispense with one volume of the book, as we have said before. But the further point to which we desired to allude in connection with this citation, is this: that the volumes mingle together the lives of Dr. James Alexander and Dr. Addison Alexander in a very remarkable way, considering the fact that they are written as the life of the latter. It is sometimes difficult, except by close observation, to tell which of the two brothers the author is speaking of. We think this is unfortunate, and even a decided fault in the book. But it is doubtless to be accounted for by the same scarcity of details connected with the career of the younger brother, of which we have already spoken more than once. We ask the reader's attention to but one more extract in this connection, which may serve to show both the peculiarities referred to. At the beginning of chapter xxviii., the biographer says, as if he were about to tell us something of much interest:

"But it is time to go back with the traveler [i. e., Dr. Addison Alexander] to Princeton and hear the news of Commencement. His former connection with Nassau Hall had not been forgotten by Dr. James Alexander. The young men of the College Societies were disappointed this year as regarded their Commencement Orator, who unexpectedly, and at a very late hour, declined. In the emergency they applied to Dr. Alexander [i. e., Dr. James Alexander], of New York, who consented to fill the gap, and at the time appointed made the address. It was, of course, very hastily prepared, but was a graceful and felicitous composition, and was widely commended."

This passage, again, has no relation to anything which goes

before or follows after it. It certainly is of very slight importance as connected with the life of Dr. James Alexander, and not the slightest as connected with that of Dr. Addison Alexander. And yet it is introduced as if some interesting circumstances, or some important events in the college world, were to be mentioned, which made the delay of the preceding narrative almost too long for the impatient writer and reader. We should not speak of these things at all, were they not found so frequently. But when we come upon them at intervals of only a few pages, from the beginning of the book to the end, we can hardly help asking what the author's ideas of biography are?

We wish to notice only one other point for criticism in this work. Dr. Alexander was a remarkable man, we believe, and we join our praise of him with that of others. But he was not the greatest man that ever lived. His biographer, however, could not have used more, and more numerous, adulatory phrases than he has done, if Dr. Alexander had been Paul himself. Indeed, we do not believe there were ever any five men in the world who, together, deserved more extreme admiration than this writer has bestowed upon his distinguished uncle. He is never compared to any one except the most world-renowned of men. He looked like Napoleon. His faults as a commentator or lecturer were like those of Neander. His style was like that of Calvin, his general knowledge, like that of Macaulay, his linguistic acquirements, like those of Sir William Jones. He died like Whitefield. It is admitted that he was inferior to Mezzofanti in the number of languages which he knew, but only in this respect; for, says his nephew, "Dr. Russell, the biographer of Mezzofanti, cannot persuade the world that he knew philology," while he, the biographer of Dr. Alexander, can assure inquiring friends that his uncle, "the ardent lover of Sir William Jones, the friend of Franz Bopp, the pupil of Dr. Pott, the early admirer of Grimm and Humboldt, and the careful student of the more recent efforts of German and English scholarship in this department, as well as of such authors as Freytag, De Sacy, Ewald, Rosenmüller, Thiersch, Buttman, Winer, Wahl, etc., was not likely to be indifferent to the amazing advances of the new science.'"

In his preaching, it is stated, perhaps fifteen times in the course of the two volumes, that he was like a rushing locomotive. He was also like a whirlwind—like a foaming torrent—like a storm. “Mighty intellects bowed under him like the pine before the tempest.” “He fairly ravished me with his enchanting imaginative pictures and his wild bursts of music and pathos. He went through his sermon as the summer wind goes through the trees before a thunder storm. He closed in a perfect cataract of glorious imagery and high religious feeling.” He projected a commentary “which no other person but himself had the ability to complete.” “When aroused, his wit flew like foam flakes, or like a gay steamer before the wind.” By his sarcasm “he would cut a man’s side open, to relieve him of a festering briar. Or, to change the figure, he hurled rocks at the fly that troubled his friend’s slumber.” “Hebrew was his atmosphere and his sunshine. It colored him as the leaf colors the silkworm.” “His favorite pupils had much the same sort of vivid feeling for him that the Old Guard had for the first Consul and the Emperor; while the body of the classes had the more quiet feeling of admiration that was generally prevalent in the French army.” His writings were characterized by “wonderful sententious completeness and power of statement. He could bundle up the substance of a shelf of authors in a paragraph.” “The Rabbinical and classical authors were at his finger’s ends.” “Sometimes in his commentaries, he leaves the analytical scaffolding behind him, and mounts up as with the wings of an eagle.” His work on Isaiah was a “Herculean task, but the author had great powers and an indomitable desire. There were moments of wavering, when this man upon the mountain-top needed to have his hands upheld by others, but, in the final issue, the victory over all difficulties was achieved, and the Amalek of German infidelity was overcome.” “If to write noble stanzas, each instinct with imagination and passion, and full of rhythmic music, requires the effort of a constructive artist, then it must be conceded that the subject of this biography was a constructive artist, and on the same grounds that settle the claim of Ariosto or Byron.” There is scarcely anything, from the

originating of a new system of theology or metaphysics to the preparation of stories for children, but this enthusiastic writer thinks his revered and admired friend might have done it equally well with the best and the greatest. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that such a man moved about in a quiet New Jersey village, for a quarter of a century, without being known all over the world. And we are quite sure that the retiring and unostentatious scholar never dreamed that his biographer would paint such an extravagant picture. We understand that the author of these volumes has been, for some years, a preacher in Virginia. If so, he has, perhaps, borrowed his style from his Southern brethren, whose extravagant imagery and magniloquent language have been always objects of wonder to the northern mind. We think, however, that the uncle would be better taken as a guide in the matter of rhetoric than his nephew; and the true estimate of the former's powers and greatness is doubtless somewhere between his own modest judgment of himself and the extremely adulatory one of his biographer. In a passage which presents a vivid description of Dr. Alexander's method of studying in his own room, we find the following pleasing picture: "His voice could be heard through his closed door, as in chirruping mood he sang his Arabic and Persian songs, blew tunes upon his ivory paper-folder, or murmured strange words in tones which might have deceived an inexperienced bee-hunter. Then he would pause, whirl the leaves of a lexicon, murmur again, whistle, soliloquize, cross and recross the floor, resume his seat, and so *da capo*. Sometimes, perhaps, when bending over Jarchi or J. D. Michaelis, a funny thought would strike him, and he would laugh aloud, quickly uttering the syllables, 'ha, ha, ha.'" The more we write of Dr. Alexander the more we like him; and we cannot but fancy his overflowingly joyous spirit refreshing itself with these volumes of his biography. In reading many of their sentences, descriptive of himself, he would, we are confident, pause, whirl over the leaves, murmur strange words in tones like a bee, whistle, soliloquize, cross and recross the floor, resume his seat, and so *da capo*, and *da capo*, and *da capo*, until, in the exuberance of his funny thoughts, he would close the

volumes with a loud utterance of those three expressive monosyllables.

NOTE.—After our Article had been written, and while it was in the printer's hands, we received the January number of the *Princeton Review*, containing a review of this biography. The authorship is indicated by the statement that the writer was a colleague of Dr. Alexander for twenty-five years, a statement which can be made only of the senior Professor of the Seminary at Princeton. He says, "This is one of the most skillfully executed biographies within our knowledge. * * The materials were abundant. * * They have been woven together with consummate skill. The style of the work also is excellent. It is clear, pure, and racy. There is no prolixity; no amplification,—all is rapid and vivacious."

ARTICLE V.—MORAL RESULTS OF THE ROMISH SYSTEM.

Catholic World, September, 1869. Article entitled "The New Englander on the Moral Aspects of Romanism."

Catholic World, October, 1869. Article entitled "Morality of the City of Rome."

It is one of the "Moral Results of the Romish System" * that it produces, among its defenders, some of the most unscrupulous disputants in the history of polemics. Other the-

* The *Catholic World* complains with bitter irony of the Rev. M. Hobart Seymour, one of the most dignified, as well as able, of controversial writers, for using this phrase, *the Romish system*, "as he elegantly, in accordance with the exigencies of modern controversy, styles the Catholic Church." It is an extremely difficult thing to suit the morbidly sensitive feelings of "our Roman Catholic brethren," in this matter of a name. If we defer to their own choice in the matter (as we should be willing enough to do, for courtesy, if they did not immediately take a trickish advantage of it), and call them *Catholics*, at once they snatch at the word and claim that we have conceded the main point at issue. If, on the other hand, we take any inoffensive and characteristic designation of their party and institution, we are sure to be met with violent or scornful reclamations, or with a tone of serene, uncomplaining, injured innocence and meekness under outrage, which distresses us out of measure. We are seeking for light, and studying the things that make for peace. Will the *Catholic World*, or some other in authority, explain to us in what respect *papist* is any more an opprobrious term than *episcopalian*, *presbyterian*, or *congregationalist*, as describing the adherent of a particular system of church-government; or wherein the name *popery* is any worse than *episcopacy* or *presbyterianism*, except in so far as the thing it stands for is worse; or how it should be an affront to call a man a Romanist, and not an affront to call one an Anglican or Gallican; or why it should be any more offensive to speak of "the Romish system," than of the Greek, or the Oxford, or the Genevan system? What can be the matter with a cause, every harmless descriptive title of which is repudiated as an insult by its adherents? It is an accepted law of language that the names of things intrinsically offensive tend to become offensive themselves, and have to be changed from time to time for new euphemisms. But this would hardly be cited by the *Catholic World*, in justification of its anger at the expression, "Popery," or "the Romish system."

As for ourselves, in our amiable desire to humor even the unreasonable whims of an opponent, we generally write out the compound "Roman Catholic" in

ological debaters argue for the truth ; and although the attitude of controversy is not favorable to candid hearing, still it is not impossible for the partisan to learn from his antagonist, and be convinced of a thing when it is proved. But the champion of Rome defends, not a proposition, but a corporation ; and he is tempted to all the arts by which a corporation-counsel may hope to make a good case for his client. The Church must be infallible (if only we could tell where the infallibility is vested), for if it is not infallible, where are we all ? Therefore, the Church is to be defended against all gainsayers. Or, to sum it up in the terse expression of the *Catholic World* for the current month, "his conscience is his church." *

The working out of this identical principle into similar results is visible in the directly opposite fanaticism which makes a religion of denouncing and abusing this same institution as the Man of Sin and the Son of Perdition. The history of pious frauds in Christendom is the history, mainly, of two sects, one holding that a certain corporation is to be vindicated and aggrandized at all hazards, the other, that it is to be vilified at all hazards. Of course, the advantage of time, skill, and experience in the business, is all on the side of Rome. Anti-popery has showed a very pretty talent in that direction, though it can never hope to equal such masterpieces of fraud as (for instance) the Decretals of Isidore and the Donation of Constantine. But "the spirit that worketh" in the one and in the other is the same. The spirit that breathes through the chaste pages of Maria Monk and the "Wonderful Adventures of a French Lady," is the genuine spirit of Roman Catholic controversy.

There is a quiet gentleman in Brooklyn who sometimes writes for the *New Englander*, Mr. L. W. Bacon, whose experience of the dealings of Roman Catholic antagonists in discussion illustrates their unpleasant modes of controversy. Some two years ago he adventured a civil pamphlet in answer to Father Hecker's eight questions, "*Is it Honest ?*" Where-

full. But it is too much to expect this of human nature in general. We cannot sympathize with the indignation that denounces Mr. Seymour for saying "Romish System."

* *Catholic World*, January, 1870, p. 547.

upon the *Catholic World* came down upon him with vast scorn and "aspersion of his parts of speech," finding in him nothing to approve or praise. Next he took to task, in an Article in *Putnam's Magazine*, certain petty impostures published in the anti-popery interest, which he liked as little as he did the brazen sophistries of Father Hecker. Whereupon the *Catholic World* fell (metaphorically) upon his neck and embraced him as a man exceptionally generous and noble; but regretted that he should have allowed himself to commend Mr. Hobart Seymour, whose statistical exhibit of "the moral results of the Romish system" was a most damaging argument against that system. Instead, however, of yielding to these soft solicitations, Mr. Bacon actually, in the July number of the *New Englander*, went so far as to vindicate Mr. Seymour's statistics, and even to give additional and more recent tables, which proved that what had been true in 1854 was true in 1869; and that, by every accessible measurement, the morality of Roman Catholic countries was worse than that of Protestant countries. Instantly Mr. Bacon became, in the eyes of the *Catholic World*, a bad man—a very bad man. Gall and wormwood are nothing to the bitterness with which it apostrophizes him:

"Your persistence in repeating calumnious statements, and spreading them out as you do among readers who will not see the refutation, will give you and your friend, Mr. M. Hobart Seymour, an unenviable notoriety among the worst calumniators of the Catholic religion who have as yet appeared. You have repeated some time ago, that most infamous calumny of the *Tax-book of the Roman Chancery*, so amply refuted by Bishop England; but although it has been called to your notice, you have never had the grace to apologize.* The old maxim

* Twice within the year the *Catholic World* has made this allegation against Mr. Bacon, with what justice the following facts will show: In the very next edition of his pamphlet, after the *Catholic World* had challenged the genuineness of the document alluded to, he appended a note giving his antagonist the full benefit of his contradiction, and waiving the use of the disputed document as unimportant to his argument; and this note has stood in all subsequent editions. See "Fair answers to Fair Questions," p. 41, note. We do not suppose that the *Catholic World* has gone on, month after month, reiterating this accusation, knowing it to be unjust. We presume that it has only repeated it *not* knowing whether it was just or not, and not having so much as looked to see.

But since the *Catholic World* will insist on hearing further concerning this "infamous calumny," we submit the following from a recent Roman Catholic author, who seems to know quite as much about the matter as Bishop England:

"Since 1512, a fresh source of information had been added, in the shape of an

seems to have been, "Lie as hard as you can, and lay it on thick, for it will all be believed," and hence we had our Maria Monks and our Brownlees. Now the tactics are to be changed, and the maxim seems to be, "Let there be some semblance of truth mixed with the lie, so that it may sink deeper; let the calumny be sugared over with professions of 'fair play,' and it will work with better effect;" and hence come such things as the *Moral Results of Romanism*, by Messrs. Seymour and Bacon, the 'model controversialists.' " *

What the object is of all this violent, Irish sort of talk towards a person whom the *Catholic World* had just been commending in the most gushing manner for his equity and generosity in controversy, and whom it knows perfectly well to be more than ready, in the face of whatever denunciation from Protestants and of whatever abusiveness from itself, to render its party every just concession—what the object of it all is can only be conjectured. Is it the plan of the *Catholic World* to make itself extremely disagreeable, in hopes that its antagonists will decline further discussion with it, and leave the field to itself? Or does it intend, if possible, by making false and insulting charges of unfair dealing, to irritate its adversary into abandoning that absolutely fair play which it is so fond of clamoring for, but which, when it gets, it finds so embarrassing? Whatever the object of this foul talk may be, it shall not hinder us from dealing with the arguments and explanations and statements of the *Catholic World* just as candidly and courteously as if it had conducted itself with decency. We shall correct our own former statements with care by whatever light we have been able to get upon the subject, even though it may be from the *Catholic World* itself; counting it "*fas ab hoste doceri*." In like spirit, the republication of Seymour's "Evenings with the Romanists," which was an-

official edition, printed in Rome, of the customary taxes in the Roman Chancery and Penitentiary. It was based throughout on the older arrangement of taxes, dating from the time of John XXII., but it was then kept secret, whereas it was now publicly exposed for sale. This publication, which was soon disseminated in every country, opened men's eyes everywhere to the huge mass of Roman reservations and prohibitions, as also to the price fixed for every transgression, and for absolution from the worst sins—murder, incest, and the like. This tariff was afterwards supposed to be an invention of the enemies of the Papacy, but the repeated editions prepared under Papal sanction, leave no doubt about the matter." "*The Pope and the Council*," by Janus, pp. 285, 286.

* *Catholic World*, October, 1869, p. 55.

nounced in our July number, and of which the *Catholic World* says, "so all the old calumnies and falsehoods are to be circulated with redoubled activity, and the commandment, 'Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor,' conveniently be thrust aside,"—has been delayed for no other reason than that the questions raised against the truth of its statements might be examined with scrupulous care to do no injustice to Roman Catholics.

Now, in what follows, we need not say that we shall have no snarling contention on petty questions with the *Catholic World*. When that journal sees fit to charge a venerable minister of Jesus Christ, distinguished for his uprightness, gentleness, and courtesy in debate, with "willful and deliberate deception," and with "mean and cowardly lying," of course there is no reply to be made. We have learned from Mr. Seymour's writings too genuine a respect for his name to do him the discourtesy of debating such charges against him. We shall proceed, in the interest of the public, and not of a private quarrel, to state the exact facts on the questions raised, making no use of the *Catholic World*, except to guide us to the points on which Mr. Seymour's statements and our own are called in doubt.

I. On the subject of *Homicide*, there is no appreciable show of objection to the figures given in the *New Englander* for July last, which prove "the proportion of criminal homicides to the population of different countries to be pretty nearly in direct ratio with the dominance of the Roman Church." These criminal homicides ranged according to the census next preceding the year 1854, from *four* to the million of inhabitants, in Protestant England, to *ninety* to the million in Sicily, *one hundred and thirteen* to the million in the Pope's own States, and *one hundred and seventy-four* to the million in Naples. The census for the year 1865-6, shows the following comparison between Protestant England and Roman Catholic France on the point of criminal homicide:

<i>To the Million of Population.</i>	<i>England.</i>	<i>France.</i>
Convictions of murder and attempts,	1½	12
" of infanticide in various degrees,	5	10
Suicides, yearly average for 1862-5,	64	127

II. The *Catholic World* “passes by this branch of the subject, for reasons which it has assigned,” and which seem to us quite inadequate, and concentrates its “care and fidelity” on the next point—the statistics of

ILLEGITIMACY.

1. *The Comparison of European Cities*.—The author of *Evenings with the Romanists*, writing in 1854, gave the names and “official returns” of ten principal cities of Protestant Prussia, and of ten principal cities of Roman Catholic Austria. The cities of Prussia gave an average of 15 per cent. of illegitimate births; the cities of Austria, an average of 45 per cent. The comparison was expressly restricted by the author to the returns of *city* population,* as exhibiting the comparative power of the two forms of Christianity in restraining human nature from sin, *in the presence of abounding temptation*; he distinctly intimated that in the rural districts of the several countries no such disparity is to be looked for.

The *Catholic World* admits the statements (which it would be impossible to deny), and then rushes upon Mr. Seymour, with coarse epithets—“mean and cowardly liar,” “calumniator,” &c., &c., and claims, with that air of injured innocence which is so favorite a weapon in Romish polemics, that if the returns of the provinces were brought into the account, they

* Mr. Seymour had said, in 1854, “Name any Protestant *country* or city in Europe, and let its depths of vice and immorality be measured and named, and I will name a Roman Catholic country or city whose depths of vice and immorality are lower still.”

Fifteen years later the *Catholic World* seems to accept the challenge, with great amenity, by citing “the case of Protestant Stockholm, where the rate of illegitimacy is over fifty to the hundred, quite equal to that of Vienna. Why did not Mr. Seymour cite Stockholm, which is notorious? I will answer: It was not convenient to spoil a good story.”

We will not stand in the way of Mr. Seymour’s answering for himself, if he likes. But it seems to us sufficient to say first, that the statement of the *Catholic World* is untrue. At the time of Mr. Seymour’s statement the official return of illegitimacy in Stockholm was 29 per cent., which is considerably less than “over fifty to the hundred.” Secondly, that the following ~~eleven~~ Roman Catholic cities were worse than the notoriously worst of all Protestant cities: Paris, 33 per cent.; Brussels, 35; Munich, 48; Vienna, 51; Laibach, 36; Brunn, 42; Lintz, 46; Prague, 47; Lunberg, 47; Klagenfort, 56; Gratz, 65 per cent.

would more than redress the balance of the cities. We proceed to put his proposition to experiment.

2. *Comparison of European Provinces.*—The *Catholic World* gives a hint of the way in which it would like to have the examination conducted; it would set the vast empire of Roman Catholic Austria, with its thirty millions of inhabitants, over against little Protestant Wurtemberg, with its million and a half; and would balance the average of the petty duchy of Baden with the average of the twenty millions of Prussia. There is no doubt that, under judicious manipulation, this method could be made to yield almost any result which the imperiled interests of the Roman Catholic Church could demand. But it strikes us that we shall get more readily at the exact truth in the case, if we take Germany, province by province, and set the Protestant provinces by themselves, with their official returns of illegitimacy, and Roman Catholic provinces by themselves, with their official returns. Two provinces, Silesia and Westphalia, are omitted, as being divided between Protestant and Romanist populations in nearly equal proportions.

ILLEGITIMACY IN GERMAN PROVINCES.

<i>Protestant.</i>		<i>Roman Catholic.</i>	
	Per cent.		Per cent.
Brandenburg,	12.	Austria (Upper and Lower,)	29.8
Hanover,	9.6	Bohemia,	16.8
Pomerania,	10.	Baden,	16.2
Prussia,	6.7	Bavaria,*	22.5
Saxony,	15.9	Carinthia,	11.7
Wurtemberg,	16.4	Carniola,	45.
		Moravia,	15.1
		Posen,	6.8
		Rhineland,	8.4
		Saltzburg,	29.6
		Styria,	30.6
		Trieste, Gorz, &c.,	9.9
		Tirol and Vorardburg,	6.
Average,		Average,	
	11.7		18.6

* The *Catholic World* goes off in a violent spasm of virtuous indignation at the injustice of producing these figures for Bavaria and Austria, where there exist "atrocious laws" forbidding to marry except under certain conditions,

This, then is what the government returns say: that in the fifty millions of the population of Germany the Roman Catholic population, in country and city together, is more than one-half again more demoralized than the Protestant population. There are nineteen illegitimates among the former, to twelve among the latter.

3. *Comparison of Mixed Populations.* — The *Catholic World* suggests that “where there is a large minority differing from the majority,” the comparison of the statistics of morality “would be most interesting;” and laments that this “cannot be done except in Prussia.” We are in a position, however, to relieve its despair, and grant it its heart’s desire.

The empire of Austria includes a population of 31,655,746. Of these, 21,082,801, or two-thirds, are non-Romanists, belonging to the Protestant Church or the Greek Church. In nine of the Austrian provinces the population is almost exclusively Roman Catholic. In seven, the Roman Catholics are, on an average, in a minority of 46 per cent.

ROMANISM AND ILLEGITIMACY IN AUSTRIA, 1866.

<i>Roman Catholic Provinces.</i>			<i>Mixed Provinces.</i>		
	Romanists per ct.	Illegit. per ct.		Romanists per ct.	Illegit. per ct.
Austria, Upper and Lower, 98.		29.3	Hungary,.....	52.	6.
Saltzberg, 99.		29.6	Galicia, 44.		8.
Styria, 99.		30.6	Bukowina,..... 9.		9.
Carinthia, 94.		11.7	Dalmatia,..... 81.		5.
Carniola, 99.		45.	Militargrenze, 42.		1.4
Trieste, Gorz, &c., 99.		9.9	Croatia, &c., 83.		5.5
Tirol, &c., 99.		6.	Transylvania, 11.		7.
Bohemia, 96.		16.3			
Moravia, 95.		15.1			
Average, 97.		21.5	Average, 46.		6.

which leads to illicit connections, &c.” “The Bavarians,” it says, “are as good a people as any in Germany, and it is a shame to libel them.” But inasmuch as Mr. Seymour had himself expressly made allowance for these “atrocious laws,” it is difficult to see how the shame attaches any more to him than it does to the *Catholic World*.

Besides, one of the very things alleged against Roman Catholic countries is their proneness to “atrocious laws” and “foundling hospitals,” and licensed prostitution and other demoralizing institutions and usages. All that we charge is that, some how or other, such countries tend, as a general rule, to a state of

“Where there is a large minority differing from the majority,” quoth the *Catholic World*, “it would be most interesting.” It is so, indeed. This falling-off in the rate of illegitimacy from twenty-one to six, when the proportion of Romanists to the population falls off from ninety-seven to forty-six, indicates the salutary effect of Protestant Christianity, not only on its own followers, but also on the working of Romanism itself. We believe that candid Roman Catholic writers themselves would acknowledge that their church is nowhere so healthy and free from abuses as where it is hedged about with plenty of heresy, nowhere so corrupt as where it is universally accepted and has everything its own way.

4. *Comparison of Nations.*—In his “Evenings with the Romanists,” Mr. Seymour, anticipating the *tu quoque* retort of the Roman Catholics, said,

“If any man will name the worst of all the Protestant countries, I care not which, I will name a Roman Catholic country still worse. Let Protestant Norway be named; its population was 1,194,610, and the proportion of illegitimate births was, at the last returns, from seven to eight per cent. Let Roman Catholic Styria, a province with a similar amount of population, 1,006,971, be set against this; the illegitimate births are twenty-four per cent.! If Hanover be referred to, and among its Protestant population the illegitimate births are ten per cent.; then let the province of Trieste, with its Roman Catholic population, be remembered, its illegitimate births are above twenty-three per cent.!”*

In this way he proceeded to compare, in 1854, Saxony with Carinthia, and sundry other regions on either side, whereupon the *Catholic World* has a violent outbreak of mingled indignation and erudition, at the “extreme trickiness” of comparing “Styria, Upper and Lower Austria, Carinthia, Salzburg, Trieste, which are not countries at all, but simply the German provinces of the Austrian Empire, and Bavaria, with *countries* so different and wide apart as Norway, Sweden, Saxony, Hanover, and Wurtemberg.” The regions in ques-

demoralization which sends the *Catholic World* beating in every direction for ingenious and plausible explanations. Since Austria has dropped the Pope and his Syllabus out of doors, let us hope that the amendment of “atrocious laws,” which has commenced, may go on to a happy completion.

* It is not strange that the lapse of fifteen years, in so rapidly changing a bit of country as the province of Trieste, should show a considerable modification of these figures, as in the foregoing tables.

tion seem to have been selected for their approximate equality in population, and it is a little difficult to see how their loss or gain of political independence affects the present case. But the style in which the *Catholic World* adorns its doctrine is beautiful. Comparing such *provinces* as Styria and Trieste, with such *countries* as Norway and Hanover! Outrage, indeed! Will some one charitably inclined send the *Catholic World* a copy of the Primary Geography studied in the “godless” schools of New York City, that it may learn that for half a century Norway has been as much a province of Sweden as Styria of Austria, and that while its Article was a-writing, Hanover was just as completely a province of Prussia? But the glory of its exact scholarship does not shine in full splendor until, in rebuke of Mr. Seymour’s “extremely tricky” way of speaking of mere provinces as if they were independent nations, it proceeds to make out lists of “Catholic countries,” and “Protestant countries,” on sound geographical principles. Its “Catholic countries” include Sardinia, Sicily, and Tuscany, and his “Protestant countries” include Norway, Hanover, Scotland, and Iceland! We are more than ever impressed with the importance of the common school system to our Roman Catholic population!

The following are the percentages of illegitimacy in the several nations of Europe :

ILLEGITIMACY IN EUROPEAN NATIONS.

<i>Protestant.</i>		<i>Roman Catholic.</i>	
	per cent.		per cent.
Denmark,	11.	Baden,	16.2
England, Scotland, and Wales,	6.7	Bavaria,	22.5
Holland,*	4.	Belgium,	7.2
Prussia, including Saxony and } Hanover, }	8.3	France,	7.5
Sweden, with Norway,	9.6	German Austria,	18.1
Switzerland, †	5.5	? Italy [defective]	5.1
Wurtemberg,	16.4	! Spain [defective]	5.5
Average,	8.8	Average,	11.7
		or, rejecting Italy and Spain,	14.5

* Contains 85 per cent. of Roman Catholics.
† Contains 41 per cent. of Roman Catholics. In the *Catholic World*, Holland and Switzerland are not allowed to stand as Protestant nations, but are classified

The returns from Italy and Spain are utterly defective and untrustworthy. Assuming the ordinary average birth-rate, the returns show that in Italy *more than one-fourth* of the births fail to be registered. Of course, as all experience shows, it is the illegitimate births that are most apt to escape record. As for Spain, its census returns, if quoted at all among statisticians, are quoted at even a larger discount than its financial securities. The run of the Spanish censuses for the last forty years, has been up and down after the following zig-zag fashion. We give the total population :

1828,.....	18,698,029.	1850,.....	10,942,000.
1837,.....	12,222,872.	1861,.....	16,000,000.
1842,.....	12,054,000.	1864,.....	15,752,607.
1846,.....	12,164,000.		

After all, what better could be expected in a country where (under the benign and enlightened influence of the Roman Church) there were, as at the last census, 422 Mayors, and 338 Deputy-Mayors, who could neither read nor write !

But even if the returns of illegitimacy in these two countries were complete, they would not be adequate to answer the pending question. In those two countries, the most favored lands of Romanism, where "the Romish system" has had absolutely unlimited opportunity for centuries, through church and monastic order, and law and government, and the giving of education, and the *preventing* of education, to work out its complete results, in morals, and industry, and intelligence, and peace, and order, the prevalent form of sexual immorality is not represented in the returns of illegitimacy. It is something for which the languages of Protestant countries have no name, but which fixed as an established usage there, under the title of the *cavaliere servente*, or the *cicisbeo*, is "the end which crowns the work" which the peculiarities of Roman

by themselves as *mixed* nations ; Wurtemberg having a like proportion of Romanists, and an exceptionally bad character, is classified remorsefully as Protestant. Unlucky Wurtemberg, wedged in between Roman Catholic Baden, with its 16 per cent. of illegitimacy, and Roman Catholic Bavaria, with its 22 per cent., is a solemn and statistical proof that "evil communications corrupt good morals."

Catholic Christianity have wrought for Latin Europe, and which they are eager to do over again in the United States.

The Irish returns, as we shall shortly show from the evidence of the Registrar General, are still more defective than the Italian, so as to be worthless for purposes of comparison.

The kingdom of Hungary is also omitted from the table. The *minority* of its population are Romanists. The majority are partly Protestant and partly of the Greek Church; the latter could scarcely be classified on either side. Accordingly only those provinces of Austria have been included which contain a Roman Catholic majority. If counted with the Roman Catholic provinces, the illegitimate births being only *seven* per cent., the omitted provinces reduce the total of the Austrian Empire to *eleven* and a fraction, according to the last returns.*

III. THE MORALITY OF IRELAND.—We promised in perfect

* The most impudent of the diversified pretences, under which it is attempted to shield the Roman Catholic nations from the force of the statistics of illegitimacy, is the pretence that those forms of crime, like fœticide and abortion, are characteristic of Protestant races. One glance at the aspect of the world to-day ought to make Roman Catholics very shy of producing it. Which are the increasing races, and which the decreasing? The question is answered in a touching paragraph from the eloquent Father Hyacinthe:

“ I hear it said that there are races that increase, and other races that diminish, or at most remain stationary. I hear it in the most eloquent sort of language for purposes of demonstration—the language of figures; and most saddening language it is, in this case, for the diminishing race, they say, is our own—it is France! I am not one of those who make the strength of any country to consist in the weakness of its neighbors—an old heathen notion which every Christian statesman should repudiate. But I do wish that my country might not go down, while the rest are rising! . . . I do wish, when I look abroad—I will say no more of Germany, I have spoken of her already; neither will I speak of Russia, which is in a very fair way to conquer upper Asia, and will soon, peradventure, rule China to the furthest East . . . but across the channel I behold the noble Anglo-Saxon race, one of the noblest in the world, and I do wish that I might be able to look upon that race without blushing! I will not reckon up her provinces and colonies; I will not pause at details;—but a vast Empire in the Indies! a flourishing and gigantic republic in the United States! a Continent, Australia, emerging from mid-ocean, and soon to be the rival of Europe and America! Forgive me, O my country, forgive one who loves thee well, this respectful and painful freedom! But I do wish that I did not have to hear it said, without having a word to say in reply, ‘ And you, Frenchmen, there are not enough of you to people and colonize Algeria!’ ”—*La Famille, Conférences de Notre Dame.*

good faith, in our Article in July, that "whenever the official figures of the last Irish census should be accessible, we would gladly make any correction of our conclusions which they might require." Certain newspapers had made astounding statements, on the authority of the last census, of an almost paradisaical purity in Ireland, which put to the blush England, Wales, and Scotland, and the town of Berwick-upon-Tweed. These things did not exactly comport with our previous impressions, derived from what we had seen of Ireland in America, and what we were accustomed to hear of the American half of the race in the police reports. Still we were conscious that we might have observed with prejudice, and we were determined to wait for the facts and study them with impartial candor. The story ran, that while the illegitimacy of England was 6.4 per cent., and that of Scotland 9.9 per cent., that of Catholic Ireland was only 3.8 per cent., and the greater part even of this was in the Protestant counties. We waited for the official figures. For decade upon decade, some influence, generally believed to be Romish, had defeated every attempt to get at the facts concerning Ireland. Now they were coming, and the *Catholic World* flapped its red covers and crowed in anticipation, and timid Protestantism trembled at its cacophonous exultations.

What do the figures amount to? The Registrar-General informs us in his Report, page 16:

"As regards the working of the measures for the registration of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in Ireland, judging from the number of these events recorded in 1864, I consider that *many* births, deaths, and marriages, *have not been recorded*.

"In several instances prosecutions have been resorted to with some advantage, but notwithstanding the exertions made to induce a general compliance with the law throughout the country, numerous cases of neglect to register births and deaths have been reported to me by the District Registrars."

The average birth-rate in all Europe is one in twenty-eight of the population. The actual number registered in Ireland has been one in forty-two. The inference is that nearly *one-third* of the whole number of births is unregistered. The Registrar-General adds, after this computation:

"It will be seen from the foregoing figures, compiled from the statistical tables of the Board of Trade, how incomplete was registration in Ireland, and com-

paring the number of births recorded in that year with those since annually registered, I regret to state that there appears but little improvement in the subsequent years."

This Report, although for the year 1864, is dated March, 1869. In almost all his quarterly returns since 1864, he complains of the omissions of registry; for example, he says in 1866, "a great number of births and deaths are unregistered;" and "at least *a third* of the births and deaths in this district have not been registered."

It appears that the illegitimate births in Ireland are not reported,—or, at least, only in the Protestant counties. Of course, if any births are to be kept off from the record, it will be, first of all, the shameful ones.

But is there no way of getting at some means of estimating the power of the Roman Catholic Church to strengthen its votaries against temptation? It is universally conceded that that church has no adherents more devoted than the Irish women. There is an impression, we hope a true one—certainly Mr. Seymour cordially confirms it—that in their native land, remote from the temptations of crowded cities and wealthy neighborhoods, they live as purely as any population in like circumstances. And we freely and cheerfully concede that something of this advantage of circumstances is due to their religion. The effectiveness of Romanism in discouraging the growth of cities, the accumulation of wealth, and the development of commerce and manufactures, with their attendant dangers, is sometimes boasted by its friends, and always conceded by its opponents. But that is a poor religion which is a safeguard only in times of security. How is it with the daughter of Erin amid the temptations of great cities, and where it is no longer possible to baulk the District-Registrar of his facts and figures? The Irish have themselves to thank if we cannot give the figures for the whole people. We take the best indications of the facts that we are able to find.

Take the city of Dublin. It is the most populous and the wealthiest city in Ireland, and is in the midst of the Roman Catholic part of its population, and where the Romish Church is strongest and most effective; and it contains more

prostitutes, for its size, than any city in the three kingdoms. There is one prostitute in every three hundred and one persons of the population, while even in London there is only a little more than half that proportion, or one in every five hundred and seventy-nine.

There is a very painfully interesting document which comes to us from a source which the *Catholic World*, certainly, will respect, and which illustrates further the comparative power of the Roman Catholic religion to secure from sin in the presence of temptation. It is the official report of the Roman Catholic chaplain at the Liverpool jail, the Reverend Father Nugent. The number of *women* committed to that prison in 1864 was 4,895, of whom there were

Protestants,	1,812
Roman Catholics,	3,083

He gives also the monthly commitments of “disorderly prostitutes” to that jail for nine months of the year 1864. They are as follows :—

	Protestants.	Roman Catholics.
January,.....	56	70
February,.....	88	97
March,	69	101
April,	60	96
May,	53	91
June,.....	65	116
July,.....	66	122
August,	71	117
September,	77	111
Total,	605	921

Now the Roman Catholic population of Liverpool, which is almost exclusively Irish, is perhaps a fifth part of the whole population of the city. Why, if Roman Catholic Ireland is so vastly purer than Protestant England and Scotland,—why should the Roman Catholic Irish, one-fifth of Liverpool, furnish more than three-fifths of the female criminals? “*Cælum, non animum,*” &c.

It would not be so easy to give exact figures illustrating the relation of crime to creed in America. We can only say that the claim of the Roman Catholic clergy to the chaplaincies of jails and prisons, on the ground that the majority of the in-

mates of these institutions are of their church, seems to be much better founded than many of their claims to public privilege. Their argument would seem to be: "We produce the criminals; why, then, should we not be allowed to be their spiritual counselors and consolers? We admit the fact, but object to the conclusion: especially in the case of juvenile delinquency, where the hope of society is that the juvenile delinquent may be put on a different track from the one on which he has been running. The population of the City of New York is said to be about one-half Roman Catholic. The juvenile vagrancy and crime of the city is almost entirely Roman Catholic. Part of it—exclusively Romish—is dispatched to an institution in Westchester county, which is as completely an ecclesiastical institution as any nunnery in Rome, but is sustained from the public treasury; and the residue, that is sent to Randall's Island, is so nearly all Romish that ecclesiastics of the Roman church have complained of being extremely ill-used, in that they could not have the spiritual direction of the multitude of their rightful wards in that penitentiary also, and carry on there the work of training which had been so hopefully begun outside.

IV. THE MORAL CONDITION OF ROME.

In the haste of closing our Article in the July number on "The Moral Results of Romanism" we appended to it the following note, which we are free to say we should have withheld, as giving an unjust and extravagant impression, if we had taken time to scrutinize it:—

"According to the best attainable evidence, the total number of births in Rome, in 1836, was 4,873; the yearly average of foundlings was 3,168. See Mr. Seymour's Introductory Chapter, page 43."

Now we are not frightened into any retraction by the fact that the *Catholic World* denounces the statement as "an infamous calumny." It said the same about the "Tax-Book of the Roman Chancery," which turns out, after all, to be no calumny at all, in the judgment of the ablest Roman Catholic scholars. And in general, every fact that makes against its cause is "an infamous calumny," and every person who writes effectively against it is a "mean and cowardly liar," and "a

vile calumniator." All this we are becoming accustomed to, and yet it affects us the less because we know that whenever, on the other hand, it comes in the way of our duty to mention facts to the advantage of the Roman Church, we shall be hugged immediately to the bosom of the *Catholic World* with gushing testimonials to our magnanimity and generosity.

But we really think that our Note over-stated the case. We might shelter ourselves under the saving clause, "according to the best attainable evidence," and vindicate the literal exactness of our Note. For excellent reasons, no doubt, the Roman Government, which has shrewdness enough in small matters, has been wont to pursue a policy of concealment, and withhold from the public the statistics of crime and immorality. Conscious that the States of the Church have an infamous reputation it studiously hides the facts in the case, as if these were worse than even the common fame. It may be a wise policy; but it is a suspicious one, and it certainly leaves some excuse for those who, being left to guess at the facts from "the best attainable evidence," find the best bad enough, and consequently sometimes guess wrong.

Our opinion of the moral condition of Rome agrees with the common impression of travellers—that it is a very corrupt and miserably misgoverned city, in which the principles of the Roman Catholic Church, having been in operation for many centuries, without let or hindrance, have brought everything, moral and material, to a bad end. Especially are we convinced that institutions which disparage the dignity of holy wedlock, by reserving public honors for the unmarried, tend to the encouragement of immorality. "Everybody understands that in the Pontifical States a married man never comes to anything. There is no future except for maids and bachelors."*

With this strong conviction, for which our readers will make what allowance they please, we wish to hold a just balance between the statements of Mr. Hobart Seymour, on the one hand, and the *Catholic World* on the other, with its citations from Mr. Maguire, an Irish Catholic M. P., and the Count de Reyneval who makes to the French Minister for Foreign

* Rome Contemporaine, par E. About, p. 262.

Affairs the welcome report that the Roman population bears the marks of "comparative ease," "apparent prosperity," and "gayety of the most expansive kind."

The contradiction between these parties is not so flat as at first appears. Mr. Seymour describes Rome before the Revolution of 1848, and Mr. Maguire describes it a dozen years after that event. In that year, as all the world know, the people of Rome rose against the Papal government, and expelled the Pope, the cardinals, and the Jesuits. His Holiness was said to have escaped, disguised as a livery-servant on the carriage of a foreign gentleman. After a long absence, in which a Republic, under Garibaldi, was proclaimed, he was brought back by the armies of France. But in the interval all was changed. The armies of France can now maintain the government of the Pope, but they cannot reconcile the people to the priests. A hatred, the most black and intense, is ever scowling upon priests and monks; and that enormous body of celibates are more isolated than before from the homes of the people. The state of things consequent upon the defeated revolution has led to a diminution of licentiousness, but an increase of lawlessness and violence.

Now in the good old days at Rome, it used to be the incessant boast of priests and monks, when conversing with Protestant visitors, that the whole world never exhibited such immense benevolence as the church of Rome manifested in receiving and nurturing so many thousands of helpless little foundling babes, that must otherwise have perished. They challenged all Protestantism to show anything comparable to it. An average, during ten years, of 3,160 foundlings received in a year—such was the statement of Mittermaier! Protestantism, with all its good works, must hang its head for shame. It may hold its own on good government, public peace, domestic virtue, but on that great test of public virtue and charity, the size of its foundling hospitals, Rome is ahead, and the rest nowhere.

But Mr. Seymour has a pleasant way in controversy, in giving an unexpected turn to his opponent's arguments; and in answer to these vannts he remarked, "this may argue unexampled benevolence on the part of monks and nuns in pro-

viding for so many, but it also argues, either a monstrous amount of illegitimate births, or at least an unparalleled number of cruel and unnatural mothers, that could thus expose their new-born offspring." Naturally the admirers of this characteristic charity of Rome, the peculiar boast of that happy city, do not like the dilemma; but that is no sufficient reason why they should let fly a storm of foul words at him.

But are his figures correct as describing the Rome of twenty-five years ago. We do not undertake to be responsible for them; but to say, as his opponents do, that these figures do not represent the Rome of to-day, is nothing to the purpose. Things have changed, and changed for the better. The first answer for Mr. Maguire and the *Catholic World*, in charging Mr. Seymour with false figures, would have been to show the true ones. The books of *Il Santo Spirito*, and of that multiple of little institutions called *Il Conservatorio* would, to them, have been accessible. Why not then meet Mr. Seymour exactly on his own ground, instead of giving the go-by to all the facts before the Revolution, and giving no exact and authenticated figures even as to the number of foundlings received at the present time?

Let us now consider the Roman Catholic answers.

The first answer assumes the correctness of Mr. Seymour's figures. But Mr. Maguire, and after him the Rev. John Sweeney, suggest that the number of 3,160 foundlings include not only those born within the city of Rome, but some brought thither from the rural districts to be dropped in the wheel of the city hospitals.

Very likely. But where do the infants come from that are received in the multitudes of *country* nunneries that abound throughout these rural districts, and commonly have each its *crèche*, or cradle, in which the child of shame may be dropped in secret, with a ring at the bell, and left? So little reason is left for mothers in the country to resort to Rome, that the number of these may reasonably be offset by the number of those in Rome who may resort to the country institutions.

The second answer is, that the great figure given by Mr. Seymour represents, not the yearly average *received* into the

establishments, but the yearly average of those *maintained* there.

This looks plausible; but it is incompatible with Mittermaier's statement, which is unequivocal. But even if the fact were so, it would make no such vast difference with the ultimate question. Morichini, a Roman Catholic, describing these foundlings, states that an average of seventy-three per cent. died yearly during infancy. Nor need we be surprised, however we may be shocked, at this frightful mortality, for as the *Imperial Review*, the leading Roman Catholic organ in England, states, of the 18,000 infants sent from Paris into the country to be nursed the mortality varied, in different departments, from 69 per cent. to 90 per cent. ! Everybody acquainted with the subject knows that this foundling hospital business is hardly better than a mitigated and legalized form of infanticide.* The survivors of a year's receipt of foundlings, if deducted from the total of the next year's inmates, would diminish the figure only some twenty or twenty-five per cent.

To come now more closely to particulars: Mr. Hobart Seymour lived in Rome, and described it (in his "Pilgrimage to Rome") as it was in all its power and glory before the Revolution. The Pope then swayed the most despotic sceptre in Europe; the power of the priesthood was unbounded; the Papal States were at their widest extent; their finances were in the most flourishing condition; all the institutions, and among them the foundling establishments, were amply provided for from the public revenues. Mr. Maguire, however, visited Rome more than a dozen years after the Revolution. The Pope remained there only as sustained against his affectionate subjects by the bayonets of France; three-fourths of the territories that were gained of old by fraud had now been wrested

* "Foundling hospitals, from the mortality in them, even under the best management, seem to be amongst the most pestilent institutions of mistaken benevolence. Such considerations induced a German author to propose as an appropriate inscription over the gates of such establishments, 'Children murdered here at the public expense.' Prof. Traill, in *Encycl. Brit.* xiv, 444. It is the prevailing opinion of British philanthropists that foundling hospitals have been, "on the whole, more pernicious than beneficial; that they have rarely accomplished their object; but that instead of preventing crime, they scatter its seeds and spread its roots on all sides." *Ibid.*, ix, 845.

away from him by violence; the priesthood, discontented and impoverished, were held in detestation by the enraged populace; the finances were so utterly ruined that subscriptions of "Peter's pence" were needed from all parts of the world; and all the old institutions of the city, including the foundling hospitals, were impoverished and crippled. This was a great change, and in many respects a very advantageous one for the Roman people.

Mr. Maguire, visiting Rome in her low estate and bankruptcy, gives an annual average of foundlings which is, as might have been expected, much lower than that in the Italian statistics of Mittermaier twenty-five years before; in his loose, vague way, he gives it as "about nine hundred." The *Catholic World* gets a statement from the records of *Il Santo Spirito* of the receipt of foundlings for three months of 1868, from which it estimates the annual receipt of that one institution at 952. It asserts flatly that there is no other place in the city where foundlings are received, besides this one, which receives nearly three a day; but we have a strong impression that it is mistaken. It gives hints of "a large proportion" coming from distant provinces, which is highly improbable, and authenticated by no figures whatever.

Taking the *Catholic World's* own figures, then, and assuming its estimate of the annual number of births in Rome, we come to the monstrous fact that about fifteen *per cent.*, or nearly *every sixth child* in that city is abandoned by its parents!

But this only introduces us to a fact more astounding still, that of this number of nearly one thousand voluntarily deserted infants, considerably more than *one-third* are the children of lawful wedlock! This, understand, is *claimed* by the *Catholic World* as an item in its *vindication* of the moral purity of the city of Rome! About one-sixth of its infants are abandoned, and of these one-third are abandoned by their lawfully married parents!

Now the *Catholic World* goes gaily on, having deducted this third part from the 952 children received at one foundling hospital, to ask us to believe that the remaining 584, knocking off the odd 184, as being possibly legitimate, or else possibly from

the rural districts—the remaining 400, then—constitute the total illegitimacy of the city of Rome! As if there were not bastards who are not foundlings, as well as foundlings who are not bastards! The probability that the number of lawful children unnaturally deserted to the almost certain death of a foundling hospital, is not balanced by an equal number of illegitimates not deserted, seems very small. But if we assume the number of illegitimates in Rome to be no more than the number of foundlings dropped into the wheel of this one asylum of *Santo Spirito*, and assume the total number of births to be no less than the estimate of the *Catholic World*, it still leaves the proportion of illegitimate births, at the present day, in Rome, to be more than twice as great as in the very worst cities of Protestant England.

“The *Civiltà Cattolica* says ‘this proportion of 28.8 of legitimate births for every one thousand of the population speaks very well for a capital city.’ And so it does; it shows, what we have always understood them to be, that the Romans are as virtuous and moral as any people of the world.”

Thus the *Catholic World*; to which it might safely add, that it shows that the separation of an enormous mass of the most vigorous part of the people under vows of celibacy and continence, does not necessarily check the multiplication of the population.*

bull against the damnable heresies of Martin Luther), in which he proposes to

* According to the statistics which the *Catholic World* itself puts in evidence, the birth-rate in the city of priests, monks, and nuns is considerably higher than in the wofully secularized kingdom of Italy; which “speaks very well” for the government—very well indeed—and ought to be counted as an offset to the fact that its murder-rate eclipses anything of the sort in the civilized world. If, in view of this awkward comparison, the defendant wishes to withdraw his worthless Italian statistics, we shall offer no objection.

We have said nothing of the wild boast of the *Catholic World* that “Rome, in respect to offenses against chastity, is probably the most orderly and decent city, of its size, in the world.” In proof, it shows from Maguire, that prostitutes, instead of being tolerated or licensed, as in other Roman Catholic countries, are forbidden to walk the streets of Rome, and apparently infers from this that their business is wholly discountenanced by His Holiness. It may be so, and if so, we should be glad to know it. But our best authenticated indication of the mind of the Holy See on this subject is in a bull of that admirable Pope, Leo X., (*Bullarium Romanum*, vol. iii., part 3, p. 484—you will find it next before his

We confess that all this guessing and groping after a statistical fact which the Roman Government finds it desirable to conceal from the world, is unsatisfactory, and not worth the time we have spent on it. But there is one point in which the morality of this most Catholic people can be brought into exact comparison with other countries: it is that of

HOMICIDE IN THE PAPAL STATES.

Sixteen years ago, Mr. Seymour, in giving the comparative statistics of murder in different countries, was able to get no official returns from the Papal States, and was compelled to rely on proximate figures, derived from other sources. The result of his comparison was as follows:

<i>Roman Catholic.</i>	<i>Murders to each million of population.</i>	<i>Roman Catholic.</i>	<i>Murders to each million of population.</i>
Ireland,	19	Lombardy,	45
Belgium,	18	Tuscany,	56
France,	31	Papal States,	113
Austria,	36	Naples,	174
Bavaria,	68	Sicily,	90
Sardinia,	20	PROTESTANT ENGLAND, ..	4

A very frightful exhibit for an infallible ruler! But the *Catholic World* "passed by this branch of the subject for reasons which it assigned, and which prevents it from taking up the matter now." Fortunate reasons! for if it *had* taken up the matter, mark what it would have come to! It is one of the many incidental bad consequences attendant on that necessary evil, a French army in the Papal States to protect the Shepherd from his own lambs, that some things come out under official (French) authority which used to be kept quietly hushed up. The French report states the horrible fact that in the Papal States there was in 1867 one murder for each 5,358 of the

grant sundry privileges to keepers of houses of ill fame in the holy city, on condition of their paying over, for a special use, from twenty to twenty-five *per cent.* of the profits. Probably this was one of the sort of bulls that are *not* infallible; if so, we are glad that, without undue reflection on the previous holiness and infallibility, the present holiness and infallibility has been able to inaugurate a more decent policy.

population! That is, there were 186 murders to each million of the population!*

We have not attempted to take up all the statistical assertions in the *Catholic World*, and explain to that journal how it has been betrayed into its mistakes. We tried this in a previous number, and it was not kindly received at all. We do not wish, for obvious reasons of humanity and expediency, to press too closely an adversary who, when driven into a corner, turns at bay and spits out such unpleasant language. The task which the *World* has set itself is quite like that with which the advocates of slavery used to toil like the bad angels, tearing up mountains of solid statistics by the roots, and casting them into the sea; and after every demonstration that figures could give, of the wrongness of their cause, turning up unabashed with an ingenious explanation. Something ought to be conceded to the heroism with which so gigantic a task has been undertaken by the *Catholic World*. Without unnecessary remarks about its queer statistics, we have contented ourselves mainly with exhibiting authentic facts, from the most recent government returns.

* The following table from Moreau de Jonnès, *Statistique de la Grande Bretagne*, Vol. ii., p. 257, is instructive and corroborative, though not recent:

ASSASSINATIONS AND ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE IN EUROPE.

Protestant	Scotland,	1835	1 for 270,000
"	England,		1 for 178,000
"	Low Countries,	1824	1 for 168,000
"	Prussia,	1824	1 for 100,000
Roman Catholic	Austria,	1809	1 for 57,000
"	Spain,	1826	1 for 4,113
"	Naples,		1 for 2,750
"	Roman States,		1 for 750

ARTICLE VI.—JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL AND ROBERT BROWNING.

The Cathedral. JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1870. 16mo. pp. 53.

Christmas Eve. ROBERT BROWNING. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1864.

WE have been accustomed to account Mr. James Russell Lowell as among the foremost of American poets. Bright-minded and cheerful, open-eyed and objective, in his diction fluent and clear, with a humor as bubbling and as changing as a mountain spring, and a sprightliness of fancy as light as the leap of a bounding fawn, he rarely fails fully to satisfy his expectant readers. The announcement of a new poem upon so fruitful a theme as "The Cathedral" raised our expectations more than ever. We could not repress the belief that, with a topic so elevating and suggestive, he would rise above his wonted excellence. We are sorry to confess our disappointment. Speculation and theology evidently do not suit his genius. They are "heavy as nightmare" to his generally cheerful and believing spirit. He had better leave such themes to Mr. Emerson. It is better that one poet should be spoiled than two, by the nebulous philosophy that resolves into "a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors" the ordinary world of poetry and of faith, with "its brave, o'erhanging firmament, its majestical roof fretted with golden fire." It is a thousand pities that even in the cathedral of Chartres, on that memorable day that never could be matched by another,

"Cloudless of care, down-shod to every sense,
And simply perfect from its own resource,"

Mr. Lowell could not forget

"the homelike sounds,
At Concord and by Bankside heard before;"

that, instead of giving himself up to the inspiring influences

of the scene, he should have fallen into a brown study concerning the relations of Faith to Science and of Science to Faith.

Had he left all thoughts of Concord at home, and given himself to the legitimate inspiration of the Cathedral, the father's faith to which, as he informs us and we believe most truly, "he is not recreant," would have found new stimulus and confirmation, and the truths which he learned "at his mother's knee" would have caught a fresh glory from "the soul's east window of divine surprise." Surely the Cathedral's inspiration is fitted to suggest thoughts more elevating and more poetic than those expressed in the lines,

"Whilere, men burnt men for a doubtful point,
As if the mind were quenchable with fire,
And Faith danced round them with her war-paint on,
Devoutly savage as an Iroquois:
Now Calvin and Servetus at one board
Snuff in grave sympathy a milder roast,
And o'er their claret settle Comte unread."

We would not be unjust to the poetic merits of "The Cathedral," even when we express our regret that its speculative character has been very unfortunate in its influence. We are certain Mr Lowell never wrote such a poem before, so artificial in its structure, so indirect and elaborate in its style, and so remote in its allusions. We can ascribe this to no other than the fact that he has given to speculation the mind that was made for faith and poetry. Very painfully, in this instance, has

"he beat his music out.
There is more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds."

We have, however, still graver objections to his philosophy than to the poetry which it has so seriously marred. We object to its assumptions and its conclusions. Mr. Lowell is correct in assuming that with many of the thinking men of the day the old Christian faith has died out; that to them its history and its miracles are untrue, its worship is "wearisome," and its hopes and consolations are undefined, and, above all, its Christ is little more than a sublime and attractive ideal, in the interpretation of which each man is at liberty to use his

individual discretion. But he is not justified in the assumption that, because these tendencies are widely prevalent, they are therefore destined to be universal, nor that, because many men of thought and science give way to them, therefore any resistance or dissent is to be taken as something exceptional and unnatural, which in the next generation is certain to be outgrown and laid aside. Mr. Lowell's reading of history is certainly too liberal not to have informed him that a similar tone has been assumed in other generations and even in other centuries by the rejectors of Christianity, and that the same conflict has been said to exist between the Science of other days and the Faith of other days, which is now affirmed to be irreconcilable between the Faith and the Science of the present. Or, if he had been at fault, his learned friend, the Rev. Hosea Biglow, would have informed him that much which he has intimated in this canticle has been bravely uttered by the classic Herbert of Cherbury, the elegant Shaftesbury, to say nothing of the vulgar Paine and the sentimental Rousseau.

He is too generous and too courteous not to be ready to concede that there are some, whose culture and honesty he respects, who firmly believe that the two are not irreconcilable. Why, then, should he assume, as one of those axioms which poetry is allowed to accept for the common mind, that the one must give way to the other? In answer to this question, we would doubtless say that this is the farthest from his intent, so much so, that it is his very design and intent to save place for Faith against the claims of Science; rather is it the aim of his argument to show that the two are not inconsistent. Of this we are aware. We doubt not the earnestness of his claim and the warmth of his sympathies in this direction. He knows that man cannot live without faith in the divine. He strives to show that this faith will and must survive all the analyses of Science and even the coarse and practical measurements of the democratic spirit. The passages in which he asserts for faith indestructible endurance and final triumph are among the finest of the poem, as indeed they must be, from the necessary relation of the believing to the poetic spirit. What we object to is that he assumes that the worship of the Christian and preëminently of the Protestant

Church at the present hour is so largely insincere as to be properly offensive and wearisome to a man of insight and to culture, and that its faith in the supernatural and miraculous is very largely a hindrance rather than a help to a true and earnest belief in that living God, who is more effectively received when self-revealed to the soul, than He can be by the medium of a Christ or the agency of a miracle.

"Where others worship I but look and long,
For, though not recreant to my father's faith,
Its forms to me are weariness."

"Alas! we cannot draw habitual breath
In the thin air of life's suprema heights;
We cannot make each meal a sacrament."

"Perhaps the deeper faith that is to come
Will see God rather in the strenuous doubt,
Than in the creed held as an infant's hand
Holds purposeless whatso is placed therein."

"O Power! more near my life than life itself.

* * * * *

I fear not thy withdrawal; more I fear,
Seeing, to know thee not, hoodwinked with dreams
Of signs and wonders, while, unnoticed, Thou,
Walking Thy garden still, commun'st with men,
Missed in the common place of miracle."

We are compelled to observe that in this Platonic communing with God by nature, however earnest it may be, there fails entirely that recognition of human weakness and guilt which were extorted from Plato in "the garden" in which he earnestly sought to know himself, and passionately longed for a teacher divinely commissioned to give him light and relief. Nor are there expressed in any part of this poem those sober and graver views of the moral order of the universe and of its sterner aspects mingled with pity, which lend such pathos to the reflections of the Greek tragedians. The search after God which this poem expresses wants the earnestness which not a few have felt who, finding themselves shut up to the light of nature, have sought after God, "if haply they might feel after and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us."

So far as the poet finds occasion to learn tolerance from his meditations in a cathedral, he cannot go beyond the measure of the New Testament, "that in every nation he that feareth

God and worketh righteousness is accepted of Him." His weariness and disgust at all formal worship, and his ill-concealed distaste for those apostles and prophets whom the Church commemorates, and who, if they were mistaken respecting their special calling and the scope of their mission, did yet accomplish a noble work and give forth a nobler example, strike us, as ill-befitting the theme.

It is also worthy of notice, that in all this poem no mention is made of the Christ in whose name, at least, all cathedrals were erected, and in whose honor all their imposing splendor of worship is conducted. It is most honorable to the taste and feeling of the writer that this should be so. His poetic sense and reverent spirit must have taught him, either consciously or unconsciously to himself, that it were better to leave Christ unnamed and unnoticed than to give him the humble place and to render to him the scanty honor which Mr. Lowell's speculative theory accords to the name and the life which as he confesses still "sway the world." To a reflecting mind there is food for pensive musing as well as for sad surprise in the only recognition of the divine sufferer which he gives in the lines,

"yet he, unconscious heir
To the influence sweet of Athens and of Rome,
And old Judea's gift of secret fire,
Spite of himself shall surely learn to know
And worship some ideal of himself,
Some divine thing, large-hearted, brotherly,
Not nice in trifles, a soft creditor,
Pleased with his world, and hating only cant.
And if his Church be doubtful, it is sure
That, in a world made for whatever else
Not made for mere enjoyment—in a world
Of toil but half requited, or, at best,
Paid in some futile currency of breath,—
A world of incompleteness, sorrow swift
And consolation laggard, whatsoe'er
The form of building or the creed professed,
The Cross, bold type of shame to homage turned,
Of an unfinished life that sways the world,
Shall tower as sovereign emblem over all."

While reading this poem of "The Cathedral," we could not avoid being reminded of the "Christmas Eve" by Robert Browning, as like it in some points and greatly unlike it in others.

ers. The scene is not in one of the stately edifices which are the glory of England, but in one of the meanest and most repulsive of its dissenting chapels;—mean for the scantiness of its dimensions and the cheapness of its furnishings, for the squalor and Pharisaism of its worshipers, and the narrowness, ignorance, and intolerance of its preacher. On a wet and sloppy Christmas Eve—quite unlike the one perfect day of Mr. Lowell at Chartres—the poet had ventured within its walls to find the Christ whom the day summoned him to remember and worship. Spite of bad smells and greasy neighbors and prying looks and canting noises and sanctimonious ways in the people and the perversion of grammar, taste, and Scripture in the preacher, he endures for a while, till, at last,

“’Twas too provoking!
My gorge rose at the nonsense and stuff of it.
So, saying, like Eve when she plucked the apple,
‘I wanted a taste, and now there’s enough of it,’
I flung out of the little chapel.”

When fairly out of doors he begins to meditate on the wretched travesty of the gospel which he had heard, pondering it in his mind over and again, till on a sudden the thought occurs to him :

“ But wherefore be harsh on a single case?
After how many modes, this Christmas Eve,
Does the self-same weary thing take place?
The same endeavor to make you believe,
And with much the same effect, no more:
Each method abundantly convincing,
As I say to those convinced before,
But scarce to be swallowed without wincing
By the not-as-yet convinced. For me,
I have my own church equally:
And in *this* church my faith sprung first!
In youth I looked to these very skies,
And probing their immensities,
I found God there, his visible power;
Yet felt in my heart, amid all its sense
Of that power, an equal evidence
That his love, there too, was the nobler dower.”

Upon this love he soliloquizes in respect to the light and hope which it may warrant for the future, and at last he casts him-

self upon it as revealed in nature in a tone not unlike that which we have already quoted from Lowell.

“ And I shall behold Thee, face to face,
O God, and in Thy light retrace
How in all I loved here, still wast Thou !
Whom pressing to, then as I fain would now,
I shall find as able to satiate
The love, Thy gift, as my spirit's wonder
Thou art able to quicken and sublimiate,
With this sky of Thine, that I now walk under,
And glory in Thee for, as I gaze
Thus, thus! oh, let men keep their ways
Of seeking Thee in a narrow shrine—
Be this my way! And this is mine! ”

On a sudden there opens to him in the heavens a partial vision of the Christ whom Lowell never names. His first emotion was of joyful surprise, then of terror; lest perhaps this Christ had been in the chapel and among the two or three friends,—according to his promise,—‘whom the poet had disdainfully left, and for this act of contempt the Christ might now leave him. This terror is at once assuaged by a look from the Master which he interprets in words which Mr. Lowell would scarce expect to hear from any orthodox representatives of Calvin or Servetus, as “over their claret they settle Comte unread,” but which we believe to be Christian and true.

“ ‘ So He said, and so it befalls.
God who registers the cup
Of mere cold water, for His sake
To a disciple rendered up,
Disdains not his own thirst to slake
At the poorest love was ever offered:
And because it was my heart I proffered,
With true love trembling at the brim,
He suffers me to follow Him
Forever my own way—dispensed
From seeking to be influenced
By all the less immediate ways
That earth, in worships manifold,
Adopts to reach, by prayer and praise,
The garment's hem, which, lo, I hold ! ’ ”

On a sudden he is caught up within the robe to the hem of which he had been steadfastly clinging, and is borne through the air, he knows not how, to Rome and to St. Peter's; where

is going on the splendid ceremonial appropriate to the sacred evening of the Christian year. The Master enters receive such love and homage as he may find in its superstitious pomp. The disciple does not deign to follow.

"Until, afresh its light suffusing me,
My heart cried—what has been abusing me
That I should wait here lonely and coldly,
Instead of rising, entering boldly,
Baring truth's face, and letting drift
Her veils of lies as they choose to shift?
Do these men praise Him? I will raise
My voice up to their point of praise!
I see the error; but above
The scope of error, see the love."

From Rome he is borne to a German University, where a Rationalist lecturer is solemnizing Christmas Eve in a philosophic fashion, by expounding the mythical theories concerning Christ and Christianity. The Master goes in here. The disciple follows.

"Cautious this time how I suffer to slip
The chance of joining in fellowship
With any that call themselves His friends,
As these folks do, I have a notion."

The professor proceeds, and after some premising, that the natural residuum of reason that is left, after stripping out the myth, is that Christ was

"A Man!—a right true man, however,
Whose work was worthy a man's endeavor,
Work that gave warrant almost sufficient
To his disciples, for rather believing
He was just omnipotent and omniscient,
As it gives to us, for as frankly receiving
His word, their tradition—which, though it meant
Something entirely different
From all that those who only heard it,
In their simplicity thought and averred it,
Had yet a meaning quite as respectable:
For, among other doctrines delectable,
Was he not surely the first to insist on
The natural sovereignty of our race?"

Perhaps this is an example of what Mr. Lowell means he says:

"Faith were Science now,
Would she but lay her bow and arrows by,
And arm her with the weapons of the time."

On hearing this discourse, which is certainly quite after the manner of the Radical Club that meets weekly in Boston, the indignant disciple breaks forth in sundry pertinent comments, among which the following are especially noticeable :

“ What is the point where Himself lays stress !
Does the precept run, ‘ Believe in Good,
In Justice, Truth, now understood
For the first time ? ’—or, ‘ Believe in Me,
Who lived and died, yet essentially
Am Lord of life ? ’ ”

He then asks :

“ Can it be that He stays inside ?
Is the vesture left me to commune with ?
Could my soul find aught to sing in tune with
Even at this lecture, if she tried ?
O let me at lowest sympathize
With the lurking drop of blood that lies
In the desiccated brain’s white roots
Without a throb for Christ’s attributes,
As the Lecturer makes his special boast !
If love’s dead there, it has left a ghost.”

He answers his own question by being reconciled to the Professor, as he hears him tell his audience :

“ ‘ Go home and venerate the Myth
I thus have experimented with—
This Man, continue to adore him
Rather than all who went before him,
And all who ever followed after ! ’—
Surely for this I may praise you, my brother ! ”

He even ventures to say :

“ I do not tell a lie so arrant
As say my passion’s wings are furled up,
And, without the plainest Heavenly warrant,
I were ready and glad to give this world up—
But still, when you rub the brow meticulous,
And ponder the profit of turning holy,
If not for God’s, for your own sake solely,
—God forbid I should find you ridiculous !
Deduce from this lecture all that eases you,
Nay, call yourselves, if the calling pleases you,
‘ Christians,’—abhor the Deist’s pravity,—
Go on, you shall no more move my gravity,
Than, when I see boys ride a-cockhorse
I find it in my heart to embarrass them
By hinting that their stick’s a mock horse,
And they really carry what they say carries them.”

After this lesson of tolerance he is suddenly thrown out violently upon the college-steps, and is in terror lest he has lost his hold of the Master's robe by showing a too loving tolerance for those who make so lightly of his person and history. Under a sense of this possible loss he reflects upon the folly of wasting his energies in watching his

" foolish heart expand
In the lazy glow of benevolence,
O'er the various modes of man's belief."
"—Needs must there be one way, our chief,
Best way of worship: let me strive
To find it, and when found, contrive
My fellows also take their share!
This constitutes my earthly care."

He passes in thought to the moment of death, when the great question for him to answer will be:

" Soul of mine, hadst thou caught and held
By the hem of the vesture! "—
" scarce had the words escaped my tongue,
When, at a passionate bound, I sprang
Out of the wandering world of rain,
Into the little chapel again."

Rubbing his eyes, he scarcely believes that he has been out of it at all; but whether it has been a dream or a reality, he has come to his senses again, and has learned a lesson which reconciles him even to the worship and preaching of the dissenting chapel. This lesson he thus expresses:

" I, then, in ignorance and weakness,
Taking God's help, have attained to think
My heart does best to receive in meekness
That mode of worship, as most to his mind,
Where earthly aids being cast behind,
His All in All appears serene
With the thinnest human veil between,
Letting the mystic Lamps, the Seven,
The many motions of His spirit,
Pass, as they list, to earth from Heaven.
For the preacher's merit or demerit,
It were to be wished the flaws were fewer
In the earthen vessel, holding treasure,
Which lies as safe in a golden ewer;
But the main thing is, does it hold good measure?"

Heaven soon sets right all other matters!"

"And let us hope

That no worse blessing befall the Pope."

"Nor may the Professor forego its peace
At Göttingen, presently, when, in the dusk
Of his life."

"When, thicker and thicker, the darkness fills
The world through his misty spectacles,
And he gropes for something more substantial
Than a fable, myth, or personification,—
May Christ do for him, what no mere man shall,
And stand confessed as the God of salvation!
Meantime, in the still recurring fear
Lest myself, at unawares, be found,
While attacking the choice of my neighbor's round,
Without my own made—I choose here!
The giving out of the hymn reclaims me;
I have done!—And if any blames me,
Thinking that merely to touch in brevity
The topics I dwell on, were unlawful,—
Or, worse, that I trench, with undue levity,
On the bounds of the holy and the awful,—
I praise the heart, and pity the head of him,
And refer myself to *THEE*, instead of him,
Who head and heart alike discernest."

"I put up pencil and join chorus
To Hepzibah Tune, without further apology,
The last five verses of the third section
Of the seventeenth hymn in Whitfield's Collection,
To conclude with the doxology."

It will be seen that the theme of the two poems is substantially the same. Both writers are oppressed with the scepticism of modern thought and feeling. In the one case it takes the form of the antagonism of a refined taste to doctrines crudely conceived, and to the homely worship of uncultured souls. In the other, it finds weariness in all forms and acts of worship as necessarily inadequate and unsatisfactory, and a necessary contradiction between science and any revealed doctrine or supernatural history. Both poets take refuge at first in God as revealed in nature. The one rests there, but not content with the personal satisfaction which he himself receives, he puts on the airs of a fastidious *dilettante* who knows God by a faith more enlightened and earnest than that of those who see Him revealed in Christ and the "common place of miracle." The

other is so glad to find Him at all, and is so occupied with love and tenderness of the Christ whom he worships, that he can feel satisfaction and sympathy with the humblest and most ignorant of his worshipers.

The one is for a moment moved to a relenting mood as he beholds a Christian, though a superstitious worshiper, but it is but for a moment only, for he relaxes into his wonted disgust at what he considers the necessary unsatisfactoriness of verbal and formal worship.

The other is so entranced with the Christ of his worship, and so oppressed with the thought of his own unworthiness and need that he finds occasion for tolerance and even for love and sympathy, in the humblest assembly that honors the Christ whom he trusts.

We hold that the conception of such a Christ, with attributes so exalted and claims so transcendent, who can condescend to assemblies so mean and worship so uncouth, is of itself an argument that goes far to establish its superhuman origin and also that the power of faith in Him, to solve the problems and to adjust the conflicts evolved by human culture and science, confirms the argument. If this argument is valid, the moral force and poetic majesty of Christ's person can never fail in any age to fill and glorify

"The soul's east window of divine surprise."

ARTICLE VII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

"**THE PRIMEVAL WORLD OF HEBREW TRADITION.**"*—This book, by Rev. F. H. Hedge, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History, and Senior Professor in the Divinity School, Cambridge, Mass., is put forth by the publishers as a "representative religious volume."

It contains twelve discourses, professedly relating to the primeval world. The first is entitled "The World a Divine Creation." In this we learn that the world never was created. Notwithstanding some dozen pages are occupied in showing a progressive geological formation of the earth, covering unknown ages, the whole discussion incontinently swamps itself as follows:

"God, in creating, did not bring into being a new substance foreign to himself. * * * The material creation has no independent existence. * * * The material creation exists only in God, and in us."

We would inquire of Dr. Hedge, in the name of Science, how long a period it is necessary to allow for the above mentioned creation?

Then comes "Man in the Image of God;" and here our author flounders in difficulties.

"There was a first man. The question arises, whether one first man for the whole human family, or one for each continent, or for each of the various races, Caucasian, African, Malay, and others, into which the naturalists divide mankind. Whether the human family originated from a single pair, or has flowed together from different centers in different lands." But the nub of the difficulty is the great Simian question, Was man originally an ape? Our author hates to believe it, but then there are very learned men who do believe it, and it is even more difficult to doubt their learning, than to doubt the apeish origin of man, and so a classification of the human races is resorted to under the principle of "divide and conquer." Some may have come from apes, and some not, though that does not prevent all being a band of broth-

* "*The Primeval World of Hebrew Tradition.*" By FREDERICK HENRY HEDGE. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1870.

ers. The apes are coming up. The more advanced may have received souls. The historic races are some of them on the decline. The author is sometimes tempted to think the transformation may have been the other way—a change of type from human to simian. Such, for example, as jeer “at the great and serious truths of humanity” (like the above, perhaps), are evidently going down. “If anything can make an ape of a man,” says our author, “it is that.”

The period of Apeish gestation being over, we come to “Man in Paradise.” The garden of Eden is doubtless an allegory, nevertheless, it has been properly located by Bunsen at the head waters of the Euphrates. At this spot, on the earth’s surface, began the history of man, or, according to our author, possibly took place the transformation of an ape. Various questions in the political economy of a future Eden are here discussed, as to whether such robbery as property will exist, and kindred matters.

We then arrive at the brute creation. Here our author is free from theologic or scientific troubles and trammels. He has a theory of his own. Orthodox Spain, where there are bull-fights is to him the representative idea of the relation of Christianity to brutes. This is in painful contrast with the spectacle of Hindu hospitals for the cure of sick animals, “in the interest of mercy entirely,” says our author, “not for the sake of the owners, but of the animals.” He might have mentioned, also, that this peculiar form of *philanthropy* has the added merit of *family feeling*. A lame cat, for instance, may be at the very moment a man’s grandfather—or a dyspeptic donkey his brother. Something should be allowed to filial tenderness. The author closes this chapter with a celebrated hymn to nature, by St. Francis of Assisi, which he says needs only a recognition of the brute creation to make it the best expression of Christian piety in relation to the visible world. We agree with the author, that David is not to be mentioned in this connection. Here is the hymn:

“Praised be my Lord God with all his creatures; and especially our brother the Sun, who brings us the day and who brings us the light; fair is he and skinning with a very great splendor. O Lord, he signifies to us Thee!

“Praised be my Lord for our sister the Moon; and for the stars, the which he has set clear and lovely in the heavens.

“Praised be my Lord for our brother the Wind, and for air and cloud, calm and all weather, by the which thou upholdest in life all creatures.

“Praised be my Lord for our sister Water, who is very serviceable unto us and precious and clean.

"Praised be my Lord for our brother Fire, through whom thou givest us light in the darkness, and he is bright and pleasant, and very mighty and strong.

, "Praised be my Lord for our mother the Earth, the which dost sustain and keep us and bringest forth divers fruits, and flowers of many colors, and grass."

Our author adds, in the following supplementary stanza, the final touch of perfection needed to render this Assisinine hymn the best expression of Christian piety extant:

"Praised be my Lord for our brothers and sisters the living creatures which thou hast made, the birds of the air, the beasts of the field, and the fishes that inhabit the Sea. They, too, are thy children, they praise thy handiwork, and thou blessest them with thy love!"

We must hasten over "Paradise Lost," which is, in fact, no loss, and come to the Cainite genealogy, which is peculiar. We quote:

"Seth is the name of a God, and Enos, his son, means man. Accordingly the genealogy in Genesis v. begins properly with Cainan (Cain). Enos being one with Adam, and Seth the Creator."

This is quite a learned note. We did suppose that the old Babylonian God, Set, here dragged up to duty in the fifth chapter of Genesis, properly belonged to some period after the flood. How he gets into the Hebrew records of this date is not mentioned—probably through the arrow-headed, in some way unknown. Cainan becomes Cain by the same process that Middleton is derived from Moses, viz. cutting off the —oses and adding on the —iddleton. So cutting off *an* from Cain-an, the terminus *ad quem*, we have Cain, the terminus *a quo*, from whom we are all descended through this revised genealogy.

As for Methuselah, his 969 years were too many for him. He either died of apoplexy from the accumulation of years and ideas—or if he lived so long, he was drowned in the flood; but in any event, whether he lived at all, or not, or was only a period, he and the period are both dead now, which is satisfactory, and the moral is, that we must all die sooner or later, which is conclusive.

"The Failure of Primeval Society" our author regards as simply "the crude abortions of immature nature in its first essays."

"The Deluge" has undoubtedly some foundation in fact, although the biblical account of it is puerile.

As for "the Dispersion," that, too, has some color of truth, inasmuch as Ethnology traces back the historic races to the alleged locality.

We have, then, "Jehovah and Abraham, a Hebrew Idyl,"

from the text, "And the Lord appeared unto Abraham in the plain of Mamre," with the story of the promise to Sarah, and the conversation concerning Sodom, upon which our author remarks—"The whole narrative, dinner and conversation included, is exceptional, a visible, palpable appearance of God to man is rare in Hebrew tradition, * * * but here is a God who is not only seen and heard, but touched, who not only walks and talks, but eats."

This is more than the author can endure. Notwithstanding man is divine and God is human (page 41) the fact of eating destroys the illusion. Such vulgar occupation becomes neither a Jehovah, nor a Christ, after his resurrection.

"The Heritage of the Inner Life" is the poetic title of the final chapter which concerns the meditative character of the patriarch Isaac. It seems the patriarch did not know his letters. He went out in the evening to meditate—"writing had not been invented. If the patriarch experienced intuitions, or formed conclusions, there was no opportunity of recording them, and so they are lost to posterity." We would suggest to Dr. Hedge, that Isaac's grand ancestors beyond the river were possibly familiar with the record of certain events which occurred some four hundred years before Abraham came into the land of Canaan, and which were inscribed upon memorial cylinders in Hamitic arrow headed characters, preserved in the Temple of the Moon, in this same Ur, or Hur of Lower Chaldea, from whence Abraham emigrated. Furthermore, that Abraham sojourned some years in Egypt, and that the Egyptian Book of the Dead antedates, or is at least as old as the time of his visit there. It is also a new idea to us, that the Phenician or Semitic alphabet is younger than either the Assyrian or Egyptian—so that if the patriarch Abraham neglected either his own or his son's education, we think him quite culpable.

But this is not the point of the chapter. It is the tendency to *inwardness* of the Hebrews, as derived from father Isaac, which strikes the mind of the author. Their *outwardness* they get from father Jacob. This inwardness flowered outward from time to time in their history, "from Joshua to John the Baptist—in Jesus—in John of the Apocalypse—in Maimonides, and in Spinoza"—and our Christianity "is a birth from the interior spiritual life so characteristic of the Hebrew race,"—from Confucius to Tam O'Shanter.

We have endeavored to skin the cream of these chapters. If our readers desire the milk of the word, let them read the book.

LANGE'S COMMENTARY ON ROMANS.*—In this volume of Lange's Commentary, Dr. Schaff himself has done a large share of the work connected with the preparation of the American edition. Without expressing any opinion of his associate (Dr. Riddle) we think it is to be regretted that Dr. Schaff did not find himself able to finish what he undertook, and to give to the entire volume the same attention and care which he has given to a portion of it. We hope the learned editor will pardon us if we add that, in our opinion, it would have been better if he had prepared a commentary of his own on this Epistle, independently of the work of Lange. In that case, we should have had a volume of greater variety, and one in which his own views could have been presented in a more satisfactory way. There is a fundamental evil or failing in every book which is prepared on the plan of this Commentary, and, notwithstanding all that is or may be said in its favor, this evil or failing will be felt by all who use it. We believe it is felt very widely by those who have examined these volumes. Where a Commentary is translated from another language, with additions, and especially where these additions are borrowed from every good source, and are inserted in the midst of the original work in bracketed passages or in foot-notes, the reader is greatly hindered in getting the full force and impression either of the first author or of his successors. It is to the mind of the student somewhat the same thing as to a hearer would be the attempt to read in his presence the text of this Epistle as printed in this volume—for example, "Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle [a called, chosen apostle] separated [set apart] unto the Gospel of God, (which he had promised afore which he promised beforehand] by [through] his prophets in the holy Scriptures) [omit parenthesis] concerning his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, [omit here the words, Jesus Christ our Lord, and transfer them to the close of verse 4], which [who] was made [born] of [from] the seed of David according to the flesh," &c. The hearer certainly would not be greatly edified when

* *A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures: Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical, with special reference to Ministers and Students.* By JOHN PETER LANGE, D. D., in connection with a number of eminent European Divines. Translated from the German, and edited with additions, original and selected, by PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D., in connection with American scholars of various Evangelical Denominations. Vol. V. of the New Testament; containing the Epistle to the Romans. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. 8vo. pp. 455.

listening to such a passage. He would prefer to hear the passage without the insertions first, and then the passage as modified by the insertions afterwards; and, in this way, he might hope to form some clear idea of what Paul's meaning actually was. So with the student, though of course not in the same degree. He can master, perhaps, the views of a dozen or twenty authors, and can compare and weigh them in his own mind, but he is rather bewildered than aided when he is so compelled to take the views of nineteen through mere parenthetical passages or foot notes breaking the sequence of the thoughts of the twentieth. We have had occasion to use Commentaries pretty extensively, and, if our experience answers to that of others, we may pronounce a judgment here which will be widely accepted. It has been often objected against German commentators, that they are too minute in their presentation of *all* views of a Biblical passage. We are not disposed to agree with this objection. But we think Dr. Schaff's German education and tendencies have led him to adopt this method, in these volumes, in a manner which is not desirable. Another mistake, which we think Dr. Schaff has made, in this great undertaking in which he is engaged, is this—that, if he were proposing to adopt the method to which we have alluded, he should not have taken some other work as the foundation for his additions and annotations, rather than that of Lange. Lange's original work, as it seems to us, is not worthy to be made the basis of a great Biblical commentary—to be brought over from Germany to America and translated from its own language to ours. The American world would not have suffered, we think, if Dr. Lange had spoken to none but his German countrymen—or, if we are mistaken in this view, we are sure that there are other German commentaries which might better have been introduced to our readers as “the great Biblical work of the age.” Lange is not a scholar of the order of many of those whose views are inserted as additions by the American editors, and the consequence is, that we have the *more* scholarly fitted into and holding a subordinate place in the *less* scholarly. We do not know why Dr. Schaff selected this work for translation rather than any other; but we fear that it was some influence from his American life, rather than his German education, which, in this point, we cannot help thinking would have been the better guide. We have sometimes said of the other volumes, and we trust that our esteemed friend will not be offended if we say of this one to which he has

contributed so much, that Lange's [American] Commentary would have been a more valuable book if Lange's part of it had been omitted.

Dr. Schaff, himself, is a scholar too well known to the public to need any commendation. It is enough to say of his present work—his additions and annotations in the early part of this volume on the Epistle to the Romans—that it is characterized by his usual research and thoroughness. The serviceableness of the book to all who use it will be largely due to what he has contributed to it, and we hope he may find himself repaid for his labors in every way. We do not wonder that he left his coadjutors to carry on the preparation of other volumes, and himself undertook the work of preparing this, for there is an interest in the study of this Epistle which nothing else affords. And yet the literature connected with it is so vast in amount, and the works of preceding commentators are so numerous, that few men have the patience and enthusiasm combined which are necessary to bear them through so laborious a task. Dr. Schaff, evidently, has both the enthusiasm and the patience. As we have already said, we only wish he had given his personal and minute supervision to the entire volumes.

We can hardly close our notice of this book without expressing our gratification, that so widely-read and so catholic a man as Dr. Schaff should have set forth the baselessness of the interpretation which Dr. Charles Hodge gives to Romans v., 12-19. If Dr. Hodge's claim that his opinions are in accordance with the views of almost all scholars needs any further reply than that given in the *New Englander* eighteen months ago, such a reply is found in the pages of this volume. The readers of this Commentary will be convinced that our Princeton friends need to revise their exegesis at this point, if nowhere else; and the testimony of this author we commend to our Princeton friends themselves, with the greater willingness, because he does not hold the view of this passage which we hold ourselves. An amusing instance of the careful exegetical study of Dr. Hodge, so far as the views of other commentators are concerned—an instance which we had noticed ourselves before this volume was published—is brought out by Dr. Schaff in his first note on page 179. Dr. Hodge charges Meyer with holding what he does not hold in his last edition of his Commentary, and what he did not hold even in the edition which was published ten years before Dr. Hodge's work was

written! We respectfully suggest that some of the (late School brethren of the Presbyterian Church, in the city of New York or elsewhere, might show a tender regard for their Old School brethren of the same Church, and, at the same time, might give them an appropriate and a useful token of the warm affection, by presenting or even lending to the Library of Princeton Seminary a few of the Commentaries which have been published within the last generation. The opportunity of examining them—even for a short time—might help the exegetical studies of the Princeton gentlemen in no small degree, and in this way, do something towards rendering permanent the union of the two branches of that Church. We think we might ourselves be induced to present a copy of Meyer's work of a date as that indicated above.

FOLSOM'S TRANSLATION OF THE GOSPEL.*—This volume is dedicated, first of all, to the author's former colleagues and pupils of the Meadville Theological School; then, to Christian disciples of every denomination; and, finally, to all who seek to know the truth and do the will of God. The reader who examines it will see that it is prepared from the standpoint of those who hold the sentiments of that Theological School, and that it endeavours to make all other seekers after the truth accept the same. This endeavor is manifest in the translation, so far as the possibilities of the case allow, but in the notes, though they are not so numerous, it is still more evident. We do not believe, however, that the Christian disciples of other denominations, or those among them who honestly and earnestly study the Scriptures, will be convinced by the author's arguments, or that they will accept his interpretations, in those cases in which the teachings of Meadville are at variance with the teachings of the Gospels. When Jesus says, for example, "Glorify thou me, Father, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was," men in general, who investigate the meaning of his words, will not understand him as saying "with thee in glory which I possessed in the divine purpose." They will turn the words, "Before Abraham was [came into being] I was," into a declaration that Jesus was merely ordained of God.

* *The Four Gospels*; Translated from the Greek Text of Tischendorf, and compared with the various readings of Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Alford, and others; and with Critical and Explanatory Notes. By N. S. FOLSOM. Boston: A. Williams & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 476.

the Messiah before the birth of Abraham. Nor will they regard the exclamation of Thomas, in the twentieth chapter of John's Gospel, as being anything less than an expression of his belief that his Lord and Master was divine. We have no space or desire to enter upon the discussion of these or similar passages here, but we are persuaded that the advocates of these views can never impress their truth upon scholarly men who have not been educated in their own doctrines. And we have never yet seen any explanation or suggestion urged in support of these views, which, to our apprehension, did not manifestly fail to meet the demands of the passages in question or of the context in the midst of which they stand. On the word *αἰώνιος*, in Matt. xxv., 8, the author says, "This word is used so often in the Scriptures to denote *indefinite* length of duration, that it seems presumptuous to affirm positively that any more was in the Master's thought here. The 'punishment' will last as long as the sin shall last; and the 'life,' too, will last as long, and only as long, as the character on which it depends shall last." On Mark ix., 44 ff., in connection with the words "unquenchable fire" and "hell," he says, "In quoting the greatest of the prophets who preceded him, Jesus spoke more nearly, if he did not speak exactly, in accordance with that prophet's thought (Is. lxvi., 24). It is questionable, even, if he meant chiefly the fires of remorse, real and terrible as these are. But he may have meant particularly those consequences of sin which, springing from the sources here alluded to in Mark, are a public warning to all who are tempted in like manner. Such a hell as we see men fall into in this life is often both fearful and fiery." These citations will indicate his opinions and method of interpretation in connection with the subject of future punishment. Of the Temptation he says, "Having separated from the narration those parts which are incidental [i. e., the forty days duration of the fasting, the Tempter in a personal form, &c.], the principal fact remains, that *Jesus had tempting thoughts* under the circumstances of place (though it is possible he went from place to place in thought only), and with the deprivations and exposures mentioned as occurring in the Desert, and that he triumphed over those thoughts, without incurring the charge or receiving the taint of sin." "The occurrence of such tempting thoughts to a pure mind," he adds, "may be accounted for, without supposing that they originated there. If the tempting thought simply tests the subject of it, and shows that one is incapable of

harboring and executing it, it is an adequate temptation, and is sinless in it." The narrative is not, thus, to be understood literally in all its details; and, on the other hand, it is not "able misunderstood by the disciples and afterward confound them with Jesus' personal experience," but an account of the which actually entered the mind of Christ under the influence of the circumstances in which he was placed. In respect to the great question concerning the time of the Last Supper, the author thinks that John's account may be reconciled with that of the Synoptics. In respect to the examinations of Jesus, he has inclined to favor the view that there were two—that referred to John being before Annas, and that mentioned in the earlier gospels being before Caiaphas. "This is the more plausible," says, "if we may assume Annas to have had an apartment in the same house with Caiaphas, to which there was one court or courtyard where the denials of Peter took place." Some writers regard this last supposition as quite beyond the region of probability, but we are unable to see why it is necessarily so. We have enough, perhaps, to excite interest in an examination of the volume. It has merits, and its author will doubtless find numbers of readers in his own section of the Church who will accept his conclusions; while, outside of that circle, it will meet, we believe, a scholarly consideration of its views and a just appreciation of what is good in it.

HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES.*—We are glad to see the complete work of Hagenbach presented to English readers in their own language. A partial translation has before been printed from another source. The difficulty with all abridgments is that the reader can never be certain that the best things are not left out. This is one objection, but others of equal weight might readily be stated. The volumes before us contain the best account which we know of, of the progress of theology, literature, and culture in Germany for the last century and a half; the best account, that is, for cultivated persons, whether clerical or lay. Hagenbach is evangelical without being narrow, and he writes, in these lectures, without the

* *History of the Church in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.* R. HAGENBACH, D. D., Professor of Theology in the University of Basel. Translated with additions, &c. By JOHN F. HURST, D. D. New York: Scribner & Co. 1869.

ness and pedantry which are often characteristic of German treatises of this nature. The translation appears to be substantially correct. That it lacks the force and flavor which belonged, in old times, to English translations from foreign tongues, is a failing which it has in common with most other efforts made, at the present day, in the same line. There is a lack of freedom and idiomatic richness and strength, which make it evident, in every page and almost every sentence, that the book was not written in English.

THE FORMATION OF CHRISTENDOM.*—The first of these volumes, from the pen of a thoughtful English writer of the Roman Catholic Church, describes the effect of Christianity upon the individual, or the moulding influence of the Christian religion in its historical influence upon man, considered as an individual. The second volume takes up the social man, from a similar point of view. Both are parts of a more comprehensive plan which remains to be carried out. There is a good degree of learning, a spirit of moderation and candor, and no inconsiderable degree of philosophical power, in these discussions. Yet they are thoroughly Roman Catholic in their conceptions of the course of civilization and in the theological ideas that underlie them. Occasionally we mark an uncritical acceptance of documents as genuine which are not so: as in Vol. I., p. 340, where the Clementine Epistles on *Virginity*—spurious productions—are referred to as authentic. The entire work will repay a perusal for those who wish to acquaint themselves with Roman Catholic theories as to the philosophy of history.

COLEMAN ON THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH.†—The new edition of this carefully-written manual has been revised by the author. The book is a compact, correct, and instructive exposition of the polity of the churches in the Apostolic Age and of the changes resulting in the prelatical system. There are statements occasionally oc-

* *The Formation of Christendom.* Part First and Part Second (Two vols.) By T. W. ALLIES. London: Longman & Co. 1865 and 1869. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1869.

† *The Apostolical and Primitive Church, Popular in its Government, Informal in its Worship: A Manual in Prelacy and Ritualism.* Carefully revised and adapted to these discussions. By LYMAN COLEMAN, D. D., Professor in Lafayette College, &c. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1869.

curing which are open to criticism. For example, on page 159, it is said that the terms *bishop* and *presbyter* are used by this ancient father [Irenæus] as perfectly convertible terms. Irenæus calls bishops presbyters, but he does not call presbyters—meaning the second grade of Church officers—bishops. His use of terms shows that the bishop had come to be an officer distinct from and elevated above the presbyters, while he still had essentially the same functions.

THE JESUS OF THE EVANGELISTS.*—This work has been published for a year, but is little known as yet in this country. It is of sufficient merit to entitle it to the attention of the theological public. It is, in some respects, original in its construction of the argument for the truth of the evangelical history. Taking the portraiture of Christ which is presented in the Gospels, it shows that “this portraiture cannot be an ideal or mythical creation.” The impossibility of accounting for this portraiture on any other supposition than that of its authenticity, is the proposition which the author ably and successfully defends. The following are the titles of the chapters: I. Introduction; II. The Portraiture of Jesus as it is exhibited in the Gospels; III. The Portraiture of the suffering Jesus of the Evangelists; IV. The union of Holiness and Benevolence in the person of the Jesus of the Gospels; V. The Moral Teaching of the Lord; VI. The Law of our Religious and Moral Development; VII. The Preparations made in the Gentile World for the Advent of Christianity; VIII. The Preparations made by Providence for the Introduction of Christianity through the Development of Judaism; IX. Messianic Conceptions in the Old Testament; X. The Development of Messianic Conceptions between the Prophetic Period and the Advent; XI. The Development of Judaism between the Termination of the Prophetic Period and the Advent; XII. The Portraiture of Christ as it is depicted in the Gospels constitutes an Essential Unity; XIII. The limits which can be assigned to the historical Jesus in the relation of Christianity on the supposition of His purely Human Character; XIV. The Jesus of the Gospels no Mythical Creation; XV. The Moral Aspect of our Lord’s Character an Historical

* *The Jesus of the Evangelists: His Historical Character Vindicated; or, an Examination of the Internal Evidence for Our Lord’s Mission, with reference to Modern Controversy.* By the Rev. C. A. Row, M. A., of Pembroke College, Oxford, &c., &c. London: Williams & Norgate. 1868.

1870.]

Hardwick's Church Histories.

Reality; XVI. The limits of the Period which Authentic History assigns as that during which the Conception of the Mythical Christ must have been created and developed in its fullness; XVII. The Evidence afforded by the Epistles for the early existence of the Portraiture of the Christ; XVIII. The Nature and Character of the Mythic Gospels; XIX. Features of the Gospels which are inconsistent with the supposition of their unhistorical character.

These various topics are treated candidly and in a scholarly spirit. The impression of the argument is somewhat weakened by the want of severe consecution in the statement of it and by the introduction of so many themes which bear on the main proposition to be sure, and which are instructively handled, but which do not always tend directly to establish the case. On the whole, the work will be found a very useful one, and it is peculiarly timely.

HARDWICK'S CHURCH HISTORIES.*—Among the publications of Macmillan & Co. (who have now established a branch of their house in New York), the works of the late Archdeacon Hardwick are of much value to theologians. His "Christ and other Masters" is a thorough survey of the heathen or ethnic religions, their history and doctrinal characteristics. The manuals of Church History, of which the titles are given below, are not mere compilations, but exhibit the fruits of original research. At the same time, the best works in this department, especially the German writers, have been well studied and faithfully used.

LIGHTFOOT'S EDITION OF CLEMENT OF ROME.†—This is the first installment of a new edition of the Apostolic Fathers, which is to be edited by the learned Hulsean Professor of Divinity at

* *History of the Christian Church. Middle Age.* By CHARLES HARDWICK, formerly Teller of St. Catharine's Church and Archdeacon of Ely. Second Edition. Edited by Francis Proctor, M. A. Cambridge and London: Macmillan & Co. 1868.

* *A History of the Christian Church during the Reformation.* [Same author editor, and publishers. 1865.]

† *S. Clement of Rome. The Two Epistles to the Corinthians.* A revised text with introduction and notes. By J. B. LIGHTFOOT, D. D., Hulsean Professor of Divinity, and Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1869. New York: 62 Bleocker street.

Cambridge, Dr. Lightfoot. The commentaries of Dr. Lightfoot upon the Epistle to the Galatians and the Epistle to the Philippians are of the highest merit, and will secure a favorable attention to the important literary undertaking which he has now in hand. The present volume contains the carefully-revised text of the first, or genuine, Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, and of the spurious fragment, called the second epistle—together with an elaborate introduction and numerous marginal notes. The judicious and candid spirit of the edition are everywhere manifest. We may adduce, as an example, his remarks on chapter xi. of the first epistle—the passage relative to the High Priest, the Priests and Levites, on which so much reliance has been placed by High Church theologians. “Does the analogy”—between the Old Testament Priesthood and the Christian ministry—“extend to the three orders?” The answer to this seems to be that, though the episcopate seems to have been widely established in Asia Minor at this time (see *Philippians*, p. 209), this epistle throughout only recognizes two orders, presbyters and deacons, as existing at Corinth.” “Later writers, indeed, did dwell on the analogy of the three-fold ministry; but we cannot argue back from them to Clement, in whose epistle the very element of *three-foldness*, which gives force to such a comparison, is wanting.” We cannot agree with everything that is said on this subject by Dr. Lightfoot, in this volume and in the Essay on the Ministry, which is connected with his work on the *Philippians*. But the points of difference between us would not be very great, and if the discussion were always conducted in the enlightened and fair spirit which he exhibits, the so-called Episcopal controversy might soon be terminated.

BINNEY'S SERMONS.*—We need not eat the whole of a pineapple to get some idea of its pungent flavor. As far as we have examined this book of sermons, we have received an impression that it is one of the strongest contributions to this kind of literature that these last days, so fruitful in publications of this sort, have produced. The exceedingly high reputation of its author as a pulpit-orator is amply sustained by these sermons. While they do not possess the elegance and the rare philosophic tone of Rob-

* *Sermons preached in the King's Weigh-house Chapel, London, 1829–1859.* By T. BINNEY. London: Macmillan and Co. 1869.

Robertson's discourses, they are superior to Robertson's sermons in robust logic, and strong, clear thought, often presenting most forcible and massive views of truth. They are eminently fitted to instruct, and to build up the people in the saving doctrines of the gospel. Some of them are treatises rather than sermons; and, indeed, the author says in his preface, that he has expanded the thoughts in some of the sermons after they were delivered.

We should judge that the main characteristic of Dr. Binney's preaching was a thoughtful, didactic method, calmly explaining and reasoning upon the truth, and drawing out by a process of steady, close thinking, the richness of the Divine word, though sometimes bursting away from the logical method, and rising into strains of brief and powerful eloquence. These discourses are evidently the elaborated ones of a long ministry. They could not be samples of every-day, ordinary, popular preaching, although characteristic of the author's general manner. In a sermon entitled "Man in Understanding," the preacher sets forth his own conception of what preaching should be, which affords incidentally a noble description of his own style. He says (p. 99) "Preaching may be too elementary, and it may not be elementary enough. In some parts of the church, where a very simple style of preaching prevails, there is the constant reiteration of just the three or four truths which make up what we call the Gospel. The people are thus always kept at the alphabet, or in the spelling book, or in the shortest and easiest reading lessons, and are never introduced to the high arguments which lie beyond. In other parts of the church, where a style of preaching more abstruse and argumentative prevails, the result is, that theology is taught rather than religion—the preacher becomes more of a lecturer or professor going through his argument, than a minister in the church speaking 'to instruction, edification, and comfort' and giving to the flock its 'portion of meat in due season.' The danger here is, too, that plain, elementary instruction will be gone through, and discussions indulged in, which take too much for granted, and for which the people are not prepared. They will be like reading the higher authors before the pupils have learnt anything of grammar. The great thing is, for Christian people to be such thorough 'men,' that they may delight in being introduced to 'the deep things of God,' and may be able to benefit by the higher forms of discipline and argument. Very simple and elementary preaching is very proper, and very

important in its place; but the Bible is a book which demands, both for explanation and defense, a great deal beyond that. The character and wants of the age, the popular and plausible forms of error, the ignorance in the church, and the subtlety of the world, together with the nature, the magnitude, and grandeur, of Christian truth, all demand, both in preachers and hearers, greater efforts after that 'manly understanding' which *includes* in it, among other things, accurate knowledge and large intelligence in relation to all spiritual truth."

For the department of sermonizing, which the discourses represent, we know of no finer illustrations than these in modern literature. The sermons entitled "The Words of Jesus, and what underlie them," "The Blessed God," and "Salvation by fire, and Salvation in fullness," are peculiarly to be commended for their richness of thought and power. The discourse on morality in trade, under the title of "Buying and Selling," might be profitably preached in America as well as in England.

LAMPS, PITCHERS, AND TRUMPETS.*—This volume is the first of two series of lectures, printed in England in one work, mostly delivered to the students in Spurgeon's "Pastor's College;" to be followed by the reprint of the second series, the latter to be devoted chiefly to examples in our own time, while this is occupied mainly with the past. The quaint title, we need not say, is taken from the history of Gideon and his three hundred men, their peculiar implements being conceived of as symbolic of different sorts of preachers. It departs from the received standard in books of homiletics, being more anecdotal, as the title-page promises, and much less formal and technical in its arrangement. Indeed, it hardly admits of analysis in a brief notice. The first lecture consists mainly of notices and sketches of Fox, Whitefield, Dawson, and R. Watson, and, going further back, of Bishop Andrewes, with extracts of what is called "the romance of the pulpit," including, also, certain continental preachers in the Reformation, such as Alexander de la Croix, Caturce, and another, martyrs, with later English and American Methodists, and also Edwards

* *Lamps, Pitchers, and Trumpets*: Lectures on the Vocation of the Preacher, illustrated by anecdotes, biographical, historical, and elucidatory, from the Great Preachers of all ages. By EDWIN PAXTON HOOD. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1869. 12mo. pp. 458.

l again Whitefield. The second lecture treats of the preacher's mission, as instructive and awakening, addressed especially to the conscience, and demanding the culture of all our powers. The Bible is set forth as a model, and the Hebrew prophets are depicted, with excellent quotations from Dean Stanley. As an example of the Puritans, Henry Smith is described, and among the other preachers, still more fully Robert Robinson, the translator of Saurin. The Jewish Church is the first subject of the third lecture, which gives a representation of Isaiah, and also (the first of what the author calls his "pulpit monographs") of Paul, as of the apostolic age—an animated delineation. The fourth lecture is devoted to the early Church, giving accounts of Clemens, Origen, Tertullian, Athanasius, Basil, Augustine, and more particularly Chrysostom. In the fifth, we have the medieval and post-medieval preachers, among them noted friars, and an interesting account of Segneri (though of the seventeenth century), called Italian Whitefield, with citations, followed by a fuller monograph of St. Bernard. The sixth lecture treats of the great preachers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and is the more interesting as commemorating some not now so familiarly known as they should be, such as Playfere, John Stoughton, Wilson (with extracts), Richard Bernard, Trapp, and Everard, giving a fuller sketch of the Puritan, Thomas Adams. The subject of the seventh is wit, humor, and coarseness in the pulpit, with specimens. South is dealt with more severely, and hence more justly than by most writers. The next lecture discusses the use and abuse of the imagination, and the various forms of illusion, analogies, parables, allegories, overwrought descriptions, and gives an ample description of Christmas Evans. "The style best adapted for usefulness in the pulpit," is the subject of the eighth lecture. The author would have the preacher study words that cherish enthusiasm, and dissuades him from multiplying other interpretations and opinions than his own, and from the declamatory and verbose and excessively smooth styles. Interesting extracts are given from Luther, and still more fully from the Abbé Llois' book, "The Church and the Pulpit." Much account is taken of what is called "the power and accent of conviction," and of preaching to the conscience. Illustrations are taken from Charles Parsons, and full and interesting extracts from Alexander Duff, with an appeal for earnestness. From this enumeration of the contents, it will be seen that these lectures are fitted to be

an accompaniment rather than a substitute for other homiletic treatises. Their style, which is free and lively, as well as their arrangement, is more suitable for oral delivery than for the uses of a text-book. To students for the ministry they have the more value and interest as giving an unusual amount of professional and personal information, with many pertinent suggestions and wholesome examples, and the general reader will find in them entertaining reading. Particularly the sketches of Chrysostom and St. Bernard merit high commendation.

A DAILY WALK WITH GOD.*—This is an earnest argument and persuasion addressed to Christians of all denominations in behalf of the liberal use of property, and especially in behalf of *daily social* worship. First, from Old Testament teachings, showing that, in addition to the weekly Sabbath, by appointing the morning and evening sacrifice, the three annual festivals, the Sabbatical year, and the year of Jubilee, God “released the Jewish Church from toil for the body about one half of the time.” Secondly, from the New Testament, showing the practice of our Lord and his apostles, and their first followers, especially in connection with the day of Pentecost. Then, from later historical testimony, that “the daily service introduced by the apostles was continued in the Christian Church,” and “generally attended by professing Christians, for more than three hundred years,” and “that the neglect of it marks the decline of piety in the Church.” The same authorities, among the early Fathers and eminent modern divines, are cited for more frequent communion than is now practised by most churches; and on this point we commend to Congregational and Presbyterian ministers the decided judgment of Calvin and Edwards. The same thing is argued further from the exigencies of the church and the world, and from the blessing that has sanctioned daily assemblages for worship. Another chapter is devoted to answering objections. Inferences are drawn as to the transientness of revivals and the means of continuing them, and the book closes with “an appeal to Christians of every

* *A Daily Walk with God, in his own Ordinances: or the Bible Standard of Duty, as exemplified in the Primitive Christians.* By Rev. STEPHEN PORTER Geneva. Fifth revised edition, with an introductory Sketch of the Author's life, by his son, Rev. J. JERMAIN PORTER, D. D., Watertown. Rochester: Erastus Darrow, Publisher. 1869. 16mo. pp. 136.

denomination." The earnest piety of the author pervades all his arguments and exhortations. He writes from long and loving familiarity with the subject, and most fervent desires for the restoration of the practice and the power of primitive Christianity. This fifth edition of his work, published by Darrow, is the more valuable for the Memoir prefixed by his son, and the accompanying tributes, since his decease, from other ministers. "Father Porter," as he was called, was one of the most saintly men in Western New York. We are glad to find his work in increasing demand. Its circulation cannot fail to further the end which above all things he desired. Daily prayer-meetings are so much gained in this direction. Young Men's Christian Associations will do well to avail themselves of this volume in maintaining such services. We desire to see it circulated as being (what is stamped on the cover) "a plea for a *daily* religious service."

NEW EDITION OF PROFESSOR FISHER'S ESSAYS ON THE SUPERNATURAL.*—The new edition of Professor Fisher's Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity is so much enlarged as to demand a new notice. It is so much enlarged and improved, that it will be necessary for all those critics and students to procure and read it, who would be placed at once in possession of the present state of literature and opinion, in respect to the subject of which it treats. The topics which are here discussed must force themselves upon the attention of every clergyman to whom is committed the important duty of defending the testimony concerning Jesus, and of every thinking man whose faith is assailed by the manifold unbeliefs that are current in every community. The candor, ability, and conclusiveness of the discussions contained in these Essays have been universally acknowledged. The additions made to this enlarged edition consist of an elaborate Introduction of thirty-eight pages, presenting a brief summary of the philosophical and critical aspects of the questions concerning the Supernatural Origin of Christianity; and an Appendix of forty pages, consisting of a series of supplementary notes which are, in fact, extensions of the several Essays. Both these additions to the volume add very greatly to its value. Since the publication of

* *Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity; with special reference to the theories of Renan, Strauss, and the Tübingen School.* By GEORGE P. FISHER, D. D., Professor of Church History in Yale College. New and Enlarged Edition. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870.

the first edition, great advances have been made in the state of opinion in regard to many of the leading topics. Important concessions have been made by the boldest critics, and the questions in dispute between historical and philosophical writers are narrowed down to fewer points, and are brought within more definite limits. The questions can be easily apprehended by any persons who will take the trouble to acquaint themselves with them, and, when they are once stated, with the arguments for and against. The adversaries of Christianity, whether in or out of so-called Christian pulpits, make the meanwhile noisy and confident boastings that the learning and science of the world are against the supernatural and the miraculous. A multitude of superficial thinkers, and active minded readers, believe what they hear often asserted and rarely disproved. The unreading defenders of the truth, whether they are learned or unlearned, are frightened out of their wits lest this boasting may have some terrible significance of reality, and they hide their heads perhaps in the sand. Let them acquaint themselves fully with the utmost that these foes of Christianity have to offer, and they will prosecute their vocation and hold their faith with clearer heads and lighter hearts. The new edition of these Essays is emphatically a book for the times.

PHILOSOPHICAL.

PRESIDENT FAIRCHILD'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY.*—President Fairchild's Treatise on Moral Philosophy was prepared to be used as a text-book in Colleges and High Schools, and is in many respects admirably fitted for these uses. In its leading principles it is very similar to the two treatises by President Hopkins, but in its details it is more directly and felicitously constructed with reference to the convenience of learners and teachers. The style is clear, the sentiments upon many delicate questions of practical ethics are, in the main, true and just, and the tone and spirit are eminently elevated and Christian.

The controversial attitude of a work of this kind towards the late Dr. Taylor seems to us entirely inexplicable and unfortunate. There was no occasion for introducing any such reference at all in a college text-book. The author does not attempt to give anything other than the most general classification of ethical theories. H

* *Moral Philosophy*; or, the Science of Obligation. By JAMES H. FAIRCHILD, President of Oberlin College. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1869.

selection is narrow even from English writers, and his notices of these are merely casual and unsatisfactory. That the views of a single American theologian, whose doctrines and influence on so many points were so nearly akin to those of the Oberlin school, should have been singled out for adverse criticism in a work designed for elementary studies, seems to us an offense against good taste and good feeling, and to exemplify a provincial tendency which we had a right to expect that the Oberlin gentlemen, and especially their catholic minded President, had altogether outgrown.

President Fairchild writes as follows: "Of those which account happiness the supreme good, there are again two classes; first, the theories which represent one's own happiness as the ultimate aim and grand motive of all virtuous action; and secondly, those which regard the happiness of all general well-being, as the end. Of the writers that have maintained the first view, Paley in England, and Dr. Taylor of New Haven, may be taken as representatives. The second view has been maintained by Priestly and Bentham in England, Jouffroy in France, and Presidents Edwards, Dwight, and Finney in America, with others less prominent. Each of these writers has his peculiar views and modes of statement, but the theories may still be embraced in two general classes." pp. 104, 5.

In another passage he speaks of the second class of theories as those "which make happiness the sole good, but find the grand motive for action not in self-love or desire of good, but in the value of the good wherever perceived. All good is to be chosen and pursued; and this choice of good is benevolence, which alone is virtuous action. Many writers have failed to distinguish between these two classes of theories, and have applied to them both the term utilitarianism, which is no more applicable to the doctrine of benevolence, as set forth by President Edwards and President Finney, than to the transcendental views of Zeno and Kant." p. 113.

Of this classification we observe that the points of opposition between the two classes are not necessarily exclusive of another. Neither President Edwards, nor Dr. Dwight, nor Dr. Taylor, would have contended that "the desire of one's own happiness as the ultimate aim and grand motive of all virtuous action" in the sense in which they used these or similar phrases—were exclusive of

or antagonist to "a regard to the happiness of all and general well-being as the end."

Next, the classification according to which Dr. Taylor is placed with Paley, and separated from Dwight and Edwards, seems to us entirely arbitrary and unwarranted. All the pupils of Dr. Taylor know, and the readers of Dr. Taylor's writings ought to be able to discover, that the system of Dr. Taylor was totally opposed to that of Paley in its so called utilitarian characteristic: that the "for the sake of everlasting happiness" of Paley stands for an entirely different motive from "the acting from a regard to their own well-being" spoken of by Dr. Taylor. An attorney trying a case before a country justice might argue that the passages quoted from the two proved a coincidence in their theories, but no person who had studied the systems of both writers ought to confound the two, so far as their doctrine of the desire of happiness is concerned, much less in respect to the spirit of their teachings.

The separation of Dr. Taylor from Drs. Dwight and Edwards, is, in our view, equally unwarrantable. The views of Dr. Dwight may be found in his System of Theology, Sermons 97, 98, and 99, the last of which is entitled "Utility the Foundation of Virtue," and in this the doctrine is explained and defended, that "*virtue is founded in utility.*" It is true that Dr. Dwight did not raise distinctly the questions which Dr. Taylor answers in respect to the universal and fundamental character of the generic subjective desire of happiness, which is common to all special desires, and establishes a relation to itself which is common to every objective motive, but his doctrine was the same in principle, and is occasionally announced in words. In Sermon 97, the truly good man is described as one "who seeks his happiness in doing good." President Edwards subjects the question to a more careful analysis with the following results, which we give in his own language: "Negatively, charity or the spirit of Christian love is not contrary to all self-love. It is not a thing contrary to Christianity that a man should love, or which is the same thing, should love his own happiness." "That a man should love his own happiness is as necessary to his nature as the faculty of will is; and it is impossible that such a love should be destroyed in any other way than by destroying his own being. The saints love their own happiness. Yea, those that are perfect in happiness, the saints and angels in heaven, love their own happiness; otherwise that

happiness which God hath given them would be no happiness to them; for that which any one does not love, he cannot enjoy any happiness in."

Affirmatively—"the inordinateness of self-love does not consist in our love of our own happiness being absolutely considered too great in degree. I do not suppose it can be said of any, that their love to their own happiness, if we consider that love absolutely and not comparatively, can be in too high a degree, or that it is a thing that is liable either to increase or diminution. For I apprehend that self-love, in this sense, is not a result of the fall but is necessary, and what belongs to the nature of all intelligent beings, and that God has made it alike in all; and that saints and sinners, and all alike, love happiness, and have the same unalterable and instinctive inclination to desire and seek it."

"A man may love himself as much as one can, and may be in the exercise of a high degree of love to his own happiness, ceaselessly longing for it, and yet he may so place that happiness, that in the very act of seeking it he may be in the high exercise of love to God; as, for example, when the happiness that he longs for is to enjoy God, or to behold his glory, or to hold communion with God, or a man may place his happiness in glorifying God. It may seem to him the greatest happiness that he can conceive of, to give God glory as he may do, and he may long for this happiness. And in longing for it, he loves that which he looks on as his happiness; for if he did not love what in this case he esteemed his own happiness, he would not long for it, and to love his own happiness is to love himself. And yet, in the same act, he loves God because he places his happiness in God, for nothing can more properly be called love to any being or thing, than to place our happiness in it. And so persons may place their happiness considerably in the good of others, their neighbors for instance, and desiring the happiness that consists in seeking their good, they may, in seeking it, love themselves, and their own happiness."

Charity and its Fruits. 229-239 *passim*. We have no room to comment on the other criticisms of the author upon Dr. Taylor's theory. Nor need we, for if he fundamentally misconceives it in its relation to that of President Edwards, it will occasion no surprise that he should misunderstand or misrepresent it in other aspects.

PROF. BASCOM'S "PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY"* gives ample indications of active and independent thinking in the right direction. In all the positions which he takes he is directly opposed to the sensational and associational systems which are just now so much in fashion, and are at once so plausible at the first view, and so unsatisfactory on closer inspection. Many of the fundamenial assumptions of these systems are ably exposed, and the material analogies by which they have been occasioned are clearly pointed out and satisfactorily set aside. On several single topics the author has made good positions, which he has ably defended. The work was not designed to serve as a complete discussion of the whole subject so much as to lay the foundations of a system, and in a general way to indicate their application to a few classes of facts, and of questions in dispute. It is therefore rather a series of Essays or Studies in the Science of Psychology, than a complete exhibition of the Science itself. The writer of a book of this sort gains to himself an advantage in that he is exempt from the obligation to work out in detail all the inferences and applications of his principles, and to show their consistency with the facts of experience. Then he may allow himself a far more liberal use of figurative language than is accorded to a writer whose problem holds him to a diction that is more strict and severe. We observe that Professor Bascom has availed himself very freely of the last named liberty; to an extent which many critics would scarcely approve. We do not believe in hypercriticism upon such a point, and would by no means reject metaphorical language in the service of philosophy. Nor would we restrict a writer from following the bent of his own genius in the choice of the metaphors which he thinks fit to employ, provided the metaphors do not mislead, and are never made the substitutes for careful analysis and systematic coherence. We dare not assert that Professor Bascom is never misled by the exuberance of his own fancy and the confidence of his own active and eager intellect to use expressions which offend even a very catholic taste, and deceive his own honest mind. Such phrases as "*cross-lots*," and "*log-chained with logical relations*," do not help any argument, nor do they please the taste of ordinary men.

We find some difficulty in determining and accepting the

* *The Principles of Psychology*. By JOHN BASCOM, Professor in Williams College. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son. 1869.

author's doctrine of the nature of consciousness. On page 17, he says, "Consciousness is *commensurate* with all mental states and acts. It accompanies feeling as thinking, and volition as much as either. The only possible way in which a mental state or act can be *testified to*, is by consciousness." "Consciousness is neither a knowing, nor a feeling, nor a willing; is neither this nor that mental act, but a condition common to them all, *a field in which they appear*, in which they arise and make proof of their existence." "Consciousness *gives*—we use familiar language, a more careful expression would be, in consciousness *is found*—the mere fact of a mental state, whether one of thought, feeling, or volition."

On page 18, he speaks of "*wrongly* regarding consciousness as a faculty giving *direct testimony* to certain things, instead of something involved in the very fact of knowing and feeling, making them what they are." Still further: "It is with most an unusual effort of mind to *direct attention* to interior phenomena;"—and again, "Neither are the several phases of mind *observed as* transpiring, but as remembered."

On page 30, after insisting on page 29 that consciousness not only is not a form of knowing, nor the power a faculty of knowing, but that it has no more to do with knowing than with feeling, so that we might as properly say, "we feel that we know," or that "we know that we feel;" he proceeds to assert, "mind, by virtue of its own nature as mind, does and suffers what it does and suffers, consciously under this simple, peculiar, and inexplicable condition of *being aware of its own acts, etc.*"

On page 50, in speaking of the faculties of the intellect and of sense as the first class of these faculties, he thus defines: "The sense includes two and quite diverse sources of *knowledge*, the power of perception, and the *immediate cognizance* which the mind has of its own states," asserting most clearly that whether consciousness be a power of knowledge or not, there is a power by which we do know these states.

But on page 76, he calls this very inner sense by the name of consciousness, and says, "Consciousness, or the inner sense, the remaining means of a *direct knowledge* of phenomena, requires but a brief notice;" and then, in the second sentence after, "self-consciousness, or consciousness or the inner sense, is not a method of the mind's action, is not a faculty of perception." And again. "We cannot readily speak of this knowledge which the mind has

of its own phases of activity, without seeming to imply more than we intend; to imply an explicit form or faculty, or means of knowing."

On pages 154, 5, 6, the author endeavors to explain what he contends is the necessary "confusion of language," by making consciousness to be one of the *regulative ideas of the reason*. The reasons for this view are, that as an essential condition of mental or physical phenomena it is analogous to space in its relation to material objects. "What space is to material facts, consciousness is to intellectual facts, the interpreting light under which they occur. The words we constantly apply to it recognize this relation—we say, 'the field of consciousness,' 'transpiring in consciousness,' 'coming up into the light of consciousness,' 'the flow of consciousness'—that is of thought, feeling in consciousness. These and like expressions are shaped under an image in which consciousness is presented as an arena of mental movements, as is space of physical events." There is much more to the same purport in which we are struck with the singular facility with which the writer interchanges the language of imagery with the language of science, and leaps from loose resemblances to well-grounded analogies. The reason why space should be classed among what in the language of Kant are called regulative ideas, and why consciousness should not be so classed, in our opinion, lies in this—that space, or its relations, belongs to the class which he denominates "synthetic ideas, a priori;" the difference, when expressed in other language, being that space is necessary, a priori, to the conception of matter, because we *necessarily presuppose* it in order that any conception of matter may be possible, while consciousness is found by *the analysis* of mental phenomena to be an element constantly present, and therefore always evolved from an analysis of a mental state. It is not known, a priori, to be a condition essential to the conception of mental phenomena, but only actually observed to be a constituent attendant in fact.

We are by no means certain that this distinction will satisfy the author that he has inadvertently classed consciousness among the ideas of the Reason. On our part, we must confess ourselves entirely unconvinced that the consciousness which is so often spoken of by him as that which is "aware of," "testifies," "takes immediate cognizance of," "observes," "directs after

to," "is the means of a direct knowledge of" the mental or psychical state, is neither an act nor a power of knowledge.

Whether the criticism which we have offered only results "from the facile application of previous opinions to detached points," or whether it proceeds from a "discussion of the principles involved, less penetrative and systematic than that here presented" by the author, we must leave others to decide.

LECKY'S HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS.*—These two volumes exhibit abundant evidence of very extensive and various reading, and of rapid and rather superficial generalization; the results of which are expressed in a very clear but somewhat artificial style. The History of European Morals may not be as brilliant or as thoughtful as the History of Rationalism, but it gives evidence of the same superior powers which caused that work to produce so profound an impression. If judged of by the promise of its title, however, it can by no means be pronounced a superior work. As a history of the theory of morals, it has few claims to consideration. As a history of the practical doctrines, or of the practices of Christendom, it is singularly unfaithful to its theme, abounding as it does in extraneous matter, and wandering off into manifold discussions which are far from being pertinent to the subject. The title of the book should be, a Discourse on the influence of Christianity upon the Morals of Europe, being an argument to show that from both the good which it achieved and failed to achieve, its claims to supernatural origin are not made good. This position is nowhere distinctly avowed. Indeed, the author seems to shrink from avowing what his own opinion is—giving the impression, notwithstanding other tokens of a frank and noble mind, that he dares not take his position and come squarely up to it and defend it. He insinuates rather than asserts, he intimates rather than argues. When he seems brought by the force of his own arguments very nearly to the point of avowing a conclusion, he turns off the attention of the reader in the opposite direction, by some vague declamation, or surprises him by some concession which was the last thing which in such a connection the reader would look for. In short, the whole tone of the author, with respect to the question which he is all the while arguing, is timid and

* *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne.* By WILLIAM EASTPOLE LECKY, M. A. Two Volumes. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1870.

evasive, and clearly shows, either that he has not formed definite opinions upon the most important positions connected with the subject which he discusses, or has not the manliness to avow them. One conspicuous instance of this cannot escape the most superficial reader. Chapter III. he devotes to the conversion of Rome, occupying one hundred and fifty pages exclusively with this subject, giving pause the meanwhile to the History of Morals in Europe. Most of this chapter is occupied with the consideration of the "Theory which attributes the conversion of the Empire to the evidences of Miracles." In the discussion of this topic he takes ground in regard to the influence and credibility of miracles which would be entirely incompatible with the truth of the gospel history. He takes it so broadly, and reaffirms it so often, and enforces and reënforces it by such a variety of considerations as to leave the impression that it would be the height of unreason for any sane man to believe that the gospel records are true. And yet he is careful to call the attention of his readers to the fact that the origin of Christianity does not come within the range of his argument; that he is concerned only with its progress in the third century, and the miracles by which some believe it to have been aided at that late period. But he does not remind them, that the positions which he has taken in respect to their credibility would be fatal to their reception when reported by any class of witnesses and in support of any doctrines. At this juncture he treats his readers, on pp. 412-13, to one of the most eloquent, as it is one of the most truthful, passages of the work, on the manifold adaptations of Christianity to the moral and affectional nature of man. But that a system so wonderfully fitted to attract and move man could have had a human origin, he does not stay to demonstrate, nor does he make a suggestion to support the theory which I manifestly would have his readers receive by "induction," that its origin could not be supernatural. We are at a loss to understand why, in a History of European Morals, the question of the miraculous in Christianity should have been introduced at all, and more particularly why, if its supernatural origin should have been incidentally treated, the peculiarities of Christianity as a moral system, should not have been fully set forth and carefully discriminated from those of the Pagan system, and the bearing of these peculiarities upon its claims to divine origination squarely met and frankly disposed of. We respect the manliness if we do not share in the views of Theodore Parker, when he says of the

miracles of the Gospels, "I cannot receive such facts on such evidence;" as well as when he refers the marvelous moral superiority of their doctrines to the elevated and purified intuitional power of the great teacher. But we do not respect the indirection of a writer who drags in the question of miracles in the last century, and does not choose to face it as it presents itself in the first, and only casually notices the only aspect of Christianity with which he was directly concerned. Is it because the English pluck is dying out, or is it because the fear of social ostracism is so terrible to literary men, or is it because conscience and the traditions of childhood still retain so strong a hold, that the Rationalism of so many English writers is indirectly avowed and so sneakingly defended?

We observe, again, that in the prosecution of what we have stated to be Mr. Lecky's real theme, he dwells at great length on the frightful abuses both of doctrine and practice which prevailed in the Christian church, and were sanctioned by its leading teachers and rulers. The picture, as he presents it, is at once disgusting and revolting in the extreme. These details, we are sorry to say, are so presented, and the argument founded on them is so managed as to enforce the impression that the system and the society which could err so grossly and so perseveringly in respect to points of such great importance, could lay no claim to divine origination or superintendence. We would remind our readers, and would like to be able to suggest to all the readers of Mr. Lecky's History, that the moral perversions and corruptions of morals in the early Christian church, are as fully exposed and as impressively set forth by modern Christian writers as they are by this half paganized, ethical critic of the school of Shaftesbury—that among others the well known Isaac Taylor has dwelt upon them as fully and as frankly as Mr. Lecky, but with a different application of the facts to the argument than that which is insinuated, but not avowed, by the latter.

Mr. Lecky belongs to a peculiar school of historical writers, whose numbers are increasing, and whose influence is rapidly augmented in English literature, of whom Buckle and Draper are representatives; who are enormous readers, hasty generalizers, superficial critics, credulous receivers of second-hand facts and inferences,—men who owe in part their ability to make an impression as writers by the very recklessness with which they use facts, provided they are effective in an ambitious period, or round

out a defective argument. Their attitude toward Christianity is decorous and respectful—nay, it is emphatically such, because they conceal their real opinions, and rather insinuate than declare them out of the very excess of their candor and moral refinement. We do not know which to dislike the most, the infidelity which they hesitate to avow, or the want of manliness which they cannot conceal.

We ought not to omit the very long introductory discussion upon ethical theories with which the author begins his history. The author's want of critical ability and of philosophical discrimination is most obvious in his treatment of this topic. His failures to do justice to the doctrines which he rejects is very conspicuous, when it is compared with that of any able historian of ethical systems—whether English or German. Kant, for example, belongs to the same ethical school with Mr. Lecky, but Kant's representations of the doctrines of the opposite party are immeasurably more profound and just than those of the latter. While in the last there are abundant quotations, much parade of reading, and no little plausibility in the impression which he makes, there is the most decisive evidence that he is not at home in the field in which he so ambitiously bears himself with such assured confidence.

It is not to be overlooked, that Mr. Lecky, like Miss Cobbe, the author of the "Essay upon Intuitive Morals," really, though not avowedly, urges the Kantian theory in its Anti-Christian application in the introduction, and throughout his entire treatise.

PROFESSOR EVERETT'S "SCIENCE OF THOUGHT"* is not a System of Logic in the ordinary sense of the phrase as it is used by English students. It is not a treatise upon the Art of Deduction or the Methods of Induction, nor upon "the Science of the Laws of Thought as Thought," as Logic is defined by Hamilton. In the language of the author, it is the Science of Sciences—or "the Science of those generalized conceptions and relations which are present in all the Sciences." This Science, as thus treated, is coincident with Metaphysics whenever Metaphysics is either intelligently or carefully discriminated from Logic on the one hand, or the ultimate principles of a special Science on the other

* *The Science of Thought; A System of Logic.* By CHARLES CARROLL EVERETT. Boston: William V. Spencer. 1869.

hand. The abundant and varied applications of this First Science, first of all to the methods of reasoning, and next to the special Sciences which are arranged under its categories, is the justification of the author for calling his work "The Science of Logic." In this he follows Hegel, who has been followed by a great number of German writers. Not only does he follow Hegel in this respect, but he avowedly adopts his method of developing the Science, as well as in many of his special doctrines. That he does not do this blindly or implicitly, is manifest from his original method of treating many themes, and from some important deviations from Hegel's own doctrines. The work is admirably written, so far as simplicity and finish of style, variety of illustrations, and amplitude of knowledge are concerned. No reader who is competent to understand the volume, can fail to be delighted with much that it contains. The Hegelian method of beginning with the highest generalizations is, in our view, practically objectionable, because it frightens many a reader at the outset who is fully qualified to understand the subject when differently treated, and because it exposes him to be misled by fanciful analogies. No writer has the confiding reader so completely in his power as the dealer in nebulous abstractions, if only he can make them iridescent with the varied hues reflected from a brilliant imagination, and apparently real by the multiform shadows cast upon them by skillfully managed illustrations. Cloudland is thus not only made a gorgeous land to the admiring pupil, but it is easily confounded with solid land when it is passed off as such by dexterous manipulations which often may deceive even the magician himself.

We have neither room nor inclination for special criticisms upon the volume before us. To be at all satisfactory, they must be given at length. Reserving to ourselves the liberty to do this on another occasion, we have no hesitation in recommending the volume as one of marked ability and interest to the students of Philosophy.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

MOMMSEN'S HISTORY OF ROME.*—This work, at its first appearance, seventeen or eighteen years ago, took the German public by surprise. Its author was known as a learned and profound investigator in the fields of Roman law, history, and archæology. But few probably had suspected the force and fire that he had in him. The powers evinced in this history, the masterly grouping and massing of his material, the skill with which he subordinates details to general effects, the vivid reality of his conceptions, the glowing intensity of his language,—these are qualities very different from those which we are wont to associate with the legist and the antiquarian. The book was intended to be popular in the best sense of the word, one that could be read and understood by all persons of sufficient intelligence to feel a real interest in its subject. The author throws aside his whole apparatus of learned research, and addresses himself to the task of setting forth in the simplest, clearest, most effective way the results of his study, the view of Roman antiquity which he has been led to form in his own mind. He gives very few notes and fewer references to authorities. He carries on no polemic, either against prevailing opinions from which he finds occasion to dissent, or in vindication of opinions which are peculiar to himself. He trusts to the general impression of coherence, harmony, and probability which his views presented in order will make on the mind of the reader. It is not to be denied that this method has certain advantages over that of Grote and Arnold, who allow us to see something of the nature and degree of the evidence on which their statements are founded, and, where opinions vary, something of the arguments by which they are supported. Unity of effect and distinctness of impression are doubtless more or less impaired by this process of criticism. Yet we must confess a preference, on the whole, for the less brilliant and impressive method. We like to know the character of the ground which we have to traverse, whether it is a rock on which we may tread firmly, or a bog which may give way under our footsteps. We wish to have the means of distinguishing what

* *The History of Rome.* By THEODOR MOMMSEN; translated, with the author's sanction and additions, by the Rev. WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D. D. With a preface by Dr. LEONHARD SCHMITZ. New Edition, in four volumes. Volume I. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 654 Broadway. 1869. 12mo. pp. xix. 685.

is certain from what is only more or less probable, what is agreed in by all the best writers from what is peculiar to one or two of them. And the effect on our mind of Mommsen's method is to inspire a vague feeling of distrust, which is anything but satisfactory; we hesitate to rely on many things which, if a course like Grote's had been pursued, we might have seen to be perfectly trustworthy.

It can hardly be said of Mommsen that he has a judicial mind. The intensity with which he holds his main conclusions makes it scarcely possible for him to be quite impartial as to matters connected with and bearing upon them. He sees everything in the light of those general opinions and convictions which he has been led to form. This is strikingly shown in his treatment of Julius Cæsar. He has been deeply impressed with the political sagacity of Cæsar, as comprehending better than any of his contemporaries the real circumstances of the time, its tendencies, necessities and possibilities. But from this he goes on almost to the length of investing his hero with political omniscience and infallibility. He vindicates every step in his career, as inspired by profound wisdom, and demanded by the true interests of the Roman world. He fails to do justice to the really able and honest men of the senatorian party. Cicero and Cato he treats with undisguised contempt. The cynical scorn with which he speaks of all persons for whom he has conceived a feeling of dislike is often unpleasing when it is not wholly unjust, and is an undeniable blemish in his history.

The volume before us is the first of four, and comes down to the close of the war with Pyrrhus, and the subjection of Italy to the Roman power. The history of the Kings, from Romulus to Tarquin the Proud, our author looks upon as unhistorical and untrustworthy. He shows it less respect than Arnold, who gives us the traditional narrative, but in a quaint quasi-Biblical style, which is intended to mark its legendary character. A similar course has been taken by Dr. Ihne in his recently published history of early Rome. But Mommsen does not even tell the story; he alludes to it frequently; he presupposes an acquaintance with it on the part of his readers; but he omits it from his pages. Even the early history of the republic, down to the burning of the city by the Gauls, he regards as, to a great extent, mythical, and contents himself with the merest sketch, touching only on events which stand connected with constitutional changes.

On these changes he is very full, tracing political forms and institutions from their beginnings in times much earlier than the establishment of the republic. It is curious how much can be made out as to these points in long periods for which we have no history in the ordinary sense of the word. It is a fact which gives evidence of that genius for political organization which existed, to a degree never surpassed (perhaps never equaled) elsewhere, in these primitive Italic communities. There is a logical coherence in the political system of the early Romans, and an orderly progress and conservative steadiness about the changes it underwent, that make it possible to trace it back step by step through the twilight of the mythic and semi-historical periods. But Mommsen does not confine himself to the political life and progress of the Romans. Language, Law, Religion, Industry, Trade, Art, Literature, all the phases of Roman activity and civilization, receive his attention, and are discussed with masterly power. There is in these chapters a fullness of thought, an inexhaustible wealth of ideas and suggestions, which make the book a marvel of historic composition.

The translation, by Dr. Dickson, is one of the best which have been made from German into English; it may take rank with Carlyle's version of Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* and Felton's version of Menzel's *History of German Literature*. It is described in Dr. Schmitz's Introduction as a labor of love on the part of the translator; and the comparison of a few pages with the German original is enough to show that it has been made with uncommon patience and painstaking. A long German sentence is often broken up into two or three English ones, a change imperatively demanded by the different genius of the two languages; but in other respects the translator follows very closely in the track of his author. The peculiarities of Mommsen's style are reflected with much skill and felicity. This is the more creditable to Dr. Dickson, because those peculiarities are such as to impose unusual difficulties on a translator. The style is not that dignified, decorous, conventional mode of expression which we find in most histories. Mommsen, like Grote, is ready to use any phraseology which most vividly or forcibly expresses his meaning. He draws freely from the language of the club room, the stock exchange, the daily newspaper. He goes beyond Grote in the freedom with which he introduces spicy and stinging colloquialisms which have hardly gained a place for themselves in polite literature. Dr. Dick-

son has enjoyed a peculiar advantage from being in communication with his author, who has examined the version sheet by sheet, making the suggestions and corrections which seemed to him desirable. The reader of this book may feel a confidence seldom allowed to the readers of translations, that he has before him the true intent and actual meaning of the foreign author.

MR. HENRY CRABB ROBINSON'S "DIARY,"* etc., etc., is not equal in interest to Boswell's Life of Johnson, but it deserves to be ranked with it for its importance as a contribution to the History of Literature, and of literary men. Mr. Robinson was not a Boswell in his exclusive and long continued devotion to a single hero, but with many qualities vastly higher and nobler than this, he resembled him in the strong and self-forgetting interest which he felt for a succession of heroes; beginning with Goethe and ending with F. W. Robertson. This series extended over a long succession of years, from before 1790 to 1866. The temperament of Robinson was the reverse of the *nil admirari*. On the contrary, he carried his amiable interest in distinguished men, especially in men distinguished in literature, to an almost childish extreme. Being by good or bad fortune born a dissenter, he was shut out from the University life, and the University studies of England, but as a compensation he went to Germany in 1800, when it was comparatively rare for an Englishman to think of the German language or of German literature at all, and when the rising suns of German genius had scarcely sent a ray of their brightness to the self-occupied and the self-satisfied little island, which was then absorbed in putting down Napoleonism and upholding British supremacy. In Germany he spent more than five years, became acquainted apparently with everybody who was worth knowing, including Madame de Stael, then in quasi exile from Paris; was on somewhat familiar terms with Goethe, and returned home in 1805 to be stared at somewhat as a visitant from the moon or Timbuctoo.

He was for a while established as a writer and foreign editor for the London Times, and finally entered upon the practice of the law as Barrister. Directly upon his return he resumed his

* *Diary, Reminiscences, and Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson, Barrister at Law, F. S. A.* Selected and edited by THOMAS SABLE, Ph. D. In two volumes. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1870.

acquaintance with the literary men of England who had become famous or who were just rising into notice, and established himself on a more or less intimate footing with very many of the most distinguished. Coleridge he knew intimately. In the family of Charles Lamb he was a frequent visitant, and a trusted and loving friend. With Southey he was a frequent correspondent. With Edward Irving and Basil Montague he associated freely. To Samuel Rogers' breakfasts he was a never to be omitted guest. To Walter Savage Landor he cleaved with unshaken constancy, and was one of the few whom Landor trusted when he distrusted all the world beside. Wordsworth, however, was the *magnus Apollo* of the later half of Robinson's life. He early gave in his adhesion to his theory of poetry; he was his staunch defender on all occasions, and in all societies; he was admitted to the most unreserved familiarity at his house. For many years before the death of the Poet, he made a Christmas visit at Rydal, and was one of the warmest and sincerest mourners at the Poet's death.

His relations to the Political and Religious development of his time were intimate and most interesting. He was from the first a Liberal in Politics, and associated with the better class of leaders in every description of political and social progress and reform. He was one of the foremost among the founders, and among the most liberal and devoted of the friends, of the London University and of University College. His religious and theological opinions were singularly unsettled from the first, and remained vacillating to the last. From being almost a follower of Godwin, he came at last to be a Broad-churchman of the type of Robertson and sympathized most warmly with the theologians and religionists of his school. From the beginning to the end of his life, Robinson was cheery, sympathizing, gentle, hopeful, and earnest, and yet, as it would seem, ever driven by the genius of unrest.

This long-lived man, who knew everybody, and was interested in everybody and in everything, kept a diary with great minuteness, wrote an abundance of long letters, and recorded in a familiar way his Reminiscences of the more important events and personages whom he had seen. From these materials, these volumes were selected and are very judiciously edited. They are an invaluable and most suggestive record of the literary, political, religious, and personal history of three-fourths of a century, during one of the most fruitful periods which the world has ever seen. As such they will be considered necessary to every library.

BARON BUNSEN'S MEMOIRS* have at last been brought within the reach and the means of many of his admirers, in this second and greatly improved edition. We say greatly improved, because it is so much abridged. The first edition was too bulky to be read with facility or pleasure, containing as it did a vast amount of matter interesting only to special students in respect to his peculiar theories, the political history and changes of Great Britain and Germany, with many trivial family and personal details which might well be spared even by his most devoted admirers. The narrative was heavy and dragging, and the whole impression of the book was one of unwieldiness. We have in its place a condensed biography of one of the most remarkable men of modern times—liberal, cultured, and earnestly Christian, the friend of Niebuhr and Arnold, as well as of everything that was good and true, having faith in progress in Science, Theology, and Politics, and not doubting in the least that Christianity is the friend of progress, and would in its turn be befriended thereby.

As a scholar, Bunsen was a model for his diligence, his enterprise, and his manysidedness. His learning was not always the most exact, but for breadth and activity he was an example worthy of admiration. As a statesman he was honest, open, and nobly true to his faith in honor and duty and in patriotic zeal. Though the cherished friend of his King, he dared to dissent from his policy in church and state at critical moments to both, and to be true to his own convictions at the peril of the loss of his place and of the confidence of his cherished royal friend. As a Christian he ever bore nearest to his heart the honor of Christ and the prosperity of His Church; but he believed that science and truth were the servants of both, and should be liberally and boldly followed, without fear of apparent consequences. He compiled a book of hymns for the service of public worship, and for years labored at his *Bibelwerk*, in the faith that the Scriptures might be so expounded as not to be an offense to scholars and cultivated men. One does not need to accept his interpretations to admire the spirit in which he conceived them, nor need we be insensible to

* *Memoirs of Baron Bunsen*, late Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of his Majesty Frederick William IV., at the Court of St. James. Drawn chiefly from Family Papers, by his widow, FRANCES BARONESS BUNSEN. Second Edition. Abridged and Corrected. In Two Volumes. (12mo.) Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1869.

some striking weaknesses in Bunsen's mind and character in order to love and admire his manifold excellencies, his beautiful life, and to more than admire his beautiful Christian death.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF COURT-PREACHER KRUMMACHER* is given to the public in an English translation—almost within twelve months of his death. It is a life in which many American readers will naturally feel a strong interest from their knowledge of the author and subject of it through his *Elijah the Tishbite*, and many other well known volumes. The reader who is attracted to it from his interest in the author, will find an additional interest awakened from the fullness and variety of information which it contains concerning many important matters pertaining to the religious history of Germany for the last half century. The scene shifts from Halle to Jena, from Jena to Frankfort on the Maine, from Frankfort to Ruhrort, from Ruhrort to the Wupperthal, the place of a very decided and strongly marked religious activity, from Elberfeldt to Berlin and Potsdam, where Krummacher died. In connection with his residence in each of these places, the author gives lively sketches of the social and religious condition of the community, and of the most distinguished personages with whom he came into contact. For these reasons his biography is as truly a sketch of his times as it is of the incidents of his own life, and his portraitures are almost as full and vivid of some of his contemporaries as the one which he sketches of himself. Thus, in connection with his University studies at Halle, he gives his lively recollections of Niemeyer, Wegscheider, Gesenius, DeWette, and Knapp, at the time when Knapp was the only champion of the Gospel against the current Rationalism. His residence at Jena suggests his recollections of Fries and Schott, and the memorable Wartburg festival of 1817. Frankfort on the Maine recalls full notices of many distinguished preachers whose names are scarcely known in this country. His pastorates in Ruhrort and the Wupperthal open to us a view of the peculiar religious life which for so many years has distinguished that portion of Germany. His residence in Berlin gives occasion to very lively and lifelike sketches of the preachers with whom he

* *Fredrich Wilhelm Krummacher*: An Autobiography. Edited by his daughter. Translated by Rev. M. G. EASTON, A. M. With a Preface by Professor CAIRUS, D. D., of Berwick. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1869.

was associated, as also of Eichhorn the minister of Public Instruction and Worship, of Schelling, Steffens, Twesten, Hengstenberg, and Neander.

Unfortunately these sketches closed with his notices of Berlin in the Revolution of 1848. We speak advisedly when we say that as a history of the times previous, this autobiography contains abundant and various information which cannot easily be obtained by an English or American reader from any other source. This information, inwrought as it is with the personal history and experiences of a prominent preacher who stood very high in a post of influence and favor with the Court, presented in a pleasant narrative, imparts to this book a peculiar charm, and entitles it to a place on the same shelf in the library with the memoirs of *Niebuhr*, *Perthes*, *Passavant*, and *Schleiermacher*.

D'AUBIGNE'S HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION.*—The Messrs. Carters have now published the fifth volume of the second series of Dr. Merle D'Aubigné's great work on the "Reformation in the Sixteenth Century." Two volumes more will probably bring the author to the conclusion of the task which he has proposed for himself. The present volume traces the progress of the Reformation in England in the time of Henry VIII.; and then resumes the story of the work accomplished in Geneva by Farel's ministry, and brings the history down to the time of the arrival of John Calvin.

ANCIENT STATES AND EMPIRES.†—Mr. Scribner has published a volume with this title, which has been prepared by Mr. John Lord, the well-known lecturer, for the special use of students in colleges and schools. The basis of his work is the admirable *History of the great monarchies of the ancient world*, by Mr. Philip Smith. His three large octavos are altogether too bulky for practical use as a class-book, and Mr. Lord has done good service to the community by condensing and rearranging it.

* *History of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin.* By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D. D. Vol. V. England, Geneva, Ferrara. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1869. 12mo. pp. 470.

† *Ancient States and Empires*, for Colleges and Schools. By JOHN LORD, LL.D. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. 8vo. pp. 645.

TRAVELS.

ACROSS AMERICA AND ASIA.*—Among the many points of interest which are discussed in this meritorious and successful narrative of a journey around the world, it is not easy to select the most worthy of note. The writer has obviously been trained, by his scientific pursuits, to discrimination and quickness of observation, but he has not failed to keep up a live interest in all that pertains to human society, as well as in all the phenomena of nature; and he does not employ technical language when the phrases of every-day life serve his purpose better. There are occasional indications that he is indifferent or inattentive to the details of literary finish; but this gives no serious blemish to his work, which is an honest, spirited, instructive, and sensible recital of the more remarkable adventures and experiences of the author in the newest "diggings" of the new world, and among the most secluded and ancient seats of empire in the old. As a whole, then, we have heartily enjoyed and profited by this volume, as one of the most recent and most trustworthy, as well as one of the most entertaining books of travel in Arizona, Japan, China, and Siberia.

The profession of the author is that of a Mining Engineer. In this capacity he first went to our mountainous West, and under the most barbarous circumstances of border life, abounding in thrilling excitements, took charge, for several months, of a silver mine. Released from this engagement he pursued his journey through dreary routes in the wilderness to California, and was there engaged by an agent of the government of Japan—to go and examine some of the deposits of coal in that empire. On this trip he was accompanied by Prof. William P. Blake. The Japanese explorations were soon impeded and brought to a close. Mr. Pumpelly then went to China, where his services were sought for by the Imperial Government of that country, and where again, after a brief period, a change of policy put an end to his official inquiries. The overland route from Peking to Moscow introduced the author to still new phases of adventure, and this portion of his narrative is among the most fresh and entertaining. The scientific results of his investigations in China and in Japan were printed some little time since among the publications of the Smith-

* *Across America and Asia. Notes of a Five Years' Journey Around the World, and of residence in Arizona, Japan, and China.* By RAPHAEL PUMPELLY. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. pp. 404. 8vo. 1870.

sonian Institution, so that in his present volume the writer has not felt called upon to enter into detail respecting them, but has been free to comment on society and institutions, and the illustrations of manners and customs which attracted his eye. The comments made by Mr. Pumpelly, in respect to the treatment bestowed by western nations, and especially by the English and the Americans, on the Chinese, and the light he throws upon the modern progress of the imperial government, will be of special interest to those of our readers who have read the instructive Articles of Dr. Martin, already printed in these pages. The chapters on "the Chinese as Emigrants and Colonizers," and on "Western Policy in China," abound in suggestions which should be read with attention by all who are studying the Chinese question. Mr. Pumpelly in an advocate of fair-play for the Chinaman, both in his own land and in ours. With us, he thinks the danger most to be guarded against is the enactment or continuance of special legislation with regard to Mongolians. Everything which tends to exclude them from the rest of the community in the United States not only injures the character of the aliens, but produces among our own citizens "those moral evils which were the worst results of slavery with us." These manly and righteous sentiments in respect to the Chinese among us have their counterpart in those brought forward in respect to the procedure of the representatives of this country. "The co-operative policy," of which Sir Frederick Bruce and Mr. Burlingame were the enlightened framers, is that which Mr. Pumpelly regards as most favorable to the interests both of China and the outside world. The extension of our intercourse with the Chinese race depends, in his opinion, on the policy by which western powers shall regulate the actions of their subjects. "Both the people and the government must learn that foreign ideas and improvements are not intended to overthrow the national independence and the imperial authority." This is a very imperfect outline of Mr. Pumpelly's volume, and a meagre representation of his spirit, but we trust it is sufficient to attract many of our readers to the book. They will find in it many laughable stories, many pithy reflections, occasional allusions to well-known friends (like Dr. Martin, Mr. Blodget, Drs. S. Wells Williams, Yung Wing, etc.), some interesting cuts and route maps, a critical essay by Mr. J. Lafarge on Japanese Art, and a photo-lithographic representation of a wonderful bronze image of Buddha in Nirvana, which stands near Yokohama in Japan.

RUSKIN'S "*QUEEN OF THE AIR*."*—Mr. Ruskin's peculiarities of thought and expression are so familiar by this time to most readers, that we might perhaps discharge our duty to them by saying that this book has the same merits and the same defects which have marked its author's works heretofore. They would then know that it must contain many generous and noble thoughts, many original and valuable remarks on art, some visionary political economy, many hasty inferences with a good deal of dogmatizing, and all expressed in a style which here and there breaks out into more genuine and glowing poetry than it is given to any other living writer to put into prose sentences. This would be a correct idea of the book; yet, because its subject takes the author into a new field, in which we believe he has done no work for the public eye before, it seems worth while to speak more particularly of it.

This book, then, consists of a discussion of the myths about Athena, the "Queen of the Air;" or, more exactly, a rambling talk about the functions of the air in the sky and on the earth with which are inwoven all the myths which can in any way be connected with the name of Athena, so as to serve the whim of the paragraph. This is followed by a chapter entitled "Athena in the Heart," wherein is discussed the influence of what the author considers right principles upon the life of nations and individuals, and here he brings in more fully his theories of art, political economy, and morals. How much Athena has to do with this discussion may be seen from the fact that her name occurs on only six of the sixty-one pages it occupies. After this, a few words on Greek art, having for text a figure of Herakles on an ancient coin, finish the book.

Mr. Ruskin does one thing that might be considered a device of cowardice in any one who had not established as he has a reputation for sublime indifference to adverse criticism. He deliberately rejects and refuses beforehand the opinion about his book of the only class of men who are qualified to pass judgment upon the greater part of it. He says that scholars cannot be expected to understand myths—it is only the men of creative and artistic genius who can enter into and explain them. The great creative minds will of course endorse his views; for, if any one ventures

* *The Queen of the Air*; being a study of the Greek Myths of Cloud and Storm. By JOHN RUSKIN, LL.D. New York: Wiley & Son. 1869.

to criticise them on philological grounds, the very act of doing so proves his unfitness, on this principle, for the undertaking. However, at the risk of this self-conviction, we propose to notice some of the many errors, inaccuracies, and groundless assumptions of the book.

His definition of a myth is as follows (p. 2): "A myth is a story with a meaning attached to it, other than it seems to have at first." What, then, is a parable? What is an allegory? What is a fable? The specific difference of the myth—that it is a story of gods and heroes, believed by all who know it to have been true in the remote past, and generally stating some natural phenomenon in personal form—has no place in this definition. Again, further on (p. 71) he uses "myth" in the sense of "type" apparently, for he speaks of *natural* myths as distinguished from human myths, and gives the bird and the serpent as examples, representing, the one "the clothed power of the air," the other "the clothed power of the dust." It would be difficult to find anywhere a more beautiful or more powerful passage than those in which he reproduces the impression made upon his sensitive nature by the bird and the serpent (pp. 70–77); yet when one reads on and tries to find out what these animals have to do with the myth of Athena, he finds that Mr. Ruskin teaches him nothing on this point. One sentence (p. 78) may be quoted to show that what is new is not always true in his explanations. "The bird power is soon made entirely human by the Greeks in their flying angel of victory; and thenceforward (?) it associates itself with the Hebrew Cherubim, and has had the most singular influence on the Christian religion by giving its wings to render the conception of angels mysterious and untenable, and check rational endeavor to determine the nature of subordinate spiritual agency."

But we are convicting ourselves of pedantry. Let us rather seek to give the general impression of the book upon us. For the scientific understanding of myths, it is worthless. Those who can judge it as they read, will learn almost nothing from it; those who cannot will only be confused and misled. It is like reading the visions of a hasheesh-eater. There is a throng and whirl of strange disconnected ideas and myths, etymologies and botany, modern science and ancient fables, art, history, political economy, architecture, morals, and absurdly quoted texts from the Bible, in one glorious jumble. The same name or figure need only occur in any two places to warrant Mr. Ruskin in putting them side by

side and drawing his inference. Athena represents the air, the wind, the rain, the life of plant and animal, color, the spirit of creation and volition, modesty, fortitude, the Holy Spirit, and several other things. If any one will read § 38, he will get a fair idea of the author's conception of method in the treatment of his subject. But for exquisite beauty of style, for warm sympathy with suffering men, and indignation at folly and wrong, for delicate sense of the beautiful in art and nature, for manly avowal of faith in moral principles, this book has its value, as has everything that Mr. Ruskin writes.

THE POPE AND THE COUNCIL.*—Every one remembers the famous scene in the novel of Ivanhoe, when, in the midst of the tournament, a stalwart knight, clad in black armor, with his face concealed behind his visor, rode into the lists and bore down the stoutest adversaries by the weight of his arm. The appearance of this anonymous volume, on the eve of the assembling of the Roman Council,—a volume in which the usurpations of the Bishop of Rome are powerfully and effectually assailed, and the new dogma of Papal Infallibility is smitten with heavy strokes, has recalled the pages of Scott's romance. Whether the book be written, as it purports to be, by liberal Catholics, or by Protestants—for its authorship is plural,—the writers are men who are fully armed, and fully and justly confident in the work which they have undertaken. There may be occasional mistakes, in the multitude of literary and historical references, which are interwoven in the discussion. But, in general, the learning is as accurate as it is ample. There may be another point of view from which the Papacy might be seen to be an institution having its temporary uses and its important office in developing European civilization. But the mistakes and iniquities of Popes and the Papal Court; the frauds and forgeries by which the Papal authority was built up; the robbery of the liberties of the church by which this consummation has been reached, are here depicted with a truthful and unsparing hand. The revival of Gallicanism is a hopeful sign of the times. It would seem as if nothing could have produced this awakening of a free spirit short of the monstrous attempt of the Jesuits and their auxiliaries to foist in the already overburdened

* *The Pope and the Council.* By JANUS. Authorized Translation from the German. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1870. 16mo. pp. xxviii., 346.

creed of the Latin church the dogma of the Pope's personal infallibility. In France, a spirit of resistance has been aroused which will probably prove to be effectual in thwarting the design of the Ultramontanist fanatics. The Bishop of Orleans confronts Manning with something of the old Gallican feeling against trans-alpine despotism. Then the present work emanates from Germany, and is pervaded with the old Teutonic hostility to the spiritual rule of Italians.

This is not the place to discuss the questions which will come before the Latin Council. We should require the space afforded by an Article rather than the narrow limits of a book-notice, if we would enter into the questions. If Papal infallibility be decreed, it will require all, and more than all, of the subtlety of the Romish theologians to define the occasions and topics when the Oracle speaks *ex cathedra*, or in the character of an Oracle. If the Immaculate Conception can be accepted as a dogma, on the *ipse dixit* of the Pope, without the declaration of a Council, why may not any other dogma be promulgated and received on the same authority, and why should not the theory, on which the definition of the Immaculate Conception by the bare voice of the Pope is admitted, be also itself shaped into a dogma which the faithful are bound to accept, under peril of perdition?

PHOCYLIDIS POEMA ADMONITORIUM.*—We are much disappointed in this little pamphlet. We had never read the poem of Phocylides, and we expected no little pleasure in looking over this edition and finding in it an encouragement and a help to the cause of classical scholarship in this country. Instead of that, we find it to be, we must say, worse than useless for its avowed purpose. In the first place, the misprints in the Greek text, more than one per page, as we noticed in merely reading it over, almost spoil it for use as a text-book. They are enough to puzzle and annoy both teacher and scholar. Then the notes are no help at all to the understanding of the poem, or to the study by it of the language, although the Greek affords abundant material for notes of both kinds. They consist mainly of quotations of parallel passages from late Greek and Latin authors, with here and there a moral reflection by the editor. In general, let us say here, parallel passages are of little use in notes to school editions of classi-

* *Phocylidis Poema Admonitorium*; recog. brevibusque not. instr. J. B. FRULING, Ph. D., etc. Andover: W. F. Draper. 1869.

cal authors, unless they are either from writers contemporary with the one annotated, so that they throw light upon the use of words or upon the thought as it lay in the mind of men at that time, or from modern writers in whom no imitation of the classical model can be suspected. Most of those in this book belong to neither class. Finally, the poem itself is very poorly adapted for use in our schools or colleges. We should not suppose that any classical scholar could read it once without being convinced that it was a production of the Christian era. If there are any lines by Phocylides in it, they are buried under the additions by a later hand, as is admitted by scholars generally. A mere series of moral precepts like this would be the dullest possible reading to a beginner in Greek, and if he got any idea of Greek morality from it, it would be a false one. As for moral influence, it would be infinitely better for a boy to read Homer, Æschylus, Thucydides, or Demosthenes. We cannot but wonder what idea Mr. Feuling has of the scholarship or common sense of his adopted country, or what motive induced him to put forth this book, which would certainly meet with poor success in his native Germany. We hope no teacher here will be induced, by the pretentious show of scholarship about it, to adopt this as a text-book.

MATTHEW ARNOLD ON "CULTURE AND ANARCHY."*—Mr. Matthew Arnold has written a very interesting "Essay," entitled "Culture and Anarchy." Its object is "to recommend culture as the great help out of our present difficulties." He defines culture as a study and pursuit of perfection. He defends it against the silly "cant of the day." He takes for its motto, not simply "to render an intelligent being yet more intelligent," but "to make reason and the will of God prevail." He evidently believes in "knowing the best which has been thought and said in the world," in "turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits," in "sweetness and light," as well as "fire and strength"—in a perfection by which all sides of human nature, and all parts of human society may be harmoniously developed. He calls it the "one thing needful" to "come to our best at all points." He is particularly severe on those who care only or chiefly "for walking staunchly by the best light they have"—who think less of "knowing" than of "doing"—which he considers to be the fault of our "Puritans, ancient and modern."

* *Culture and Anarchy: an Essay in Political and Social Criticism.* By MATTHEW ARNOLD. London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1869.

We are interested especially in the distinction which he makes between *Hebraizing* and *Hellenizing*, and which runs through the whole Essay. To *Hebraize* is "to sacrifice all other sides of our being to the religious side." This "leads to a narrow and twisted growth of our religious side itself, and to a failure in perfection." This is the tendency of "all America." Hellenism and Hebraism are rival forces and divide the empire of the world. Their final aim is the same, viz.: "man's perfection or salvation." But they pursue it in different ways. The uppermost idea of the one is "to see things as they really are:" of the other, is "conduct and obedience." The governing idea of the one is "spontaneity of consciousness;" of the other, "strictness of conscience." "The Hellenic half of our nature, bearing rule, makes a sort of provision for the Hebrew half, but it turns out to be an inadequate provision: and again the Hebrew half of our nature, bearing rule, makes a sort of provision for the Hellenic half; but this, too, turns out to be an inadequate provision. The true and smooth order of humanity's development is not reached in either way." Neither of them is "the *law* of human development." Both are but "contributions" to it. This is capital.

But we *demur* when he says that "Christianity occupied itself, like Hebraism, with the moral side of man *exclusively*." "What was this but an importation of Hellenism *into Hebraism*?" "Whereas St. Paul imported Hellenism within the limits of our moral part only, this part being still treated by him as *all in all*,"—"we ought to try and import it"—"into all the lines of our activity," &c. Is this a just and fair representation of Christianity? Is it not *broader* in its sphere than Hebraism? Does it not "import" into *human nature and human society* more than either Hebraism or Hellenism? indeed, *all* that can be needed or wanted for man's salvation and perfection. How can *we* import what Paul did not, since he is not satisfied "till we all come to a perfect man," and declares of Christ, "In him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge;" or Peter, since he distinctly speaks of "all things that pertain unto life and godliness through the knowledge of Him that hath called us to glory and virtue; whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises; that by these ye might be *partakers of the divine nature*?" It is doubtless true (as is here said) that "no man, who knows nothing else, knows even his Bible." But who that knows "Sophocles and Plato" can say that "their notion of what goes to make up holiness was larger than" that of Christ and his Apostles?

Perhaps the most practical part of the Essay is that in which he speaks of the "flexibility of culture," or its "independence of machinery." Faith in machinery may well be called "our besetting danger." "What is freedom but machinery? what is population but machinery? what is coal but machinery? what are railroads but machinery? what is wealth but machinery? what are religious organizations but machinery?" We are not to worship these as precious ends in themselves. But, after all, does he not generally *undervalue* them? *E. g.* "the blessedness of the franchise and the wonderfulness of (our) industrial performances." He seems to despise "freedom," while he almost worships "establishments."

The Essay is very suggestive, for it abounds in felicitous hits, as when he distinguishes between "provinciality" and "totality"—when he distributes society in England into "Barbarians, Philistines, and Populace," and adds, "America is just ourselves, with the Barbarians quite left out, and the populace nearly;" when he calls the non-conformists "hole and corner churches;" when he avers that "the whole attitude of horror and holy superiority assumed by Puritanism towards the Church of Rome," merits Sir Henry Wotton's rebuke, "take heed of thinking that the further you go from the church of Rome, the nearer you are to God;" when he distinguishes between "creative" and "instrumental" statesmen; when he quotes Epictetus as saying "It is a sign of a nature not finely tempered to give yourselves up to things which relate to the body; to make, *e. g.*, a great fuss about eating, drinking, walking, riding. All these things ought to be done merely *by the way*; the formation of the spirit and character must be our real concern:" when he insists that "culture does not set itself against games and sports. It congratulates the future, and hopes it will make a good use of its improved physical basis; but it points out that our passing generation of boys and young men is meantime sacrificed;" that "culture is always assigning to system-makers and systems a smaller share in the bent of human destiny than their friends like"—"will not let us rivet our faith upon any one man and his doings"—labors to "humanize knowledge" by divesting it of all that is "harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive," is eminently practical, because "even when it does not lend a hand to rough and coarse movements," it "qualifies it to act less at random," &c. How strange that only once does he make direct allusion to that "something which thwarts and spoils all our

efforts, viz., *sin* ! With a stronger sense of human sinfulness, he might not have been so confident that "now and for us it is a time to *Hellenize*." In fact, he seems to feel that it is worse for those who have such a religion as ours, than for those who are utterly "without religion."

CLASSICAL STUDY.*—The aim of this book is to present, in a compact form, an antidote to the judgments, adverse to the study of the classics, which are enforced with earnestness by many educators at the present time. The views of twenty-one able men are here given with more or less fullness, extracted from papers which have been published within the last thirty-five years. These papers are of varying excellence; the ablest, without question, being an extract from Mr. Mill's Inaugural before the University of St. Andrews, but no one of them is without merit.

The first, that of Rev. Mr. Jones, Principal of King William's College in the Isle of Man, is a thorough analysis of the advantages of the study of the classics in itself considered, and as compared with the pursuit of any other branch which may be made central in a college course. One might, after reading this paper and the Discourse of Mr. Mill, regard them as covering the entire ground involved in the discussion. But so numberless are the considerations developed by a fair consideration of the question, that the reading of each successive essay seems to add something forceful, and often something beautiful to the thoughts, that have been previously unfolded. Indeed, the book, apart from its arguments, is one of the noblest pleas that could be made for classical culture. In the plain and lucid exposition of the first paper, in the terse and pointed sentences of Mr. Mill, embracing the widest scope of knowledge, in the exact and discriminating statements of Prof. Conington, in the glow of Prof. Edwards's scholarly enthusiasm, and in the rhetoric of Mr. Thompson, one finds the precious leaven of classical training.

We think more may be made, than is made in the papers written by Americans, of the worth of preparation by classical study for the special needs of our own country; that it might be shown that classical scholarship is not in our times necessarily "devitalized," but that the exercise of the judgment in deciding between

* *Classical Study: Its Value Illustrated by Extracts from the Writings of Eminent Scholars.* Edited with an Introduction by SAMUEL H. TAYLOR, LL.D., Principal of Phillips Academy. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1870.

different readings and emendations, in calculating probabilities, is a training well adapted to prepare men for business life. But the value of this training for professional men, and as ennobling the entire nature, could hardly be more clearly shown by abstract arguments than in the collective writings of these scholars.

Should any one think that two or three of these papers might have been omitted, we will venture to doubt whether any two friends of classical study would agree upon the extracts to be rejected. If this be true, there could be no higher evidence of the skill with which the editor has done his work.

No one can read this book and fail to see that the classics have been made responsible for a great deal that has resulted from bad teaching. Teachers will find here valuable suggestions and will receive from these pages stimulus to constant labor, that they may bring their work up to the fine art, which it must become in order to be successful. When one reflects how few teachers in our country inspire any love for the classics in their pupils (it adds not a little to the enjoyment of reading the book to know that its compiler is eminent among the few), one does not wonder at the outcry against classical study. It may be, that as the number and importance of other branches increase, less time must be given to the classics in the future. Hence there must be wise methods and more self-sacrificing teaching, that more work and more loving work may be expended by students in their pursuit, than has been ever in the past. If the majority of our students learn to enjoy the classics before entering college, and the standard of admission be everywhere raised, the elective system may produce less harmful results than its opponents anticipate.

This book might become a powerful auxiliary to the cause of classical learning. Teachers might read extracts from it to their advanced classes and enforce the opinions of the writers by unfolding the precious value of the legacies in scholarship and eloquence left by such men as Legaré, Edwards, Felton, and Conington, and dwelling upon the noble contributions to literature and metaphysical discussion of Mill, Porter, and McCosh. 'Too little effort has been made to show to our students in this way the worth of classical study. We wish that Dr. Taylor (who might so easily and so ably do it) would supplement this volume by another, which should exhibit in this concrete way the truth of the opinions asserted in this book. Such a volume might contain, for

instance, translations of Sainte Beuve's critiques on Terence and Virgil; the chapter of Mommsen on the earliest migrations into Italy, passages perhaps from eminent English orators and poets, and other matter which directly and indirectly should show the effect of classical training. Though such a collection would be a more open, would it after all be a more concrete exhibition of the worth of classical scholarship than the volume before us?

LIBRARY OF WONDERS.—There are books which are equally interesting, and some which are equally instructive, to boys and men, young people and old people. To this class belongs the *Librairie des Merveilles*, a series of books in French, relating to science, art, antiquities, etc., and written generally by men eminent in the various departments of knowledge to which they relate. The information is up to the point of the latest investigations; it is presented in clear language and a lively style; and is illustrated with numerous excellent cuts such as the art of wood-engraving enables the publisher to supply at a comparatively small cost. Messrs. Charles Scribner & Co. have published translations of a number of these volumes, and propose to add others, if not the whole of the series, to their list. We commend these volumes as worthy of the attention of all lovers of good books, and especially for such as are in quest of profitable reading for boys and girls.

Among the volumes already published, are "The Wonders of Heat," "The Wonders of Optics," "Thunder and Lightning," "Pompeii," and "Egypt."

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

The Earlier Years of Our Lord's Life on Earth. By the Rev. William Hanna, D. D., LL.D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870. 12mo. pp. 400.

The Spirit of Life; or, Scripture Testimony to the Divine Person and Work of the Holy Ghost. By E. H. Bickersteth, M. A., author of "Yesterday, To-Day, and Forever." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870. 12mo. pp. 192.

Light and Truth; or, Bible Thoughts and Themes. The Acts and the larger Epistles. By Horatio Bonar, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870. 12mo. pp. 414.

The Life, Passion, Death, and Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ: Being an Abridged Harmony of the four Gospels in the words of the Sacred Text. Edited by Rev. Henry Thornby. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1870. 12mo. pp. 184.

Christ and the Church: Lectures delivered in St. Ann's Church, Eighth street, during the season of Advent, 1869. By the Rev. Thomas S. Preston. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1870. 12mo. pp. 344.

Words of Comfort for Parents Bereaved of Little Children. Edited by William Logan, Glasgow, Scotland. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870. 12mo. pp. 387.

The Crown without the Conflict; or, Musings on the Death of Children. By the Rev. R. H. Lundie, M. A., Fairfield, Liverpool. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870. 24mo. pp. 29.

The Shepherd of Israel; or, Illustrations of the Inner Life. By the Rev. Duncan Macgregor, M. A., Minister of St. Peter's, Dundee, Scotland. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870. 16mo. pp. 339.

The Scripturalness and Expediency of the System of Modern Evangelism. By the Rev. W. W. Davenport. Boston: Nichols & Noyes. 1869. 8vo. pp. 31.

Sunday Laws of the State of New York, and Judicial Decisions affirming their Constitutionality. New York: New York Sabbath Committee, No. 5 Bible House. 1869. 8vo. pp. 16.

Address at the laying of the Corner Stone of the Divinity Hall of the Theological Department of Yale College, September 22, 1869. 8vo. pp. 48.

Proceedings of the Commemorative Union Meeting of the Three Presbyterian Churches of the City of Detroit, held in the First Presbyterian Church on the evening of Sunday, December 6, 1869. Phonographically reported by Charles Flowers. 8vo. pp. 36.

The Promise of Shiloh; or, Christ's Temporal Sovereignty upon Earth: When will it be Fulfilled? By Joseph L. Lord, M. A., of the Boston Bar. Boston: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 106.

Jesus on the Throne of His Father David; or, The Tabernacle of David: When will it be built again? Sequel to "The Promise of Shiloh." By Jose

L. Lord, M. A., of the Boston Bar. New York: James Inglis & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 92.

Religion and Life. By James Reed. New York. 1869. 16mo. pp. 35.

The Better Life, and How to Find It. By Rev. Edward Payson Hammond. Boston: Henry Hoyt. 16mo. pp. 126.

The Writings of Madame Swetchine. Edited by Count de Falloux, of the French Academy. Translated by H. W. Preston. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1869. 16mo. pp. 255.

HISTORICAL.

A Brief Sketch of the Early History of the Catholic Church on the Island of New York. By the Rev. J. R. Bayley, Secretary to the Archbishop of New York. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 1870. 16mo. pp. 242.

The Capture of Ticonderoga, in 1775. A Paper read before the Vermont Historical Society at Montpelier, October 19, 1869. By Hiland Hall. 1869. 8vo. pp. 82.

Rameses the Great; or, Egypt 3,300 Years Ago. Translated from the French of F. Lanoye. With thirty-nine wood cuts by Lancelot, Sellier, and Bayard. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870. 16mo. pp. 296.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Essay on Divorces and Divorce Legislation. With special reference to the United States. By Theodore D. Woolsey, D.D., LL. D., President of Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1869. 12mo. pp. 308.

Bible Animals: Being a description of every living creature mentioned in the Scriptures, from the Ape to the Coral. By the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A., F.L.S., etc. With one hundred new designs by W. F. Keyl, T. W. Wood, and E. A. Smith. Engraved by G. Pearson. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870. 8vo. pp. 652.

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant: His Services and Characteristics, as sketched by Major-General B. S. Roberts, before the Faculty and Students of Yale College, by invitation, October, 1865; and again read to the Legislature of Connecticut, by special invitation, in 1866, at its session at New Haven, Conn. 1869. 8vo. pp. 19.

Meteors, Aerolites, Storms, and Atmospheric Phenomena. From the French of Zürcher and Margollé. By William Lackland. Illustrated with twenty-three fine wood cuts, by Lebreton. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1870. 16mo. pp. 324.

Arms and Armor in Antiquity and the Middle Ages: also, a descriptive notice of modern weapons. Translated from the French of M. P. Lacombe, and with a preface, notes, and one additional chapter on arms and armor in England. By Charles Boutell, M. A. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1870. 12mo. pp. 296.

An American Family in Paris. With fifty-eight illustrations of Historical Monuments and Familiar Scenes. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1869. 16mo. pp. 319.

Stories from my Attic. By the author of "Dream Children." With illustrations. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1869. 16mo. pp. 269.

White and Red: A Narrative of Life among the Northwest Indians. By Helen C. Weeks. With eight illustrations by A. P. Close. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 16mo. pp. 266.

Two Lives in One. By Vieux Moustache. With a Frontispiece by F. O. C. Darley. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1870. 16mo. pp. 246.

Old Horse Gray, and the Parish of Grumbleton. By Edward Hopper. Respectfully dedicated to the Merciful Philozoist, Henry Bergh. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1869. 12mo. pp. 82.

The Poems of Emma C. Embury. First collected edition. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1869. 12mo. pp. 368.

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A P R I L, 1 8 7 0.

ARTICLE I.—THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE AND THE
COUNCIL OF THE VATICAN.

Conciliengeschichte. Nach den Quellen bearbeitet von Dr.
CARL JOSEPH HEFELE, o. ö Professor an der Universität Tü-
bingen. Siebenter Band. I. Abth. Geschichte des Concils
von Constanz. Freiburg im Breisgau: 1869.

*The Centenary of St. Peter and the General Council: A
Pastoral Letter to the Clergy, &c.* By HENRY EDWARD,
Archbishop of Westminster. London: Longmans, Green
& Co., 1867.

THE Council of Constance, which was in session during the interval between the years 1414 and 1418, was the most brilliant and imposing of the ecclesiastical assemblies of the middle ages. If the number of bishops present was not so large as at some of the other great synods of the Church, this difference was more than made up by the multitude of inferior

clergy, of doctors and of jurists, and by the unexampled array of sovereigns and nobles. Pope and Emperor were both present each with a numerous and dazzling retinue of officers and attendants. It has been pronounced the first example of a congress of princes in modern times, since there was hardly a kingdom or principality of the catholic world, however small or remote, that was not represented by princes or other deputies. A throng of not less than fifty thousand people, drawn by official obligation, curiosity, the love of gain or of pleasure flowed into the city of Constance, to witness the doings of the Council. It has been truly said that a detailed description of the scenes that took place within and without the assembly would afford a complete as well as vivid picture of the life and manners of the time. The occasion that called the Council together was of the gravest character. The abuses in the administration of the Church had grown to be unbearable. In Bohemia there was a formidable religious movement that threatened to result in the establishment of a new and powerful sect. Above all, the long schism which the Council of Pisa had unsuccessfully tried to terminate, demanded an instant and effectual remedy, if Christendom and the Catholic Church were to be saved from permanent division. It is to the proceedings of this Synod, that the new instalment of Hefele's copious work on the History of Councils is devoted.

Hefele is one of the most learned and justly esteemed of the Catholic theologians north of the Alps. His work is one to which a Protestant, to be sure, must often take exception; yet generally speaking, it is characterized by a spirit of fairness and it is not probable that it contains any intentional perversion of facts or sophistry in argument. Hefele is frequently called a liberal Catholic; and so he is, in comparison with the Curialists or extreme ultramontanist party. On the particular question whether the Pope is, by himself and independently of the concurrence of a Council, infallible in matters of faith and morals, we do not find that, in the work before us, he distinctly avows his opinion. But he is far from being a Gallican, in the sense of the old Paris theologians, who exerted a commanding influence in the Reforming Councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle, or in the sense of Bossuet, who followed

in their track. In fact, he describes his own position as being a middle one, between the Gallicans on the one hand and the Curialists on the other. The Pope is neither *above* nor *under* the Council, but is the head of the Church; his relation being analogous to that of the head to the members of the human body. A Council without the Pope is incomplete. It is not an œcumenical Council. His assent to the dogmatic decrees of such an assembly is requisite, to give them infallible authority. Yet Hefele holds, as indeed does Bellarmine, that a Council might depose a Pope for heresy, inasmuch as a heretic is *ipso facto* disqualified from holding an ecclesiastical office, high or low.* But in such a proceeding the Council does not act as an œcumenical assembly. Being cut off from the Pope, it cannot act in this capacity. We have the singular doctrine, then, that an assembly of bishops, which is incompetent, without the Pope's assent, to issue infallible definitions of doctrine, is still competent to put the Pope on trial for heresy, convict him, and degrade him from his office. Hefele shows his conservatism, also, in maintaining that a Pope cannot be deposed by a Council for personal misconduct. He may be a very bad man, but he cannot, for this reason, be deprived of his office. John XXIII., Hefele expressly says, could not have been lawfully deposed for his crimes. It was only heresy on his part that could authorize such a proceeding. The doubtful validity of his election is brought in, as another sufficient cause for removing him from his station. How far this theory is from that of the Constance theologians and of hosts of able and good Catholics in past ages, we need not stop to point out.

In his History, Hefele is evidently biased by the theory as to the relation of the Pope to the Council, to which we have just adverted. He supports by feeble arguments the often refuted assertion that the Bishops of Rome convoked and presided over the early œcumenical Councils, including that of Nicæa. The proposition that the Roman Bishop convoked the Council of Nicæa, rests on no proof that has any weight, and is contrary to all the evidence and probabilities in the

* Bellarmine, as will be explained hereafter, does not admit, for himself, that a Pope will ever be left to fall from the faith.

case. It was Constantine who endeavored to quell the disturbance raised by Arius at Alexandria. It was through his friend Hosius, the Spanish Bishop whom he held in so high esteem, that he sent his letter which was designed to pacify the contending parties. Not a syllable do we hear from the contemporary historians and witnesses, of any connection of the Roman Bishop with these preliminary events. Constantine, in all his letters and missives that relate to the Council, says nothing about the Pope. The assertion that Hosius acted for the Pope and presided in his name, is not only a pure conjecture, but is virtually contradicted by Eusebius, who speaks of the Roman presbyters as acting for the Roman Prelate, and although Hosius is named in the same sentence, no such representative character is ascribed to him. That Hosius signs the decrees of the synod first, is owing to the circumstance that he was a "world-renowned" man, as Eusebius says of him; to his personal relations to the Emperor; and to the probable fact that he was one of the presidents; not as standing in the Pope's place, but through his own merits. It was he and Eusebius of Cæsarea, as Stanley justly thinks, who sat, one on each side of the Emperor, when that august personage took his place in the midst of the Council. The two Roman presbyters signed after Hosius—we assume that the authorities which report the signatures in this order, are correct,—out of respect to the Roman Bishop, to whom a primacy of dignity would probably have been conceded, had he been present; although, even in this case, it is not certain that the name of Hosius would not have been first inscribed. Now that the pseudo-Isidorian misconceptions and misrepresentations respecting the powers conceded to the Roman Bishops in the first centuries, have been so long exploded, is it too much to hope that Roman Catholic writers will cease to strain historical evidence for the sake of establishing an indefensible position? The sole authority which Hefele cites for the pretended presidency of the Roman Prelate at Nicæa, is Gelasius of Cyzicus, who wrote towards the end of the fourth century—an utterly worthless witness, a *mauvais compilateur*, as Dupin calls him. Gelasius interpolates in a quotation from Eusebius the statement that the Pope presided by representatives. But his whole narrative of

the Council swarms with errors. He even gives an account of discussions on the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, although, as is well known, the subject was not touched at the Council. One may see how desperate the case is, when a scholar, like Hefele, finding nothing in Eusebius or Socrates or Athanasius, to afford any aid to his position, falls back on Gelasius!

The two topics of most interest which are brought forward in Hefele's recent volume on the proceedings at Constance, are the decrees of the 4th and 5th sessions, affirming the subordination of Pope to Council, and the trial and execution of Huss. Hefele dissents, of course, from the view of the extreme Curialists, who deny the œcumenicity of the Constance Council altogether. It requires, indeed, some hardihood even in them to take such ground, in the face of the distinct declaration of Martin V., in the bull against the Hussites. But Hefele allows an œcumenical character only to those acts of the Council which were done after the election of the Pope and with his approval (the 41st to 45th sessions, inclusive), together with such other previous acts and decrees as were ratified by him. All the ingenuity of the Papal theologians has been exerted in the effort to show that the famous doctrines of the 4th and 5th sessions never had Papal sanction. The decrees which had been agreed upon in the meetings of the nations, were to be read in the general session (the 4th) by Zabarella, Cardinal of Florence, the anti-Gallican spokesman. But it was found that in his hands they had undergone an alteration. One of the changes was that in the 1st Article which declared the obligation of all, the Pope included, to obey the Council, the words,—“Reformation in head and members”—one of the points in regard to which the obligation to submit to the Council was affirmed—were left out. This, Hefele states, was by an arrangement between Sigismund and the Cardinals. Then the intelligence came that the Pope had fled again, leaving Schaffhausen. The Council now insisted upon the passage of the Articles as originally conceived, and as approved by the nations, and this took place at the 5th general session, at which Zabarella and seven other cardinals were present. They made no protest, and the Articles were passed in due form. We

cannot admit, therefore, the plea of Hefele, that on account of their secret objections or private declarations, supposing these to have been in opposition to the decrees, they were rendered invalid. In two discourses of Gerson, they were quoted before the Council as authoritative acts, and no voice was lifted up to dispute the statement. They are to be regarded as the decrees of the Council, not less than the declarations of the preceding session. But we do not see that Hefele materially helps his case, were he to succeed in showing that the proceedings of the 5th Session were without the assent of the Cardinals. For the 1st Article, as read by Zabarella and passed in the 4th Session, is all that a Gallican can ask. It read thus: "The Synod of Constance, regularly assembled in the Holy Ghost, forming a universal Council and representing the militant Church, has its authority immediately from God, and every one, the Pope included, is bound to obey it in what pertains to the Faith and to the extirpation of Schism." This is enough. The superiority of the Council to the Pope is unambiguously declared. And as to the omitted clause—"the Reformation of the Church in head and members,"—the Council practically vindicated its right on this point by deposing John XXIII., and by other measures equally significant. But how about the approval of the Popes? In the first place, John XXIII., before his deposition declared, over and over again, that the Council was "holy and could not err." Hefele himself quotes these declarations. To be sure, Balthasar Cossa was one of the most flagitious of men although Hefele would mitigate somewhat the verdict of execration that was pronounced upon him by his contemporaries. But he was Pope, nevertheless, up to the time of his deposition. In the second place, Martin V. sanctioned the proceedings of the Council, in terms that cover the 4th and 5th Sessions. No matter what reluctance he may have felt in doing this. No matter what counter expressions he may have uttered. In the matter of Falkenberg, who had so grievously incensed the Poles by his book, and whom the French, on account of the affinity of his doctrines with those of Jean Petit wished also to condemn, the Pope declared that he maintained the decrees of the Council as to everything which had been adopted in *materiis fidei et conciliariter*. The verdict against

Falkenberg had been passed in the nations, but not in the general session. This is the sense of the term *conciliariter*. It is not opposed to *tumultuariter*, as Hefele seemed to think, in his first volume; but to *nationaliter*. Now the decrees of the 4th and 5th Sessions *were* adopted *conciliariter*. Hefele objects, again, that they are not *de fide*. That is, they are not of a dogmatic character. They were obviously so meant; and this Hefele himself concedes.* If the supremacy of Pope over Council can be made into a dogma, why not the reverse proposition? If the infallibility of the Pope can be turned into an article of the creed, why not the infallibility of the Council? But look at Martin's bull against the Hussites. In this bull, it was provided that every person suspected of holding the condemned heresies of Wickliffe and Huss, should be required by bishop or inquisitor to say, among other things, whether he believes that "what the Holy Council of Constance, representing the universal Church, has sanctioned and sanctions *in favorem fidei et salutem animarum* is binding on all Christian believers, and also that what the Synod has condemned as contrary to the faith, must be held by all to deserve reprobation." Hefele can do nothing with this passage except to construe the terms,—*in favorem fidei et salutem animarum*, as restrictive! As if Martin in a bull for the suppression of heresy, which aimed to accomplish its end by bringing the authority of the Council to bear heavily upon offenders, would couple with the assertion of the œcumenical character of the Synod, a partial denial of the same! As if he would suggest to persons heretically inclined, that decrees not judged to be *in favorem fidei* and for the health of souls, need not be respected! But Hefele is compelled to resort to the hypothesis that Martin V. purposely used ambiguous language, such as might be understood by each party as favoring its cause against the other. That is, he intended that the supporters of the Council should understand him to approve of their doctrine, at the same time that he left a loop-hole out of which he could escape! We think more charitably, in this instance, of Martin V., and we interpret him as giving a full and un-

* p. 104.

qualified assent to the decrees and declarations, passed in general session, of the Council of Constance. In the third place, when the Council of Basle had reaffirmed the Constance decrees on the point in question, Eugene IV. gave them his express and unqualified sanction. The pretence of the Curialists, that this was done under stress, will not answer. There was the force of public opinion and the pressure of circumstances, so that he did what he would have preferred not to do ; but he acted freely, without coercion. Moreover, his legates solemnly swore to observe the decrees of the Council of Basle, before they were permitted to preside. We might bring other evidence to prove that Popes have sanctioned the Constance doctrine, upon the relative authority of Councils. But the great French historians and theologians have established the fact long ago. It is only the fresh assertion of the contrary proposition by Hefele, and his particular mode of defending it, that has induced us to enter into the question at all.

The subject of the trial and execution of Huss is treated by Hefele, on the whole, with commendable fairness. There are occasional criticisms on the character and on the statements of Huss, to which we do not assent, but which are to be expected from a Roman Catholic, even though his proclivities are humane and liberal. Huss, though strongly influenced by the writings of Wickliffe, was quite a different man in his intellectual cast. Huss did not carry out his principles, as Wickliffe did, to their logical consequences ; although, had he lived longer, he might have worked out a more complete system. The Council found it difficult to fasten on propositions which, in the sense in which they were intended by him, could justly be declared heretical ; and the impatience and passion of the assembly prevented him from having a fair and attentive hearing. His occasional paradoxes, which were in themselves innocent, were perversely construed into an assault upon the foundations of civil as well as ecclesiastical authority. But the Council were sagacious enough to discern that he disowned the authority of the Church, and placed himself on the Scriptures as he understood them. He was, in truth, a Protestant

in this essential principle. He was ready to renounce errors, if he could be convinced that his opinions were errors; but he would not abjure his opinions at the mere command of the Council. He presented thus, in the attitude which he assumed before that body, a practical demonstration to their eyes that he was a heretic. D'Ailly, Gerson, and the rest of the eminent men who led in the Council and who were ready to pull the offending Pope down from his throne, were attached as firmly as possible to the doctrine of hierarchical authority. They simply held the episcopal, aristocratic theory that this authority inheres not in the Pope personally, but is diffused through the hierarchical body; that the center of gravity is in the whole assembly of bishops, and not in the primate. They felt it the more necessary, since they were effecting changes with a high hand, to mark the limits of the reform which they aspired to achieve; and this limit, as one has said, they did mark with blood. Every enlightened Protestant Christian who believes that the Scriptures are the guide in doctrine and life, and that the disciple has the right to interpret the Scriptures for himself, looks up to Huss as a noble witness for the truth and an illustrious martyr. It is evident that his uprightness, his sincerity, his unfaltering courage, his spirit of forgiveness, so like that of the Master, make a deep impression even upon men like Hefeles, who yet deem his doctrinal position an erroneous one. Luther said, in view of the words and conduct of Huss, that if he was not a good Christian, there never was one.

Respecting the execution of Huss, Hefeles has interesting remarks, which are designed to soften the condemnation which is visited on the Council for this act; for it is the Council, and not Huss, which, in modern days, is on trial. He urges the fact that all civil punishments in those days were severe and barbarous even, when judged by our standards and by existing codes. He also shows that, according to the universal opinion of that age, a heretic, convicted by the proper ecclesiastical authority, should and must be put to death by the civil magistrate. Huss was adjudged a heretic by the highest judicial body; and his opinions were, in fact, if compared with the creed, heretical. The legislation, however, which inflicted

such penalties upon heresy, Hefele styles "Draconian," and he deplores the execution of Huss the more, since great disadvantages have resulted to the Church from this iron legislation, and countless misunderstandings and misconceptions have been occasioned by it.

Hefele brings up the burning of Servetus, as an illustration of the sentiments prevalent even a hundred years later and among Protestants, respecting the right mode of dealing with heretics. The feeble attempts which have been made in times past to relieve Calvin from the responsibility connected with the death of Servetus, are now, for the most part, abandoned, as they ought to be. Calvin, seven years before the arrest of Servetus, said that if he came to Geneva, he should not, with his (Calvin's) consent, go away alive. He approved and justified the execution. The "mild Melancthon," as Hefele truly says, joined in this approval. Protestants generally, at that time, held that civil magistrates should use the sword, which is entrusted to them, for the extirpation of heresy. The theory of religious persecution is now given up, for two reasons. First, there is undoubtedly a different estimate of the criminality involved in holding erroneous opinions in religion, and a disposition to more charitable judgment. Along with this feeling, there is a stronger sense of the difficulty of measuring the guilt of false belief. Yet this is not the only, nor is it the chief, influence which renders Protestants averse to the use of force against what they consider dangerous and mischievous errors. Nor is the experience of the futility of forcible and violent means for the defence of truth, the sole or the principal cause of this change. We may hold that men are morally responsible for their beliefs, inasmuch as they are responsible for using those means of ascertaining the truth, which God has placed within their reach, and because character cannot be severed from belief; and, at the same time, we may hold that it is utterly wrong to use force for the propagation of truth or the extirpation of error. The real ground of this view is, that it is not the function of the Church to use, directly or indirectly, any but moral influences against religious error, and that it is not the function of the State to punish men for their opinions. This radical alteration in the view that is taken of the proper function

of the State, and of the Church as well, is the ground of toleration; although the other motives to the exercise of this spirit, which have been adverted to, are cogent auxiliary reasons. There are two important differences between Protestants and Roman Catholics, in regard to this subject. The first is, that the amount of persecution of which Protestants have been guilty is far less than that for which Catholics, in the same period of time, are accountable. Thus, Protestants have never perpetrated such cruelties as were perpetrated in the Netherlands by the Roman Catholics under Philip of Spain and through the Inquisition. This difference is not an unimportant one; since it shows that the misgivings which spring from humane Christian feeling have had far more practical influence in neutralizing the power of wrong principles, among Protestants than among Roman Catholics. It took some time for Protestants to emancipate themselves from the theory of persecution, which was an heir-loom from the middle ages and the Catholic hierarchy; but even before this happy result was consummated, it was manifest that the old principle of suppressing error by force had relaxed its hold upon the Protestant mind. The main difference between Protestants and Catholics on this subject, however, is that while we disown the theory of persecution, and lament that Protestants should have been so mistaken as to be guilty of it; while, in short, we heartily repent, so far as one generation can repent of the errors of another, of all the instances of religious persecution in which Protestants bore a part, the Catholic Church makes no such confession and exercises no such compunction. Hefele may deplore the severity of the sentence against Huss, but even he does not commit himself to an absolute rejection of the theory on which that sentence was pronounced. To the attitude of the Catholic church generally on this point, we shall soon have occasion again to refer.

The true force and intent of the safe-conduct which Sigismund had given to Huss, is a topic of much interest to the historical student. Did the safe-conduct, properly interpreted, protect the bearer of it against the Council, as well as from attacks which might emanate from all *other* persons and bodies;

or was it merely a passport ensuring his safety on the journey to Constance, a hearing before the Council, and a safe return in case of acquittal? This last interpretation is strenuously advocated by Hefele. With him agrees Palacky, the learned and usually accurate historian of Bohemia.* The same view is adopted by Leo, the German historian, although his very lukewarm Protestantism should prevent him from being quoted, as he sometimes is, as a Protestant authority. On the other side are Hallam and most of the other Protestant historians. Neander speaks of the restricted interpretation of the safe-conduct as a device of modern sophistical historians, and considers that Sigismund was guilty of a perfidious violation of his promise.

How stands the evidence? If we look at the terms of the safe-conduct, we find that Huss is taken under the protection of Sigismund and of the Empire, and that all lords and magistrates are enjoined to permit him, without hindrance or molestation, to go and return,—“transire, stare, morari, et *redire libere*.” Hefele concedes that his safe return was guaranteed, provided he should be acquitted; but no exception or promise is found in the document itself. This exception Hefele considers to be implied in the nature of the case. Huss was going before a judicial body to be tried, and it is not to be supposed that the Emperor would undertake to protect him against the very tribunal before which, as an accused person, he was to make answer. The reply to this is, that Huss did not so regard the Council. He often said that he desired to bring his cause before the Council; but in all his expressions of this nature, there is always the avowed or implied qualification, that unless he can be convinced of the error of his opinions, he shall not abandon them. To give up his alleged errors, provided they can be shown to be such, he ever professes his readiness, but only on this condition. In reality, he wished to vindicate himself before so great an assembly, and in this public and conspicuous manner, against aspersions that had been thrown out by his enemies, and he wished to show what sort of a man he was by a free and open declaration of his opinions and feelings. It was always far from his design, as his whole conduct as well

* *Geschichte der Böhmen*, III. ii. p. 357 n.

as words prove, to surrender the convictions of his own mind, in consequence of a mandate from any man or body of men. No weight, therefore, is to be attached to this argument of Hefele, especially as there is no evidence that Sigismund, prior to the Council, had a materially different idea respecting the design of Huss's visit to Constance, from that of Huss himself. But what was the interpretation which Huss himself gave to the safe-conduct? He considered that Sigismund had bound himself to bring him back in safety to Bohemia. In one of his last letters, he accuses Sigismund of breaking his engagement, and says, that he ought to have told the Council: "if he (Huss) does not choose to abide the decision of the Council, I will send him to the king of Bohemia, together with your sentence and the documents in support of it, to the end that he [the king] with his clergy may judge him."* Huss adds that Sigismund had allowed Henry Lefl and others to say to him, that he should be brought back unhurt, in case he chose not to submit to the judgment of the Council. Peter von Mladenowicz, the friend of Huss, declares the same thing. Hefele and Palacky say that nothing should have been built by Huss and his friends on such declarations, since they manifestly transcended the bounds of Sigismund's lawful power. But this answer appears to us insufficient. The veracity of Huss cannot be called in question; and if the official agents of Sigismund gave him this assurance, it is probable that Sigismund expected to be able to verify it. That Sigismund blushed when Huss fixed his eyes upon him, at the moment when the sentence of the Council was pronounced, rests upon the testimony of a credible eye-witness. That it was a fact widely reported, may be inferred from the remark of Charles V. at Worms, when, in reference to a suggestion that he should avail himself of the opportunity to lay hold of Luther, he said that he would not blush like his predecessor Sigismund. Whether more or less importance is attached to this famous blush of Sigismund, the fact seems to rest on pretty good authority. The only argument of much weight on Hefele's side of the question, is derived from a passage in one of the remonstrances addressed by

* The language of Huss is given by Hefele, p. 226.

the Bohemian nobles to Sigismund, after Huss had been taken into custody, and before he had been brought before the Council. The arrest of Huss, as is well known, was effected by the Cardinals on their own authority, with the consent of John XXIII.,—involuntary consent, as he declared to the Bohemians. It is acknowledged on all hands that *this* imprisonment was considered, by the Bohemian friends of Huss, and by Sigismund himself, a flagrant violation of the terms of the safe-conduct. Sigismund, having threatened to liberate him by force, actually went so far as to quit Constance,—so indignant was he that the Council did not adopt efficient means to relieve him from this disgrace. It was only when it was strongly represented to him that if the Council was to be controlled in its action, all the hopes of reform and of terminating the schism would be nipped in the bud, that he consented to come back. When by the flight of his custodians, Huss was released from the hands of the Cardinals, the Bohemians were confident in the expectation that Sigismund would deliver him from his cruel confinement and procure for him a hearing before the Council. When this did not follow, but Huss was still kept in prison, the Bohemians were yet more aggrieved and exasperated. Among the petitions and remonstrances with which they endeavored to move the Council and Sigismund to fulfill the obligations under which he had placed himself, there is one in which they say, that provided Huss is found guilty before the Council, and his false doctrine is shown to him, they do not expect that he is to go away unpunished, but that the Emperor may then do with him what he chooses. The phrase is:—“*Nec vero cupimus, ut convictus, falsa que doctrina ipsi ostensâ, impunitus abeat. Sed tum pro ut potest, cum ipso agat, deque ipso quod vult faciat.*”^{*} Possibly they mean no more than Huss meant himself in his professions of a willingness to bow to the Council, if they will show him—that is, make him see—that he is in error. We must allow that this is not the most natural interpretation of the phrase. It is more naturally interpreted as implying a strong desire that he should be delivered from his gaolers and be heard before the

^{*} Van der Hardt. iii. 83.

Council, with the judgment of which, even if unfavorable to Huss, his friends would be content. If this be the true meaning of the passage in the Bohemians' petition to Sigismund, we must conclude that the exact sense of the safe-conduct was not definitely understood by all of the parties concerned, and that a discussion and difference of opinion as to its intent and scope sprung up, when the true meaning of it became a matter of vital moment.*

In this place, we may notice an unjust criticism of Hefele upon Gieseler. Says the former: "Finally, in reference to the letter of safe-conduct, another, still heavier offence has been laid to the charge of the Council of Constance, which Gieseler thus formulizes: 'in order to justify the Emperor on account of his violated safe-conduct, the Council put forth the shameful decree, that no faith is to be kept with a heretic?' For the sake of giving at least the semblance of a proof, Gieseler cites two decrees of the Constance Synod, which Van der Hardt (T. iv. p. 521) and Mansi (T. xxvii., p. 791 and 799) have communicated. The first of them says: 'if a Prince, also, has given out a letter of safe-conduct, the Ecclesiastical Court is still authorized to bring the person charged with heresy to an examination, and, if he shows himself guilty and contumacious, to punishment; nevertheless, he who has given the safe-conduct is bound, as far as stands in his power, to labor to fulfill it.' I know not what solid objection any one, from the stand-point of those times, could bring to this. But against Gieseler it can be said with the best reason, that he has grossly sinned against the Synod and against the truth, in just leaving out the conclusion of the reprobated decree, viz: 'that the giver of the safe-conduct must do his utmost to fulfill it.'"

Gieseler combines with an unsurpassed thoroughness of investigation an unequalled accuracy of statement. His frigid impartiality is one of his leading characteristics. He is totally incapable of a wilful *suppressio veri*. Looking into Van der

* The safe-conduct obtained for Jerome was differently drawn up; but this proceeded from the Council.

We understand that Rev. E. H. Gillett, in the next edition of his interesting work on the "Life and Times of Huss," will make the safe-conduct from Sigismund the subject of special examination.

Hardt, we find that the decree referred to is abbreviated and imperfectly paraphrased by Hefele, in the passage just cited. The decree declares that a safe-conduct issued to heretics or persons charged with heresy, by kings or other princes, with whatever bond they may have bound themselves,—*quocunque vinculo se astrinxerint*,—can work no prejudice to the Catholic faith and interpose no hindrance in the way of the arraignment and punishment of such persons by the proper ecclesiastical tribunal, even though they may have come to the place of trial, trusting in the safe-conduct, and would not have come without it. Then follows the concluding sentence, omitted by Gieseler: “Nor is the promiser, when he has otherwise done what in him lies, any further obliged, in consequence of his engagement.” Now, it is obvious that this sentence does not affect materially the import of the decree. But in the text of Van der Hardt, it is given in brackets (with a reference to two manuscripts in which it is found); and it was probably a doubt as to its genuineness that led Gieseler to leave it out. The second decree, asserting that in the matter of a safe-conduct, faith need not be kept by Princes with heretics, Hefele declares not to have been passed by the Council, and to be found only in one codex. But it is given as authentic by Van der Hardt, and although Hefele’s view may, perhaps, be correct, that it was a programme or original proposition for which the first quoted decree was substituted,—this decree being the one that actually passed in the general session,—there is not the smallest ground for impugning the honesty and impartiality of Gieseler. The decree, in the most offensive form of it, asserts that the king had done what he lawfully could and what it behoved him to do, in the matter of the safe-conduct.† The obnoxious clause affirms that Huss, by persistently attacking the orthodox faith, has put himself beyond the pale—*reddiderit alienum*—of every safe-conduct and privilege; “nor is any faith or promise to be kept with him, by natural right, divine or human, to the prejudice of the Catholic Church.” The doctrine which both decrees were framed to embody, was the

* *Nec sic promittentem, cum aliàs fecerit quod in ipso est, ex hoc in aliquo remansisse obligatum.*

† “*Ex debito fecisse quod licuit, et quod decuit Regiam Majestatem.*”

same, namely, that a safe-conduct from a secular Prince gives to a heretic no protection against the lawful ecclesiastical tribunal. The decree which, according to Hefele, was passed, simply formulizes this doctrine. The other decree adds the reason that promises of protection to one who turns out to be an obstinate heretic are *ipso facto* void. The theologians, from the first, endeavored to indoctrinate Sigismund with the idea that his safe-conduct was limited and qualified by the absolute rights of the ecclesiastical tribunal to try and convict heretics; and there were not wanting those who put the doctrine in the repulsive form in which it appears in the draft of the second decree referred to by Gieseler. It is evident that there was complaint and loud complaint that Sigismund had broken his engagement; otherwise, there would have been no occasion for such a decree, in either form. The decree which Hefele allows to have been passed, proves not less clearly than the other, that an accusation of bad faith had been brought against the Emperor, which was founded on his failure to protect Huss from the penalty imposed by the Council.

Huss was condemned. The old quarrel in the University of Prague, which resulted in the desertion of the University by the whole body of German teachers and students, had some influence in increasing that spirit of hostility towards the Bohemian innovators, which inflamed the Council; but the influence of this circumstance was comparatively small. The philosophical quarrel between Nominalism, which was now once more in the ascendancy at Paris and elsewhere, and Realism, to which in common with Anselm and the most orthodox of the Schoolmen, Huss, like Wickliffe, adhered, sharpened the antagonism of Gerson. But the violent and mob-like deportment of the Council, which contrasts so unfavorably with the noble serenity and self-possession of their victim, was due to the vindictive hatred that was felt towards what they called heresy. This sentiment was sufficient to paralyze all wiser and more humane feelings, even in the hearts of good men,—for such, we doubt not, were many of those who killed Huss, and for whose forgiveness he, remembering the words of his dying Master, prayed. Say what one will of minor, incidental questions, like this of the intent of the safe-conduct, and bring

forward what other examples one may of ecclesiastical tyranny and cruelty, it remains true that a frightful tragedy was enacted at Constance, when a sincere, earnest preacher of the Gospel, inspired with heroic courage and Christian gentleness, and so elevated by faith and love that death had for him no terrors, was killed for his opinions by men who claimed to be acting in the name of Jesus and by his authority. Luther published four of the impressive letters which Huss wrote while he was in prison and shortly before his death,* and in the preface Luther gives an interesting reminiscence concerning himself. He says that when he was a young theologian at Erfurt, he took down from the convent library a volume of Huss's sermons. He was curious to see for what heresies it was that Huss had been killed; but, as he read, he was struck with astonishment that a man who wrote in so excellent and Christian a way should have been burned to death for heresy. As he put back the volume, he thought to himself—not knowing then the particulars of the history,—that Huss must have become a heretic after writing these sermons.

Bossuet wrote a book on the Variations of Protestantism. Quite as copious and telling a book might be written on the Variations of Roman Catholicism; and, we may add, in such a work the name of Bossuet himself would figure largely. Bellarmine, a great, exponent of the Papal, anti-Gallican theology, and a great name in the estimation of all parties, resorts to different subterfuges in order to escape from the difficulty occasioned by the Constance decrees relative to the power of a Council.† He brings forward the utterly false position of Turrecremata, Campegius, and others, that the Constance propositions were meant to apply only to times of schism, when opinion is divided as to who is the lawful Pope. He denies, of course, that Martin V. opposed the decrees in question, and makes the term *conciliariter*, or *concilialiter*, mean “after the manner of other Councils, the matter having been diligently examined;” a totally different definition from either of those

* These letters are included in the edition of Huss's letters in prison, published by Micowek.

† O. III. Lib. II., c. xix., p. 1222 seq.

given by Hefele, and one altogether unfounded. Equally unfounded is the assertion that when Martin approved of the decrees which had been adopted *de fide* and *concilialiter*, he referred solely to those against the Wickliffites and Hussites. Bellarmine denies that John XXIII. and Gregory IX. were deposed against their will, and affirms that, admitting that they were, the power to depose them does not involve the power to frame new dogmas. His whole treatment of this question is according to his usual method, which is to bring forward everything that can be said, with any degree of plausibility, against the antagonist, whether the considerations advanced are consistent with one another or not. He is master of the art of fencing; a typical polemic. Bellarmine maintains the opinion that the Pope is absolutely superior to a Council, and that he cannot be deposed.* In an earlier section of his work,† he takes up the question whether a heretical Pope can be deposed, and discusses it at length. He begins by stating the opinion of Pighius that a Pope cannot be a heretic, and with this opinion he expresses his concurrence. "Yet," he adds, "because it is not certain, *and the common opinion is the opposite*"—"communis opinio est in contrarium"—"it will be worth while to see what answer can be given, provided it be allowed that the Pope *can* be a heretic." It seems, by Bellarmine's own concession, that it was the common opinion that a Pope could fall into heresy. Bellarmine, with the rest of the advocates of the indefectibility of the Pope, is involved in extreme embarrassment by examples like those of Liberius, who cast off Athanasius, signed the confession of the semi-Arians, and received them to his fellowship, and of Honorius, who espoused the cause of the Monothelites, and was anathematized as a heretic by the 6th General Council, as well as by several of his own successors. The various evasions that have been sought out for the purpose of avoiding these unwelcome facts, form a curious chapter in polemical theology. Hefele, while he contends that Liberius was not a heretic in his real opinion on the Trinity, allows that his constancy so far broke down, that he purchased his return from exile by deserting the orthodox

* C. IV. L. II. c. xxii., seq.

† C. III. II. c. xxx.

Athanasians, abjuring the term *homoousion* (and with it, of course, giving up the Nicene creed), and by joining hands with heretics. Newman, in his edition of Athanasius, styles Liberius "a renegade."* He speaks of that time as one when "the Latins" were "committed to an anti-Catholic creed, the Pope a renegade, Hosius fallen and dead, Athanasius wandering in the deserts, Arians in the sees of Christendom," etc. That Liberius gave up the Nicene formulary and allied himself with the semi-Arians, is an unquestionable fact. Athanasius, Jerome, and Hilary are strong witnesses to his unfaithfulness. The instance of Honorius is still more perplexing to the Curialists. He expressed his concurrence with the Monothelite, Sergius. All that Hefele can claim in behalf of him is, that he was a Dyothelite *at heart*, but not competent to handle the question, and was therefore led to the avowal of opposite principles. That he took the Monothelite position in his letters to Sergius, will be clear to every unprejudiced person who is familiar with the points that were under discussion.† But whether he did or not, it is a fact that he was anathematized as a heretic by the 6th general Council, in repeated declarations. It is a fact that this condemnation was approved by the Pope, as well as by the Emperor. It is a fact, moreover, that Pope Leo II., who had succeeded Agatho, reiterated the anathema of the Council. "Pariter anathemitizamus novi erroris inventores, id est, Theodorum Pharinitanum episcopum, Cyrum Alexandrinum, Sergium, Pyrrhum, Paulum, Petrum, Constantinopolitanæ ecclesiæ subessores magis quam præsu-les, NEONON ET HONORIUM, qui hanc apostolicam sedem non apostolicæ traditionis doctrina lustravit, sed profana proditi-
 one immaculatam fidem subvertere conatus est [or, according to the Greek, subverti permisit] et omnes, qui in suo errore defuncti sunt." In a letter to the Spanish bishops, and in another letter to king Erwig, Leo charged Honorius with nourishing the flames of heretical doctrine and defiling the spotless rule of Apostolic tradition which he had received from his predecessors. The Trullan Synod (Concilium Quinisextum) repeated

* p. 127 N. c.

† See, on this point, Neander, III., 179 N. 3.

the condemnation of Honorius, which the 6th Council had passed. The 7th General Council did the same, and so did the 8th. Pope Hadrian II. (867-872) wrote: "although the anathema was pronounced upon Honorius after his death, yet it is to be understood that it was because he was charged with heresy, for which cause alone it is allowed to inferiors to resist the movements of their superiors." This declaration of Hadrian was read and approved in the 7th session of the 8th General Council. Hefele shows fully and conclusively that Honorius was condemned by the 6th General Council for heresy. He holds that the Council was right in doing this, since they could not look into his heart, but must judge his declarations and avowals, which are really heretical. The foolish, because desperately futile, endeavor of Baronius to make out that the name of Honorius had been falsely inserted in the proceedings of the 6th General Council, is completely demolished in the third volume of Hefele, where proofs of the foregoing statements may be found. Popes and Councils, then, have united in anathematizing Honorius as a patron and supporter of heresy. Did they believe that a pope is indefectible? When Popes acknowledged the 6th General Council and anathematized Honorius, did they hold the doctrine that a Pope cannot err from the faith? When all other refuges fail, the defenders of Papal infallibility set up the plea that Honorius was uttering private opinions, not public definitions of doctrine! Letters, then, from the Bishop of Rome to the Bishop of Constantinople on a doctrinal question that is agitating the whole Church, are destitute of authority!

Since writing the foregoing remarks upon the case of Honorius, we have received the pamphlet of M. Gratry,* Priest of the Oratoire and member of the French Academy, which relates to just this topic. M. Gratry is a distinguished writer upon philosophy and theology. We recollect that his able work on "The Knowledge of God"† is preceded by a commendatory letter from Pius IX. In the little pamphlet before us, M. Gratry

* Mgr. L'Evêque D'Orléans et Mgr. L'Archevêque de Malines. Première lettre à Mgr. Dechamps. Par A. Gratry, Prêtre de l'oratoire, membre de l'académie Française. Paris: 1870.

† "La Connaissance de Dieu."

expresses his strong sense of the wrong that is done to history by the attempts to falsify the testimonies to the condemnation of Honorius for heresy. He shows that Honorius was condemned for heresy "by three œcumenical Councils which were approved by the Popes, by two Roman Councils, which were presided over by Popes, and by the Pontifical profession of faith in use for ages (*plusieurs siècles*). He exposes, with strong displeasure, the absurd pretense that the 6th Council meant anything by *heresy* except that which the word imports. He shows that Leo II. anathematized Honorius for something besides mere negligence. It was the neglect to extinguish an error which grew out of sympathy with it, and a willingness that it should prevail. He reminds Archbishop Manning that he exposes himself to the penalty of excommunication threatened against all defenders of heretics, when, in the face of the verdict of three General Councils, he assumes, in the exercise of his individual judgment, to pronounce the offending letters of Honorius to be free from heresy. But M. Gratry is especially earnest in his protest against the changes that have been introduced into the Roman breviary and the *Liber Diurnus*. In all the copies of the former, up to the commencement of the sixteenth century, the condemnation of Honorius is mentioned. The name of Honorius has now been stricken out. The *Liber Diurnus* contains the ancient confession of faith of the Popes. This included the condemnation of Honorius, but the *Liber Diurnus*, containing the disagreeable passage, is now suppressed. These things, together with the evasions of the papal apologists for Honorius, appear to M. Gratry to be examples of intolerable duplicity and mendacity. He inquires if the Church and the Pope are to be helped by lies! In the last number of the Quarterly Journal of Hefele,* there is a brief Article by the learned Editor on the *Liber Diurnus*. He affirms that it is perfectly clear that at the beginning of the 8th century it was held at Rome that a Pope might be subjected to trial and condemnation, at the hands of a General Council, for heresy, and also for negligence in his office. Hefele does not explicitly say, either in this Article or in his History of Coun-

* *Quartal-schrift*. 1869. 4.

cils, whether or not Leo II. anathematized Honorius for heresy as well as for criminal negligence. He does not conceal, however, the fact that Leo II. approved of the proceedings of the 6th Council, and the fact that by the Council Honorius was condemned for being himself a heretic. That Leo II. and the other Popes meant, in their reiterated anathemas, to charge upon Honorius more than mere remissness, even real participation in heresy, is made evident by M. Gratry. The further plea that Honorius was not speaking *ex cathedra*, when responding to interrogatories of the Eastern Primate on a debated question of doctrine, is effectively disposed of in this little pamphlet.

The Synod of the Vatican, which Pius IX. has convoked to rebuke the errors of the times, is a much less imposing assemblage than that which was gathered within the ancient walls of Constance. The realistic or practical spirit of the nineteenth century neither provides nor craves a pageant such as gratified the taste of the fifteenth. The mediæval passion for symbols and shows has now, to a great extent, passed away. Everything in the present Council betokens the altered condition of Church and society. That the Pope should gather a Council at Rome, summon it into his own court and camp, as it were; also, that he should be suffered to mark out and manage its proceedings, with little, if any, audible remonstrance, indicates a great change, even since the days of the Tridentine Synod, in the temper of the bishops. The absence of the sovereigns and princes is another notable feature, indicating that the policy of the Church is not coincident with that of the European states, and that church and state move in different orbits. The cabinets stand aloof, prepared, if it is thought expedient, to withstand and thwart the determinations of the Council. The Church, in turn, asks no advice from the civil rulers, and is conscious how little practical authority she exercises over their conduct and over the course of political affairs.

On one of the two great points which absorbed the attention of the fathers at Constance, there is a remarkable contrast between that body and the one now in session. The prerogatives of the Pope are again a topic of discussion; but we find a powerful party in favor of declaring the personal infallibility

of the Pope. If a general Council could be brought to renounce the very prerogative which liberal Catholics have claimed for it, that would be a triumph for the Papacy indeed. The monster which has so long lifted its head against the chair of Peter would strangle itself. The principles and aims of the ultramontanist party are well set forth in the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Manning, one of their most prominent leaders. He writes in vigorous English. It is almost a pleasure to read invectives against one's self, when they are uttered in the terse and polished style of this noted Prelate. We find in his pamphlet a distinct expression of the ultramontanist theology; the very principles which Innocent III. proclaimed when the Papacy was at the summit of its power. The Lord made Peter, and the successors of Peter, the fountain both of doctrine and of jurisdiction. Episcopal authority, therefore, is derived from the Pope and through him. He is the bishop of bishops, and the doctor of the universal church. We cannot praise Bossuet, "when his illustrious name is under a cloud." "Ultramontanism is Catholic Christianity." The object of greatest dislike to this representative of the Papal party is "nationalism." It is a Judaic notion that began to rise when the idea of Catholic unity began to decline. It was the rise of modern nationalities, we are told, that caused the great Western schism and Protestantism after it. This is the Archbishop's protest against modern civilization, for modern civilization as distinguished from mediæval, is inseparable from the rise of nationalities to distinct and separate existence, and to a consciousness of separate rights and obligations. What is Manning's theory? Does he think that the resistance to Boniface VIII. by France was all wrong? Does he approve of the bulls of Boniface—*clericis laicos* and all? Does he think that the European nations and their governments should have yielded humble submission to the lofty claims of the Papal see to a dominion over them? Does he think that the Council of Constance committed a capital error in seeking to curtail the Papal office? Should that Council, instead of voting by nations, have allowed John XXIII. with his host of Italian ecclesiastics to govern the Assembly by their numerical force? What would have been the condition of the Roman Catholic Church if this had happened? It

would seem that the Archbishop is prepared to sanction the doctrine which the most ambitious of the Popes formulized and acted upon, that the State is to be subject to the Church, and that the civil governments are to receive law from the Pope. When one reads, in the light of history, the Archbishop's fine phrases about the union of the two jurisdictions, the church and state, and "the supreme direction of the supernatural over the natural law," coupled as these phrases are with denunciations of the system that subordinates the Church to the State, or makes the latter independent of the former, and with a general disapproval of the "nationalism" which is the prevailing characteristic of the free civilization of the modern age, one is led to conclude that it is the realization of the old and fallen assumptions of Hildebrand, Innocent, and Boniface, that this enthusiastic Prelate hopes to behold.

It is not strange that French ecclesiastics are affronted at the supercilious and slighting tone in which Manning speaks of Gallicanism. He affects to consider this a transient episode in the course of the history of the Church of France; a divergence from the orthodox faith, which never counted in its favor more than a fraction of the French clergy. And he identifies Gallicanism with the movement of Louis XIV. and the Declaration of 1682. The Archbishop misreads history. If we take Gallicanism, as Bossuet defines it, as consisting of the three principles of the independence of kings, as to temporalities, of ecclesiastical control, the derivation of episcopal authority immediately from Christ, and the authority of Councils, we shall find the roots of this type of Catholicism far back in French history. The peculiarities of the French Church, as a national Church, claiming rights and privileges of its own, appear in full vigor in the days of Charlemagne. They were maintained by Louis IX. with persevering energy, against Papal encroachments. In the eventful period before the Protestant movement, when great but ineffectual efforts at reform were attempted, it was French doctors and statesmen who were forward and influential in the effort to restrict Papal prerogatives, as well as to remedy Papal abuses. Gallicanism is not at all the transient and erratic phenomenon which Manning represents it to be.

In view of such declarations as are made in this pamphlet of Manning, and in other publications of the ultramontanist party, the question arises whether the Council of the Vatican is to re-affirm the principles on which John Huss and Jerome of Prague were led to the stake. We should be glad to have explicit information on this subject. The question is not whether the form and degree of penalty to be inflicted for opinions which are judged heretical, may not be changed to suit modern ideas of the criminal code. It is to be presumed that neither Pope nor Bishops would wish to have Protestants or other heretics burned at the stake. But the question is, whether the principle that Church and State may rightfully combine, the one to adjudge the degree of their guilt and the other to inflict the penalty upon persevering opposers of the Roman Catholic dogmas, is still held? Ought men to be punished criminally by the Church, or by the State executing the Church's verdict, for heretical opinions? If we seek for an answer to this question in the Pope's Encyclical, we find that the old doctrine of persecution appears to be approved and asserted, and the modern doctrine of toleration appears to be condemned and denounced. The liberty of conscience, which is conceded by modern States, is set down among the damnable errors of the times. What does the Pope mean? If he does not mean that civil governments ought to use force to punish persons who teach doctrines which are pronounced by him or by the Catholic Church heretical, what do these statements of the Encyclical mean? The "bloody tenet of persecution" is not yet abandoned, but, it would seem, is again to be asserted in audacious opposition to the humane and Christian spirit of the age, and in obstinate derogation of the precepts of the founder of Christianity.

The other point of the Pope's infallibility, in which, if the new dogma is carried, the Council of Constance will be flatly contradicted by the Vatican Synod, is one which an enemy of the Catholic Church might wish to see adopted. For ourselves, if the Roman Catholic Church is to act practically upon this dogma, as it has done in regard to the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, we should prefer to have it defined and declared; for then it would be more likely to awaken opposition. But

we should prefer that the doctrine should be neither practically nor theoretically received. We may desire that evil should be manifested, but not that evil should be done, in order that good may come. And we have no hostility to the Roman Catholic Church, except so far as we deem its doctrines erroneous.

One of Manning's arguments in favor of an authoritative proclamation of the infallibility of the Pope is derived from the *need* of such a doctrine. Protestants are told that the Church is infallible, but they taunt Catholics with the fact of a division among themselves as to the place where infallibility resides. Persons in quest of a safe harbor into which they can retreat from the agitations of doubt, are exhorted to cast themselves upon the authority of the Church; but when they comply with the counsel, they hear it said by some that the Pope's definitions of doctrine are not irreformable. We fear, however, that if the Ultramontanists were to secure their end, difficulties and perplexities would still remain. What are the bounds and limits of this Papal infallibility? We are told by Perrone and the other Catholic theologians of this school, that his infallibility relates only to matters pertaining to Faith and Morals, and that on these matters he is unerring only when he speaks to the whole Church in his character of universal bishop. The fine distinctions which are made by these theologians remind us of a passage in the "Republic" of Plato, where Socrates, in one of his paradoxical speeches, argues that no physician can err, since when he mistakes he is not *in* that mistake, or so far as he makes it, a physician; and that no pilot can err, since, if he misleads a vessel, he is not in this act a pilot, and so of the various trades and professions. A thousand questions would immediately arise respecting the metes and bounds of this supernatural prerogative of the Pope, if it were to be authoritatively ascribed to him. Moreover, the historical perplexities in which the champions of the Roman Catholic system would be involved, already great enough to task them to the utmost, would be much enhanced through such a decree.

The Roman Catholic hierarchy assumes to stand, with priestly prerogatives, between the soul and God. This doctrine of a priesthood in the Christian Church, all consistent

Protestants unite in rejecting. It is the first great corruption of Christianity. It is grateful to notice occasional symptoms of a more true and spiritual conception of the Gospel and the Church. Father Hyacinthe, in one of his sermons or addresses, remarks that he cannot look on these great Protestant communities, with all the fruits of religion which they exhibit, as disinherited of the Holy Ghost. The expression is a very striking one. It shows how the very warmth and honesty of Christian feeling may carry one beyond the narrow bounds of sect. It was just this recognition of the fruits or effects of the Spirit, that opened the eyes of the Apostle Peter, and broke down his traditional prejudice. "Forasmuch," he said, "as God gave them the like gift as he did unto us, who believed on the Lord Jesus Christ, what was I that I could withstand God." (Acts xi. 17). A like argument brought all of the Apostles to give the right hand of fellowship to Paul and Barnabas. They learned that the Spirit was not confined in the channel to which they had limited His operations. A new dispensation had come, which was of a different character from the old. The revival of Judaism in the Roman Catholic Church obscured for ages an essential peculiarity of the Gospel and the Gospel Dispensation. Such words as these of Father Hyacinthe, to which we have referred, indicate, in our judgment, the way in which the Roman Catholic error and all sectarian narrowness will ultimately disappear. Good men will be compelled to acknowledge that a Christianity, as genuine and as valuable, it may be, as their own, is found outside of the borders in which they had supposed it to be confined.

ARTICLE II.—A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S "PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE."

A LITTLE less than eighteen months ago a remarkable address was delivered in Edinburgh, by Professor Thomas H. Huxley, of London, which has been published and extensively circulated, and has attracted much attention. Its author is Professor of Comparative Anatomy and Physiology in the Royal College of Surgeons, and has for some years held a prominent position among English physicists. The striking facts and startling assertions of the writer, and especially the bold and almost defiant manner in which they are presented, are well calculated to excite the attention of thinking men. Professor Huxley did not hesitate in this address to avow himself a follower of David Hume, and to quote with approval this sentiment of that philosopher :

"If we take in hand any volume of Divinity or school metaphysics, let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?* No. *Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?* No. Commit it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

He boldly declared that all inquiries about spiritual things lie "outside of the limits of philosophical enquiry," and cannot be matters of knowledge or faith; and told his hearers that if they accepted his conclusions "they had placed their feet on the first rung of a ladder which, in many people's estimation," and he did not except himself, "leads to the antipodes of heaven." He, to be sure, denies that he is a materialist, and yet affirms that "matter may be regarded as a form of thought, thought may be regarded as a property of matter," and again, "matter and spirit are but names for the imaginary substrata of groups of natural phenomena," leaving his readers in doubt whether to class him among materialists or nihilists.

It is not surprising that such views have been received with satisfaction by those who believe that there is a contest waging between physical science and faith, in which the former is to

gain the victory ; and that the offensive manner in which they have been presented has caused them to be regarded by others with suspicion so strong as to prevent their acquainting themselves with either the facts, the arguments, or the conclusions of the essay. We do not sympathize with either of these classes. We do not believe in any necessary antagonism between physical science and religious or Christian faith. We are at times amused, and, it may be, vexed with the arrogance of physicists, as if all knowledge was to die with them, especially when we find one theorist of this sort opposing another ; one stoutly affirming what the other denies. Indeed, when we have heard what have been regarded as some of the best established principles of physical science overthrown and again re-established, we have sometimes thought that it was not worth while to interfere in their disputes. But theories and conclusions which are put forth with so much assurance, and in the way of challenge to all the world, and which are accepted by so many as indisputable, ought not to be passed by without notice. We propose, then, to examine the theories and arguments of this essay. If it shall be found on examination that the facts do not sustain the theories, it will not be the first time in history that on "the battle fields of science" the performance has not equalled the promise.

The first thing which strikes us in reading the essay is the loose estimate which the writer puts on language as a means of expressing ideas. He tells us, indeed, "that scientific language should possess a definite and constant signification," yet when it suits one purpose, he says that "matter and life are inseparably connected," and with another object in view he speaks of "lifeless matter." He denies that in nature there is anything which corresponds to the metaphysical idea of "cause and effect," and notwithstanding this he uses these terms in his essay and makes much of the "powers of matter," and reasons about the "direct results of the nature of matter," as if there could be a power which produces no effect, and a result which is traceable to no cause. In the conclusion of his essay he uses this language, "If we find that the ascertainment of the order of nature is facilitated by using one terminology or one set of symbols, rather than another,

it is our clear duty to use the former, and no harm can accrue so long as we bear in mind that we are dealing with terms and symbols. In itself it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter." A remarkable declaration, certainly, to come from an eminent professor of physical science, the superior adaptation of which to train the mind to habits of precision is the continual boast of its friends. We shall have occasion, as we proceed, to notice the singular use of words by our author, and shall, perhaps, find that he has been led into some striking fallacies by it. We allude to it now that our readers may have it in mind as we advance in the examination of the argument.

Professor Huxley announces his subject as "Protoplasm," but as he supposes this term is not generally intelligible he translates it, for the benefit of the unscientific, into the phrase "Physical Basis of Life." We regard it as unfortunate that a term which has acquired a definite signification, should have been exchanged for such a phrase as "Physical Basis of Life," or that the writer had not at least explained what he means by this somewhat ambiguous expression. For instance, he nowhere tells us what he means by "life." He, indeed, states the common conception of life to be "something which works through matter, but is independent of it," leading us to suppose that he himself conceives of "life" as something different from this; but whether, in his view, life is something which does not work through matter, meaning something which has no connection with matter, or as something which is dependent on matter, we are not clearly informed. In the next line of his printed essay we find it stated that "life and matter are inseparably connected," which seems to be intelligible, and we understand him to hold that the stones have life, and even the "cooked mutton," about which he is so learned and witty, declaring that it is "competent to resume its old functions as matter of life," although now "dead."

He afterwards, however, speaks of "lifeless matter," that is matter which is not "inseparably connected with life," under which class he includes cooked mutton, but as he does not explain how the cooked mutton can be "lifeless" and yet have

power to do what he says it is competent to do, we are left in doubt as to his making any real distinction between the living and the lifeless. He seems here to think it of no importance what terminology he uses. So, too, "basis" is a word having a definite meaning as a foundation on which a superstructure, of life for instance, is or may be built, and we should suppose that to be its meaning here, but that we find Professor Huxley almost immediately using it as synonymous with "matter," as if he intended by it the material substance out of which life is made, and we finally conclude this latter to be his real meaning. If, however, Professor Huxley does not explain the expression, "Physical Basis of Life," he goes on to inform us what conclusion is suggested by it, viz: "that there is one kind of matter which is common to all living beings, and that their endless diversities are bound together by a physical unity." This statement is simple and definite, and we think we have arrived at the truth which this teacher is about to present to us, and we inquire is this the new philosophy which is to revolutionize the opinions of men? Is this the conclusion "shocking to common sense," by accepting which we are to be led away from heaven? Is this the foundation for the somewhat glowing rhetoric with which Professor Huxley brings into one class the brightly colored lichen of the rock and the painter who strives to reproduce it on the canvass; the microscopic fungus and the gigantic Californian pine; the flower which adorns a girl's hair and the blood which courses through her veins?

It is no new idea that there is one kind of matter common to all living beings and inanimate things as well. Chemistry long ago told us that all material substances may be resolved into a few simple elements. The experience of the world has shown from the first, that at death all living things are changed into their inanimate constituents. The oldest book we have teaches among its earliest utterances that man, the head of creation, was formed of the dust of the ground. We have no difficulty with this "conclusion" which the Professor announces. We accept it heartily. There is a sense in which all animals are "bound together in a physical unity," and in that sense we assent to the proposition; not meaning thereby that all

living things are parts of one vast material substance, or that they have all sprung from the same grain of matter; not asserting that there is no diversity; but such a unity as is indicated by the word of God, and by the experience of men coupled with the investigations of science.

Professor Huxley does not allow us to rest long on this proposition. He proceeds to develop his theory more in detail.

Before proceeding, however, to discuss his arguments, we will quote from his essay some passages which will serve to acquaint our readers with the facts on which these arguments rest:

"You are doubtless aware that the common nettle owes its stinging property to the innumerable stiff and needle-like, though exquisitely delicate, hairs which cover its surface. Each stinging-needle tapers from a broad base to a slender summit, which, though rounded at the end, is of such microscopic fineness that it readily penetrates, and breaks off in the skin. The whole hair consists of a very delicate outer case of wood, closely applied to the inner surface of which is a layer of semi-fluid matter, full of innumerable granules of extreme minuteness. This semi-fluid lining is protoplasm, which thus constitutes a kind of bag, full of a limpid liquid, and roughly corresponding in form with the interior of the hair which it fills. When viewed with a sufficiently high magnifying power, the protoplasmic layer of the nettle hair is seen to be in a condition of unceasing activity. Local contractions of the whole thickness of its substance pass slowly and gradually from point to point, and give rise to the appearance of progressive waves, just as the bending of successive stalks of corn by a breeze produces the apparent billows of a corn-field. But, in addition to these movements, and independently of them, the granules are driven, in relatively rapid streams, through channels in the protoplasm which seem to have a considerable amount of persistence. Most commonly, the currents in adjacent parts of the protoplasm take similar directions; and thus, there is a general stream up one side of the hair and down the other. But this does not prevent the existence of partial currents which take different routes; and, sometimes, trains of granules may be seen coursing swiftly in opposite directions, within a twenty-thousandth of an inch of one another; while, occasionally, opposite streams come into direct collision, and after a longer or shorter struggle one predominates. The cause of these currents seems to lie in contractions of the protoplasm which bounds the channels in which they flow, but which are so minute that the best microscopes show only their effects, and not themselves."

"If a drop of blood be drawn by pricking one's finger, and viewed with proper precautions and under a sufficiently high microscopic power, there will be seen among the innumerable multitude of little, circular, discoidal bodies or corpuscles, which float in it and give it its color, a comparatively small number of colorless corpuscles, of somewhat larger size and very irregular shape. If the drop of blood be kept at the temperature of the body, these colorless corpuscles will be seen to exhibit a marvelous activity, changing their forms with great ra-

pidity, drawing in and thrusting out prolongations of their substance, and creeping about as if they were independent organisms. The substance which is thus active is a mass of protoplasm, and its activity differs in detail, rather than in principle, from that of the protoplasm of the nettle. Under sundry circumstances the corpuscle dies and becomes distended into a round mass, in the midst of which is seen a smaller spherical body, which existed, but was more or less hidden, in the living corpuscle, and is called its *nucleus*. Corpuscles of essentially similar structure are to be found in the skin, in the lining of the mouth, and scattered through the whole frame work of the body. Nay, more; in the earliest condition of the human organism, in that state in which it has just become distinguishable from the egg in which it arises, it is nothing but an aggregation of such corpuscles, and every organ of the body was once no more than such an aggregation. Thus a nucleated mass of protoplasm turns out to be the structural unit of the human body." "Beast and fowl, reptile and fish, mollusk, worm and polype, are all composed of structural units of the same character, namely, masses of protoplasm with a nucleus."

In these extracts we have all the facts which are essential to enable us to understand the arguments used by Professor Huxley to support his main proposition. Other facts we shall bring forward as it becomes necessary. His statement of a general unity he now develops as follows:

"I propose to demonstrate that a three-fold unity, namely, a unity of power or faculty, a unity of form, and a unity of substantial composition, pervades the whole living world."

Let us examine each of these propositions with the promised demonstration in order. First, a unity of power pervades the whole living world. Professor Huxley explains that these powers may be different in degree, but claims that they are similar in kind. The proposition then, is, that the same kind of power pervades all living things. The demonstration is as follows: "Either they (the powers of all living things) are immediately directed to the maintenance and development of the body, or they effect transitory changes in the relative positions of parts of the body, or they tend towards a continuance of the species." Granting all this to be true, the demonstration is not complete. The argument is that because for instance, the body of a plant is maintained and developed by "a power," and the body of an animal is maintained and developed by "a power," therefore these powers are of the same kind. But this reasoning does not go very far to establish the proposition. Even if we admit that the results of the

two powers are the same, that is, that the body of the plant and the animal are the same, which is certainly not a self-evident truth, it does not necessarily follow that the powers from which each are derived are the same. In the inanimate world the same result may be produced in different ways, by different powers. How does it appear that the same is not the case in the living world? That an accomplished result is a certain indicator of the kind of power which produced it, is not an axiom, and if it is true, its truth needs to be shown. But Professor Huxley assumes it. He brings no evidence to show that the processes which tend to the maintenance and development of the body of the plant are directed by the same kind of power as those which tend to the maintenance and development of the body of the animal. This unity of power is asserted—assumed; not proved nor demonstrated.

If we suppose that by this proposition Professor Huxley means that as the powers of all living things reside in the protoplasms, there is a unity of power, or the same kind of power in the protoplasms, no proof is adduced of this. Let us enquire, however, what the facts, as he has given them, teach on this subject. Do they show that the powers of the animal and vegetable protoplasms are of the same kind? The protoplasm of the animal has no power to assimilate mineral matter, or, in the language of Professor Huxley, "to manufacture new protoplasm out of mineral compounds." "A solution," he says, "of smelling salts in water, with an infinitesimal proportion of some other saline matters, contains all the elementary bodies which enter into protoplasm; but as I need hardly say, a hogshead of that fluid would not keep a hungry man from starving, nor would it save any animal whatever from a like fate." If, however, the animal cannot, the vegetable protoplasm can, derive nourishment from mineral matter. "The fluid," he continues, "which offers such a barmecide feast to the animal, is a table richly spread to multitudes of plants." This "striking difference," as Professor Huxley himself calls it, interferes materially with the truth of the proposition, that "a unity of power pervades the whole living world," and perhaps ends the discussion on this point. We observe, however, another "striking difference" between

the powers of animal protoplasm and vegetable protoplasm. The former never manufactures vegetable protoplasm, the latter never manufactures animal protoplasm. A block may be cut from the body of a tree, but it never shapes itself into the head of a philosopher, nor does a cabbage spring spontaneously from above the shoulders of a man. The power of the animal protoplasm to derive nourishment is limited to animal and vegetable matter, and does not extend to the mineral world; the power of the vegetable protoplasm to derive nourishment is limited to the vegetables and minerals and does not extend to animal matter. In the source, then, from which their nourishment is derived, and in the products which are the result of their operation, in their beginning and in their end, the powers of animal and vegetable protoplasm differ. "With such qualification," says Professor Huxley, "as arises out of this fact, it may be truly said that the acts of living things are fundamentally one." The man who can argue (?) in this way would assert that the act of the horse in drawing a load, and of the philosopher in drawing an inference, are fundamentally one. Indeed, such a conclusion is in strict accord with Professor Huxley's theory, for does he not tell us that "all acts of the intellect are resolvable into muscular contractions?"

The second proposition which he proposes to demonstrate is, that "there is a unity of form in all living things." What is meant by this? Not that the worm has the same form as the eagle; not that the man has the same form as the squash. No one accustomed to regard language as a vehicle for expressing ideas would guess what hidden meaning lies wrapped up in this phrase, or what facts are adduced to demonstrate the truth of the proposition that "there is a unity of form in all living things." Indeed, in his argument on this very subject, unity of form, Professor Huxley, as in repeated instances elsewhere, some of which we have already shown, contradicts himself, when he says that "the substance of the nettle is made up of masses of nucleated protoplasm, each contained in a wooden case, *which is modified in form.*" His *demonstration* of this proposition seems to be, for we speak with some caution, that as in the plant the protoplasm is seen

to be in a state of unceasing activity, a general stream coursing up one side and down the other, &c., and in the drop of blood the protoplasm is seen ever in motion; the simple fact that there is motion in the two cases is sufficient to prove, nay, to demonstrate, that there is a unity of form between them. Professor Huxley does not tell us (if the fact were so, he would not withhold it,) that the "granules of extreme minuteness" which course so swiftly in the nettle hair, are of the same size or shape, or that their course is in the same order or figure, as is the case with those "corpuscles of very irregular shape" which are moving with such ceaseless activity in the drop of blood. A variation, in any one of these particulars would be an important variation sufficient to negative the idea of a unity of form or any other essential unity. We infer from his description of the two protoplasms, the character of their movements, and what is said of the granules in one—"coursing up and down in swift columns"—and the corpuscles in the other—"creeping about and putting out prolongations of their substance"—that there is a difference in one, or other, or all the particulars mentioned above. Professor Huxley admits a difference, saying "the activity of the protoplasm of the animal differs from that of the vegetable, but that it is a difference of detail merely, and not of principle. But what do we know of principle and detail in this case? If, which we do not admit but as Professor Huxley seems to imply, the circulation of the infinitesimal portions of the animal or vegetable protoplasm constitutes life; it would be a natural inference that the form and size of the revolving globules, the rapidity of their motion, their relative distances from each other, the character of the curve which they describe in their revolution, all matters of detail, may be matters of principle as well, and that these details or some of them bring it to pass that from one nucleated mass of protoplasm there springs a tree, and from another a man. But we do not attempt, at this stage of our enquiries, to present any demonstration ourselves. Our sole aim is to test his. We sum up, then, our conclusion upon this point, as follows: There is no proof offered to show, the contrary is evident to the senses, that the forms of living things are alike. No evi-

dence is adduced to show that there is "unity of form" in the protoplasms; the only unity, if it can be called such, is in the fact that in all protoplasms there is motion. This is the whole of the promised demonstration of this proposition.

The third proposition which Professor Huxley professes to demonstrate is, that "there is a unity of material composition in all living matter." He tells us that chemical analysis shows "that all forms of protoplasm which have been examined are composed of the four elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen;" and this appears to be his promised demonstration. Carbonate of lime is the example which he uses for illustration, although the reason of comparing mineral compounds with living matter is not made apparent. He says, "this mineral assumes an immense diversity of characters, though no one doubts that under all these Protean changes it is one and the same thing." But he had already said, "the statement that a crystal of calc-spar consists of carbonate of lime, is quite true, *if we only mean that by appropriate processes it may be resolved into carbonic acid and quick-lime.* If you pass the same carbonic acid over the very quick-lime thus obtained, you will obtain carbonate of lime again; but it will not be calc-spar, nor anything like it." It is not for us to reconcile such discrepancies as are presented in these two extracts, and Professor Huxley does not attempt it. How carbonate of lime in all its Protean changes can always be one and the same thing, — and yet entirely dissimilar from calc-spar, which, by chemical analysis, yields no other elements than carbonate of lime, we do not pretend to explain. We think, however, that if "carbonate of lime is not calc-spar nor anything like it," although calc-spar yields on chemical analysis precisely the same elements as carbonate of lime, then, on Professor Huxley's own mode of argument, we may safely claim that the protoplasm of the plant may yield on chemical analysis the same elements as the protoplasm of the animal, and yet the one is not the other, "nor anything like it." Even though Professor Huxley declares that "general uniformity by no means excludes any amount of special modifications of the fundamental substance" (whatever that phrase means), we claim him as our authority against his own proposition. Chemistry, if it teaches

some things, does not teach all respecting even the material composition of bodies. If it did, we must believe that calc-spar is identical with "the quick-lime and carbonic acid into which it may be resolved by known processes;" that the water which floats our ships is one and the same thing with the steam which propels them, and the ice which obstructs their passage.

If, however, when Professor Huxley says that there is a unity of material composition in all living matter, he only means that all living matter may be resolved into a few simple substances, we have no objection to the phrase, "unity of material composition;" if he means only that our chemical tests show no difference of material composition in all protoplasm, we have no objection to it. We only object to the assumption that these tests, or any other which we now know, teach the whole truth respecting the material composition of bodies, and to the assertion that the resemblances which he can trace prove identity. The fact that a mass of protoplasm cannot be re-formed from the elements into which it is resolved proves that there is something about its material composition which has not yet been discovered by the profoundest chemist or the most acute microscopic observer.

We have already said that the truth that there is a bond of connection between all material substances is not new. The one living God has not left out of his creation the manifestation of His unity, forgotten and overlooked as this truth may have sometimes been in contemplating the boundless diversity of His works. The unity of the creation is a doctrine of the Bible, and the more it is understood will increase our admiration of the power and skill of the great Architect.

In concluding this part of the subject we say, then, that Professor Huxley has not demonstrated either of his three Propositions, "nor any thing like it." He has given, on the contrary, abundant reason to believe that neither of them is true.

We propose, now, to examine this essay from another point of view, and to show some of the assumptions, and fallacies on which its theories and conclusions are built.

The facts are few and simple. Carbonic acid, water, and ammonia, all of which are compound substances, formed from the simple elements, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen are lifeless. These compounds, and nothing else, are found in all protoplasm, and in protoplasm we find indications of life. Upon these facts, Professor Huxley argues as follows :

“Carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen are all lifeless bodies. Of these, carbon and oxygen unite in certain proportions and under certain conditions to give rise to carbonic acid ; hydrogen and oxygen produce water ; nitrogen and hydrogen give rise to ammonia. These new compounds, like the elementary bodies of which they are composed, are lifeless. But when they are brought together under certain conditions they give rise to the still more complex body, protoplasm, and this protoplasm exhibits the phenomena of life. I see no break in this series of steps in molecular complication, and I am unable to understand why the language which is applicable to one term of the series may not be used to any of the others.

Let us examine this argument and see whether there is any “break in the series of steps” by which the conclusion is reached. We will take one step for an example :—“Hydrogen and oxygen produce water.” Do they *produce* water ? Professor Huxley tells us a little further on, “when hydrogen and oxygen are mixed in a certain proportion, *and the electric spark is passed through them*, they disappear, and a quantity of water equal in weight to the sum of their weights appears in their place.” Here we have a definite scientific statement, but a very different one from that which he uses as “a step” in his argument :—“Hydrogen and oxygen produce water !” No ; they might have lain together in whatever proportions from the first moment of creation, and they would not have produced water. They are inert, inactive, passive. Were it not that an electric spark, a slip of platinum, or some degree of heat had moved them, they would have remained uncompounded to this day. Should the electric spark count for nothing in this series of steps ? Without it the result described would not have appeared. The important element, the agent without which no change could have been effected, is omitted, and “this step is found to be resting on no solid basis. So another step in the series is, that under certain conditions carbon and oxygen unite to form carbonic acid. Without the presence of these conditions carbonic acid is not found. But if we cannot leave out (

view the electric spark in the formation of water, if we cannot omit the conditions under which carbon and oxygen unite to form carbonic acid, neither can we omit the conditions under which protoplasm is formed, the condition of vitality, the spark of life.

In this argument Professor Huxley overlooks or conceals the important distinction between living matter and lifeless matter. The living thing develops and increases its bulk; it changes other compounds and elementary substances, and assimilates them to itself; it *acts* in various ways. The lifeless substance does not develop or increase, it exerts no power, it does nothing. How can the two be compared? It is evident that they cannot be united in one category.

Again, it is not logical to say this result occurs under certain conditions, that other result occurs under certain conditions, therefore the results are the same. The question at once arises what are the conditions in the two cases? This is the important point. The conditions may be heavenwide. Professor Huxley says "there is not the slightest parity between the powers of the water and those of the oxygen and hydrogen which have been given to it," and so of the formation of protoplasm he says, "there is no sort of parity between the properties of the components and the properties of the resultant," a very strong reason one would think for not attempting any comparison, for where there is no parity things cannot be compared. Yet the whole of Professor Huxley's argument is based upon just this attempted comparison. A strong reason, if we may reason from inanimate to animate things, one would think, for believing that as in the one case the elements of oxygen and hydrogen do nothing towards the formation of water, a resultant having no parity with its elements, but are dependent on a spark of electricity or other active agent; so in the other case the carbonic acid, ammonia and water do nothing towards the formation of protoplasm, but are dependent on the introduction of the element of life, for there is no parity between the properties of the components and the resultant.

But Professor Huxley goes on to say, "If the phenomena exhibited by water are its properties, so are those presented by protoplasm its properties. If the properties of water may

properly be said to result from the nature and disposition of its molecules, I can find no intelligible ground for refusing to say that the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and disposition of its molecules."

To say nothing of the doubtful propriety of reasoning from lifeless to living matter, we have here a fallacy resulting from the use of the word "property." Little as Professor Huxley at times seems to think of the use of words there are occasions when his whole argument seems to hang on the use of a word. As a little while ago his argument was, that because certain conditions could be predicated of two things, therefore they could be regarded as successive steps in a series, however different those conditions might be, so now because he chooses to call certain things "properties" of water and certain other things "properties" of protoplasm, he compares them together. What does Professor Huxley mean by the expression "properties of water?" He means that the particles of water have an inherent power resulting from the nature and disposition of the molecules to change into steam or into ice. They are not acted on, but they act, "just as truly as the living man acts." "At 32 degrees Fahrenheit and far below that temperature," he says, "oxygen and hydrogen are elastic gaseous bodies, whose particles tend to rush away from one another with great force. Water at the same temperature is a strong, though brittle solid, whose particles tend to cohere into definite geometrical shapes, and sometimes build up frosty imitations of the most complex forms of vegetable foliage." We call these the properties of water and do not hesitate to believe that they result from the properties of the component elements of the water." No proof is attempted, however, no observed fact sustains the theory that these results proceed from the nature or disposition of the molecules, or from the inherent power of water. It is all conjecture, a pure assumption. Professor Huxley is a man of science, who takes nothing on faith; he has made wonderful discoveries by means of the microscope. Has he ever seen, through his most powerful lenses, this wonderful power, this all-controlling property which "guides the aqueous particles to their places in the facets of the crystal and among the leaflets of the hoar frost." No; he does not pretend to have seen any such thing, or

that any one else has seen any such thing. "We *believe*," he says, that in some way or another they (these phenomena) result from the properties of the component elements of the water." As, however, he tells us in another place that we can *know* nothing of the real nature of any thing, this guess that the result, which he sees, proceeds from the properties (nature?) of the component elements of the water, seems extraordinary. It is pure assumption. In the language of the logicians he begs the question, and the whole question. Have the oxygen and hydrogen power or property resulting from the disposition of their molecules to become water? If so, it is strange they have never done so, but always need the action of the electric spark, or other agent extraneous to themselves; and still, with this fact before him, Professor Huxley turns away from it, and from the analogy which it suggests, and guesses that there is inherent power in inert matter. And then comes this extraordinary conclusion. "If scientific language is to possess a definite and constant signification, whenever it is employed, it seems to me that we are logically bound to apply to the protoplasm the physical basis of life, the same conceptions as those which are held to be legitimate elsewhere." Wonderful logic. If Professor Huxley *conceives*, not observes, something to be the property of water, he is logically bound to conceive something else to be a property of protoplasm. If he guesses that there is inherent power in the elements of water, he is logically bound to guess that there is inherent power in the elements of protoplasm. In the same way, we argue, as he guesses that "the appearance of progressive waves" in the protoplasm results solely from the nature and disposition of the molecules of which it is composed, he is logically bound to guess that "the apparent billows of a corn-field," which he says these waves resemble, result from the nature and disposition of the molecules composing the corn-stalks, and not at all from the breeze which sweeps over them. This assumption underlies his whole theory; to it he seeks to bend his facts, by it his terminology is decided.

Why is it not as logical to suppose that there is a principle of life of which we only see the results in the protoplasm, as to suppose that these results come from a power residing in or

springing from the nature and disposition of the molecules, which power we cannot see, the nature of which we know nothing of, and the mode of whose operation we cannot explain? The electric spark, which performs so important a part in the formation of water from the elements oxygen and hydrogen, leaves its results behind it and is not discovered by the most accurate tests or the strongest lens. The argument against the vital power is as valid against the material power or against electrical power or against the power of the breeze on the corn-field.

We have said that one fallacy of this argument, we may now say this guessing, is in the use of the word "properties." This word, in its proper sense, signifies that which is peculiar to some power or object. It tells nothing of the essential nature of that to which it is applied. In this sense it is right to use it with reference to any thing which is the subject of remark, but when we go beyond this simple, natural meaning, and assign to this word a meaning which professes to interpret the nature of the object to which it is applied, we are liable to fall into error. But Professor Huxley, in many instances, perhaps always, uses this word "property" to signify the power which inheres in the nature, the material composition of the object, and on this use of the word he bases his argument. Throughout his essay he makes no difference between the living and the lifeless, using the spiritual terminology on material subjects. Thus, he says, the elements of water have power to become water; the water has power to change its character; cooked mutton has power to resume its old functions. He speaks of water as having both active and passive powers, and the same can with the same propriety be predicted of all matter. But what is a passive power? There can be no such thing. It is a contradiction in terms. Power is in its essence active, efficient, not passive or inert. If his meaning is simply that a substance may be acted on, the only result obtained by using the word "power," to express that idea is to mislead and confuse. We have however perhaps said enough to show that the main propositions of this noted essay are not established, that the theory which underlies it is not supported by the facts in the case, but is a sheer assumption.

A little more than two hundred years ago Harvey demonstrated the circulation of the blood, and since that time many

new facts concerning this circulation have been discovered. Professor Huxley is the latest laborer in this field, and has carried his investigations further than any who have preceded him, even so far as to ascertain the movements of the infinitesimal portions of the blood to the twenty thousandth part of an inch ; but he is as far as Harvey was from understanding the secret spring of these movements. Harvey could demonstrate that the blood was driven by the heart through the arteries and returned through the veins, but he could not tell what causes the heart to pulsate or by what means its activity is continued. Huxley demonstrates that the blood contains corpuscles of extreme minuteness which are in ceaseless motion, but he cannot explain to us what hidden power gives to these corpuscles their original movement or why the movement, when once begun, continues. All that Huxley knows, all that can be known by observation is, that when life is present, activity in the corpuscles is present ; when life ceases, the activity also ceases. Physical science is not competent to explain whether the life is the cause of the activity, or the activity is the cause of the life. The ultimate fact, and one that must always remain such to the observer is, that they exist together. Although Professor Huxley should increase the magnifying power of his lenses a hundred fold, he could not throw a ray of light on the origin of life. We gladly accept him as our teacher in respect to all the facts pertaining to the living organism, which he has observed or may observe, but when he forms a "conception" or expresses a "belief," he steps outside of what he calls "the limits of philosophical inquiry," and we decline to follow him. Unless his conceptions and beliefs are deducible from his facts, they are no better than the vagaries of a dream.

We cannot but think that the world would have been the gainer if Professor Huxley had devoted less time to the microscope and more to the study of logic. We are surprised that so many physicists should have received the arguments and conclusions of this essay without objection. One desirous of depreciating the study of physical science, would want no better argument than is afforded by the assumptions and fallacies of one of its most eminent professors, and the readiness with which these are accepted by others.

ARTICLE III.—IS THE DOCTRINE OF THE FINAL RESTORATION OF ALL MEN SCRIPTURAL?

Does the Bible furnish ground for the belief that all men will finally be restored to holiness and happiness? There need be no apology for discussing a subject so close to human feeling, and which attracts increased attention daily, in the theological world. As we naturally desire salvation for ourselves and for others, so we sensitively shrink from the idea that any should be eternally lost. The thought is also attractive to our reason, that the universe will finally be in complete harmony with itself; that God will use methods, in the lapse of ages, by which sin and misery shall be terminated, and holiness and happiness characterize all his rational creatures. We can hardly conceive that a good man should be without sympathy with such longings and hopes. They are the views of those called "Liberal Christians." They were entertained by John Frederick Oberlin and John Foster, after an examination of the subject in the light of reason and of the Word of God. Not a few Christians decidedly lean towards this belief, while the contrary view is accepted by yet others only with painful doubt, and a sense of conflict. Learned and orthodox German commentators, such as Tholuck, Neander, Olshausen, and Lange, also intimate that the Bible gives an occasional hint, in some large-hearted and far-reaching Pauline expression, of such a restoration. Let us approach the subject, then, in a spirit of candor and charity, endeavoring to gather up all the facts which can shed light upon it; let us come to it gradually, patiently, thoughtfully, asking divine guidance in exploring the divine counsels.

First of all, then, we confess that the doctrine of the final restoration of all fallen souls comes to us with this suspicious mark upon its front, that it has never been the faith of the church of Christ. Doubtless individuals, like Clemens, Alexandrinus, and Origen, were found in the early church (and, at

a later period, now and then, a heretical or mystical sect or school) who favored this doctrine. But nothing is more clear than that the church, as a body, has ever maintained the opposite view, and made it a prominent part of the Christian faith. Now it is to be conceded, that no opinion can be settled in any age merely by being put to vote. The majority on a given point has often been wrong; the minority may be the wiser and better party. But the fact before us has to do with something beside mere numbers. It can support the verdict of the church by a threefold consideration of great power.

(1). The majority in this case can abide any comparative test of learning or piety which may be applied to ascertain quality as well as numbers. It is not an ignorant, superstitious, and morally debased majority against a learned, liberal, and pure minority. Certainly the current doctrine of the Christian church on this subject has been supported by the overwhelming weight of scholarship and piety among those who accept the teachings of Scripture as inspired. From age to age, in the light as well as in the darkness, before, during, and since the prevalence of Romish usurpation and corruption, by bodies of Christians who differ widely in other respects, and who embrace the Oriental churches, the Latin church, and all but one or two small sects of Protestantism, has the doctrine of restoration been rejected, as utterly inconsistent with Scripture.

(2). The value of this rejection is increased by the fact that it is contrary to the natural tendency. Here the very claim which, in one aspect, favors the doctrine, is seen to operate against it. The question must be answered, How comes it, that the church has been thus agreed in interpreting the Bible contrary to man's natural desire, and to plausible demands of the reason? Every man, thinking of his personal danger as a sinner, would incline to the less terrible view of the penalty of sin, and to the larger view of the results of redemption. The same inclination would arise in the minds of parents, children, and friends, as they contemplated the final destiny of those they loved. The longing for universal happiness and holiness must always have been strong in pious souls, and must have predisposed them to regard with favor an interpretation

of Scripture which would warrant the addition of faith to such a hope. Yet the doctrine of restoration, although supported by natural feeling, and by many desires and sympathies in regenerate souls, has utterly failed to command the faith of the Christian church.

(3). But more significant still is the relation of such a unity and permanence of church belief to the promised guidance of the Holy Spirit. We may properly reject the idea of Papal Infallibility: we may doubt such a quality even in an Ecumenical Council that should be truly representative of the universal Christian church; but we cannot explain away the promised illumination of the abiding Comforter, so that it shall mean nothing practical or valuable. Rejecting any enthusiastic and mystical appropriations of it by individuals, in a sense that would render them inspired authorities, and avoiding the other extreme of applying it to an outward organism or corporation, we are warranted in understanding it to mean, *at least*, that the body of true believers, the succession of those regenerated by the Holy Spirit, shall be taught the truth as revealed in Scripture concerning the grand facts which constitute the working power of the gospel on earth. And this would seem necessarily to include the truth respecting the final destiny of men, which stands so closely related to the whole doctrine of sin and redemption. Can it then be, that the Holy Ghost has allowed almost the entire church to abide in serious error on this solemn subject? But while deeply impressed with this opening suspicion, this ear-mark of error, we will not regard it as conclusive against all argument. Perhaps too much light could not be allowed to flood the church at first; perhaps the lapse of eighteen centuries has so elevated its character and increased its intelligence, that now it is prepared to be taught by the Holy Spirit, that its past anxiety for the fate of the wicked has been unwarranted and excessive, and its confident interpretation of Scripture quite mistaken! This does not seem very probable; let us admit it to be possible. We observe, then,

Secondly, That we regard it as another unfavorable circumstance, that the argument for a final restoration is so largely based on mere sentiment, or else on abstract, philosophical

arguments concerning the divine character and government, called sometimes "the principles of the Bible." We have been struck with the fact, that in the minds of many who advocate this doctrine, it seems to be an ebullition of feeling rather than a careful exercise of judgment. "It must be true! They cannot bring themselves to believe the contrary! They will sooner reject the Bible, or even become atheists at once!" One can hardly be expected to convince such a state of mind, or to be convinced by it. To us it does not seem like an act of reason, or a state of humility. We confess that we are very ignorant of the consequences or deserts of sin, except as God teaches us by his word. The future world is an unexplored realm, save as Christ, who came to reveal some of its mysteries, has put on record his testimony. Conscience prophesies evil: we dare not trust natural hopes: we are shut up to the words of Him who said "I am the Truth!"

Thus, if any one arrays against the Biblical declaration that those on the left hand of the Judge "shall go away into everlasting punishment," the objection that these words of Christ offend his sentiment of justice; that no earthly sin can justly entail an eternity of woe; we cannot be made to believe that Christ was without the sentiment of justice, or that He carelessly used language to shock that sentiment in his hearers. Hence, if no other reply were possible, we could refer the solution to the disclosures of the next life, as a course wiser and safer than to deny or to change the words of Christ. Yet reason assures that sin in the human soul is not a mere act, or series of acts, but is an abiding state, and is so viewed in the Bible always; that the penalty of "eternal death" has relation to this fundamental fact; and that a soul which persists in sin through this life is in confirmed and hopeless depravity, and is therefore properly sentenced to a corresponding exclusion from the society and bliss of heaven. Thus our conception of justice is in no respect wounded: which teaches us to suspect that a sentimental religion may not be a rational religion, and should not be allowed to give law to exegesis.

For somewhat similar reasons, we lack confidence in those—whether called theologians or philosophers—who build a universe of perfect order and beauty out of abstract principles,

and who have vast knowledge, aside from Scripture, of what God can and cannot do. We can only take the *kosmos* as we find it, and interpret its past, and predict its future, by reading the word of Him who rules it; in which word He supplies facts not otherwise discoverable, and announces purposes which reason could not anticipate. Perhaps Tennyson, in "*In Memoriam*," has presented a fair specimen of the intermingling of the sentimental and rationalistic process of thought on this subject, and of the small certainty of its conclusion:

" Oh, yet we trust that, somehow, good
Will be the final goal of ill,
To pangs of nature, sins of will,
Defects of doubt, and taints of blood ;

" That nothing walks with aimless feet ;
That not one life shall be destroyed,
Or cast as rubbish to the void,
When God hath made the pile complete ;

" That not a worm is cloven in vain ;
That not a moth with vain desire
Is shrivelled in a fruitless fire,
Or but subserves another's gain.

" Behold ! we know not anything ;
I can but trust that good shall fall
At last, far off, at last, to all,
And every winter change to spring.

" So runs my dream : but what am I ?
An infant crying in the night :
An infant crying for the light ;
And with no language but a cry."

But this " dream " has its nightmare. The poet is haunted by horrible doubts, which crush his rising faith, and he breathes out his difficulties in such stanzas as these :

" The wish, that of the living whole
No life may fail beyond the grave—
Derives it not from what we have
The likest God within the soul ?

"Are God and Nature, then, at strife,
That Nature lends such evil dreams ?
So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life ;

"That I, considering everywhere
Her secret meaning in her deeds,
And finding that of fifty seeds,
She often brings but one to bear,

"I falter where I firmly trod,
And falling with my weight of cares
Upon the great world's altar-stairs
That slope through darkness up to God,

"I stretch lame hands of faith, and grope,
And gather dust and chaff, and call
To what I feel is Lord of all,
And faintly trust the larger hope."

Yes, this "faint trust" is all the support which can be given by either natural sentiment or natural reason, to this "larger hope." The difficulty is, that the principles adopted involve conclusions which, in brightening the future, contradict the past and present, and therefore prove their own absurdity. Thus the advocates of universal restoration argue that the boundless perfections of God imply that the outcome of human history will be only holiness and happiness; that these compel us to believe that his power will secure a universe in which shall be found no sin or misery, since nothing less can satisfy the desire, or manifest the glory, of infinite love, while any other result would be the eternal triumph of evil over God. We will not deny a certain degree of force in this argument, and that it appeals strongly to an idea of moral beauty and fitness. But omitting, at present, a reference to Scripture, and regarding only the abstract reason of the case, a difficulty lies in the fact, that one can in this way as easily prove, either that there is no God of infinite perfection, or that there never has been sin or misery! For surely it may be argued that a Being of infinite natural and moral attributes would create and preserve a perfect moral universe, into which neither sin nor suffering should ever gain admittance. A

Being of boundless purity and love would so abhor sin and suffering, that he would take all possible means of preventing their existence, equally because hateful to himself as because destructive to his creatures; and, inasmuch as his resources are boundless, and He can do all his will, it is simply impossible that He should have allowed evil to cast even a shadow upon his universe. Rather than admit the contrary, it might be said, if we must concede the fact of sin and suffering, we will deny that there is a God; we will fall back on pantheism or atheism. It is no sufficient answer, to reply, "that we may not reason about temporary evil as we would about eternal evil; that it might be wise and right to adopt a system in which sin and suffering should have a brief existence; but that to affirm their eternal duration is to deny the divine attributes." This is not a question of quantity, or of time, but of quality. It is the question of sin or no sin, that a holy, wise, and omnipotent God is called on to decide; and not more or less sin, or longer or shorter sin. Abstract reason, if it can take jurisdiction of this matter at all (which we very much doubt), must teach that God's abhorrence of sin would lead him to do all that he could to prevent its occurrence among his creatures, while his physical and moral omnipotence would ensure success in its prevention. If any objection be made to this sweeping demand of reason, in the name of the freedom of the creature, and the peculiar limitations of moral government (as the facts of the case would seem to require), then abstract philosophizing is ruled out once for all, and may not return to dictate on other points. Having failed utterly as to the origin and early history of the universe, it shall have no hearing as to its final destiny. So poor a historian cannot figure creditably as a prophet! Hence Rev. Thomas Starr King admits, virtually, that in the abuse of their freedom there may be souls who will persist forever in sin, and who will correspondingly suffer. His philosophy compels him to say candidly: "We cannot conceive too seriously the ingratitude of evil, the wrong which sin does to our own nature; the offence it offers to the purity of God; the peril which habits of evil, wrought into the constitution of

our nature, induce, by sinking us away from the region of true life and blessedness. We may be sure that hereafter, as well as here, the spiritual laws will be utterly hostile to everything but goodness in us, and that we shall suffer according to our denial of God, and our chosen distance from him." Again he says: "Neither is it a question whether or not the sin of this life will be visited with bitter consequences in the life to come; nor even whether souls may not harden themselves against the justice and grace of the Infinite forever, and prefer forever, through the natural gravitation of evil loves, to live away from God, and from the bliss that attends the continual reception of his life." ("Two Discourses on the Doctrine of Endless Punishment," pp. 31, 38.)

It may appear to the restorationist that an infinitely perfect king and kingdom imply that in the result there shall be not left one rebel, nor the vestige of a prison; but on the same principle it may much more certainly be affirmed, that an infinitely perfect king and kingdom imply a realm into which no thought of rebellion ever entered, and no prison was ever needed! If we are at liberty to reason merely from our idea of perfection in government, or our idea of what the divine attributes require or imply, is it not a more worthy and glorious conception, to think of God as having a holy and happy universe from the very first, than to believe that it was marred by sin and suffering for long ages, and then was recovered to purity and bliss? Would the latter result, even if secured, remove the imperfection of the previous reign of evil? Would not the memory of it eternally abide, a dark spot in the history of the universe, and in the consciousness of the once apostate races? Thus it appears that, even at best, restorationists arrive at no absolute perfection in the divine government, as measured by their own standard, while they are contradicted in their leading principles of reasoning by all that we now see to be, and know to have taken place.

We have a right to reason from what has been and now is, to what shall be, so far as principles are concerned. If the creation of finite minds with freedom of will, and the institution of moral government, imply a limitation of the Creator,—not in himself, but in his revelations and influence,—by finite

capacities, so that God may not prevent the introduction of sin and misery, and their continuance through ages, then one is authorized to say, that the same limitations, growing out of creature-freedom and the peculiarities of moral government, will not require so much of eternal sin and misery may remain, after a glorious redemption, in a crushed remnant of rebellion and a signal example made of persistent transgressors. No one can show that the attribute of benevolence is thereby impeached, that injustice is done, or that moral government has not been administered in the wisest and most worthy manner.

Nor is this conclusion at all invalidated by the declaration that punishment is in its very nature disciplinary to the sufferer, and will therefore be used by God to reclaim his erring subjects. We dispute that philosophy of punishment. It is not self-evident and axiomatic. It is not universally accepted. What is its proof? God nowhere affirms it in his word. Reason teaches that, under law, punishment has principal reference, and ought to have principal reference, to the public good, and the support of government. History fails to produce a single human government, from the beginning of time to the present, based on that idea, or a single legislator who advocated it. Penalties are inflicted principally to deter others from crime, and are never made conditional upon the repentance of the offender. Even under the brief and less rigorous parental form of government, perseverance in wrong when mature years are reached, and when the family safety and peace are affected, is visited with total and final expulsion. The Bible represents the effect of future punishment on the wicked to be, "weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth," rather than repentance.

Thirdly. We cannot but notice the vagueness of the professed Scriptural evidence. A doctrine so important should be clearly taught. Human hope requires it, the relation to the other parts of the evangelical system makes it necessary, and, according to the reasoning of its advocates, the bearing on the divine glory renders such a statement imperative. Yet the direct evidence from Biblical assertion is acknowledged to be scant. Thus an Article in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, January,

1870, on "The Doctrine of The Apostles," based on the German work of Professor Herman Messner, says: "The doctrine of the restoration of those who did not believe in Christ during their earthly life is certainly not distinctly and expressly taught, but only intimated." Olshausen, in his commentary on Matt. xii. 31, 32, although inclined to that view of the future, is compelled to speak of it thus: "It has no doubt a deep root in noble minds: it is the expression of a heartfelt desire for a consummate harmony throughout creation. But considered from a purely exegetical point of view, we must confess, that no passage in the New Testament affords a clear and *positive* testimony for the consummation of this heartfelt desire." So also Neander, (*Planting and Training*, p. 294), after advancing cautiously, and with doubt, to the idea that such a doctrine may be intended in certain Pauline passages, adds: "At all events, we find here only some slight intimations, and we acknowledge the guidance of divine wisdom, that, in the records of revelation destined for such various steps of religious development, no more light has been communicated on this subject!"

What, then, are the testimonies of Scripture alleged in support of the final restoration of all beings to holiness and bliss? There is not one which is direct, which bears, that is specifically, on the point before us: not one which, speaking of the punishment of sinners in the future life, declares that it will be temporary, or disciplinary; not one which states that the sinful will be released from their prison house, or that, eventually, the flames of hell will be quenched, because the devil, with all his angelic and human followers, shall have been converted. The texts cited by restorationists are on other subjects. Hence Rev. Thomas Starr King said candidly (*Doctrine of Endless Punishment*, p. 5), "I do not find the doctrine of the ultimate salvation of all souls clearly stated in any text, or in any discourse, that has been reported from the lips of Christ." He appeals therefore to "*the principles of the religion of Jesus.*" Again he says (p. 6), "There is no argument for the final triumph of goodness recorded in the four gospels, nor any dogmatic textual assertion of that doctrine; but all the principles glow there, vivid as the sunlight, that are re-

quired to give us the most consoling trust in God through eternity, and the most cheering hope for man."

There are, indeed, passages which speak in a lively and emphatic manner of certain general bearings and broad results of the atonement of Christ. These, pressed to the extreme of their literal and independent meaning, and unqualified by the specific and definite limitations elsewhere made, give plausibility to the theory in question. The most common argument in the early stage of modern Universalism was from the numerous texts which declare the universal relations of the death of Christ, suffered for "all men," for "the world," &c. But the distinction between the efficacy of Christ's death as placing all men in a salvable condition, and as actually saving them, is so evident, and is so sustained by all the texts which annex conditions of repentance and faith, that the argument has nearly dropped from use, especially as the Universalists have ceased to believe in a vicarious atonement at all!

But what shall be said of Romans xi, 32? "For God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all." Does not this assertion point to his ultimate purpose, and the final result? Not as regards all men individually. The Apostle is stating that the Jews are for a time cut off, in order that the Gentiles may be grafted in; and that, at a later period, the Jews will be reclaimed, and thus mercy be shown to both sections of mankind, and the salvation of Christ come to all without exception of race. That the benefit of the salvation was conditional, however, and suspended on personal faith, is put beyond doubt by a precisely parallel passage in the same Apostle's epistle to the Galatians, in which he thus makes plain his meaning: (iii, 22.) "But the Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe."

A stronger appeal is made to the language of the fifth chapter of Romans, in which a contrast is drawn between what the human race lost in Adam, and what it gained in Christ: "For if through the offence of the one the many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by the one man Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto the many." * * "Therefore as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all

men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, so by the obedience of the one shall the many be made righteous. * * * But where sin abounded, grace did much more abound; that as sin reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ, our Lord." It may candidly be admitted, that if we had no other instruction in the Bible respecting the final results of the redemptive scheme, a ground of hope might be afforded, by these expressions, of a universal human salvation. But in their interpretation we are limited (1) by the plain and express declarations of Scripture to the contrary, which we are yet to consider; (2) by the opposing language of the Apostle in this very epistle, in the second chapter, where he restricts eternal life "to them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality;" (3) by the conditional nature which he invariably ascribes to salvation by Christ; (4) by the personal act of appropriation which the very parallel and contrast between what we derive from Adam and from Christ imply in each case, seeing that "death passed upon all men *because all have sinned*," (verse 12), or made Adam's transgression their own by voluntary lives of sin—a fact which calls in the parallel for a similarly personal appropriation of the redemption through Christ; which possibly may be meant by the form of expression that, "much more *they who receive* (that is, by personal, voluntary act) the abundance of grace, and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign in life by the one, Jesus Christ." (verse 17.) Nor when this limitation is thus made, are the assertions of the passage rendered weak and meaningless. They still abide in truth and force, showing a superiority in the salvation over the ruin; (1) in that the vast majority of the human race will be found at the end among the redeemed, the lost being but as the inmates of our prisons compared with the virtuous community; and (2) in that God, through the work of Christ, will have turned the fact of sin into an occasion of the divine glory, otherwise unparalleled.

Another passage often cited to sustain the theory of resto-

ration is, 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. "For since by man came death by man also came the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." There is certainly much to be said for the explanation (favored by De Wette) that the "all" in the two members of this comparison are not identical, but represent two classes with their respective heads—all men dying in Adam, their natural head, and all saints as surely made alive in Christ their spiritual head especially as in this whole chapter the Apostle is specifically discussing the future life of the saints. Yet in view of the parallel passage in Romans, just considered, we think the argument exegetically probable, that the two "all"s correspond and refer to the whole human race, respecting whom it is true that they become subject to bodily death through Adam, and receive a bodily resurrection through Christ. But this latter like many other things procured for us through Christ, may be made a curse instead of a blessing by an impenitent life. Hence Christ himself alludes to a double resurrection: "The hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation." That Paul did not develop this latter truth is explained by the specific purpose which he had in view, in comforting the saints. Yet we do seem to have a hint of a distinction, and of the reference of the glorious resurrection only to Christians, in the very next words: "But every man in his own order—Christ the first fruits, afterward *they that are Christ's* at his coming." The whole usage of Paul in his writings, in his constant characterization of the saints as "in Christ Jesus," and as "Christ's," forbids us to understand such a specific phrase as including all men.

Perhaps the weak argument derived from 1 Tim. ii. 4, "Who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth," and the parallel words, in 2 Pet., ii. 9, "Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance," ought not to be passed by. When it is said that God is surely able to carry out his will, as here expressed, and that consequently all men will be saved, it is a

sumed that the words refer to his decretive will, and announce a purposed result. But the context—which in the one passage is an exhortation to prayer for all classes of men, and in the other is an explanation of the delay of wrath,—as well as the whole drift of Scripture, points us rather to his benevolent will or desire, which urges all to be saved, and makes it our duty to labor and pray for all. It is thus simply parallel to the words in Ezekiel xviii, 32, “For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God; wherefore turn yourselves and live ye,” and in xxxiii, 11, “Say unto them, As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?”

An attempt is made to press into use, Phil. ii, 9–11. “Wherefore God hath highly exalted him (Christ Jesus) and given him a name which is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things (beings) in heaven, and things (beings) in earth, and things (beings) under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.” This sets forth simply the “Lordship” of Christ, as a fact to be universally recognized in heaven, earth, and the underworld, or by angels, living men, and the departed, or, as some prefer, by heaven, earth, and hell. Olshausen, himself a restorationist, says: “Jesus is not here acknowledged as Mediator, but as Lord, and the true interpretation of this passage, as also Rom. xiv. 11, and Is. xlv. 23, show, that it is not a willing acknowledgment of Jesus that is here spoken of.” “Those knees which till then were not willingly bowed to him, shall then be forced to bow.” Even now, James tells us, “the devils believe and tremble,” and when Jesus was on earth the demons recognized his authority, and feared that he was come “to torment them before the time,” knowing that eventually they were to be stripped of power, to be humbled beneath his judgment seat, and to be cast into hell forever.

A somewhat favorite proof-text for the doctrine of restoration has been the language of Peter in Acts iii. 21, “Whom (Jesus) the heaven must receive, until the time of the restitu-

tion of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." Not to lay undue stress on the fact that the word "restitution" (*ἀποκαταστάσεως*) may mean "full establishment," and thus the idea be only that Jesus is to tarry in heaven until all has been accomplished on earth which the prophets have predicted, we may claim that such general phraseology simply imports the final victory of the kingdom of Christ over Satanic opposition, and the renewal of earth's allegiance to her rightful king, as constantly foretold by the Jewish prophets. This by no means teaches or implies, that Satan and all the other defeated enemies are transformed into saints, and made inhabitants of heaven a result of which surely the "holy prophets since the world began" have not continually spoken, while the Old Testament is filled with predictions that the Messiah would crush his foes. But, at his second coming, Christ will inaugurate his holy and blissful kingdom for the reward of his redeemed ones, and will institute a second paradise, of which he has said, (Rev. ii. 7) "To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life which is in the midst of the paradise of God."

But the chief reliance of the restorationists is on Colossian i., 19, 20. "For it pleased the Father that in him (the Son) should all fulness dwell, and having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself by him, I say, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven." This had influence with Neander to make him say (Planting, &c. B. vi, cap. I.) "This passage we shall interpret in the simplest and most natural manner, if we can admit such a reference to the reconciling and redeeming work of Christ on the fallen spiritual world. * * * A magnificent prospect is thus presented of the final triumph of the work of redemption, which was first opened to the mind of the great Apostle in the last stage of his Christian development, by means of that love which impelled him to sacrifice himself for the salvation of mankind." Ellicott, also, while not quite venturing to affirm the same idea, comes so close to it as to write: "This and no less than this, it *does* say, that the eternal and incarnate Son is the "causa medians" by which the absolute totality of created things shall be restored into its primal harmon

with its Creator—a declaration more specifically unfolded in the following clause; more than this it *does not* say, and where God is silent, it is not for man to speak;” an interpretation, which savors more of caution than courage. Let us more boldly face the question, which is, How to give an interpretation to these words, which shall be natural and appropriate, and yet in entire harmony with the obvious drift of Scripture in its numerous specific declarations as to the final condition of the righteous and the wicked after the general judgment. To affirm here a doctrine of universal restoration of fallen men and angels, certainly seems to be a flat contradiction of a hundred explicit passages, which teach the final perdition of impenitent men, besides several which unequivocally declare the eternal ruin of Satan and his fallen comrades, and one (Heb. ii. 16) which asserts that Christ’s redemption does not extend to angels. Yet, on the other hand, many find difficulty in understanding any thing less in construing such emphatic words as “reconcile all things unto himself,” followed by the explanatory clause, “whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven.” It may be suggested here, that the alleged universality of the language is, after all, limited to earth and heaven, and therefore does not include the devil and his angels; and further, that the reference may be, therefore, to the idea of Peter, who, in the very act of declaring the certain “perdition of ungodly men,” says: “We, according to his promise, look for a new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.” It may also be said with truth, that less contradiction to the other assertions of Scripture would be found in interpreting this passage on the annihilation theory, than on that of restoration; so that it should describe the harmonious and perfect condition of things, when the wicked shall have perished out of being, and only a holy universe remain, bound together by the love of a redeeming God. But we prefer another solution. The difficulty arises from taking the language in question in an individual instead of an organic sense. Paul is not speaking of the inhabitants of heaven and earth as a mass of individuals, every one of whom is declared to have been “reconciled” by Christ to the Father. That sense would have no application to the larger portion of those

supposed to be represented by the word "heaven," the unfallen angels, who need no reconciliation individually; nor yet could it apply to the fallen angels, without contradicting expressly the assertion in Heb. ii, 16, which states that Christ did not undertake the redemption of angels. Paul is using heaven and earth as a convenient and customary phrase to denote the organic universe, as such, the instituted kingdom of God. This, viewed as an organic unit, was brought into a state of controversy, division, and alienation, by a two-fold rupture; the apostacy of Satan and the fall of Adam. The original moral universe, from that day to the day of Judgment, presents a scene of disorder, because the process of the development and the conflict of good and evil, under a redemptive scheme, is unfinished. But that being completed at the Judgment, God and holiness having been fully vindicated, and Satan and sin as fully exposed, the rebellion having been successfully crushed, and the unrepentant fragment condignly sentenced to eternal woe, God will thereupon reconstruct his moral universe, or reorganize his kingdom, in the new and glorious light of redemption, bringing forth his "new heavens and earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." This shall be a *kosmos* of perfect purity, into which sin can never gain access, even by a misunderstanding of God, such as that to which the original *kosmos* was liable; for "the blood of the cross" will have forever made peace between God and his rational creatures, and the organized universe will be "reconciled" through Christ unto the Father. Of this organic unity hell makes no part. Lost men and angels are outside of the *kosmos*. They have no recognized place. They are stricken from the roll. They are the convicts in the prison; not counted among citizens, civilly dead. They are "the dogs" outside of the New Jerusalem, and thus not referred to when one describes the glories of the holy city and the bliss of its inhabitants.

As the passage in Ephesians i, 10, is entirely parallel with the one just considered, it is unnecessary to repeat the explanation in connection with it. The same idea of a reconstructed holy universe (in which no account is taken of hell) is conveyed by the words, "That in the dispensation of the fulness

of times He might gather in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth ; even in him."

Thus we see, that the alleged Scriptural evidence for restoration is wanting in definitiveness, and is an inference from certain general expressions interpreted, without reason, and contrary to the whole analogy of Scripture, in an unlimited manner. We agree, therefore, with Rev. Thomas Starr King, though with an opposite application of his language, that "the method which so many pulpit teachers pursue of bringing texts together and pressing words to the utmost limit of meaning which dictionaries will allow, is a most dangerous method of handling the Scripture, an almost hopeless mode of reaching truth, a puerile style of discussion, and the last way of paying reverence to the New Testament."—(*Doctrine of Endless Punishment*, p. 12).

Fourthly. The doctrine of restoration seems inconsistent with the specific declarations of Scripture respecting the eternity of future punishment. The texts cited in its favor are not numerous, and are not on the specific point at issue, but are general statements of the triumphant results of Christ's redemption, from which a hopeful inference is drawn. Those opposed to it are many, probably twenty or fifty to one in number, and are given as explicit statements of fact on the very subject of the punishment of the wicked. It is always a safe rule, to explain the doubtful by the plain passages, to limit inferential arguments by those which are direct, and to value one word of positive testimony above the most plausible theories and suppositions. Plain evidence that a thing is, must outweigh all objections brought to prove that it cannot be. Now Christ is the most credible of witnesses on the point in question, and he has taught us more in amount and explicitness than all the inspired writers, having spoken with frequency and plainness. His solemn statement of the result of the judgment, at which He will preside is, that He will say unto them on the left hand, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels;" and again, he says, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal." Immense efforts have been made, by men learned and unlearned, to show that

“everlasting” in this passage means only of long duration. But the literal and natural sense is sustained by these five considerations: (1) the use of the same Greek word in the same sentence to denote the “eternal” life of the righteous; (2) the concurrence of other texts with varied language expressing the same idea; (3) the fact that the sentence is pronounced at the general judgment, which closes earthly history, and beyond the results of which we have no further revelations as to the wicked; (4) that the words were addressed to those who believe, as Josephus and other authors testify, in the doctrine of the endless punishment of the wicked; and (5) the constant use of the word *αἰώνιος* in the New Testament to denote a strict eternity. We have no space to enlarge upon these points. As to the last, we observe, that the word *αἰώνιος* occurs 71 times in the New Testament, in 61 of which there can be no doubt that it means literally endless, because it is used in 59 instances of the results of Christ’s salvation, and in 2 as a divine characteristic; while once it is used of the past eternity, and twice of eternity as beginning, through the fact of creation, to be marked off by ages. There only remain the 7 passages in which it is applied to the future punishment of the wicked. One of these (Mark iii, 29) contains, by the way, in the Greek expression now accepted as correct by the best authorities (Griesbach, Lachmann, and Tischendorf, sustained by the Sinaitic and Vatican MSS.) the very phrase so abhorrent to Restoration-Optimists, “eternal sin,”—*ἐνοχός ἐστιν αἰωνίου ἁμαρτήματος*. There is thus room for but one exegetical conclusion from the New Testament usage, which is corroborated beyond doubt by the numerous parallel expressions, “death;” “shall not see life;” “hath never forgiveness;” “shall not be forgiven, neither in this world, neither in the world to come.” “unquenchable fire;” “worm dieth not;” “tormented for ever and ever;” “perdition of ungodly men;” “whose end is destruction;” “fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries;” “whose end is, to be burned.” Nor is the effort more successful to eliminate from *αἰώνιος* the idea of time altogether, and to make it denote quality only, something spiritual in character, because Christ said, “This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus

Christ, whom Thou hast sent ;” inferring that by analogy death eternal is merely ignorance of God ! It is obvious that Christ does not eliminate the element of time, at all, but only adds to it, from the word “life,” the spiritual element ; the whole phrase thus denoting the endless knowledge and enjoyment of God and Christ. Hence, eternal death must be the endless ruin which is involved in the loss of God as the soul’s portion, and of Christ as the soul’s Saviour.

Neander makes a singular attempt to reconcile restoration with these explicit assertions to the contrary. He says (Planting, B. VI., Cap. 1., Note): “The doctrine of such a universal restitution would not stand in contradiction to the doctrine of eternal punishment, as it appears in the gospels ; for, although those who are hardened in wickedness, left to the consequences of their conduct, their merited fate, have to expect endless unhappiness, yet a secret decree of the divine compassion is not necessarily excluded, by virtue of which, through the wisdom of God revealing itself in the discipline of free agents, they will be led to a free appropriation of redemption.” How a secret decree, which contradicts God’s announced purpose and declared sentence, is reconcilable with divine truth, does not readily appear ; nor yet how that can be called “secret” which is stated by Paul with sufficient explicitness to warrant our faith ; nor why, if it was to be secret, God did not succeed better in biding it from Neander and the other Germans ! The theory for explaining away the positive, varied, and oft-repeated language of Christ, adopted by Rev. Thomas Starr King, viz. that “Jesus was a poet ;” that “he loved indefinite language, vast expressions, paradoxes, gorgeous imagery, vivid parables ;” that his words were “a few fragmentary flashes of poetry ;” that he had an “oriental imagination,” &c., &c.—this theory scarcely needs refutation, so inconsistent is it with confidence in Christ as an infallible teacher, with the intention and use of the Bible, and with the possibility of any system of doctrine whatever.

Fifthly. The doctrine of a final restoration is not commended by its tendencies and results. Its very defenders are often fearful in this respect, and singularly enough give this as a reason why God did not more plainly reveal it in the Bible !

Thus, in a passage already quoted, Neander acknowledges the divine wisdom in the fact that "no more light has been communicated on this subject!" Prof. Messner, also, after using the words previously cited from the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, adds, "It is not difficult to perceive the divine wisdom in not having granted us a further revelation on this subject!" There are doubtless many who inwardly incline towards this belief, or who secretly adopt it, but are persuaded that it would be of evil effect, if generally credited! The faith of such believers must be weak indeed, while their intellectual conclusion is plainly at war with their religious instincts and common sense. Their fears are not groundless. We regard the tendency of the doctrine as bad in a two-fold respect.

(1). Theologically. The minds which cherish objections to the orthodox creed in this respect, such that they can surmount all exegetical difficulties in rejecting it, will not apply their doubts and reasonings to this subject alone, nor pause with discarding a single article of the orthodox faith. Their peculiar feeling and exegesis will be brought to bear with like effect upon the other distinctive points of evangelical belief. The road entered upon tends logically downward, and few will be content with taking only the first step. We have illustrations on a large scale. Universalism began with preaching restorationism as its only dissent from orthodoxy; but in the course of the century, it has passed to the repudiation of the trinity, the deity of Christ, the atonement, total depravity, and regeneration, as held by evangelical churches, and to-day its supporters claim to stand on the platform of "Liberal" Christianity, some of them being numbered with its "left wing" of radical rationalists, and "free religionists." By an instructive parallel movement, Unitarianism, which began by differing from orthodoxy as to the trinity, has worked its logical way onward to the rejection of eternal punishment. The (Unitarian) *Monthly Review and Religious Magazine* (February. 1870) says of the idea of restoration, "While the Universalist puts it forward as one of the doctrines of Christianity, the Unitarian cherishes it as one of the glorious hopes of humanity. The Universalist preaches it as the word of God. The Unitarian holds it as the hope of man." The difference between

Unitarianism and Universalism at the present time, is popularly considered to be one almost wholly of gentility!

(2). Practically. There is a loss of moral and religious power, when the doctrine of eternal ruin gives place to temporary suffering for disciplinary purposes only. The motive (which is certainly Scriptural and reasonable) to "flee from the wrath to come," loses much of its force. Ministers do not insist on it, and hearers do not feel it. The tendency is, to make religion less distinctive and paramount; less spiritual in development, and Godward in action, and more formal in character and humanitarian in object. Revivals disappear and are ridiculed, and the distinction between religion and morality, between Christians and the world, becomes obscure. And what is noticeable is, that these results go beyond what would seem to be logically necessary; inasmuch as a genuine faith in a limited but dreadful future punishment, might reasonably stimulate the Restorationists to a style of preaching and of spiritual labor quite parallel with that of the orthodox. Yet we neither see nor hear of any such effect of their belief; which, they must confess, would make them more nearly resemble the primitive Christians. To object to an eternal hell seems to them more important than to warn the wicked against a hell enduring enough, as they acknowledge, to be called by Christ *αἰώνιος*! As to public morals, it would hardly be rash to assert that the effect must be deleterious in time. We concede that such men as Neander and Tholuck, Oberlin and John Foster, are not likely to lose their religion, or to fall into immorality, because of their error on this point; and, also, that the ministers and church members of the denominations in this respect in error are not chargeable with impure lives. But they are the better class of those so believing; are often persons educated under other influences; and are fortified by existing social relations and public opinion. The full effect of a disbelief in eternal punishment could only be seen in successive generations, or isolated communities, trained from childhood in that opinion, without aid from the orthodox faith. We may err in such a judgment, but it seems to us that, at present, the restoration-theory wears its best appearance as to moral results; and this because it

does not grow on its own stock, but is grafted into minds formed or fortified under opposite views. It is represented largely by men of principle and culture who, having drifted into that sentiment, are not seriously affected by it in general character. But there is a class below which must speedily receive serious injury from the prevalence of such opinions—men who need the restraint of the Bible doctrine of retribution, and who desire nothing more than deliverance from the orthodox idea of hell, in order to plunge into vice with greediness. Let it be generally believed that heaven is sure to every man at last, and the flood-gates of sin will be wide open.

ARTICLE IV.—MEMOIRS OF ALEXANDER CAMPBELL.

Memoirs of Alexander Campbell, embracing a view of the origin, progress, and principles of the religious reformation which he advocated. By ROBERT RICHARDSON. Two volumes. 8vo. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1868.

THE *Memoirs of Alexander Campbell*, including as they do a sketch of the rise and progress of the religious community which he founded, are a valuable contribution to the religious history of this country as well as a very important illustration of the defects of a theory of Christianity which, at the present day, is very attractive. The Campbellite Baptists, as they are called, number five hundred thousand members—baptized persons or adherents—according to the latest reports. These all look upon Alexander Campbell as the great leader and reformer to whom it was given of God to discover the true basis of church fellowship and unity, and to enforce it with efficiency and success. The history of the several stages or steps of progress by which he was led to what he considered the Scriptural doctrine upon these subjects, of the courage and boldness with which he expounded and defended his peculiar views, and of the great ability and zeal with which he gathered disciples and inspired other preachers with a confidence and zeal similar to his own, is told in this volume with great minuteness and apparent fidelity. The result is a biography of interest and importance.

Alexander Campbell was born in the county of Antrim, Ireland, in 1788. His father was a teacher of youth and a preacher to a small Presbyterian Secession church of the Anti-Burgher wing. The son received most of his early education under his father's tuition, and began his public life as a teacher. After a sharp and somewhat protracted religious experience, he became a communicant in his father's church. His early life gave him abundant experience of the narrowness of sectarian strifes and the bitterness of sectarian ani-

mosity. His father, being a man of a more catholic spirit, was somewhat impatient of the bonds by which he was oppressed, and strove in vain to bring about a union between the Burghers and Anti-Burghers. The oppressions which rested upon Irish dissenters, both Catholic and Protestant, roused in both father and son a determined antagonism against every form of political and ecclesiastical domination. In 1807, Thomas Campbell, the father, was induced to visit America to avert the threatened failure of his health. His destination was Washington County, Pennsylvania, to which region a number of his pupils and friends had previously emigrated; and it was arranged that in case he should be pleased with the country, his family should follow him. The family were sent for after a few months had elapsed, and in October, 1808, Alexander sailed for America with his mother and the family. After a few days they were wrecked upon one of the Islands off the west coast of Scotland. The lateness of the season, and the desirableness that Alexander should have additional opportunity to pursue his studies, determined them to spend the winter in Glasgow. Here Alexander was brought into a close intimacy with the Rev. Greville Ewing, who had been closely identified with the religious movement commenced a few years before by the Haldanes, which had such important consequences in the British Islands and on the continent of Europe, and indirectly through Alexander Campbell in this country.

From the school of the Haldanes he learned to take a very much more simple view of faith than the highly scholastic and cumbrous notion which had been traditional in the Scottish churches. Instead of regarding it as a mysterious creation which could neither be explained nor analyzed any further than to say that it was the effect of the workings of the Holy Spirit, Campbell learned "to insist upon the absolute necessity of evidence, and to assert, most truthfully, that when there was no evidence there could be no faith; yet he ever regarded true faith in Christ as implying a willingness to submit to his authority, and as consisting in a heartfelt personal trust in Him as the Son of God and the appointed Saviour of mankind."

Dr. Ewing was finally led, by the force of circumstances and

the study of the Scriptures, to adopt the Congregational views of Church Polity, and among other innovations upon the Scotch usage, to introduce the administration of the Lord's Supper every Lord's day. It was after these important steps had been taken, and while the new movement in Glasgow was in the ardor and *éclat* of its first enthusiasm, under Dr. Ewing and his assistant, Mr., afterwards Dr. Wardlaw, that Mr. Campbell spent his winter in Glasgow. Though he did not break from the Seceding church, and felt obliged to attend its Sabbath services, he warmly sympathized with the simpler views of the gospel, and the freer and more apostolic views of church organization, which were adopted by Dr. Ewing's followers.

After going through all these experiences of ten most exciting and memorable months, this ardent and self-confident young Irishman again set sail for America in August, 1809, in the 21st year of his age. The family landed in New York on September 29th, Friday, and on Sunday he heard Dr. John M. Mason preach. He soon set off to join his father in Washington Co., Penn. Great was their joy at meeting, and greater was the astonishment of the son to find that his father, having been annoyed by "the persecutions he had undergone at the hands of the Seceding clergy on account of his efforts to effect a reformation and to promote Christian union on the basis of the Holy Scriptures," "had actually dissolved his connection with the Seceders," and "had been for some time past preaching independently to audiences made up of individuals of different parties, who were willing to listen to his overtures for Christian union upon the basis of the Bible alone. Alexander was greatly rejoiced at this announcement, and could not but admire the ways of Providence, which had thus, through a bitter experience, delivered his father from the shackles of partyism, so that instead of fearing opposition from him to the views to which he had himself been definitely brought while in Glasgow, he found him already, though by a somewhat different method, led practically to the same conclusions." The chief offense of Mr. Campbell, the elder, seems to have been that shortly after his arrival in America, his spirit was moved at a sacramental celebration to lament the

divisions in the Presbyterian family which deterred a number of believing Christians from uniting with the Secession Anti-Burghers in commemorating the death of the common Saviour. This aroused the suspicion of the guardians of the faith as delivered to the "Anti-Burghers," which led to questionings which aroused the independence of the Irish preacher, and this to his public censure for "not adhering to the 'Secession section only.'" Then followed his formal renunciation of the authority of the Synod and his abandonment of all ministerial connection with it. This was the beginning of the so-called Campbell movement, or, as its adherents choose to call it, the Religious Reformation on the basis of the Scriptures. It began with the necessities and independent spirit of Campbell, the father, and was formally urged on by the already kindled zeal of Campbell, the son. Mr. Campbell, the elder, having already been favorably known as a preacher in Washington and Alleghany Counties, would of course not be silent. He preached as he found opportunity, urging his plan "for Christian liberality and Christian union upon the basis of the Bible, and large numbers continued to attend his ministrations. wherever it was in his power to hold meetings." "Finding, after a time, that his hearers were constant in their attendance, and apparently convinced of the correctness of the principles which he taught, and desirous of the success of his efforts to form a union upon the Bible alone," he proposed a meeting for the serious and formal discussion of the principles which might be safely adopted as the foundation of their society and the bond of its union. He was himself, in his doctrinal belief, an adherent of the Westminster Confession of Faith. But he found it already conceded in all the Protestant formularies that the Bible was the only foundation of faith and practice. He felt himself authorized to propose and enjoin upon all his brethren to make this their starting point. They were all at one in their dissatisfaction "with religious parties, and especially with the intolerant and sectarian spirit which pervaded them." At this first meeting, under the exhortations of Thomas Campbell, they were invited to adopt this as their formative principle and rule. "When the Scriptures speak, we speak, and when the Scriptures are silent, we are

silent." In the announcement of this principle, says the biographer very justly, was "the formal and actual commencement of the Reformation, which was subsequently carried on with so much success." Not long after Mr. Campbell had taken his seat, a shrewd Scotch Seceder arose and said, "Mr. Campbell, if we adopt that as a basis then there is an end of infant baptism." "Of course," said Mr. Campbell in reply, "if infant baptism be not found in Scripture, we can have nothing to do with it." Mr. C. had not reflected upon what might be the result and application of his own principles, "but thought that in the absence of positive Scripture authority each one might be permitted to determine for himself both as to the validity of infant baptism and the propriety of the respective powers or actions of sprinkling, pouring, and immersion." Such differences were then regarded by him as among the "non-essentials." Notwithstanding these differences of sentiment on such points, the brethren united on the cardinal basis of faith on the 17th of August, 1809, as "The Christian Association of Washington." A log edifice was soon erected as their place of assemblage. Mr. Campbell at once gave himself to the work of preparing a declaration and address which was approved and ordered to be printed September 7th, 1809. This declaration sets forth the principles and aims of the Society. Of the principles, the following is the most important, and comprehends most of the others: "We are also of opinion that as the divine word is equally binding upon all, so all lie under an equal obligation to be bound by it, and it alone, and not by any human interpretation of it, and that, therefore, no man has a right to judge his brother except in so far as he manifestly violates the express letter of the law—that every such judgment is an express violation of the law of Christ, a daring usurpation of his throne, and a gross intrusion upon the rights and liberties of his subjects." The society expressly disclaims to be a church, but purports to be only an association of "voluntary advocates for church reformation."

To this document thirteen propositions were attached, of which we quote the following:

"That the Church of Christ upon earth is essentially, intentionally, and constitutionally one; consisting of all those in every place that profess their faith in

Christ and obedience to him in all things according to the Scriptures, and that manifest the same by their tempers and conduct; and of none else, as none else can be truly and properly called Christians.

“That, in order to do this, nothing ought to be inculcated upon Christians as articles of faith, nor required of them as terms of communion, but what is expressly taught and enjoined upon them in the Word of God. Nor ought anything to be admitted as of Divine obligation in their Church constitution and managements, but what is expressly enjoined by the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ and his apostles upon the New Testament Church, either in express terms or by approved precedent.

“That although inferences and deductions from Scripture premises, when fairly inferred, may be truly called the doctrine of God’s holy word, yet are they not formally binding upon the consciences of Christians further than they perceive the connection, and evidently see that they are so, for their faith must not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power and veracity of God. Therefore no such deductions can be made terms of communion, but do properly belong to the after and progressive edification of the Church. Hence it is evident that no such deductions or inferential truths ought to have any place in the Church’s confession.

“That although doctrinal exhibitions of the great system of Divine truths, and defensive testimonies, in opposition to prevailing errors, be highly expedient, and the more full and explicit they be for those purposes the better; yet, as these must be, in a great measure, the effect of human reasoning, and of course must contain many inferential truths, they ought not to be made terms of Christian communion, unless we suppose, what is contrary to fact, that none have a right to the communion of the Church, but such as possess a very clear and decisive judgment, or are come to a very high degree of doctrinal information; whereas the Church from the beginning did, and ever will, consist of little children and young men, as well as fathers.

“That as it is not necessary that persons should have a particular knowledge or distinct apprehension of all Divinely-revealed truths, in order to entitle them to a place in the Church; neither should they, for this purpose, be required to make a profession more extensive than their knowledge; but that, on the contrary, their having a due measure of scriptural self-knowledge respecting their lost and perishing condition by nature and practice, and of the way of salvation through Jesus Christ, accompanied with a profession of their faith in and obedience to him in all things, according to his word, is all that is absolutely necessary to qualify them for admission into his Church.” pp. 258, 259, 260.

This remarkable document occupied fifty-four closely printed pages, and was signed by Thomas Campbell and Thomas Acheson. It was more remarkable for those times than if it were issued now. It was the result of painful and bitter experience by earnest Christian men of the evils of dogmatic interpretations of the Scriptures and bigoted sectarianism. It was the outgrowth of enquiries and aspirations such as occupy many thoughtful persons at the present moment who are disgusted with the arrogance of priestly claims, the childishness

of ritual spectacles, the positiveness of scholastic dogmatism, and the narrowness of contending sects, and are anxiously forecasting what the better church of the future is likely to become, and how soon it is likely to appear in a practical and organized form. Events proved that this document was the germ of a large organization which, in aiming to rise above the features and the spirit of a sect or "partyism," did not escape entirely the inconveniences and temper which it sought to avoid.

It was while this address was in the hands of the printer that Alexander joined his father, after the singular transformation in the opinions and sentiments of father and son. He read the paper in the light of his recent experience in Scotland, and with the interest imparted by his newly formed principles and aspirations, and at once gave his adhesion to its doctrines and consecrated his life to the accomplishment of its aims. He refused flattering offers of lucrative employment and gave himself to the work of propagating these principles, resolving from the first never to receive compensation for his labors in the Christian ministry. With two companions, members of the association, he renewed his studies in the languages and theology. In July, 1810, he preached his first sermon, and in a single year had preached one hundred and six discourses. The movement begun by the association seemed now to be shaping itself toward the formation of a new sect in a way which alarmed Mr. Thomas Campbell. At the instance of a friend he was induced to ask a recognition of himself and his society by the Synod of Pittsburg, which met October 4, 1810. But this body declined to recognize him or the society in any way, one reason being that the society had allowed Alexander to exercise his gift of public speaking "without any regular authority." This action of the Synod stirred the spirit of the ardent young Irishman and he at once in an animated sermon, large portions of which are printed in the memoir, proceeded to summon the society to propagate its principles and organize societies upon the New Testament platform. The author of the memoir insists, and correctly, so far as we can see, "that the positions taken by the Christian Association were almost identical with those taken by the

churches established by the Haldanes, with which Alexander had become familiar during his residence in Scotland. The independence of each congregation, its government by its own rulers, the Scriptures as the only authoritative guide, the practice of lay-preaching, and the toleration of infant baptism, were all points of agreement." "On the other hand the reform urged by the Campbells * * was much more radical and sweeping. Its aim was not so much to repair defects in modern Christianity, as to restore that which was original and pure, 'both in letter and spirit, in principle and practice.'"

In 1811, the society organized itself into a church somewhat in the way in which the English Brownists, or Independents, and the New England planters, had done before them. It is worth noticing that Thomas Campbell proposed that each member should, as a test of his fitness to be received, "give a satisfactory answer to the question, 'what is the meritorious cause of a sinner's acceptance with God.'" Two failed to give satisfaction and were set aside. Of this church Thomas Campbell was chosen Elder; and Alexander was licensed. The new church began with solemnizing the Lord's Supper weekly. Two or three of the society, having never been baptised, declined to participate in the ordinance, and sought baptism; but as they preferred to be immersed, Thomas Campbell, though he had never been himself immersed, immersed these disciples. It is noticed by the biographer in commenting upon a sermon preached at this time by Alexander Campbell, that at this period, "while he had taken a simple and just view of faith as a 'trusting in Christ,' 'a hearty reliance upon Him for salvation,' etc., he still retained the opinion that this 'trusting' was 'from the operation of God, and the effect of Almighty power and regenerating grace.'" This view was subsequently modified. Within a few months his attention was called again to the question of baptism, and he became convinced that the proper rendering of baptism and to baptize, was *immersion* and to *immerse*, and that believers only were the proper subjects of this ordinance. He was immersed himself, and so was his father, with all their relatives. It is noticed in this connection, and what is recorded was of the greatest significance in its bearings upon the future devel-

opment of Campbellism—that “Alexander had stipulated with Elder Luce that the ceremony should be performed precisely according to the pattern given in the New Testament, and that, as there was no account of any of the first converts being called upon to give what is called a ‘religious experience,’ this custom should be omitted, and that the candidates should be admitted on the simple confession that ‘Jesus is the Son of God.’” The development of these views transferred the leadership of this movement from the hands of the father to the son. It is forcibly and truly remarked by the biographer that if the new church had confined itself to a protest against sectarian divisions and extended creeds, it would have made little impression, but when it began to preach what seemed to be a new and simpler way of salvation, by immersion as the profession of personal faith in Jesus as the Son of God, it had a new and distinct message to men.

At this point what has since been called Campbellism took definite shape and consistency. Starting with the desire to reform Christianity after the primitive or New Testament pattern, its organizing leader found, first of all, the duty of faith in Jesus as the Son of God to be prescribed; next, the duty of being baptised in His name; next, the act of observing the Lord’s Supper as a memorial of His Son, and the Lord’s Day in honor of His resurrection. These, he contended, were prescribed by the command of God, these and no more, as the grounds of acceptance with God and the bond of Christian organization and fellowship. But the simple duty of faith had been greatly complicated in all branches of the Christian church in respect to the determination of its object and the analysis of its nature. Its proper object, Campbell contended, was preeminently a person, not a creed, least of all a complicated system of scholastic propositions, such as had been successively developed by hair-splitting theologians.

It is true when Mr. Campbell was pressed with the question—must not something be known and approved concerning the person in whom we trust, in order that we may believe intelligibly and acceptably?—he was forced to reply that there must. To the question which would be immediately suggested, if what is known is stated in distinct propositions, is not that a

creed, and from a creed do not a catechism and a doctrinal system proceed by logical and actual necessity? he would say yes; but he would immediately seek to recover his position by asserting, "I simply follow the New Testament direction and that prescribes faith in Jesus as the Son of God, not faith in what that belief involves. I plant myself on an express command of God, and do not add what that command implies." His opponent would reply that this is to regard faith, the condition of salvation, as an intellectual *opus operandum*, and Mr. Campbell becomes a superstitious literalist in order to save his own consistency.

The analysis of faith as a subjective act or state necessarily conducted to a similar result. The theologians answer the question, *what is faith?* says Campbell, by a metaphysical analysis of its nature and its relations to repentance, conversion, regeneration, etc.; whereas I find in the New Testament that it is *trust*. "But is it simply *trust*, or confidence in the fact that Jesus was the Messias?" "Not at all," he replies, "but it implies the willingness to be guided by his will and to yield the life to his control." "Then if the faith is not followed by these fruits, the believer cannot be acknowledged as a Christian?" "Certainly." "But what are the indications of real discipleship?" "Are not love, repentance, purity, justice, and truth, such indications?" "Certainly." "Is it then faith or trust which is accepted, or is it the new character of which faith is the sign?" Pushed by these questions, which had been asked again and again, long before they vexed Mr. Campbell, the apostle of the Reformation could only betake himself to the letter of the word, and say trust is all that is required and trust it shall be, and if a man says he trusts in Christ and is willing to obey Him, I am forbidden by the commands and precedent of the New Testament to subject his faith to any further question or analysis; thus repeating a second time an act of superstitious literalism. The same is conspicuous in his view of Baptism. It is literally the being immersed, he contends, which the New Testament requires. "It is the being plunged beneath the water that is demanded, and to that requirement I submit. I find, moreover, that this immersion is coupled with faith—made coördinate

with it as a joint condition of the remission of sins and receiving the Holy Ghost, so that without baptism there is no promise, and baptism itself must be accepted as the requisite for forgiveness and eternal life." The literalism is here manifest, which fails to see that it is not the rite as such, but the rite as a symbol of the confession of Christ before men which gives it any moral worth. Moreover, it also fails to observe that the confession of Christ as an act is of no moral significance except as it is a token of the reality and energy of love, or of the new moral life.

We do not wonder that Mr. Campbell was led by a sense of consistency to go a step further; so far that, through his anxiety not to complicate either faith, or the confession of it, with any renewal of character, he made Baptism to be the regeneration of the New Testament, and a pre-condition of the renewal by the Holy Ghost. The observance of the Lord's Day and the Lord's Supper were in like manner insisted on with a certain protesting freedom from Jewish notions, but with a literal formalism, that observed what was required simply because it was required.

In the same way, the protest against the sectarian churches became itself sectarian in insisting that no one could be regarded as a New Testament believer, who had not submitted to immersion, in what was regarded as the New Testament mode and with the New Testament significance.

More generally conceived and described, the system of Campbellism is the result of an attempt to go back to primitive Christianity on the simple basis of the New Testament when interpreted without "the historic sense." The letter is adhered to, but the import of the letter, when it is explained in the light of the circumstances under which it was uttered and written, is overlooked, or rather there is manifest a blind and superstitious dread of using these circumstances in order to gain the needed illumination and explanation. To believe that Jesus was the Son of God, and to be baptised in His name, signified, in apostolic times, a definite knowledge of some spiritual truth, and a practical subjection to that truth of the feelings, the principles, and the character. The Campbells were altogether right, as many reformers and thinkers,

before and since, have been in being scandalized at the metaphysical creeds which were presented as a condition of fellowship in the Christian church. They were reasonably disgusted at the narrow spirit with which the several Christian sects prosecute their separate interests and contend against their rivals, whom they ought to cherish as fellow workers in the Kingdom of the Master. Their aims were catholic and noble but the expedient to which they resorted, of making a historic faith and immersion the sole conditions of Christian fellowship was unsound and narrow in its conception. That it in fact proved inconvenient in its working should not be surprising. That it should be difficult to draw the line between what the Scriptures expressly declare and what may fairly be inferred from their teachings, would surprise no one who has known anything of the history of religious discussions and interpretations. The memoir of Campbell's life contains not a few revelations of the inconvenient workings of his system. It not unfrequently occurred that a teacher in this connection was charged with rejecting the divinity of our Lord, or was reported to be unsound on some other point deemed essential to the Christian faith. In such cases it became the duty of Mr. Campbell to call the offender to an explanation, or to use his personal influence for the correction of his error. In a similar way occasional breaches of morality, either real or imagined, would occur, and the application of discipline in some form became necessary. In other words there was an unwritten creed that was actually taught and received in this rapidly increasing and widely spread communion, and which was made a test in some sort of fellowship and brotherhood. Thus grew up an unwritten code of ethical and religious rules that were tests of the Christian life, and applied in the way of discipline.

It would be interesting to many of our readers should we describe minutely the career of this remarkable preacher to its termination. His conviction of the necessity of a new translation of the New Testament, and the courage with which he ventured upon introducing one into popular acceptance in his churches; his energy in sustaining for so many years a vigorous periodical; the courage, versatility, and ability which he ex

hibited in public debates with a great variety of prominent champions of faiths and opinions diverse from his own, are all instructively described in these volumes by Mr. Campbell's biographer.

The story of the progress of this anti-sectarian sect, this "anti-party" party, is also recorded with great spirit. That among a population such as then inhabited western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kentucky, etc., the doctrines of Campbell should have been very attractive is not in the least surprising. The broad-minded and independent farmers of these districts could not but admire the catholic promises and the large hearted principles of Mr. Campbell and his associates. They could not but be disgusted with the bigotry and narrowness of many of the sects which abounded among them. The scholastic creeds, the hair-splitting distinctions, the abstract psychological tests of character which were made the conditions of admission to the church and the Kingdom of Heaven, could not but contrast unfavorably with the simple requisitions and the definite acts which were imposed by the so called New Testament Christianity of the new preachers. The general freedom and liberality of spirit in respect to conduct which was allowed, had its good as well as its dangerous side.

It is difficult for us at the East to form any judgment in regard to the general character of this communion. It would be wrong to express such a judgment if we had formed one, without either documents or testimony. We shall have discharged our duty when we have called the attention of our readers to this very interesting personal memoir, this instructive chapter in American Ecclesiastical History. But what is much more important, in these days of ecclesiastical reconstruction and of more or less vague aspirations after the church of the future, we advise our seekers after the comprehensive and unsectarian church which is to be, to read the story of Alexander Campbell's gropings and struggles in the same direction. Perhaps the record of his experience will increase the catholicity, while it will not diminish the caution of those who are looking for a simple, yet comprehensive, symbol of Christian faith and bond of Christian fellowship.

ARTICLE V.—CHRISTIANITY A UNIVERSAL RELIGION.

THE religion of the Old Testament had two unlike faces. If you looked at it on the one side, it was narrow, local, exclusive; if you looked at it on the other side, it was broad, free, intended for mankind. The hedge of national and formal observances, which gave it an uninviting aspect, was designed for the protection of its absolute and universal doctrines, until the fulness of time, having impressed themselves on the hearts of one people, they could pass the more readily over to other man race. It was like a blossom of surpassing beauty, but with a thorny calyx until the sun burst it open and displayed the eyes of men. The calyx, having done its work, dropped, but the blossom shone in perpetual glory.

Meanwhile from within the pale of this narrow, national and ceremonial religion, voices of the noblest and truest reach us, showing that they beheld in the future a spread of a glory for the worship of Jehovah, which nothing in the present was justified. Let us listen to some of these voices.

First, we may notice, scattered through the ancient scriptures, a conviction of the greatness of Jehovah, as the universal creator and Lord, and of the nothingness of gods worshipped by the heathen. "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth even they shall perish from the earth and from under these heavens." Next we perceive the expectation of proselytes coming to worship at Jerusalem, and whole nations joining themselves to the God of Israel. At the dedication of the temple, Solomon spoke of the stranger who was not of God's people, but should come out of a far country for his name's sake. "For they shall hear," says he, "of thy great name, and of thy strong hand, and of thy stretched arm," and he prays that the prayer of the stranger may be heard when he shall come and pray towards the house of God, so that all the people of the earth may know God's name and fear him, as do his people Israel. So in one of the Psalms

(lxviii, 31) it is said that "Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands to God," that is, either in prayer or to offer gifts; and in the prophets that "Israel shall be the third with Egypt and Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the land, whom the Lord shall bless, saying blessed be Egypt my people, and Assyria the work of my hands, and Israel my inheritance." In another place the eunuch, whom the law of Moses shut out from the blessings of the congregation, and the sons of the stranger, who complained that they were separated from the Lord's people, had the promise made to them that they should be joyful in God's house of prayer, and should be accepted in their burnt offerings and sacrifices, "for my house," saith God, "shall be called a house of prayer for all people." Thus out of Zion was the law to go forth, and the word of the Lord out of Jerusalem, or as the prophet Zechariah says, "the Lord shall be king over all the earth; in that day there shall be one Lord and his name one."

Still more spiritual is the picture which Jeremiah gives of the worship of the future, where he says that in the coming time, "they shall no more say the ark of the covenant of the Lord, neither shall they remember it," . . . "but Jerusalem shall be called the throne of the Lord, and all the nations shall be gathered unto it, to the name of the Lord, to Jerusalem; neither shall they walk any more after the imagination of their evil heart." As if the holiness of the penetrale of the temple and of the ceremonial worship should fade and grow pale, before the holiness of Jerusalem, as the gathering place of converted and purified heathens.

But especially remarkable are those places in the later chapters of Isaiah, where the servant of Jehovah is spoken of in connexion with a spread of religion over all lands. That servant or messenger at first, owing to his marred form and visage, shall cause many to be astonished, but afterwards he shall cause many nations to rejoice in himself,—for so what is rendered "he shall sprinkle" ought probably to be translated. "He is mine elect," saith God, "in whom my soul delighteth; I have put my spirit upon him, and he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles,"—"he shall not fail nor be discouraged till he have set judgment in the earth, and the isles (or coasts)

shall wait for his law." And in another place the same servant of the Lord is thus addressed: "It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel; I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation to the end of the earth."

We may add that what prophets taught, the very faith of an Israelite would make him look upon as probable. The sublime conception of God was the pious Jew's highest treasure. To him Jehovah was God alone; he held no divided empire with heathen objects of worship. Should not this idea, which seemed so real to him, triumph over all unreality? He could not but live in hope of a glorious future, because God was his God and the God of all the earth, though unknown, as yet, to most of his creatures.

Still more must this faith have given the promise of triumph, when in the lands of the dispersion he had opportunity to contrast his God and his religion with those of even the most polished heathen. Theirs were the religions of children; his rested on truths wide as heaven and deep as the earth's base, which would have made Plato bow in adoration. How could such a faith fail to spread? He saw proselytes coming to the synagogue: he felt that his nation had a great destiny. The promise to the fathers, the declaration of the prophets, the very notion of Jehovah's religion, all betokened its universality.

And so there can be no doubt, that about the time of Christ's coming, every pious Jew, however narrow and national might be his view of the Messiah, did expect the Gentiles to share in the great blessing. As the aged Simeon by faith saw in the infant Jesus the promised Saviour, he called him a light to lighten the Gentiles, as well as the glory of Israel. Our Lord himself encouraged these expectations. Thus he says, "and other sheep I have which are not of this fold; them also must I bring, and there shall be one fold and one shepherd." So in speaking of the progress of the gospel in the world, and of its rejection by the Jews, he teaches us that "many shall come from the east and the west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob in the Kingdom of

God, while the children of the kingdom shall be cast out into outer darkness." And indeed, the command to the Apostles to teach all nations, and the declaration that the gospel of the kingdom would be preached to all nations ere the end came, involve this universality of the gospel,—a doctrine into which Paul especially penetrated earliest and most deeply, and to which he was committed with all his heart, from his conversion to his martyrdom.

Having thus shown that the ancient scriptures taught the spread of Jehovah's religion over the world, that the expectation of this event was fondly cherished by the Jews, and that Christ applied the predictions to his gospel, we propose to enquire next, on what this universality of the gospel depended, what there is in it which fits it to be a religion for mankind, how it cut the cord which bound it to Judaism, and how it has proved itself in the experiment to be the universal religion.

I. In the first place, the gospel discarded whatever was local, national, and ceremonial, in the old religion, and retained whatever had a bearing on the whole human race. It put aside all that required worship to be confined to Jerusalem, all that was preparatory to a higher state of religious knowledge, all symbols half concealing and half revealing something glorious in the future. It kept, as it could not help keep, those doctrines of world-wide bearing which lay at the foundation of Judaism, the doctrines, namely, concerning God and concerning the fallen state of man, for the sake of which, Judaism had existed, while it rejected all that separated the Jews from the rest of the world as the peculiar people of God. There were three possible courses for the gospel to take in its practical workings, with reference to the old dispensation. It might, first, form a union with the older system, retaining the whole of the ceremonial law, and simply adding itself as a new element or institution to that which was already established, in which case Jew and Gentile would form one body, with common obligations to obey the law. Or, secondly, it might release Gentile converts from obligations which lay on Jews, and so form two communities, both professing a faith in the gospel, but differing most widely in worship and tone of char-

acter. Or, lastly, it might proclaim that Christ had abolished the Jewish system, and so, by releasing the Jew from its obligations, put him on a common ground of freedom with the Gentile.

The first of these three courses was probably that which the greater part of the nation anticipated, and to which the drapery of the ancient prophets gave countenance. Yet it would have been self-destruction for the gospel to perpetuate or even long to endure a union of the spiritual with the ceremonial, of the thing signified with the type. The mind, enlightened by it, at once asked why, if Christ procured forgiveness, the blood of bulls and goats was any longer needed. It was, moreover, impossible for the dwellers in remote parts of the world to fulfil the requirements of the ritual, which had an eye towards a narrow land, whose inhabitants could with ease meet together. And the Jews themselves had already paved the way for the neglect of the law by the system of proselytes, who might, in some sort, share the religious blessings of the nation without being incorporated into it. It needed, therefore, no long experience of the manner in which the gospel took hold of the Gentile mind to see that it was more efficacious, more beneficial without than with Judaism, and that if it allowed the old religion to go with it over the world, there would arise a strife of principles to be terminated by ultimate rejection and overthrow of the one or of the other.

The second course, that of giving a dispensation from the law to the Gentile but not to the Jew, was a half way measure, a method of compromise, by which Jewish national feeling was reconciled to Christianity, and many zealous Jews might be retained in the church who would otherwise have deserted it. On this ground stood the Apostles for a time, and only by degrees gave it up. But in truth it was almost as objectionable as the first course, if not more so. How could two such churches have walked hand in hand, the one of which would regard as worse than useless the ceremonies which the other clung to as God's law to the fathers? How could Christ have reigned supreme amid the sacrifices kept up from age to age, which had no meaning, unless they did some good to the worshiper which he could not do? The Jewish church then, by

a logical necessity, would fall away from Christianity,—a fate that actually overtook a portion of it, which tried to harmonize the new and the old. On the other hand, the Gentiles might fairly argue that if there had been a progress in religion as there was from Abraham onward, and if a new era had begun, and the religion had put on its universal character, there must be some change in forms and outward institutions to fit it for mankind. Of what possible use could it be to keep up a difference between Jew and Gentile, if the rights of both were the same under the gospel, if both had the same access by Christ to the Father.

The third course then, that of doing away with whatever was local and symbolical, was the only logical, the only safe, the only beneficial one. But the steps by which the church among the Jews was led towards it were remarkable, as disclosing to us God's way of letting light by degrees fall into minds blinded and swayed by national partialities. First, Christ had uttered a few sayings looking that way, as that glorious one, "the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father." Next it needed special revelations of a very remarkable kind, to show to Peter and the other disciples that there was to be no caste in the church, that a Jew might eat and mingle freely with a Gentile Christian, like Cornelius, as with a brother. Then the church was called upon to decide whether the Gentiles who believed should be bound to observe the law of Moses, and by inspired directions it freed them from the useless and deadly yoke. Then the apostle Paul was raised up to show that the law was done away by Christ,—the shadow by the substance,—and his disciples pursued the same line of thought, until it became the triumphant and general view of the Christian body. And finally, the destruction of Jerusalem gave the death blow to a half Jewish half Christian religion; the temple in ruins, the nation destroyed, the rites neglected or made impossible, who with a Christian mind could longer hold on to that which fanatical Jews had abandoned?

Thus, not by any one revelation directly bearing on the point, but by various hints as it were, did divine wisdom purge and separate the gospel from the old leaven of the Mosaic law.

As the gospel seized on Jewish minds, it by degrees broke its fetters, it felt its freedom and power at once, it uttered for the world and for the world the noble words "where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, but Christ is all and in all."

This was a vital, a momentous advance. We are so moved from Jewish ways of thinking that it may seem as if the Apostle to the Gentiles is wasting energy when battling with Jews concerning the law. But in fact he was the truest exponent of the gospel in all this, and by no means exaggerated the importance of the question at issue. To him, humanly speaking, the religion of Christ could not be reached by mankind. He, or some one less fitted by inexperience and acquaintance with the feelings of the Jew, wanted to settle that question, for on it the destinies of the Gentile world depended.

II. The universality of the gospel, we add in the same place, was favored by its clear disclosures concerning a future life. It is remarkable that so soon as the gospel embraced the world as its place of action, it embraced this world as its next as its time of action. Everywhere and forever were its watchwords. The little Jewish state was held together by it, it put out a very explicit doctrine in relation to the last thing, though such a doctrine was held, and was, at the time of Christ, widely entertained. The mind was in a condition of childhood; it lived under an immediate Providence, whose rewards and punishments were not put off until after death, while it was a local, it was also, in a sense, an earthly religion, earthly, that is, to all except a few nobler men among the people.

But when the gospel came into the world and when it was velleled over the world, it was necessary that it should light upon a future life and the future destinies of man. It referred not to a logical necessity, to the fact that so great an event as the incarnation of the Son of God would seem destitute of meaning and out of proportion to the wants of man, if its bearings reached only to the end of the present life. Now we refer to the demands which the human family would naturally make upon the new revelation, that it must and

to clear up the mystery of man's position in the world, which philosophy had vainly attempted to explore. But it was necessary for the success of the gospel, necessary in order to attract and sober and alarm the nations, necessary in order that men should perceive the greatness of the gift which the gospel offers, that it should speak a word of authority on the duration of the soul. It cannot be conceived that men would long listen to a story of redemption, broken off in the midst, before it told of a hereafter. But on the other hand, when it brought the world to come before the eyes of men, it satisfied a longing which no mythology, no system of human wisdom, had met. And it put the life beyond the grave into such a connexion with the life this side, that all its teachings became interesting, momentous, imperative.

III. More, far more, than all things else in the gospel, the doctrine of Christ dying for the sins of the world, and dying on the cross to procure forgiveness, contains a power over the universal human family. The elements of the old dispensation, which the new carried along with it, the doctrine of God, and of man's fallen condition, are indeed fundamental truths of a universal nature, as interesting to the Greek as to the Jew, to the barbarian as to the Greek, and without them there could have been no gospel. But our remark now is that what belongs exclusively to the gospel, the manifestation of God to the world by his own Son in a state of humiliation, and above all through his atoning death, contained in itself a power and an attractiveness as wide as mankind. The death of Christ for sin did not draw its strength from those universal doctrines of the old religion with which it was in company, so much as by its own strength it lent them a force they had not before.

“And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me. This he said, signifying what manner of death he should die.” It was surely a daring word for a Galilean to utter, when about to die a malefactor's death, he said that such an event would cast Satan from his throne of empire and draw men unto himself. No other human being then living dreamed of such a thing. And almost every one who believed in a Messiah would have called him a dreamer for entertaining such a thought. But the facts of all lands and of all centuries since have proved

that Jesus knew mankind better than all wise men, Jew or pagan—that he knew man’s heart as well as he knew himself; and so the double fact of his consciousness of coming from God, and of his knowledge where the strength of his religion lay, is an evidence, never to be overcome, that he is the Saviour for mankind. At the time when he uttered these words his lowliness was proof to many that he was an impostor. But his lowliness of station and of temper has reached to ten thousand dark, depraved places, where no kingly virtues could penetrate. When he hung on the cross his enemies thought that an end was put to his pretensions and his faction. But what has interested the heart of the world since so much as this great moment? Let Christian tears, let Christian song and art, let Christian theology in all its shapes, answer the question. Or let the new convert from heathenism in any quarter—the Hindoo, or Sandwich Islander, or Hottentot, or American Indian—answer; and he will tell of a strange power coming from the dying Christ. And this, whether he may have had instilled into him a theory of atonement or not. Let him follow the simple narrative and have no dogma—the narrative breaks and subdues him, as it did when told by the artless disciples of the Redeemer.

Now, if we may get behind and analyze the feelings of Christian souls, in what consists the great power of the cross—of the cross, we mean, as taken in connection with the rising from the dead and the exaltation. What is there which gives their universal sway over men to these distinctive facts of the gospel?

In the first place the influence of the death of Christ on all races and times arises from its being a fact and not a dogma. The strength of heathenism lay in its mythologies, and when these were found to be false, no philosophy could hold them up or take their place. Mankind have ever had a longing to be brought into the presence of the Godhead, to have something authoratative from him; and the revelation needs to take the shape of history to be powerful and attractive. Doctrine must come out of facts to have any power: it is dead being alone.

Again the cross appeals to the common feelings of our nature, which, whether men fully understand them or not, crave forgiveness and reconciliation with God. A sense of sin, careless as men seem about their conduct, lies in every breast, slumbering perhaps but not extinct. This sense of sin may meet the doctrine of the cross as an enemy which would take from it its lustrations and sacrifices, or would alarmingly enhance the guilt of sin, but the gospel is an enemy which can conquer it and win it over. There is no other way of appealing to heathens than to dwellers in Christian lands; both have the same kind, if not degree, of preparation for Christ, in a sense of distance from God and of falling short of the end for which they were made. The heathen needs little or no training before he is ready to receive Christ, and indeed, is better off than one who for years, by sophistries, has shielded himself from the truth.

Thirdly, the cross satisfies the rational nature of all. We do not mean that all men or that any man can give a full explanation of Christ, or of his work, nor can we suppose that in a great scheme, involving relations of the deepest kind between God and man, complete explanation and removal of difficulties is possible. Nay more, if this were possible it would not be desirable, for the soul is not saved by clear understanding of truth, but by the awakening of feelings and purposes that are good, and these do not demand a perfectly definite statement. But we mean that however men explain the cross, they are convinced when they receive it that it is the wisdom of God. It is not something clothed in Jewish drapery, which a person of another race needs to strip naked and put into the abstract form, in order to welcome it; but it makes an appeal to all classes of minds everywhere, to all who have noticed the part which vicarious action plays in the world, and the good which vicarious suffering brings to thousands, and even to the undeserving.

And if there were no adequate solution of the atonement we fall back on this which our *whole race* can appreciate—that in Christ living and dying there is a union of holiness and love. Holiness alone could not satisfy man, for he stands in dread and distrust aloof from a God of holiness. Love alone

could not satisfy him, for it could alone, without revealing God's feeling toward sin, work no transformations. But holiness, holy love, can bring God and man together, make man like God by winning him to God, as God be like man in order to win him. With this deep impression in Christ's offer of pardon, holiness and love are united, an impression which the cross makes on the heart of man; and we have the outlines of a doctrine which, under various names, commends itself to all.

We may add that the condescension of Christ carries with it a power over mankind. There is no more moving force of love than this, which gives to divine Providence and grace its principal sweetness. This quality shines in all of Christ's life and actions, for we go back in all to the incarnation of the Son of God. The height of this attractive glory of Christ reaches us at the lowest point of Christ's lowliness, at the ignominious cross itself. When we contemplate him on the cross we have the strongest promptings to give him our love; the stronger, the lower we feel ourselves to be in sin, and the deeper in our depression. His condescension commends itself thus to all, and most to the mass of mankind.

Another obvious cord which binds him to all mankind is his brotherly sympathy, which indeed is nothing else but love in his state of humiliation. It is not the sympathy of a fellow-creature which would have comparatively but little value and force, nor the love of God, but the feeling entertained toward man by the incarnate Saviour, who has made himself their fellow-creature. It unites thus all the power of love divine and human.

Nor would the work of Christ as the world's Saviour be complete, if we were to stop at the cross. His exaltation, the power of his death into his life in glory, attracts the faith and hope of man towards heaven, shows to his wonder the great scale and wide extent of the plan of grace, and exhibits him as an all-sufficient ever-ready helper.

IV. The life and death of Christ are the foundation of Christian morality, which is in some of its features unlike all other forms of morality, Jewish or philosophical, and commends itself as a model, to all mankind. Here we see the passive

first raised to a level with or above the active, and a kind of heroism exhibited in action which the lowest can admire and imitate. Here we see action under the sway of such virtues taking the place of the contemplation of the philosopher, and therefore possible for all. Here we find a new idea of life—that its purity consists not in religious observances or withdrawal from the world, but in ennobling all the scenes and relations of life, great and small, by a spirit of consecration to God. The divine and human are blended in the life of the Christian, as they are in union in the person of the Saviour. The great characteristics of Christian morality are such as to appear possible for all; they wear a human garb which is attractive to all. The life of Christ, and a life such as Christ's, however it rebukes sin, commands the respect and attracts the love of the world.

V. We add, fifthly, that the brotherhood of Christians, implied in Christian privileges and taking form in the church, greatly helps the system to become universal. A religion of castes, or one with a priestly class, divides society and degrades its lower members. A religious philosophy is not fitted for mankind. A national religion puts up a bar against human brotherhood. But as all differences of men are infinitely small before God, and as Christ came for the whole race, there was laid up in true religion, especially in its form of redemption, a fraternal spirit. All are brethren even as Christ is the brother of all. A common redemption involves a community of believers, who are one every where and through all classes. This one Catholic church, in which all share alike, is the only society spreading through the world that has ever been conceived of. Imagine, instead of it, various branches of a church, or various churches for different ranks, and you will feel that in such a system, if it were possible, the Gospel would defeat itself, and limit its own spread from land to land, and from one stratum of society to another.

We have confined our attention to the question, What there is in Christianity itself to gain access for it among men every where and at all stages of culture? Did not the subject stretch beyond our limits, we might put this quality of the

Gospel to the test of fact and observation. We might draw notice to its power of attraction for all kinds of minds and of sensibilities, for the intellectual and the warm-hearted, for the hopeful and the desponding, for the practical and the contemplative, for the mind of coarser and that of finer mould, the manly and the feminine, the experienced and the inexperienced. We might show its sympathies with art, science, and political liberty. We might gather the testimonies of history, which tells us how neither the degradation nor the refinement of a race, neither its inaptness for reflection nor its worn out civilization, nor even its self-conceit can neutralize the force of Christianity. Every where, and in all classes, it shows its restorative, formative, creative power. As "there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female, but all are one in Christ Jesus," so its aim is to make one family of God, one kingdom of heaven to which all nations are to belong, and this the proof of facts shows that it can accomplish.

But dismissing these considerations thus briefly, we go on to close our discussion with a few reflections; the *first* of which is that this universal character of Christianity is best taught by experience. The man who receives it in its power into his heart knows that it has transformed him not by its sway over civilized men, nor over those who are imbued with Old Testament ideas, but by its sway over him as a *man*, by its appeals to that in him which he shares in common with all mankind. If, having exalted his conception of the universal Ruler, and deepened his sense of obligation and of sin, it now speaks to him of the worth of his soul, of his wants, of the Christian redemption, and the Christian life of holiness, he knows that the plea is as applicable to all who bear the human name; and if it can transform and purify him, it can do the same for men in Africa, or Labrador, or China—it is a religion for the world. Its truths, under the impressive form of facts and of life, he knows to be universal truths, and to be designed for all. He therefore believes in a Catholic church, in the feasibility of missions, in the future spread of Christianity in every clime. The Christian spirit that is in him makes him hopeful; he, more than all men besides, believes in the capacity of man to

rise above the present confusion of the world, and to approach nigh to perfect manhood. It is not civilization that he believes, nor governments, nor the nineteenth century, but the Gospel, this which has made civilization what it is more than all causes besides, and is purifying governments, this which can carry civilization where it goes and make all things new there, while if civilization went alone it would but increase the capacity of savages to do evil.

2. The Gospel is no republication, and authorized exposition of the religion of nature, as some persons, called Christians, have accounted it. It is something more, or else nothing. It claims to contain a method of recovering man from his ruins through the life and death of the Son of God, which, by its startling nature, proves that it must be some new additional revelation, or some marvelous imposture. The power with which it has acted on man, through what is novel in it and superadded to the old religion, shows that it was no new edition merely of the religion of Adam, Abraham, and Moses, but a mystery of godliness hid from ages and generations. It claims to be a religion adapted for the fulness of times, the patriarchal religion and Judaism being but messengers sent to prepare its way; to be a religion for those who had been trained already under the divine law and the system of the Old Testament; to be a religion of the latter days, of the last stage of man's historical progress in this world,—in other words, to be man's religion until the coming again of Christ for judgment.

And if so, it is idle, it is unchristian to try to recommend Christianity by rounding off its corners and sharp points, in order to have as little that is positive about it as possible. He cannot understand or love the Gospel who makes such an attempt. He cannot understand man who does not perceive that there are principles in him and wants every where, through all races, in civilized life and in savage, which Christianity with its dying redeemer, and its future retributions, and its Divine Spirit in the world, meets and satisfies; so that if a civilized country or age should perchance show a spirit alien from the Gospel, the fault would not lie in the Gospel's want of universality but in the godlessly corrupt character of the age or civilization. How foolish, how cowardly, to bring

it shorn of its peculiarities to the mind of the world, because there are now, as there were at first, many who reject it for those peculiarities. How foolish, we say, is this, when it has won its way, and obtained its triumphs, and set itself up in the hearts and thinking of men as a controlling power, chiefly by what is peculiar to it and characteristic. Take away all this, and if you could still offer salvation to men, you would have cut the cord which binds man to the Gospel, you would have brought about the death of positive revealed religion.

3. The idea is therefore vain that the Gospel will be superseded in the progress of society by some more abstract religion, which shall retain its morality and throw away its facts. Some seem to think that civilization has a power to do good without Christianity. As the master said, in his foresight of the triumph of his religion, "now is the Prince of this world cast out," so say they, standing on the hilltop of this nineteenth century, "now is the Redeemer of the world cast out." He represents, they admit, the highest development of humanity, and his views are nearest to the truth. All religions have had some grains of truth in them; His has the most; but a time is coming and now is, when the world is become old and knowing enough to get along without revelation by a simple faith in the God of nature. Such is to be the world-religion of the maturity of mankind.

There are two questions that arise before us here; one whether the Gospel is true or not, the other whether, if it be discarded, any other religion will take its place among men—for that some one religion is to be universal, all signs show. With the first of these questions we are here not immediately concerned. If it be false, it must fall; if true, it will stand its ground, as it has stood its ground hitherto, against the attacks of its foes and the follies of its friends. And the man who rejects it must find it hard to account for its wonderful adaptation to all races and ages. Whence did falsehood get such a hold over mankind?

But the other question—what the world could do without the Gospel—what universal religion could take its place, deserves our attention, and indeed claims it for a longer time

than we can now spare. Let us, as it regards this question, briefly consider one or two points.

First. Such a new religion must be a philosophy, another revelation being out of the question. Now it is probable, if not certain, that the loss of authority and of vivid impressiveness, which would arise from putting human *dogmas* in the place of the life of a divine teacher, would be utterly irreparable. Religion after that would lie fainting in the dust. Who that considers the cravings of man disclosed by all mythology for a connection with heaven, who that understands where the power of the Gospel lies, will doubt that the power of a religion depends on its being believed to state facts concerning God, and that as soon as men make a religion for themselves, it will lose its hold on them,—as soon as they have constructed an automaton pretending to have life, they will get behind the machinery, and laugh at it.

Secondly. What will be the conclusions of this new universal religion of man's devising? What will it lay down as certain? Will it teach the immortality of the soul? But the most advanced philosophy, that of Hegel, is so dark on that great point, that after the founder's death his school divided into two parts contending with one another—like Michael and the devil about the body of Moses—on this very question, Whether or not he taught the soul's immortality. Will it teach a providence and a plan in nature? But the positive philosophy of Comte ignores final causes altogether. The foundations of the religion—or universal philosophy as we may call it—it would seem, must shrink to about the proportions of atheism.

Thirdly. The ideas of sin, repentance, redemption, immortality, are inwrought into the literature, art, life, and feelings of all Christian lands. They serve, in fact, as resting places for the intellect, sentiments, and hope of myriads. When a vacuum is created by the departure of the Gospel, what shall fill it? Or could it ever thrust out the Gospel, unless it brought in something for men to rely upon, to hope from, to love and to fear?

Fourthly. Civilization and progress are words of jugglery, they are general terms of no meaning except as including the

motive forces which lead man on to the standard of perfect manhood. These forces are religion, morals, social life, government, art, and science. The chief of these motive forces is religion. How is the world to get along without them any more than the most nicely furnished locomotive can leave its place, or can go on safely without steam or a road? Would it not be as absurd to say that civilization consists in that advancement of society which will supersede the family and the state, as in that which will supersede the necessity of religion? Until civilization can create some new kind of force to perfect mankind, it must depend in no small degree for its perfection and spread on the moral powers called into being by the Gospel.

And, in fact, the highest civilization hitherto reached, contains within itself enormous disorders. Where great masses are crowded together as in large cities, extreme refinement gives to some an elegant sceptical worldliness, while close by them there are godless desperates, savages worse than the Pagans who live under simpler institutions. Will those cultivated men who are throwing religion away surpass Christians in the earnestness of doing good; and what will doing good *mean*, if God and immortality and the Gospel ideal of a perfect life and retribution are given up! Christianity was plainly intended to make men good; it does contain very strong motives to virtue and uprightness, and yet its influence is small, and hitherto upon a few. How, when its truths are denied and its motive power is stopped, can there be any better state of things? *They* are bound to say, who are busy in hastening on such an era.

Until, then, there are signs more than we have now, that some new cause or combination of causes will perfect man and society, we will believe that the renovation of the world is laid in the hands of the Gospel. And we will hope in it, as the grand catholicon, as the tree of life which yields *her fruit every month, and the leaves of the tree are for the healing of the nations.*

ARTICLE VI.—THE PROPRIETIES OF THE PULPIT.

THERE are those who would settle all questions of taste or decorum on which they are either in a minority or indifferent, by the ancient maxim, "*De gustibus*," &c., meaning thus to deny all jurisdiction and leave a decision impossible. The maxim justly imports that, as in respect to physical appetite, so in art, literature, and social life, there are questions which must be left to individual partialities. Men cannot be expected to agree, and therefore ought not to dispute about them. But the ancient critic did not hold that there is no standard of good taste, or that there can be no approximation to harmony among cultivated minds, and therefore every one ought to abide by his own practice according to his preference, or in the absence of any preference. By common acknowledgment, there is such a thing as we call good taste, decorum, or, especially in respect to graver or more sacred occasions, propriety. It has its foundation in the nature of things and the natural susceptibilities of the human mind as cultivated and matured. It has its own canons of criticism. Questions of this sort may be reasonably discussed, and with the advantage of time and experience, differing minds may arrive at common perceptions and conclusions on these subjects as generally as on graver matters of truth or obligation. The concurrent, lasting judgment of educated persons conversant with the subject in view, must form a legitimate tribunal. There is no more warrant for saying there is no such thing as propriety, because all are not agreed upon it, than for saying the same of truth. The pretense is no better than a flimsy refuge for conceit, vanity, and presumption. That there is a propriety to be ascertained and regarded in the most important work we can have to do, even in the public worship of God, is acknowledged in the apostle's precept: "Let all things be done decently and in order."* There is a decency, an order,

* 1 Cor. xiv., 40.

in the services of a Christian assembly, which the writer there has in view ; a character, that is suitable and becoming ; the worshipers must judge, and may learn, what it is ; and no individual is authorized to violate or overlook it in carrying out his separate partiality.

The proprieties of the church, then, are those considerations that serve to determine what is proper, what is decent, or becoming, in the services of the church. As the persons concerned are the minister and the people, the subject may relate especially to the pulpit or to the pews. Confining ourselves now to one only, we inquire as to the proprieties of the pulpit. And, not to cover too much ground, we here refer only to the conduct of the devotional services of a Christian assembly.

In the greater part of Christendom, public prayer is in prescribed forms. Even there the effect of the service depends much on the spirit and the manner in which it is performed. But wherever, as in most Protestant congregations, the officiating minister is required to compose the prayers as well as the sermon, his office becomes more difficult and responsible than is commonly imagined. To introduce the right thoughts in the right language, with due regard to all the circumstances of the occasion, requires qualifications not to be presumed in the majority of men,—sensibility and sympathy, imagination, and memory, and judgment, with good general powers, in unusual measure and combination. High excellence here demands rarer resources than in preaching. The wonder is not that the service is so often unsatisfactory, but that it is no worse, especially since candidates for the ministry seldom appreciate its importance, or approach it with the requisite preparation.

One principal consideration determining the nature of public worship, and therefore its proprieties, is this, that it is addressed directly to God. He is its object, and as such is immediately contemplated in the act. It is not so with all duties or good works, some of them necessarily occupying the mind to the present exclusion of thoughts of divine things. It is not so even with preaching, which therefore has other laws. To say that all actions ought to be a kind of worship, is only a rhetorical figure for setting forth the tribute He receives from obedience.

This fact, of the direct contemplation of God in proper worship, of course enjoins the obligations of sincerity, purity, lowliness, and reverence, but these are not now in view so much as the claims of a true propriety. In a service addressed to God, as all may see, there is no place for the same colloquial freedom which is allowed in conference with men. The temper, the thought, the language, the voice, must be affected by this difference. There cannot be the same familiarity at the throne of grace as in conversation. There can be no defense for the minister who, according to a child's natural, just criticism, "prayed as if God were his cousin," or another who conducted family worship in such a manner that a boy asked, "Does God like such praying?"

Hence, too, prettinesses of expression, polite phrases, and flourishes of rhetoric, are out of place in prayers and hymns. As opposed to these things, simplicity is indispensable. The imagination, however naturally fervid, must be chastened as far as the presence of God is felt. The petitioner must not declaim.

In the same view, we object to what is called "preaching prayer," which aims directly and consciously at effect upon the human hearers. The only effect that ought to be sought directly, is upon the divine hearer. It is true that this service has a most salutary influence upon the assembly, yet such an influence itself requires that it be not directly aimed at, but left to flow from a proper appeal to God. For the same reason the singing that is obviously designed, like an artistic performance, to please the assembly, belongs to a musical concert rather than to the worship of God. In fine, the end proposed, both in prayers and hymns, is the expression of devout affection; and impression is not a legitimate object except as it may be reached secondarily and incidentally, which, indeed, is the most effectual way of reaching it.

A second consideration is the fact that the minister is the organ of the worshiping congregation. He is a priest in this sense that he represents them before the divine throne. He conducts *their* worship. Hence, he says, "Let us pray;" and since such a relation must always be taken for granted, this simple form is better, because more simple, than "Let us

unite in prayer." So far, indeed, as the people may act for themselves, there is no reason why they should be only represented, and therefore congregational singing, as far as it can be had, answers more nearly than any other to the idea of public worship. There is the same argument for certain brief forms of prayer, such as the Lord's prayer, which may be conveniently uttered both by the minister and the people. It is as unreasonable to exclude all prescribed forms among the people, as to exclude all extemporaneous utterance on the part of the minister. The service, whether of the one sort or the other, is properly what it is called in the title of the Episcopal prayer-book, "Common Prayer," being common in the sense of the phrase, "the common salvation," since it purports to be the offering of the congregation, and not of the minister alone. For this reason, if we were treating now of the proprieties of the pews, we should insist on the people bearing some part in all the offices of worship, not only actively in praise, but at least in some posture of consent in prayer.

Since the minister stands in this relation, it becomes him, moreover, to conduct the service as though it were his prerogative, and were expected of him in his place. Hence we cannot like to hear him say, "The choir will please to sing," or "omit if you please," or "shall we sing?" or the like parlor-phraseology, instead of, simply, as his office authorizes, "Let us sing." Might he not as properly say, "Shall we pray?" or, "If you please, let us pray?" If we mistake not, there is in such usages an indication of what is still more plainly shown in other ways, the notion that singing is not as strictly as praying an act of worship.

But still more we insist, that as the organ of the church the minister must truly represent their condition, capacities, wants, and feelings. His confessions, petitions, and thanksgivings, must be such as they could utter with one voice, or as he can have their sympathy in uttering. Now it is generally acknowledged that his use of an unknown tongue, speaking for himself, but to them unintelligibly, would violate this rule. Yet he violates it no less if for any reason he is beyond or above the range of their sympathy in thought, or feeling, or language. It is for him to lead them; and, if possible, so to

lead as to allure and advance them ; but he must so lead that they can follow him, which certainly they cannot do up and down every by-way of fancy, or among the pyrotechnics of eccentric feeling, or in the rarified air of mysticism. A prayer may be strictly too poetical, in the better sense of the word ; and still more unbecoming is rhapsody or sentimentalism. It has its admirers, yet they utterly mistake this canon of all criticism, that the worship which purports to come from the people must represent the people.

The same rule may be violated by a certain refined, elevated spirituality. High experiences, like subtle speculations, may belong to the minister's own exercises, but cannot become him as the organ of the church. His interior history, his individual type of piety, may have an interest as his own, but what have we to do with these when he and they—and they through him—are looking to God ? His idiosyncasy thus obtruded is an impertinence. Some would have the minister sunk in the man : rather we would sink the man in the minister,—not in an official personage, yet in the living minister, whenever he represents the church, as when he says, “ Let us pray.”

In this connection occurs a caution against the excessive quaintness or originality—it will be called the one or the other as it is disliked or relished—whether in thought or language, which continually startles the worshipers. Two devout and cultivated persons were conversing on this general subject, the one a Baptist, the other an Episcopalian, and while the first complained that where prescribed forms were used he always knew what was coming next, the other complained that without them he never knew what was coming next. Either of the two contrary extremes thus described in the condition of the worshipers may impair the effect. Ex-tempore prayer, which we have now in view, may the less expose them to inattention through familiarity, yet, on the other hand, it may be of such a sort as to surprise, or even bewilder or perplex them, so far as not the less to defeat its proper end, and this the more by reason of its ill-directed intellectual activity. Whatever other merits it may have, it must fail as public prayer if it cannot represent and lead their

devotions, if it moves them rather to wonder than to rather to study the minister than to worship God.

For the same reason there should be in his dress and manners as little as possible to attract attention to his individuality. With this view we might concede some advantage in a garb, common to his class, though it is sometimes complained of for this very reason; since it may be suitable to the necessity of his function, by hiding personal diversities from those who agree in that function if in nothing else, and thus diverting attention from himself. At any rate, eccentric personal appearance, however it may stimulate curiosity, diverts the minds of the worshipers from the very office which brings him at once nearest to them and to his master. It has been well said, that in preaching a man should hide himself behind the cross: no less in conducting public prayer he should hide himself at the foot of the throne.

We might add another consideration: public worship should be stated, frequent service. Hence it will naturally be conducted with a certain equableness and self-possession which is not to be expected of extraordinary occasions. To attempt to carry it forward in the manner of a specialty, or serially, as if it were a camp-meeting or a Pentecostal festival, is foreign and uncongenial. The incidents of novelty, excitement, surprise, and picturesqueness, do not give character to common, social life, and public worship is the common social life of the church. Nor will they fail, if important, to impair in the long run the interest they were expected to enhance.

In a similar way we might reason from the natural conditions with which the minister's function and surroundings are invested, that they impose laws of propriety which ought not to be set aside. But we have gone far enough to indicate at least the method for just criticism on this subject. It should be the concern of every minister, by the decency and order of his public services, as well as in his doctrine and life, to commend himself first indeed to his Master, but for that end to the judgments also of thoughtful, cultivated, Christian wor-

ARTICLE VII.—THE NEW CRITICISM.

Within the present century, there has come into being a description of criticism which is familiarly designated as the historical or philosophical criticism. Our libraries and book-shops are furnished with many books which are made up of criticisms of other books. Not only is there a countless number of essays devoted to the criticism and interpretation of single authors and even of single works, but whole volumes are occupied with the illustration of great authors or some one of their works. We have more than one series of essays, and even whole libraries, devoted to critiques upon single writers, as Homer, Goethe, and Shakespeare. Active controversies have arisen between the partisans of opposing theories. Indeed, critiques and counter critiques are so abundant, that it almost seems as though this was the age of nothing but criticism, and literature were nothing if not critical. In other words there now exists a special department of literature which is employed in the interpretation and judgment of literature itself. It has enlisted the services of many of the ablest writers of their time, some of whom have not only been distinguished as critics of the productions of men of surpassing genius, but have also themselves been known as the foremost writers of their generation. We need name only *Goethe*, the *Schlegels*, *Coleridge*, *Wordsworth*, *Mad. de Stael*, *St. Beuve*, *Wilson*, and *Matthew Arnold*. Criticism itself has become a department of literature, and is justified in its claims by being also historical, philosophical, and almost creative of itself.

This new criticism, in the eminent sense of the phrase, may be said to be of German origin, though it has attained a vigorous growth on English soil. That it should first have taken form in Germany was natural. It is the natural outgrowth of extensive reading, joined with an appreciative imagination and reflective sagacity. It must necessarily have been somewhat late in its development. As men must act poems before they write them,—as one or many must act the hero, before

others can recount his exploits or celebrate his praises, so literature must be created before it can be criticised. There must be brought into being a considerable number of productions, in the forms of poetry, fiction, the drama, history, biography, and eloquence, before the materials are prepared with which the critic can begin. When we assert that the species of criticism which we have in mind is comparatively of recent origin, we do not say that criticism of every kind is recent in its growth, nor indeed that before the present century there were no profound and genial critics, who took historic and philosophical estimates of the great writers who had gone before them, but only that criticism as it now exists has come into organized being, with distinctly recognised functions and fixed principles and laws for its direction. Dryden and Johnson were both penetrating, and to a certain degree large-minded critics, but neither Dryden nor Johnson rose above very narrow traditions, or personal prejudices. We speak of the old and the new generally when we say, that formerly, criticism confined itself almost exclusively to the form of literature, as the choice of words, the rhythm of verse, the proportion of parts, the order of development, the effectiveness of the introduction, the argument, and the peroration, and these, with the illustration and explanation of the meaning of a work or a writer, constituted its entire aim. Now, while it does not neglect the form, it thinks more of the matter, i. e. the weightiness and truth of the thoughts, the energy and nobleness of the sentiments, the splendor and power of the imagery, and the heroic manhood or the refined womanhood of the writer as expressed in his or her works. Formerly it judged of the form by the fashion of the day in respect of style and diction, and pronounced everything barbarous which was not after the newest type, very much as the dress or hat which are most becoming in themselves are declared to be dowdy and frightful, if worn a year or a season too early or too late. Now the form is regarded as that which in some respects must be transient and changeable, according to the shaping power of the matter itself, the temper of the writer, and the temper of the times in which he lived and for which he wrote. Formerly the critic was regarded by others and too often regarded him-

self as the natural enemy of the author. Now it is exacted of him that he should be the expounder of the author's thoughts and the sharer of his feelings; that he should almost see with his eyes, hear with his ears, and judge with his mind. But this estimate of the characteristic features of the new criticism is general and superficial. A closer and more careful examination, gives the following results:

First: the new criticism starts with a more enlarged and profound conception of literature itself. The word literature, etymologically considered, is necessarily somewhat loose and general in its import, signifying whatever is committed to a permanent form by writing. When this import is somewhat narrowed, it signifies whatever survives a merely ephemeral existence, and attracts the notice of a second generation. In this sense, any book or tract would come under this designation, which is worth retaining in a library, or which happens to be so preserved. With the older critics, literature included only those works which were eminent and attractive from perfection in style, beauty, and fitness of imagery, or elevation of sentiment; those being preëminent which combined all these excellencies in one. By a practice that was almost universal, the word was restricted to those works whose prime object was to address the imagination or to please the taste. Under this usage literature was confined to poetry, fiction, and the drama, also to various lighter effusions, which had the common characteristic of being designed to amuse rather than instruct, to gratify some æsthetic interest rather than to convince or to arouse to action. If a work had any higher end than these, it was by general consent excluded from literature and deemed unworthy of the notice of the critic, as it was exempt from his censure. The poetry of Milton was literature, but his *Areopagitica* with its magnificent prose, and his *Defensio Populi Anglicani*, were not, because they were political tracts. The poems of Donne and Cowley were literature, but the sermons of *Jeremy Taylor*, though luxuriant with the wealth of an oriental imagination, were not literature, because they were composed with an earnest Christian purpose. A work profound in thought, if it was designed to convince of truth; impassioned in eloquence, if it was written to persuade; bright with humor,

if it was intended for practical effect ; was excluded from the roll of the literature of the period, as too severe and earnest, however finished it might be in style, rich in imagery, or elevated in sentiment. A conception of literature so narrow must, of necessity, be belittling and trivial to author and critic. It could not but make the writer trifling and heartless, and his censor fastidious and flippant.

Now-a-days literature is restricted within no such narrow limits, and, as the result, both literature and criticism have been elevated. While it is required that every work which aspires to be called a work of literature should have a certain perfection of finish and of form, none are excluded by reason of their solidity of matter, or earnestness of aim. A history or a sermon, an oration or a political tract, even a scientific essay, if excellent in method and style, in eloquence and imagery, takes the place as a contribution to the literature of a period or of a nation, to which its merits entitle it. As a consequence, the conception of literature itself is greatly elevated and ennobled. Instead of being regarded as one of the accessories of culture and luxury, it is viewed as the best and noblest expression of the best powers of the ablest men of an age. Instead of being judged by the mere accidents of form, and according to the capriciousness of a changing taste, it is both studied and tested according to its perfect ideal. It follows,—

Second : that while the older was narrow and conventional in its standards, the new criticism is catholic and liberal in its spirit. The tendency of the earlier criticism was to set up a single author who was supposed to be nearest the ideal perfection, as the standard by which to try every other. Every other author, and the literature of every other period, were measured by him and the literature of which he set the fashion. Thus, in the days of Queen Anne, Dryden, Addison, and Swift were the *ne plus ultra* of actual and almost possible perfection. A generation later, Johnson and his imitators imposed, if they did not constitute, the rule of measurement. The earlier and nobler writers of the days of Elizabeth and James were either depreciated for their latinised and lumbering sentences, or counted half barbarians for that individual freedom which constituted their real strength and glory.

In a generation still later, literature was still more or less conventional, because criticism kept it in bonds to the factitious standards which were derived from Addison, Pope, and Johnson; inconsistent with one another, as were the examples and the teachings of the masters from which she received her laws. In vain did Thomson give range to the impulses of his creative imagination, and Cowper plead the exemption from rule of one who claimed to be a rhymester and did not aspire to be called a poet. In vain did Burke give vent to the eloquence and imagery which his fiery imagination could not restrain, and Scott follow the bent of a romantic spirit which was in-breathed from his infancy. Criticism was still inexorable, till the more catholic spirit of Coleridge, Wordsworth, and others whom they incited and inspired, awakened the English mind to the personal and admiring study of the older writers, and encouraged the young *littérateurs* to dare to use all the resources of their own language with the freedom of the elder days, and to give utterance to their thoughts in a more copious and untrammelled diction. The cumbrous phraseology of the old writers, their involved sentences, their learned pedantry, their disregard of neatness, directness, simplicity, and taste, had previously made them outcasts from polite society, or if they were admitted it was to be wondered at rather than to be admired on account of "the barbaric pearl and gold" with which they were so richly clad, albeit the ornaments were uncouth and the garments were misshapen. But now these defects are little thought of in comparison with the greater copiousness and variety of their diction, the individuality impressed upon their style, and the shaping of the diction to the thought and feeling of the writer. To the victory, thus achieved by this more catholic criticism, do we owe it, that, in the last two generations, the range of thought in our leading writers has been so greatly enlarged, the depth of their researches has been proportionately increased, their philosophy has been more profound, their strength and intensity of emotion have been augmented, their imaginative power has been more unrestrained and more creative, and their diction has been more varied and powerful.

The modern criticism has not only been more catholic in its tastes and judgments of native literature, but also in its capa-

city to judge fairly and to appreciate adequately the literature of other countries and of remote ages. In this respect the earlier criticism was eminently bigoted and narrow. Looking upon its own narrow domain as the celestial empire and the flowery land, it regarded all foreign writers as in a certain sense outside barbarians, who might indeed be worthy of consideration for certain excellencies of style or imagery, or for the purposes of grammar and philology, but were thought to have no special claim to attention as varied expressions of that common human life which makes the whole world kin. The new criticism, in rising above such narrow prejudices, has not only done justice to its neighbor, but it has gained more than an equivalent for itself—reaping the double benison of charity, which always blesses him that gives as well as him that takes. In this, it has sympathized with the general movement of our times. While many of the sciences, both physical and humanistic, have become liberal by becoming *comparative*, as anatomy, physiology, and theology; criticism has also learned to compare the literatures of different ages and different nations, and to estimate them by certain fundamental principles. Critics now bring to the same bar of judgment Goethe, Shakespeare and Molière, and try them all in respect of their common adaptation to express and please the same human nature. Criticism concludes its examination and allots its sentences without respect of persons. What is different in each writer, in language or nationality, serves to set in bolder relief what is common; and the various methods by which writers of different countries accomplish the same effect, impress the reader with the varied resources of human genius. National peculiarities, whether of matter or form, are relished with a special zest, and the reader's attention is quickened as he turns from one to the other with a freshened interest.

This leads us to observe,—

Third: The new criticism is more *philosophical* than the old in its methods, and is therefore more just in its conclusions. Indeed it calls itself, by eminence, *philosophical* criticism. This claim is not extravagant, if the criticism be at once really elevated and catholic, inasmuch as these terms are almost interchangeable with profound and comprehensive. In aspiring

to be philosophical, it seeks to find those principles which explain and justify everything that is excellent, and to expose and reject everything that is defective or bad. In respect of style or diction, it seeks for the permanent and common characteristics of good writing, in those endless and manifold peculiarities of an individual writer, which spring from the constraints of language, from the genius of his nation, from the temper and culture of his period, and from his own individual habits or circumstances. In respect of thought, it measures each writer by the circumstances of his people and his time, as well as by the special aim which he has in view, and the capacity or attainments which the workings of his imagination may have made. In respect to the past it judges his genius by all the local and temporary influences, as well as by its acceptableness to the private taste of the critic or the community with whom he sympathizes. It does not try Goethe by Molière, or either by Shakespeare, or each and all by a living English dramatist or poet, but according to a just standard for each. It does not claim from Auerbach and Freitag, what it exacts from George Eliot and Anthony Trollope. In the same way, among English writers, it does not measure Scott by Dickens or Dickens by Thackeray, or Thackeray by George Eliot, or George Eliot by Hawthorne. It does not test the subjective Tennyson by the objective William Morris, nor Robert Browning by the simple William Barnes, of Dorsetshire, nor the Spanish Gypsy by the Ring and the Book, nor Whittier by Longfellow. It finds what is good in each, and judges the good of each, by the individuality of the author, the ends for which he writes, the audience to whom he writes, the times in which he writes, and the language through which he writes, as well as the people whose genius inspires what he writes. While it receives, as the rule of its judgments, the nature of man, it recognizes the truth that this nature exists and manifests itself under an indefinite variety of conditions, without ceasing to be the same.

We add next, and—

Fourth: that this criticism, in being more just, is necessarily more *generous* and *genial*. It cannot well be otherwise. For its cardinal maxim is, the critic cannot be just to an author unless he puts himself in the author's place. Its comprehensive rule is, if you would understand an author's meaning you

must learn to think as the author thinks, to feel as he feels, to look at nature and man through his eyes, to respond to both with his soul, to estimate his audience as he knew them, to measure the instruments of language and imagery which he had at command, in their several limitations, as well as their capacities. You must do all these things before you can even begin to judge him. This is only a special application of the principle which is expressed in the golden rule, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." In putting in practice this rule of simple justice to any author who deserves our attentive study, there is awakened toward him an appreciative sympathy. It is only by seeking fairly and fully to understand a writer, that we are enabled to enter fully into his feelings, to catch his spirit, and to estimate his reasonings if we are not convinced of their conclusiveness. So complete, at times, is this sympathy with a writer whom we desire to understand, that as we give ourselves up to his influence, we seem to be his other self; we seem with him to compose a second time what he has already created for us, and, borne on the rushing stream of his thick coming fancies, to revel in the joy of exercising the gift which we dream we have newly acquired. Criticism thus applied wakens enthusiasm rather than represses it. It teaches us to look for excellences rather than to search for defects—and when it enables us to find them, it prompts to our unrepressed enjoyment of them; it wakens in the mind a generous, because an intelligent delight in the beauties it reveals,—it bids the reader be lenient to inadvertencies and defects in a writer of positive merit, because it teaches him how they are to be accounted for.

Fifth: The philosophic critic, in the very best sense of the term, *interprets* the author to the reader. Thomas Carlyle says, in his peculiar way, of Heyne, the editor of Virgil, "I can remember it was quite a revolution in my mind when I got hold of that man's book on Virgil. I found that for the first time I had understood him—that he had introduced me for the first time into an insight of Roman life, and pointed out the circumstances in which the poems were written—and here was interpretation." This is indeed interpretation, and such interpretation is needed in a far wider and deeper sense

than is commonly appreciated, and of a multitude of authors whose meaning seems obvious to a man of common understanding, while yet it may be imperfectly understood. What Carlyle calls the circumstances in which a work was written, are very comprehensive in their significance. They include almost everything which may be known about an author; not the accidents of his external life—the day of his birth and death, the time when he lived or died,—but the sort of a man he was in character and the sort of people with whom he had to do; and this, not so much in their manners and habits as in their conception of life, their moving principles, including their prejudices and superstitions—what they were willing to fight for and die for, what they loved most heartily and hated most bitterly; how they kept their holidays, how they spent their work-days, and all else that may give a complete picture of the life out of which sprung the poems or sermons or tracts which the writer composed, and for which he wrote them. Matthew Arnold says, very pertinently, that “creative literary genius does not principally show itself in discovering new ideas, ‘but’ its gift lies in the faculty of being happily inspired by a certain intellectual and spiritual atmosphere, which finds itself in them.” “This is the reason why creative epochs in literature are so rare,” “because, for the creation of a master-work of literature, two powers must concur, the power of the moment and the power of the man, and the man is not enough without the moment.” To understand the atmosphere on which a great writer depended for the development of his genius, is not always easy. It requires much study and sagacity to find it out, much honesty and zeal to appreciate it, and often great skill to represent it for the ready apprehension of another. This is the reason why the greatest gifts of genius can be so severely tasked as well as worthily employed in this service of interpretation, and also why when this service is successfully performed, it invests the author with a manifold greater interest to the reader, and binds him to his interpreter by heavy obligations.

There is also another sense, perhaps a higher, in which the critic interprets his author, especially if he be a great dramatic writer, who must outline his characters by a few bold and mas-

terly strokes, and manifest their inner life by means of a few significant words and actions. The reader, without the aid of the critic, may be astonished by bold deeds and be excited by passionate words, and yet be unable except with this aid to penetrate their significance or to fill out what the poet has only suggested. We select Hamlet as a striking example of what we mean. As we study this character, we say at once some age and thought are required to excite an interest in its obvious aspects and import. Let us concede however that it is scarcely possible for an intelligent person to follow the fortunes of the unlucky prince, without feeling a saddened sympathy stealing over his soul, at the same time that he is more and more perplexed by the enigmatical character of much that he says and does. But let such a man meet the brief delineation of Hamlet which Goethe has given in two or three pages of *Wilhelm Meister*, and return to the play; he will find it invested with a new interest, as well as enriched with a deeper significance. If we suppose Goethe's conception of Hamlet to be correct, it sends light through the whole of the play and gives significance to incidents and sayings that would otherwise be unintelligible, if not offensive. The difficulty in fully understanding Hamlet without such a guide is, in part, as we have already intimated, that his character is rather sketched than completed—that it is suggested rather than developed; and also that many readers lack the experience of human life, and the sagacity to interpret what they observe, which are requisite to comprehend a character so complicated and strange. Goethe interprets Hamlet when he teaches the reader to imagine some one of his own circle who has had an experience similar to his, and to conceive what would be his conflicting emotions, under a calamity so sudden and so sad. He goes even further and teaches us to understand the almost superhuman sagacity of the poet in making a word or an act, perhaps of irony or bitter scorn, to be so weighty with significance. For Goethe to have interpreted Hamlet may not be so signal a proof of genius as it was for Shakespeare to create him, but no man who could not also create could have interpreted the character so well, if he could have interpreted it at all. The acceptable service which Goethe has rendered to the readers of the great Dramatist is

one of the most important which modern criticism has achieved. While it illustrates the need which the reader may feel of the critic's assistance, it exalts the service to which the critic is called. What Goethe did for Hamlet, has been done by other critics for many of the other characters of Shakspeare. We know it is often said that some of the ablest of Shakspeare's critics have found more in many of his characters than ever Shakspeare dreamed, and that by the extravagance of their fancies and the boldness of their suggestions, they have buried out of sight the originals which Shakspeare conceived. This may be conceded, and the fact still be unquestioned that even where critics err by overdoing, they stimulate to healthful inquiry and to wakeful earnestness. Certainly, the modern world would lose much of stimulating and instructive reading, if it should lose what Coleridge, and Hazlitt, and Mrs. Jameson, what Ulrici, Schlegel, and Gervinus, what Henry Reed, Hudson, and Grant White have written upon the great English Dramatist.

If the gifted critic sometimes errs or overdoes by substituting his own fancies for the thoughts of his author, he more than compensates for this, by making the suggestions of the author a text for brilliant thoughts of his own. As there is nothing more stimulating to a man of genius than the works of another man of genius, so it should not be surprising that the criticisms of such writers as Coleridge, Goethe, and St. Beuve, upon a great writer, may contain the most valuable and inspiring original contributions. The thoughts need be none the less original because they are excited by the thoughts of another, any more than the thoughts of two persons who are brilliant in conversation, are less original or less weighty because the one stimulates or arouses the other. Often, when the critic meets his author, the encounter may not be unlike that which the witty Thomas Fuller records of Shakspeare and Ben Jonson, in the words which, though familiar, will bear repeating: "Many were the wit-combats between him and Ben Jonson, which two I beheld like a Spanish great galleon and an English man-of-war. Master Jonson, like the former, was built far higher in learning; solid but slow in his performances. Shakspeare, like an English man-of-war, lesser in bulk, but lighter in sail-

ing, could turn with all tides, and take advantage of all winds, by the quickness of his wit and invention."

Sixth : Philosophical criticism not only interprets an author by means of his times, *but it interprets the times of an author by means of his writings*. In other words, modern criticism is a most important adjunct to history, and for that reason eminently deserves to be called *historical* criticism. Not only *must* we know something of the history of an author's surroundings,—his atmosphere, as Matthew Arnold calls them,—in order to fully or more justly appreciate either the man or his works, but we can also learn very much of these surroundings by means of his writings. The literature of a period is one of the most important adjuncts to the study of its history. It supplies certain descriptions of information which no other sources of knowledge can yield. It stamps and fixes impressions of much besides, such as no secondary or indirect information can possibly imprint, giving those vivid and life-like images of the men and scenes of the past which are the best substitutes for having actually lived among them. The *Odyssey* of Homer is a fresh and detailed picture of the Greek life in its golden age. As we follow the story of the wanderings of its hero, we see and feel how the Greeks must have lived in the times when Homer actually wrote,—what they thought, how they felt, how they furnished their houses, how they supplied their tables, how they entertained their guests, how they regarded their wives and children, and in what esteem they held their horses and dogs. We learn with what thoughts they looked up to the stars, with what longing and admiring eyes they looked out on the neighboring azure sea as it lay along their sharp horizon, ever glittering with its rippling laughter, and with what a shuddering awe they thought of the mysterious and unexplored ocean which extended beyond, how far and whither they knew not. We are made to know how the Greeks viewed the present life in its wealth and friendship, its prizes and honors, its love of country and of glory, its comforts of home and its delights of love, and how they sought to penetrate into the life unseen, filling it with the shapes of beauty and of terror with which their brilliant mythology also peopled the earth and the air. We visit Greece with longing

expectations. We rejoice in its transparent atmosphere and delight in its beautiful islands and its azure sea. We admire the few remnants of its temples and shrines. But we are appalled at the misery and degradation of its present inhabitants, we cannot find the lively and polished Greek whom we look for among the loungers in the market places of Athens or the attendants upon its university. We can only find him as we study the comedies of Aristophanes. We look for Socrates in the scanty and starveling groves which we fancy may be haunted by his shade, but we can only find him where we find Alcibiades and Plato, in the dialogues written by Plato himself, and in Xenophon's sketches from the life. We go to the Pnyx to hear Demosthenes, and to the Areopagus to listen to Paul, but it is only in the recorded words of each that we can either hear the orators or see their audiences.

We visit Damascus, Syria, and Palestine. Simple history, even when it is the best constructed, and the most faithful, can only give us imperfect impressions of the people which once inhabited the now half deserted plains and mountains. The brief, but graphic, annals of patriarchs and Jewish kings supply us only with the facts concerning the external life of the people that once made these deserts blossom as the rose. But in these records we can neither find the people as they were, nor can we imagine how they felt and lived. We must go to Job to find the devout man of the desert, the counterpart of Abraham, the father of his people; and with Job and the Odyssey, together, we begin to understand the monotheistic patriarch of the East. When we study the code of laws which Moses enacted, and the solemn counsels with which he enforced these laws, we begin to find who the Hebrew people were. If we proceed to study those matchless Psalms, in which God was praised for the glory of the Heavens, the beauty of the stars, the tumult of the storm and the noise of the ocean, over which He thundered with His awful voice; the Psalms by which His Holiness was extolled, the victories of His leadership were recounted, the nation's feasts of thanksgiving and sacrifice were solemnized, the glory of Jerusalem was fitly set forth; in which also the prayer and praise, the penitence and thankfulness of the individual worshiper were

expressed in words which have never been surpassed; then, and not till then, do we learn, in the spirit of Hebrew Poetry, the spirit of the Hebrew people. If we follow on through the sad lamentations of their prophets, their fierce rebukes, their faithful admonitions, and their glorious predictions, we learn to know this people more perfectly in their evil as well as their good, in their sad perverseness, as well as their many repentings and frequent returns to God. In all these treasures of poetic and prophetic literature, we trace the rising of the star of promise, till it stood at last over Bethlehem, and heralded the angelic shouts of glad tidings of great joy.

We wander all the way from Bethlehem to Calvary,

—in those holy fields,
Over whose acres walked those blessed feet,
Which, eighteen hundred years ago, were nailed
For our advantage to the bitter cross.

studying the path in which those footsteps lie, if perhaps we may catch some vision of the present Jesus. But both in Bethlehem and at the Sepulchre, we hear the answer to our longings, He is not here, He is risen. As we read the history which records His deeds, we cannot bring Him back to the desolate land which He once inhabited. But as we read His own words in the most precious legacy which human literature has preserved, we seem to see Him living—and while we worship at His feet, we rejoice in His benediction.

When we go to Rome and Italy we cannot find the old Romans, however earnestly we search for them in their sepulchres, in the Forum, or the Coliseum, or however sanguinely we look to see them repeated in the population which now inhabits the Eternal city. We cannot revive them to our imaginations by the unaided force of all the suggestions which haunt the Tibur or the Appian way. We find them only as we consult the letters of Cicero and of Pliny, and the poems of Virgil, of Lucan, and of Lucretius, or study the treatises of Seneca and Antoninus. The old Roman life re-appears in the incidental records of their thoughts and feelings, which we find in these and similar writers, and in the incidental glimpses which they give of the life of the people with whom they had to do.

As we compare ancient literature with modern, we reach the confident conclusion, that the virtues of the ancients were patriotism, hospitality, friendship, and honor, all restricted in their sphere, however noble in kind, and limited to certain external duties or habitual sentiments. We miss entirely the self-denying love of man as man, which Christianity sanctioned by the most characteristic act of its great founder. The Christian love to enemies, the Christian forgiveness of injuries, its sweet and contented submission to adversity, its patience under undeserved wrong, the overcoming evil with good—all being special virtues of the temper, springing from charity as the bond of their perfectness—were not known, we do not say in the practice of the ancients, but they were not honored as elements of their ideal. All this we know from their literature when it is critically studied as a trustworthy representation of the people's inner life. From the literature of the ancients we learn with satisfactory certainty the place which woman held in the house and in society. We know that in the esteem and affections of the best and the purest, she did not hold the place, with the rarest exceptions, which she now holds in the confidence and love of myriads of households and of hearts. The ideal man of the noblest ancient schools, was immeasurably inferior to the ideal man of multitudes of humble and uncultured Christian communities. We learn all this from what is plainly manifest in the literatures of the ancient and modern worlds.

The importance of the critical study of literature as an aid to the interpretation of modern history is equally manifest. It is even more so, because the appliances which literature furnishes for the exposition of many periods of modern history are so much more varied than those which illustrate the best known of any of the ancient generations. The reign of Queen Elizabeth is reflected, as in a magic mirror, in the plays and letters, in the sermons and diaries of her time. The times of the memorable conflict between Puritan and Cavalier can be almost literally reproduced from the direct and indirect sketches which were made of its various characters and scenes, in the manifold forms of literature which were photographed from the life by unconscious artists. The writings of Swift

and his compeers, the plays and songs of the hour, the libels and street placards, the sermons and letters, were the materials which enabled Thackeray, with the rarest critical discernment to reconstruct his admirable historical tale of the days of Queen Anne. It was out of the literature of their several periods, that Scott was able almost to recreate them before our eyes.

This service of the critical study of literature is as great to the reader as it is to the writer of history. No one can fully appreciate the history of any people or of any period, by relying on the descriptions and judgments of others. He must, in a certain sense, construct the history for himself, even when he reads it as constructed by others; at least he must reinforce the assertions, and verify the conclusions, of his authorities, by looking for himself, so far as he may, upon the people and events described, and doing this face to face. This he can in no way do so effectually as by studying their literature. But in order to do this with the most eminent success, most readers require the aid of the philosophical critic, to explain the relation of literature to history.

Seventh. The critical study of literature is of service to *biography* as well as to history. If we can read the times of an author by the pictures of them which he reflects in his writings, much more can we learn the character of the author himself by the sentiments and feelings with which he reproduces his times, as these determine the shadings and colors with which he represents them. If a man's private letters are often the best materials out of which to construct his biography, it should be remembered that much of what he publishes as his works are in some sense his public letters, his epistles to the world and to posterity, as these convey, not alone what he professedly aims to produce and record, but often much more of what he unconsciously reveals. Some books from their very nature, reveal very little of their author's feelings and character. But very many books communicate much more, at times, than he designs or desires. The sonnets of Shakespeare, the poems of Milton, the playful and serious essays of Cowper, the meditations of Wordsworth, the passionate outbreaks of Byron, the vague aspirations of Shelley, and the

sad, brief elegies of Tennyson, when skillfully interpreted, enable us penetrate into the secrets of their hearts, and open to us the hidden springs of their character. It is the office of the critic to discriminate between what does and what does not express the man, and thus to interpret the man by many of his works; and the service which he renders to the reader is often of surpassing interest.

The features of modern criticism which have been enumerated, may suffice. We may perhaps more profitably, as well as more practically, consider our own literature as a field for its exercise. We may aver with confidence, that English literature furnishes the amplest, the most varied, and the most interesting material for the critic, of any whether ancient or modern. It ought not to surprise us that it should. The compound structure of the language gives an advantage to the writer as well as to the philologist, furnishing often a richer choice of terms, a greater variety of phrases, and a wider range of structure, than is possible for any other modern tongue. This affects its form alone is true, but the form in this instance happens to furnish large capacities for the investment and expression of a rich and manifold material. This material is rich and manifold, chiefly, because its people have been free, and being free, have been bold in thought, and earnest in feeling. They have been moved and stirred by the largest spirit of adventure in commerce, in war, in colonizing, and in self government. They have had an intense religious spirit, manifested in a sufficient variety of forms, and inspiring to fervent faith, to martyrlike boldness, and to consistent and heroic self-denial. They have had earnest political struggles for the crown and *against* the crown,—for the liberty of the commons, and the traditional rights of the people, and for the divine right of kings, and the dignity of the royal prerogative. They have had sacred and happy homes,—fire side enjoyments hallowed by domestic love, and made doubly sacred and dear by ancestral recollections. They have had exhaustless and irrepressible humor—an inborn love of noisy hilarity, an infinitude of original characters to provoke this humor, and inspire the songs of a people ever ready to be excited to uproarious merriment. They have had a free press—a free

pulpit, and free newspapers, in spite of occasional censorship, packed juries, and venal judges.

If we trace the history and characteristics of this literature we may well be amazed at its varied riches, and be excited to avail ourselves of its inviting stores to a more earnest as well as a more critical use of its ample resources.

We begin with Chaucer. In the *Canterbury Tales* we have a worthy counterpart to the *Odyssey*, giving as they do, a graphic and varied picture of the many sided life, and the strongly marked characteristics which, even at this very early period, were manifest among the English people. Indeed we could not desire a more satisfactory illustration of the truth and justice of all that we have said of literature as a field for the study of history, than is furnished in these tales of Chaucer. The attentive reader cannot fail to observe how eminently true it is that the times illustrate the author and the author illustrates his times; how, through these tales, we have a direct insight into the manners and the sentiments, the customs and the philosophy of our ancestors, as they were, and as they lived some five hundred years ago. We have only to look through this magic show glass, and we are transported back to the very scenes which were then transacted, and those early times live again before our eyes. It is not a lifeless chronicle which we read, it is not a grave description, not a careful analysis, not a logical generalization, such as the annalist and the historian furnish. It is not even an historical novel in which a writer of a later period has endeavored to recreate the times as he conceived them, but it is an unconscious painter of the men and the manners with which he was conversant. How strong and bold-hearted were those men, how natural their manners,—how brave and sincere, how humorous and tender hearted, how beneficent and devout were the sentiments which they express.

After a long and somewhat dreary interval, we come to the age of Shakespeare, and not the age of Shakespeare alone, but that of Spencer and Sidney, and Raleigh, and Hooker, and Bacon, and Ben Jonson, and the train of dramatists of whom Jonson was the representative and the head. We call this truly the golden age of English literature, and we ask what agencies

could have produced such writers as these? We find our answer—first in the vigorous growth of the English stock, that, under all the burdens of royal and churchly oppression, had never been debased or crushed, but had held its own in the hall of the gentry, the farm house of the yeoman, and the cottage of the laborer. This living force was marvellously excited by the Protestant Reformation, and when after many struggles, a Protestant Queen had come to the throne, it experienced, as it were, a thrill of new creative energy. Foreign wars, commercial adventures, romantic discoveries, all united to keep this young life excited to its utmost tension, and to move it by an inward ferment. The thoughts of men were great; their hopes were unbounded, their feelings were fervent, their self confidence was untrammelled; their power of expression was untamed. They had at their command the language not as yet shaped by critics or developed into any normal structure,—a fit instrument of the young giants, rejoicing in their strength, who were ready to use it, each as he would. Could the student desire a study more inviting than that to which the literature of these active and hopeful days invites him? Whether he would study the authors or their times, or both together, whether he would study the matter or the form of literature,—thought, sentiment, and imagery, on the one hand, or diction, rythm, and periodic power on the other,—he could ask for nothing more exciting or more rewarding than what is furnished here.

The age of Milton follows, and not of Milton only but of Taylor, and Sir Thomas Browne, of Baxter, and Bunyan, of Hobbes, and Fuller. Here the English life and with it English literature appears in other forms, more fixed, and serious, and grave, but with not a whit of its force abated, nor aught of its fiery energy repressed. Imagination is still as soaring as ever, and the manifold and seeming exhaustless varieties of diction illustrate the resources and the plastic capacities of the English language. This period was marked for its political struggles, and its religious strifes, for its intense feeling and its strong thinking; for its ardent longings, and its patient endurance, and above all, for its faith in God and in man; and all these influences shaped the literature, as the literature formed the period.

The age of Dryden followed, and not of Dryden only, but of South, and Locke, and Boyle, and Newton. It was a tamer period, in which accuracy of thought, and exactness of language, and symmetry and beauty of style, and repression of feeling, and caution in imagery, were all conspicuous. It was an age of repression and of criticism, as was natural after the real and imagined excesses of principle and feeling which had characterized the times of the commonwealth,—an age in which religion declined and immorality was less sustained, an age of free thinking and unbelief,—which were scarcely held in check by the efforts of Locke and Boyle. With an age thus characterized in the life of the people, the literature of the period sympathized. First of all, it was the period in which the modern and the better English style was developed and fixed—preeminently by Dryden. Next criticism itself was first applied with systematic aims and definite results. In both Dryden was preëminent. With more accurate thinking and careful writing, there were not wholly lost the fire of feeling and the splendor of imagination which had distinguished the earlier periods.

Then followed the age of Pope, and not of Pope alone, but also of Addison and Swift, of Shaftesbury and Bishop Butler, of Berkeley and Warburton, and they were followed by that of Richardson, Defoe, Fielding, and Smollett. It was an age in no wise distinguished for earnestness or for faith, an age of conventionalities, gaiety, and frivolity, an age of free living, and of free thinking, an age in which satire and sneering criticism would be likely to flourish, and in which both were abundant. As was the life, such was the literature of the period, with here and there an exception. For the ease and felicity of its prose diction, and for the correctness and smoothness of its verse to the ear—it has been called the Augustan age of English literature but the perfection of form to which it brought this literature was ill compensated for the loss of these higher qualities by which the earlier periods were distinguished.

In the latter half of the same century there was a change for the better. This was the period of Johnson, and of Burke of Thomson, Goldsmith, and Cowper. The national life gre

more serious. The lower classes had been moved to greater religious earnestness by Wesley, Whitfield, and others. The higher were tired with the emptiness and dissoluteness, with the heartlessness and frivolity of the generations before them,—there was a longing after better things, and to this longing the literature of the period gave expression in manifold signs.

Then came the French Revolution, filling many hopeful and sanguine spirits with ardent enthusiasm, and stirring their minds with inquiries which led to profounder studies of the principles of moral, political, and theological faith—then the inevitable reaction, involving strong repressive measures, and dividing society into angry sections,—then the long and costly wars of the allies, and the exciting career of the first Napoleon. All these movements in English thought, attended, as they were, by the corrupt demoralization of the court and example of the last of the Georges, were reflected in English literature as it presents itself in the first thirty years of the present century. This is the period of Scott, of Byron and Shelley, of Coleridge and Southey, of Wordsworth, Wilson, and Lamb, of Macaulay and Hallam, of Jeffrey and Mackintosh. Literature is sharply divided into opposing schools—expressing the divided sentiment and opinion of the English nation. Foremost among them is that catholic and comprehensive school which dared to free itself from the fashion of the day in both thought and diction, and to go back to the English writers of the earlier periods, and to vindicate Shakespeare, and Milton, and Hooker, and Bacon, from the neglect into which they had fallen. More than all, this school dared to vindicate for itself the liberty to use all the resources of the English language, as well as to sound all the depths of English thought and feeling after the ancient ways. While in one direction, as with Byron, literature is passionate and satanic, and in another, as with Shelley, it is blasphemous and atheistic; while in Scott it is brilliantly romantic; while with Hallam and Mackintosh it is solidly earnest; with Coleridge, Wordsworth, Southey, and Wilson, it is more thoughtful and affectionate, it is mindful of nature and of God, and above all it dares to be true to all that is best in human character and literature. With this school and its awakened interest in all the older

literature, there arose also the spirit of historical and philosophical criticism, which has been the theme of this paper and which has largely contributed to the many sided, and in general, the elevated literature of the present generation. Of this literature we need not write, for to attempt to characterize it would lead us beyond our limits.

This English literature is our heritage, and to study it should be our delight and occupation. That it may be a delight, it must be, in some sense, an occupation. If we are to judge of it in a truly critical spirit,—if we are to understand historically its authors and the times in which they lived—if we are to judge of it philosophically, and to read intelligently its graver writers of the past, or the more novel and fresher of the present,—we must read it earnestly and comprehensively; we must make it our study—not a study that is painful or repulsive—but one that is patient, systematic, and earnest.

English literature when once it has become a familiar field of intelligent study, brings this advantage, that it is a field which the student will never be able and never will desire to desert. To him who has learned to read aright, every week will bring some fresh tale, or poem, or essay, or history; every season will introduce some fresh author, who summons the reader to a new feast of delight, which will be none the less keenly enjoyed, because it is enjoyed with a chastened taste, and is judged with critical appreciation. All the life-long, amid its cares and its sorrows, its employments and its leisure, there will be at hand a capacity and a taste for these satisfying and elevating pleasures,—which instruct while they delight,—which lead us upwards to heaven, while they make us content with the earth. No class of habits that are purely intellectual can possibly enter so largely into our happiness for life, as those habits of reading with discrimination and with ardor, which are formed by abundant studies in the history and criticism of English literature.

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

THE END OF THE WORLD, AND THE DAY OF JUDGMENT.*—We are informed that some two thousand, more or less, of our fellow-beings, of fair average intellect, are accustomed to attend upon the weekly ministrations of Rev. William Rounseville Alger. In order that outsiders, who do not attend upon those ministrations, may not be at disadvantage with these two thousand select, progressive souls, on the two subjects, *The End of the World, and The Day of Judgment*, we give in brief the doctrine of the above discourses.

Our preacher affirms that the notion of the End of the World is a vulgar, traditional superstition, common to all nations—Hindus, Polynesians, Greeks, Scandinavians, and Persians, included.

Then comes a portrayal of the Hebrew scenic Eschatology, treated with that high local coloring peculiar to certain advanced artists at the "Hub," and closing with the inquiry and conclusion, "Is there any more reason for believing this doctrine, than for believing other kindred schemes? No! not a whit."

Next follows a comparison of the ecclesiastical and scientific doctrines of the End of the World, and we learn that both are objectionable, the scientific being the least so, because, as our preacher naively remarks, "we can contemplate the scientific prophecy of the End of the World with a peace of mind which the traditional prophecy does not permit;" and, he adds, "We shrink in fright from the wrath and power of the personal Judge, the inexorable Foe of the Wicked," which constitutes the principle objection, in the mind of the preacher, to the ecclesiastical doctrine.

The scientific End of the World may be contemplated with calmness, because, in the first place, it is extremely doubtful whether it will ever occur at all. "A billion of centuries hence,"

* *The End of the World, and the Day of Judgment.* Two Discourses preached to the Music Hall Society by their Minister, the Rev. WILLIAM ROUNSEVILLE ALGER. Published by request. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1870.

says our preacher, "the world may, perhaps, come to an end," and then, on the other hand, it may not, but if it does, we are not left wholly at a loss even in that contingency. *Collective Humanity* and Science combined may ward off the fatal crisis.

We quote:—"A brilliant French writer has suggested that even if the natural course of evolution does of itself necessitate the final destruction of the world, yet our race, judging from the magnificent achievements of science and art already reached, may, within ten thousand centuries, which will be long before the foreseen end approaches, obtain such a knowledge and control of the forces of nature, as to make collective humanity master of this planet, able to shape and guide its tendencies, ward off every fatal crisis, and perfect and immortalize the system as now sustained. It is an audacious fancy. But like many other incredible conceptions which have forerun their own still more incredible fulfillment, the very thought electrifies us with hope and courage."

Is the brain of Boston softening?

The conclusion from the preceding "investigation," as our preacher terms it, is "that the world is to last, and our race to flourish on it, virtually forever."

We have then a discourse upon The Day of Judgment, wherein that "catastrophic myth" is treated with the same warm, local coloring, although the execution might be characterized, in high art, as "spotty." The doctrine, so far as it hangs together at all, may be set forth in the preacher's illustration of the orthodox view. Here it is:

"The Judge will say to the orthodox on his right, 'You may have been impure and cruel,—lied, cheated, hated your neighbor, rolled in vice and crime,—but you have believed in me, in my divinity; therefore, come ye blessed, inherit my kingdom.' To the heretical on his left he will say, 'You may have been pure and kind,—sought the truth, self-sacrificingly served your fellow-men, fulfilled every moral duty in your power,—but you have not believed in me, in my deity, and my blood; therefore, depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire.'"

But the chief folly of the orthodox is in believing in any judgment of the wicked at all. "It is," says the preacher, "a direct transference into the Godhead of the most egotistical and hateful feelings of a bad man. No good man, who had been ever so grossly misconceived, vilified, and wronged, if he saw his enemies prostrate in submissive terror at his feet, perfectly powerless

Before his authority, could bear to trample on them and wreak vengeance on them. He would say, 'Unhappy ones, fear not; you have misunderstood me; I will not injure you; if there be any favor which I can bestow on you, freely take it.' And is it not an incredible blasphemy to deny to the deified Christ a magnanimity equal to that which any good man would exhibit?"

The doctrine of the preacher would rather require the Judge should say to the heretical on his right,—“You may have been pure and kind, sought the truth, self-sacrificingly served your fellow-men, fulfilled every moral duty in your power,—but you are not one whit better off than our friends of the left wing.”

To the orthodox on his left he should say,—“You may have been impure and cruel,—lied, cheated, hated your neighbor, rolled in vice and crime,—but, unhappy ones, fear not; you have misunderstood me; I will not injure you; if there be any favor which I can bestow on you, freely take it.”

The above is a true bill of the whole doctrine; and the discourse ends in a grand *feu de joie* over the disappearance of these dreadful incubi which have so long sat upon the breast of man.

“Away, then, monstrous horrors, bred in the night of the past!” exclaims our preacher, “The cock-crow of reason has been heard, and it is time ye were gone.”

Sage of Concord thou hast triumphed!—Cast thy bread upon the waters and thou shalt find it after many days. See first the blade, then the ear, and, last of all, the full corn in the ear, of that little germ thou didst cast upon the waters a quarter of a century ago.

“*Man, though in brothels, or jails,
or on gibbets, is on his way to all
that is good and true.*”

He that goeth forth weeping, and bearing precious seed, shall doubtless come again with rejoicing, bringing his sheaves with him.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF.*—The author, in his preface to this book, affirms his aim to be “an attempt on purely positive grounds, to determine the religious instincts of humanity;” his “purely positive ground” being Comparative

* *Origin and Development of Religious Belief.* By S. BARING GOULD, M. A. Part I. Heathenism and Mosaism. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1870.

Anatomy, out of which he proposes to develop a "Cosmo-theology."

According to our author, the absorption of force and its expenditure through the assimilation of food, and their after liberation in the human organism, develops a variety of results. This variety is effected through the polarity of the spinal cord, the structure of man being axial, one end in the stomach and the other in the brain, vitality, the other through the oxidation of the gray matter of the cerebrum, ideas, and in the cerebellum, religion. His statement of the province of religion :

"To coördinate the mind and the sentiment, to unite subjectivity and objectivity in a common work, to develop equally and harmoniously the intellectual and the sensory ganglionic tract, and to subordinate to the dominion of reason and the feelings, acting conjointly, the actions of the body—the province of religion undertakes to perform.

"Philosophy, the cultivation of logic, the abstract sciences tend to the development of the pitch of the intelligence.

"Solidarity, politics, social life, give tone to the feelings; but religion has its special prerogative to develop equally and justly both the mind and the affections, to hold the balance between reason and sentiment, to direct the life-force to the development and oxidation of cerebric and nervous tissue."

In this mode of treatment all mental and moral ideas, emotions and esthetical precepts are simply resolutions and formations of mechanical forces. It may be interesting to know the physical result of the contemplation of a great work of art by a connoisseur. We quote :

"The perception of pleasure or pain is a resolution of force. This is the case in the life of the animal. Where there is no pleasurable or painful stimulus there is no arrest and disintegration of force. A clown placed before Raphael, is insensible to its beauty. The waves of light pass through the brain as through a sheet of clear glass. But a connoisseur before it is arrested in delight, because the pulsations of light are stopped and resolved in which, like a convex mirror, focuses and refracts the force, and like a lens solves it. The formation of an idea, as has already been said, is an arrest and alteration of force, and a stream of ideas passing through the brain has the evidence of its material action in the excretion of alkaline phosphates in the urine. The resolution of muscle, on the contrary, produces lithates."

Out of his physical structure of man, our author proceeds to develop the religious instincts of humanity, returning even to the "wild bog of savageism" for the springs of religious ideas. Many of his discussions and comparisons are interesting, but without value. The fundamental difficulty is the subject

omitted from the premises. The reader is requested to bear in mind that neither the existence of God, nor the truth of Revelation, is assumed in the argument. Mosaism and all the various forms of heathenism are therefore discussed as arising wholly out of the religious instincts of man, as the product of his physical structure, having no relation whatever to an original revelation, or knowledge of God acquired in any other way than through the oxidation of the cerebrum. This fundamental assumption, or non-assumption, renders the argument, as an argument, futile. To use a common illustration—It is like the play of Hamlet, with that personage omitted.

Thus all forms of heathenism are treated as attempts toward positive religion, rather than as wanderings from a higher type. Idolatry becomes “an outward expression of a belief in a personal God,” and “piety toward plants and animals,” and we learn that “to Fetishism humanity owes immense obligations.” At the same time, the leading and the leaning of the argument to the position, that the physical structure of man cries out, as it were, for the coördinating and controlling forces of Christianity to its perfect development, gives a certain value to the discussion.

In the words of the author:

“The history of religious experiments is exceedingly instructive, for it shows us, first, what are the religious instincts of humanity; and, secondly, failure, through imperfect coördination of these instincts. A review of the religions of the world will show us of what nature that religion must be which alone will satisfy humanity—a religion in which those inherent tendencies of the mind and soul which produced Fetishism, Anthropomorphism, Polytheism, Monotheism, Spiritualism, Idealism, Positivism, will find their coördinate expression; a religion in which all the sacred systems of humanity may meet, as in a Field of the Cloth of Gold, to adorn it with their piety, their mysticism, their mythology, their subtlety of thought, their splendor of ceremonial, their adaptability to progress, their elasticity of organization—and meeting may exhaust their own resources—

“ ‘By this to sicken their estates, that never
They shall abound as formerly.’

“HENRY VIII., ACT. I., S. I.”

This direction of the argument leads us to look with interest to the second volume in which the author will endeavor “to show how that Christianity, by its fundamental postulate—the Incarnation—assumes to meet all the religious instincts of humanity; how it actually does meet them; and how failure is due to counteracting political or social causes.”

In the meantime, we can commend this volume, Part I., to the

warm regard of those philosophers who, by the application of a thermometer to the back of their heads, are convinced that thought is a mode of heat. They may be able to get a little mechanical contrivance which, applied by our missionaries directly to the cerebellums of the heathen, may produce an instantaneous modification of the religious sentiment. Henceforth the Church of the Future endeavor "to direct the spontaneous life-force to the development and oxidation of the cerebral sensory tissue."

GLOAG'S COMMENTARY ON THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. The author of this commentary is the minister of a parish in the neighborhood of Glasgow, who has given his attention to exegesis and studies in no inconsiderable degree. He refers to his past avocations as occupying so much of his time as to hinder some prosecution of his work. But he claims—what those who peruse the volumes will find abundant evidence to prove—that he has gone over the ground with great care, and has investigated thoroughly the works of the leading authorities in the German language and in our own. His commentary is mainly expository. Extending over nine hundred pages, it is very full and complete, and at the same time is free from the faults which are often met with in books of this character, where the writer allows himself to digress. It displays scholarly tastes and attainments as well as candor and freedom from prejudice in the author; and, altogether, it will prove an addition to the helps which the student may desire for the study of this most important portion of the New Testament. The commentary is preceded by an Introduction, consisting of eight different sections, in which such questions as the Authorship, the Language and Text, the Chronology of the book are considered. Several of the more interesting topics of discussion connected with the different parts of the book are also examined, as they are suggested by the text, and the author seems not to shrink from any investigation to which he is legitimately entitled. We notice that he places the date of Paul's conversion in 37, and that of the Apostolic Council and the visit of Paul to Jerusalem, which is alluded to in the second chapter of Galatians.

* *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles*. PATON J. GLOAG, D. D., Minister of Blantyre. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Two vols. 8vo., pp. 439 and 456. New York: Scribner, Welford & Co. \$10.50.

the year 51. He thus adopts the view which separates these events by only fourteen years, referring all the measures of time in the first two chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians to the conversion of the Apostle as their starting point. This is a question which can, perhaps, never be satisfactorily settled; and yet, the more we investigate it, the more are we persuaded that the other view is the more reasonable one. The evidence in regard to the time of Paul's conversion, also, seems to us to favor some other date than the one here given—either placing it, as we think, in the year 35, and seventeen years before the Apostolic Council, or, if that be not admitted, carrying it to as late a point as the year 38. Dr. Gloag regards the Gift of Tongues, on the day of Pentecost, as having been a miraculous gift of speaking foreign languages, though, in the Corinthian church, he admits that it may have been of a somewhat different character. In respect to the relationship of James, who is called the Lord's brother, to Jesus, he presents the different views which have been held, but leaves the point without coming to any decision. The number of topics of this and other classes which are treated of in the volume is quite considerable, but they are made subordinate to the author's main design, which, as he is careful to remind his readers, is to prepare a purely exegetical work. The difficulties which have been suggested by Baur and others in connection with the Acts are, also, considered wherever in the progress of the work they arise, and the examination of all these questions is such as to show that the author is familiar with them. If these discussions are not extended enough to satisfy the student altogether, they at least call his attention to the subjects discussed, and, at the same time, point him to the best works in which they are more thoroughly investigated. The author has certainly exhibited a devotion to biblical scholarship which is creditable to him and worthy of imitation. His book will receive commendation, we think, from those who examine it, and will be regarded as a useful work. It is published by Messrs. T. & T. Clark, of Edinburgh, and so far as its general appearance, type and paper are concerned, it is all that could be desired. In respect, however, to the price at which it is offered, we wish it might be lower. The publishing house through which it is introduced to the American public, is that of Messrs. Scribner, Welford, & Co., of New York.

HENDERSON'S COMMENTARY ON EZEKIEL.*—This volume of Dr. Henderson's commentaries was the last one which he published previous to his death. It is prepared upon the same plan, and in accordance with the same principles of interpretation, which have characterized the other volumes already introduced into this country. It is, however, briefer in its annotations and less elaborate than those on Isaiah and the Minor Prophets, a peculiarity which has been accounted for by the fact that it was prepared so late in the author's life. We think it is too brief for its highest usefulness. Dr. Henderson was a man of learning and of laborious and patient research. But the opinion has been already expressed in the NEW ENGLANDER, that his method of interpretation is a wrong one—making the events of history the measure and test of the prophet's meaning. We cannot, therefore, regard his work as of equal value with the best German commentaries on the prophet's writings. They have, however, met with a favorable reception both in England and America, and, to those who have used with satisfaction the former volumes, we think the present one may be commended.

SORROW.†—This subject has been often chosen for a single poem or sketch or essay, but seldom before for a whole volume. One wonders that it should have been thus adopted, as if its aspect were itself alluring, or as if being once entered upon it held the writer as by a spell. The title itself is enough to repel most readers. We were not surprised when a critic in a prominent journal—who, however, we suspect, had not looked much beyond the table of contents,—judged it not worth while to draw so much more attention to sorrow itself than to its mitigation. But the name of the author should lead one to look beyond first impressions, since his earlier work engaged the attention of many thoughtful readers. And in fact, though singularly enough his chief subject here is sorrow rather than consolation, his clear, calm treatment, with the aid of touching examples and not infrequent quotations, gives it unexpected attractions, appealing health-

* *The Book of the Prophet Ezekiel*, Translated from the original Hebrew. With a Commentary, Critical, Philological and Exegetical. By E. HENDERSON, D.D. Author of Commentaries on the Book of the Minor Prophets, Jeremiah and Lamentations, Isaiah, etc. Andover: Warren F Draper. 1870. 8vo., pp. 228.

† *Sorrow*. By JOHN REID, author of "Voices of the Soul answered in God." New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870. 12mo., pp. 373.

fully to our knowledge of human life and our sympathies, and keeping clear of the morbid fancy or the narrow sentimentalism that lie in wait for most writers on such subjects. The work is a series of brief essays on the kinds, causes, and effects of sorrow. Among the subordinate topics giving titles to the chapters, are "the sorrow of great minds," "sorrow at home," sorrow as affected by "loneliness," that which is connected with "love between the sexes," "the sorrow of children," "the Bible and sorrow," that which is for "the dead," "the man of sorrows," that which is "pleasing," that which is "beautiful," its "bearing on the higher themes of existence," and "sorrow because of the shadows that fall upon us from the other life." The last four are on the sorrow of parents in the loss of "infant children," the "mystery of sorrow," "sorrow alleviated and destroyed," and "God and heaven as thoughts of power to the sorrowful." It will be seen at once that these topics of consolation have not so large a place in the book as the reader would expect or think desirable, and yet he is not pained or wearied, as he might have feared, with the delineations of grief that fill so many more of the chapters. Sombre as is the theme, it is relieved by delicate distinctions and many beautiful thoughts. We know nothing of the author's history, and we confess some curiosity to learn how he should have been led to so large an utterance in this plaintive monotone, but he seems to have

"an eye
That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality."

A mind so reflective and observant will invest any subject that it handles with a charm. While commending the style in general, we must take exception to something of formality in the transitions from one subordinate point to another, partly in the italicizing of certain words as if to mark distinct heads of thought, giving a sermonizing air that might be better dispensed with. But this is of the less account, since the more desirable qualities of good sermons appear throughout the work in the devout temper and the earnest faith of a Christian minister.

HE THAT OVERCOMETH.*—Mr. Boardman's former work, "The Higher Christian Life," made him favorably known several years

* *He that Overcometh*; or a conquering Gospel. By W. E. BOARDMAN, author of "The Higher Christian Life." Boston: Henry Hoyt, 9 Cornhill. 12mo., pp. 302

ago in the circle of earnest Christian people in this country who, instead of resting satisfied with the standard of practical religion exemplified in the church at large, aspired, for themselves and others, to a higher plane of piety. Of those whose wants it met, some have passed into the clearer vision of the objects of faith, while others still surviving will welcome the further treatment of the same themes from the same pen. The present volume may not attract as much attention, since works of this kind have been more multiplied, yet we judge it to be not less fitted to further vital piety. Like the other, it has to do with Christian experience in the proper sense of that phrase. It is distributed under three heads, "Life," "Work," and "Results;" and each of these is in several chapters,—under the first, for example, "Man in Creation," "the Perversion," "a Conversion," "the Test," &c., several sketches being interspersed as illustrations from facts in life. The drift of the whole is in keeping with this sentence from the preface:—"There is but one way of silencing naturalism, and that is by power and presence of supernaturalism." The spiritual and supernatural elements of Christianity are uppermost in the delineations here given of piety. Justification by faith, the work of the Holy Spirit, and the efficacy of "praying and working," pervade the book. The tone is cheerful and hopeful, the style clear and direct, and the method fitted to guide and stimulate various classes of readers in the best aims. It has occurred to us that here and there more ample explanations of true statements might have been profitable, and yet, on the whole, the work is one of the best lately issued for the improvement of Christian character and efficiency.

LIGHT AND TRUTH.*—In the 414 pages of "Light and Truth," Dr. Bonar has set forth a series of eighty-three short devotional meditations and lectures on various topics, suggested by texts in the Acts, and in the Epistles to the Romans, and the Corinthians. In their scope and intent these papers remind us of Jay's Morning and Evening Exercises, being popular, pious, and helpful; not remarkably brilliant, nor attempting much in the way of exposition; but, so far as we see, unobjectionable in sentiment and spirit, reverent in their treatment of the text, and full of gospel truth. The titles of the papers are, in many cases, attractive and suggestive,

* *Light and Truth; or, Bible Thoughts and Themes.* The Acts and the larger Epistles. By HORATIUS BONAR, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1870. pp. 414.

But at other times they cover more ground than the discussion which they introduce; sometimes too, the discussions might have gained in force by being restricted in range. Still, the author has confined himself to "Bible thoughts and themes," and writes with the intent to instruct and bless mankind.

THE EARLIER YEARS OF OUR LORD'S LIFE ON EARTH.*—In this first of a series of six volumes, Dr. Hanna makes a valuable contribution to the large list of works devoted to Jesus and his life on earth. Writing in a style remarkably fresh and spirited, without any parade of learning, and having the advantage of personal familiarity with many of the localities mentioned in the gospel history, he has been very successful in giving vivid sketches of events familiar to every reader of the Bible. Should the remainder of the series be executed in the same way, we think the work, while open to criticism in details, will deserve to be put in the foremost rank of popular presentations of the life of Christ.

It is, of course, a mere slip of the pen when the author allows himself to say (page 123) that Jesus "had no earthly *parent*;" but it is an obvious, perhaps a common misapprehension of the text, when he cites the aged Simeon's words, "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace," as an "expression of his *desire*." (page 63.) The *nunc dimittis* is surely not a prayer. Dr. Hanna contradicts himself, as well as the scripture, when he affirms (page 118) that when Joseph and Mary went up with Jesus to the passover, they had not been in Jerusalem since the time when they presented him as an infant in the temple. The hypothesis that Simon was the son Alphaeus, and that he was called the Canaanite [Cananite] because of his connection with the village of Cana, are altogether too farfetched and improbable to support any conjecture concerning the family for whose sake Jesus changed the water into wine. Some such blemishes as these excite the wish that the work had received a more thorough revision, by which it would have gained in accuracy without losing in popularity.

* *The Earlier Years of our Lord's Life on Earth.* By the REV. WILLIAM HANNA, DD., LL.D., [D.D., LL.D.] New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 580 Broadway. 1870. 12mo. pp. 400.

THE FAMILY AND THE CHURCH.*—The Position of Father Hyacinthe, in relation to Rome and the Roman Catholic Church, is so conspicuous, every help to a knowledge of the man and of his principles is important. Inasmuch as he has never been an author of books or pamphlets, those who would become acquainted with him, and cannot hear him, are compelled to accept the reports (generally imperfect and fragmentary, though sometimes revised by himself) of his spoken discourses. A volume of such reported discourses, hastily collected but carefully translated, was commended to our readers in the last Number of the *New Englander*. Another volume is now before the public; and in its contents it is the complement rather than the orderly sequel of its predecessor. In the first volume, we have the fourth of the five courses of Advent conferences, that on the relations of Christianity to Civil Society on the State. The present volume gives us the third of those courses, and the fifth,—on Domestic Society or “the Family,” and on Religious Society or “the Church.” It contains, also, the memorable speech at Malines on “the education of the working classes,” and a brief tribute to the memory of Bishop Baudry, who had been his teacher in theology, and whom he honors as his spiritual father. A spirited and well informed essay on “Father Hyacinthe and his Church,” by the Hon. John Bigelow (reprinted from Putnam’s Magazine), forms an appropriate Introduction; and Bishop Dupanloup’s Letter to his clergy against the dogma of Papal Infallibility is given as an appendix. The two volumes contain everything that Father Hyacinthe has written or revised for publication.

It has been given out, on we know not what authority, that the great preacher has been released by the Pope from the monastic vows that bound him to the Carmelite order, and has been restored to the ranks of the secular clergy; and from this it has been inferred that, by some surrender of the principles professed in his letter to the General of his Order, he has made a dishonorable peace with his adversaries at Rome. We have no private or special information which authorizes us to contradict the story;

* *The Family and the Church*. Advent Conferences of Notre Dame, Paris. 1866–7, 1868–9. By the Rev. Father HYACINTHE, late Superior of the Barefooted Carmelites of Paris. Edited by LEONARD WOOLSEY BACON. With an Introduction by JOHN BIGELOW, Esq., late Minister of the United States at the Court of France. New York: G. P. Putnam & Son.

but we will venture to say that whatever else may be true, the author of the two volumes has not so humbled himself as to accept the "doctrines and practices which call themselves Roman but are not Christian," and that, if Pius IX. has relieved him from excommunication and restored him to a standing in the secular priesthood, that restoration is because of some very significant hint from the emperor of the French, or rather from the very liberal statesman who is just now governing at Paris in the name of the emperor. The story of Father Hyacinthe is not ended. If he lives he will be heard of in the great conflict which is soon to shake the Roman Catholic nations. The author of these discourses, and especially of the speech on "The Education of the working classes," cannot be silent long at such a crisis.

The great conflict of the present time—after the conflict between the Supernaturalism of Christianity and the mere Naturalism of unbelieving science—is that between Spiritual Christianity and Formalism. In the Roman Catholic Church, Formalism predominates. In Protestant communions, it takes the shape and bears the name, just now, of Ritualism. On one side is a religion of faith, of love, of spiritual communion with the one invisible and infinite object of worship, and of joy in the help of an unseen and ever living Saviour—a religion which grounds itself on the great objective truths of the Christian revelation. On the other side is a religion which lives and has its being in outward institutions, which works by sacerdotal manifestations, which makes much of costumes and attitudes, and which rejoices in the stage-effect of imposing ceremonies—a hierarchical religion investing its priests with dominion over the conscience by setting them as mediators between the soul and God. Those who would know on which side Father Hyacinthe is found, and is likely to be found, in the conflict between Formalism and Spiritual religion, may satisfy themselves by reading in this volume the discourses on the Church—particularly the first, on "The Church Universal," and the last, on "The Conflict between the Letter and the Spirit in the Jewish Church."

PATER MUNDI.*—The author of "*Ecce Cœlum*" could not well be expected to write a dull book on any subject, much less one in which God and Nature were the chief topic. But whether he could be able to clothe the skeleton of a two-volume argument for Theism—often so dry and grim in other hands—with the flesh and muscle, the life and beauty, that charm us in "*Parish Astronomy*," could only be shown conclusively by the production of a work like that before us. *Pater Mundi*, though from the nature of the subject not likely to be so generally popular as *Ecce Cœlum*, will, nevertheless, by the glow and magnetism of its rhetoric, and the enthusiastic earnestness of its tone, as well as the strength of its argument, be sure to command everywhere appreciative and admiring readers, and prove, we trust, of special value to those who are inclined to regard science as hostile to religion. The author affects, however, no judicial impartiality in conducting his argument, but purposely throws himself into it with all the feeling and earnestness of an advocate anxious to carry a point. It is in this magnetic glow, indeed, that the strength of the book chiefly lies. The logic of it could be put in a nutshell. But that logic is vitalized and made effective by the force and richness of the illustrations drawn from the various fields of science. It is these all glowing, often with poetic fervor, that rivet the attention at once, and carry the reader insensibly on from topic to topic. In some of the lectures, indeed, the argument assumes the elevation and almost the form of a grand poem. The sixth, for example, like a sublime ode, returns, strophe by strophe, with each point made in the argument, to the same exultant chorus, which becomes at once a *quod erat demonstrandum* to the understanding, and an inspiration of faith to the heart.

The second volume promises to be even more attractive than the first; for it is to be still more replete with the marvels and sublimities of the sciences, as illustrative of the argument. We welcome the work, then, as a valuable contribution to Natural Theology, especially for general readers. It is too much forgotten by many that God may be studied in flower and forest, in storm and star, and in the soul of man, as well as in Moses and the pro-

* *Pater Mundi; or, Modern Science testifying to the Heavenly Father.* Being in substance lectures delivered to senior classes in Amherst College. By the REV. E. F. BURR, D.D., author of "*Ecce Cœlum*." In two volumes. Vol. I. Boston: Nichols and Noyes, No. 117 Washington Street. 1870. 8vo. pp. 294.

phets. The glowing pages of *Pater Mundi* teach impressively that the God of Revelation is the God of Nature as well.

The title sufficiently indicates the general scope and object of the work. There are eight lectures in this volume. Having heard most of them as delivered, and since read them with added interest, we can cordially recommend the work as one that will be found both interesting and instructive. Its general boldness and originality of style may be inferred from its striking dedication: — “*To the HEAVENLY FATHER to whom we dedicate our Sabbaths, our Sanctuaries, and ourselves, THESE VOLUMES, in illustration of his being and greatness, are reverently inscribed.*”

IMMORTALITY.*—Perowne's Four Sermons on Immortality treat the subject within narrow limits in a far more comprehensive and many-sided way than is common even with theological lecturers. The Lectures are entitled—The Future Life. The Hope of the Gentile. The Hope of the Jew. The Hope of the Christian. In the first, the modern theories are satisfactorily, though, of necessity, not very exhaustively discussed, in the three forms of scientific materialism, philosophical pantheism, and necromantic spiritualism. In the second, are expounded the conceptions of the future life which were taught and held respectively by the Egyptian, the Greek, and the Oriental. In the third, the Hope of the Jew is discussed at length, and in this is examined with some care and scholarship the oft mooted questions, how far a future life was revealed to the Hebrews by their prophets and inspired teachers, and how fully and distinctly they recognized such a life in their practical faith. We cannot say these questions are as sharply discriminated as we fancy they might and ought to be, but we find some very good thoughts upon each. The Hope of the Christian, or the Christian doctrine of the future life, is the theme of the last lecture. This hope is made to rest on two facts, the Resurrection of Christ and the inner life of the spirit, and is confirmed by the consideration of the analogies of Nature. The discussions of all these topics indicate a mind fully alive to the questions of the times, and accustomed to thorough and independent investigation. While, as we have said, they are neither

* *Immortality.* Four Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge. Being the Hulsean Lectures for 1868. By J. J. STEWART PEROWNE, B. D., Vice-Principal and Professor of Hebrew in St. Davids College, Lampeter, etc., etc. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1870.

so profound nor so exhaustive as might be conceived to be possible, they are sufficiently so for the majority of readers, and they are written in a lucid and pleasing style. The preface notices Mr. Huxley's much talked of paper on the Physical Basis of Life, and the Appendix No. I. is an extract from Professor Tyndall's address before the British Association at Norwich. No. II. discusses Job xix, 24-26. No. III. treats, a little more critically than the text, of the Jewish doctrine of the Future Life. No. IV. cites a fine passage from Nitsch on the Christian doctrine. This little volume, as will be inferred from this criticism of its contents, is very timely, and it deserves general circulation.

MR. MURRAY'S MUSIC HALL SERMONS.*—Mr. Murray having turned from deer-stalking and trout fishing to his genuine avocation as a preacher, shows that the qualities which made him successful among the Adirondac hills and ponds may be turned to good account in some other ways. A bold hand and quick eye, art in throwing the bait, tenacity in holding on to the prey, a little rashness in shooting the rapids of argument, and a dash too much of foam in the rhetoric, but a knack at coming out high and dry, safe and sound, and a real love and tender charity for the victims of his skill—these qualities have not deserted him when he has followed higher game. We have read this comfortable little volume of twelve sermons with much pleasure and profit. The style is graphic and the thought fresh. There is considerable power exhibited in picturesque and moral word-painting. The sermons have point, speak right out, and do not hesitate to cut right and left on occasions. Often they have beauty of illustration drawn from pure nature. The element of Christian hope runs through them. The discourse on the "Divine Friendship" is a fine and brave discourse. The last sermon on "The Moral Condition of Boston and How to Improve it," treats a difficult subject with delicacy, sagacity, and honesty. That system which educates highly, and yet which affords no corresponding means of gratifying the newly refined tastes which it originates, is justly and temperately criticised. Some passages of this sermon have an incisive and vigorous style promising good things in the future, when a sobered strength shall have taught the preacher to repress exuberance without destroying individuality.

* *Music Hall Sermons.* By WILLIAM H. H. MURRAY, Pastor of Park Street Church. Boston. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1870.

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY'S ESSAYS.*—Archbishop Whately's well known Essays, and his "Historic Doubts," are reprinted by Mr. Warren F. Draper, of Andover, in a neat and careful manner, and are bound in the same volume. The subjects of the Essays are as follows. Revelation of a future state. On the Declaration of God in His Son. On Love towards Christ as a motive to obedience. On the Practical Character of Revelation. On the Example of Children as proposed to Christians. On the Omission of a system of articles of Faith, Liturgies, and Ecclesiastical Canons. To these is added an appendix on the Absence of a Priesthood. Of these essays, the first and the fourth have attracted the most attention, and have elicited an active discussion as to their soundness. In the first, the author asserts, more positively than most modern Christian writers, that the wisest and the most thoughtful of the ancients did not believe in a future state. He also insists that the Mosaic Revelation neither made known nor recognized a happy future state as the reward of human virtue, but that it is in Christianity alone that such a hope is warranted. The Essay on the practical character of Revelation has been criticised very sharply as opening the way to latitudinarian sentiments, and, when taken with two or three passages in the appendix to the author's Logic, as teaching Sabellian views of the Trinity. Whatever may be thought of Whately's views on particular doctrines of the Christian system, no one can question his sturdy good sense, his discriminating judgment, and his large-hearted catholicity. In some respects it might seem that, perhaps, his views have been outgrown by the new forms of infidelity and of orthodoxy which have come into being since his time. It will be found, however, that his deliberate opinion upon any fundamental question is always worth considering, and often contains more weighty thought than the unpretending manner of stating it would indicate.

* *Essays on Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion.* By RICHARD WHATELY, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. From the Seventh London Edition. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1870.

Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte. From the Eleventh London Edition. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1870.

THE SACRIFICE OF PRAISE.*—This book is modestly put forth without the sanction of any name, the compilers choosing to style themselves “A Committee of the Session of the Brick Presbyterian Church in New York.” The design expressed in its title and preface is to present a selection of the best Hymns to the exclusion of a large number of the less effective. In England public taste has demanded works of this kind, in lieu of the multitudinous hymns and cantos, good, bad, and indifferent, which had swelled collections there, as they had here, up to twelve or fifteen hundred. The public is beginning to see that very short hymns are a mistake as well as very long ones. A congregation has no time to draw spiritual nourishment from a hymn of two or three verses, and the tendency now in England is to take a smaller number of hymns, and these more perfect in character. “Hymns, Ancient and Modern,” the most popular of English hymn-books, contains 386 Hymns; *Lyra Britannica*, London, 1867, 660 Hymns; *The Scottish Hymnal*, 1868, 200 Hymns; *The Peoples’ Hymnal*, 1868, 600 Hymns; *The United Presbyterian*, 468 Hymns; *The Congregational Union*, 748 Hymns.

The *Sacrifice of Praise*, designed for private devotion as well as public worship, and containing Psalms, Hymns, and Spiritual Songs, is limited to 616 Lyrics. The principle of giving the text of the hymns, as originally written, is quite faithfully adhered to.

The greatest variety of opinion has been expressed as to what constitutes a good hymn. Didactic hymns have been condemned because “if the sermon preaches, and the hymn also, the monotony of the service will occasion uneasiness.” Subjective hymns have been objected to as unfit for the united worship of a congregation. Watts’s lines, “When I can read my title clear,” are omitted by one compiler because he thinks them “gravely wrong in doctrine,” and “There is a land of pure delight,” because “seriously faulty in style.” The well-known hymn of Montgomery, “Prayer is the soul’s sincere desire,” is claimed to be inadmissible because it is merely a definition of prayer. Other critics have deemed it important to tone down the originally fervent utterances of Wesley and Heber, though far less fervent than their inspired model, the Psalms. Men in their enthusiastic dev-

* *The Sacrifice of Praise*, Psalms, Hymns, and Spiritual Songs, designed for public worship and private devotion, with notes on the origin of Hymns. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870.

tion to the true doctrine, have forgotten that in hymns, truth is necessarily presented "poetically, not dogmatically, to the adoring gaze of faith and love, not to the discriminating survey of the intellect." Some, desiring to improve on Toplady and Cowper, have recast their hymns, diminishing by a verse or two, "Rock of Ages," dropping out therefrom the idea that the blood of Christ cleanses from the guilt and power of sin, and in the hymn, "There is a fountain filled with blood," destroying the immediate effect of the antithesis in the last two verses. The full effect of the last line of each verse of Charlotte Elliott's exquisite hymn, "My God is any hour so sweet," has been destroyed by the addition of adjectives in order to suit the tune! Sir John Bowring's admirable hymn, "God is love, his mercy brightens," has been objected to as too full of aspirates and sibilants. These are samples of that variety of opinion which brings home the question, whether our rule should be to prove faithful to the poet's text, or whether our hymns shall be mutilated, recast, and their appeals to the intellect and the affections be sacrificed in order to subordinate them to the tune or to the views of every new compiler.

The Committee of the Brick Church appear to have entirely disregarded such criticisms as we have referred to. Betaking themselves to the Word of God for their guidance, they have, in their preface, vindicated the bold and unqualified presentation of different aspects of the truth. They also say: "In preparing the present selection of hymns, those passages of Scripture have been kept in view which teach that the object of praise is to glorify God (Ps. l., 23) that the understanding and spirit are to be exercised in worship (1 Cor. xiv., 15) and that Christians should teach and admonish one another in Psalms, and Hymns, and Spiritual Songs," (Col. iii., 16). A sermon preached by the Chairman of the Committee, Rev. Dr. James O. Murray (which has been published by C. Scribner & Co.) on the subject of Christian Hymnology, shows that the questions of merit on which they formed their opinions were, Is the hymn based on Scriptural truth? Does it bear the Scriptural test of ministering to the intellect and the heart, and is it lyrical?

The result of their labors, based on these principles, is a collection distinguished by literary excellence and spiritual power, which represents the various phases of Christian feeling and experience in different souls and under varying circumstances. The hymns are chiefly those of writers of celebrity, like Watts, Dodd-

ridge, Wesley, Toplady, Cowper, Newton, Lyte, and Heber, their names and the dates being attached to their compositions. An Index of Authors, comprising over one hundred and sixty names, from Ambrose and Anatolius, in the fourth and fifth centuries, down to the writers of our own day is added, affording evidence of research, and that the committee have gathered beside all waters in a truly catholic spirit. A Prayer, affording a good index to the state of heart with which the sacrifice of praise should be offered, precedes the Hymns. The restoration of the glowing language of the original text, together with more than one hundred lyrics not common in any American collection, and the introduction of much valuable information in the notes regarding the origin of hymns give a freshness to the book, and must cause it to be highly prized wherever used. It is admirably adapted for private use.

We have no space left to illustrate the great improvement made in the restoration of hymns, but must content ourselves by quoting No. 165, as a fair average of the newer lyrics taken by the committee :

“ Not yet ye people of His grace,
Ye see your Saviour face to face;
Not yet enamored eyes ye bring
Unto the glory of your King.

“ Ye follow in His steps below,
Along His thorny way ye go,
Ye stand His bitter cross beside,
Ye cling to Him, the crucified.

“ Upon His grace ye banquet here:
Ye know Him true, ye feel Him near;
The balm of His dear blood ye bless;
Ye wear His robe of righteousness.

“ But greater shall the wonder grow,
But mightier shall the joy o’erflow;
Upon your Lord, ye yet shall gaze
And look your love and sweet amaze.

“ O make me meet for joy like this!
O! grant me grace to bear the blow,
To set my heart on Thee below,
No other lord or love to know.

“Then shall I set my eyes on Thee;
The King in all His beauty see,
And gazing on forevermore,
Glow with the beauty I adore.

“THOMAS H. GILL, 1859.”

DR. MURRAY'S SERMON ON CHRISTIAN HYMNOLOGY.*—This excellent Discourse was preached on the occasion of the introduction of the author's Hymn Book into the public services of the Church of which he is the Pastor. The scholarship and taste of Dr. Murray are, without pretense or ostentation, and with entire subordination to the motive of edification, illustrated on every page. We know not where to find in so brief a form, so much information, and, at the same time, so much instructive thought, on the subject of Hymns, as this Discourse presents. We have room for only a brief extract relating to Congregational Singing:

“The reasons for insisting on congregational singing are few and simple, but they are incontrovertible.

“1st. Only by such a service of song can we imitate the example of our Lord and his Apostles.

“2d. The best and largest part of our churches calls for it. If this part desires to sing the praise of God with its own lips, it is arbitrary and unjust to deprive it of the privilege, that the tastes of the few may be gratified by choir performances. Not only so, but if it is debarred the privilege, what becomes of the spirituality in the worship of song?

“3d. The evidence is abundant that spiritual life is evoked from our hymnology only so far as it is *personally* appropriated to the spiritual wants of the individual Christian.

“4th. In the times of highest and purest spiritual activity, the church of Christ has always demanded congregational singing. Revivals of religion tolerate nothing else. But we have great need to remember that congregational singing is not something which comes of itself and without effort, ‘If,’† said John Calvin, ‘the singing is such as befits the reverence which we ought to feel when we sing before God and the angels, it is an ornament which bestows grace and dignity upon our worship; and it is an excellent method of kindling the heart, and making it burn with great ardor in prayer. But we must at all times take heed lest the ear should be more attentive to the harmony of the sound than the soul to the hidden meaning of the words.’

“So profoundly was he convinced that special pains must be taken in order to secure an effective congregational singing, that a music teacher was secured, paid

* *Christian Hymnology*.—A Sermon preached in the Brick Church, New York, December 12th, 1869. By JAMES O. MURRAY, D. D., Associate Pastor. Published by request of the Session. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870.

† Institutes, Ch. xx.

by the State, who gave lessons three times a week to several choirs of children. They seem to have led the congregation in its service of song after a careful training for the purpose. Calvin's idea of Church music was exactly that of Israel's psalmist: *Both young men and maidens, old men and children, let them praise the name of the Lord.* We have need to follow closely the example of our great leader, in the cultivation of sacred song, as well as in his theology. First, the service of praise must be exalted as a part of worship. Then the *fittest* mediums of song-worship, in the choicest chants and hymns, should be furnished the people of God, and the tame, mediocre, insipid, prosaic rhymes on spiritual themes, falsely called psalms or hymns or spiritual songs, discarded. And then by a direct education of the people in singing these hymns to suitable tunes, the latent capacities for congregational singing in our churches should be called out. This will take time and pains, but it is well worth all it will cost. In no dim or doubtful sense will it prove true, that a revival of the spirit of Christian song is a revival of religion." pp. 39, 40, 41.

THE ANTE-NICENE LIBRARY.—Messrs. Scribner, Welford, & Co., have received two new volumes of the English Translation of the Ante-Nicene theologians,—viz. a volume containing the treatises of Cyprian, both those which are known to be genuine, and those which are questionable; also the writings of Novatian, the Octavius of Minucius Felix, etc.; and a volume comprising the Writings of Methodius, of Alexander of Alexandria, the spurious Epistles of Clement of Rome concerning Virginité, and a variety of minor treatises and fragments of other ecclesiastical writers. The entire series, of which these two volumes are a part, will have the effect to bring the Fathers of the First Period to the knowledge of many who could never resort to the original works. It is to be earnestly hoped that the enterprize will receive sufficient encouragement to induce the Scottish publishers (Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh) to give us the works of Origen entire. He is the most important of the Pre-Nicene Fathers, and his voluminous writings, if presented in an English dress, would be much more valuable than are many of the documents which enter into the volumes last issued.

SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE.—The xxv.th number of Doctors Hackett and Abbot's edition of this work brings it down to, or rather into, the Article, "Samaritan Pentateuch." In typography and literary excellence we observe no falling off in the later numbers as compared with the earlier. The American edition, as we have before said, is a great improvement upon the Dictionary as originally published in England.

HENRY WARD BEECHER'S SERMONS.*—It is a little remarkable that till now there has not been what might be called a handsome "library edition" of the sermons of Henry Ward Beecher, the preacher who is more widely known than any other in America. For years, it has seemed as if there could hardly be anywhere a first-class religious newspaper, in New York City or out of it, unless its conductors gave weekly a full report of one of his sermons; or at least a sketch of some one of his "lecture room talks." But at last we have two handsome good sized octavo volumes, which are published by Messrs J. B. Ford & Co., from "verbatim reports by T. J. Ellingwood," to which Mr. Beecher has himself added a preface.

This preface covers but two pages, but it is by no means the least interesting part of the book. We should like to transfer the whole of it to our pages, as it shows what this great pulpit orator deems essential to success in gaining the interested attention of church going people who listen to sermons.

Mr. Beecher says that sermons will be "interesting," not so much "by the merit of their contents," as "by their skilfull adaptation to the wants of men." And again: "The master sermons of one age will fall powerless on another." "The sermons that will be read by multitudes are those which bring God's infinite truth into vital relations with the thoughts, sympathies, enterprises, habits, loves, hatreds, temptations and sins, ideals and aspirations of the times in which the preacher lives." And again: "A few sermons there are, a very few, that so grasp the heart truths in their universal forms as to be interesting and powerful alike in every age. But few good sermons can live longer than the generation for which they were made. The true preacher is to be eminently a man of his own time."

In other words, every congregation is always, and without exception, under the sway of a thousand subtle influences that are changing imperceptibly even from week to week. Each individual feels them, though no man can analyse them. There is what may be called the "spirit of the week," or the "spirit of the occasion,"—more evanescent even than the "spirit of the times." Now the "merit" of the sermons of two preachers being equal, the

* *The Sermons of Henry Ward Beecher*, in Plymouth Church, Brooklyn. From verbatim reports by T. J. ELLINGWOOD. "Plymouth Pulpit." First Series—September, 1868—March, 1869. Second Series—March—September, 1869. New York: J. B. Ford & Co. 1869. 8vo. pp. 438, 466.

clergyman who takes advantage of this subtle state of feeling in a congregation, even by the slightest allusion, finds the fuel all prepared, ready to his hand; and fire is kindled at once, and no one knows how. While the preacher who does not adapt himself to this subtle spirit, will find little or no response. He is at an immense disadvantage. He has to dry his wood before he can hope to fire it.

During the war, a very popular clergyman preached on the nature of God's government over men. It was a constructive sermon, and the congregation evidently followed with interest and satisfaction as he developed his argument. There was no special glow in the pulpit, and no warm response from the pews. At last, the preacher had sufficiently felt the force of his argument, and brought out the doctrine of his discourse in such a way as to convince the intellect, when he proceeded to remind his hearers that one of the characteristics of a good government is, that it make itself conspicuously seen or felt. Often under a good government men scarcely know that there is any government. But, said he, changing his manner, and with tones that electrified the whole congregation, "if you want to find you are under a government, FIRE ON FORT SUMTER!" A cannon ball had crashed through the walls of the church, it had produced more emotion. From that moment the speaker held his audience breathless and spell-bound. Now suppose he had said those very same words five years before, they would have fallen cold and dead. Suppose they had been uttered to a British audience, in a British church, that very Sunday. We repeat our quotation from Mr. Beecher's preface to his master sermons of one age will fall powerless on another. A minister has found that a sermon which even one day before seemed to carry all before it, had with the lapse of a month somehow lost all its special power. To quote again, there must be a "vital relation" between the thoughts, sympathies, enterprises, habits, temptations and sins, ideals and aspirations which are swaying the minds of the hearers. And, as we see it is by working ever on this line that Mr. Beecher has won his success and his reputation.

THE OVERTURE OF ANGELS.*—Messrs. J. B. Ford & Co., have also published in a beautiful volume, with the title which we here put down, that portion of Mr. Beecher's forthcoming "Life of Jesus,—the Christ," which depicts the scenes and events that cluster about the birth of our Lord.

REV. MR. GAGE'S "RELIEF MAPS" OF PALESTINE.—The Rev. W. L. Gage, of Hartford, Conn., published some months ago a "Relief Map" of Palestine, which has been widely sold, and is now quite generally known. He proposes to publish, on the first of May, "A Relief Map of New Testament Palestine," in similar style, and on July 15th, he will also publish a Map of the Sinaitic Peninsula, and the Scene of the Wanderings of the Israelites. The price of the first two maps, neatly framed, is \$1 each; and they may be had by remitting this sum to Mr. Gage by mail. The price of the Map of the Sinaitic Peninsula will be \$1.50. These sums will cover the cost of transportation to any part of the United States. The maps are put up in such a way that they ought to go without being injured to the most remote parts of the country.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

THE XI. TH AND XII. TH VOLUMES OF FROUDE'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND.†—These volumes appear with a change of title, indicating that instead of proceeding to the close of Elizabeth's reign, the work terminates with the defeat of the Armada. These volumes are, therefore, the last of the series. Mr. Froude's reason for stopping at this point is not a very conclusive one; since the supremacy of Protestantism in England can hardly be considered to have been absolutely settled until the Revolution of '88. The two volumes before us are filled up with the intrigues of the European Princes and Cabinets, which are narrated with the author's wonted perspicuity and liveliness, and with the utmost detail. The stirring events are the execution of the Queen of Scots and the dispersion and defeat of Philip's fleet. The most obvious

* *The Overture of Angels.* By HENRY WARD BEECHER. New York: J. B. Ford & Co. 8vo. pp. 55.

† *History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada.* By JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE, M. A. (Vols. xi. and xii.) New York: C. Scribner & Co. 1870.

merits of Froude are his masterly skill in the grouping of events, his descriptive power, and his animated and brilliant style. His work is not in the "old Almanac style," as the dry, unreadable method of composing history has been characterized. As to the more solid qualifications for historical writing, it is evident that Mr. Froude has diligently explored the materials offered to his inspection in the State Paper Office, and in the Spanish Archives. Whether he has accurately followed and cited his documents can not be absolutely decided until they shall have been examined by others or presented to the public in print. A rather savage criticism of Froude, in the "Saturday Review," taxes him with "incurable inaccuracy," but brings little proof in support of the imputation. The examples of inexact statement, which the Reviewer adduces, are mostly trivial. At the same time, there is a smartness and evident taste for strong coloring in Froude, which excite a certain degree of distrust, and make us regret the absence of more abundant, and explicit marginal evidence for the statements of the text. As a lively and powerful picture of an eventful portion of Elizabeth's reign, the later volumes of this work will always maintain a very high rank. In some other aspects, as a historical production, it is, in a marked degree, deficient. The Constitutional History of this formative and pregnant period is very scantily and imperfectly treated. A student of the growth of the English system of government must resort to Hallam and other writers, for he will derive little satisfaction from Froude. The greatest defect, however, is in the way in which the ecclesiastical history of England is treated. Much complaint is made, and with some justice, of the hostility and contempt with which the English Episcopal Church is uniformly mentioned. What a meagre and, in many respects, positively incorrect idea of the progress and character of Protestantism in England would be gained, if a reader were shut up to the instructions of this history! The Author is one of the free-thinkers of the "earnest" type, and, with all his vigor and terseness, is not free from the cant of his school. Many sentences and paragraphs sound like an echo of some of the old, oracular utterances of Carlyle. In fact, the moral judgments of Froude are not only untrustworthy, but are often vacillating and inconsistent. It is not without indignation that one reads (Vol. I., pp. 35, 36) the observations upon the war in the Netherlands, and the expediency of a surrender to Spain on the part of the heroic people who

were founding a Great Republic, and giving an immortal example of self-sacrificing patriotism. Mr. Froude's estimate of the character of Mary of Scotland is a righteous one, and will do something to dispel the halo which still lingers about the brow of this intellectual, energetic, fascinating, but bad, mischievous woman. So his unveiling of the mendacity, fickleness, imprudence, selfishness, and other evil traits of Elizabeth, will aid in correcting the exaggerated impression relative to her sagacity and genius, which has not been dislodged from the popular mind. Wherever she departed from Burghley's counsels, she uniformly blundered. We must say of Froude's book, as of so many other books, that being so good, it is a pity that it is not better. In these last volumes there is, at least, nothing so utterly unpardonable as the defense of the atrocious murder of Sir Thomas More, and the hardly less iniquitous execution of Cromwel, whom, it will be remembered, Froude praises through his whole career up to the very steps of the scaffold, but there turns round and apologises for his destruction. The story of intrigue and deception is spun out, in these volumes, to a somewhat wearisome length; and if Froude, in case he proceeded, were to continue his narrative with the same minuteness, it may be well that he stops at this point. We think, however, that the remainder of Elizabeth's reign might well have been presented with more brevity and condensation, and thus completeness be given to a work which is really left a fragment. Portions of history may profitably be written in this detailed fashion, but life is too short to render it possible for the whole long story of human affairs to be thus narrated.

MOMMSEN'S HISTORY OF ROME, VOLUME II.—The first volume of this work was noticed at some length in the last Number of the *New Englander*. The one now before us takes up the history at the opening of the wars with Carthage, in 264 B. C., and carries it forward through about a century, to the close of the third Macedonian war in 168. To most readers, probably, it will appear a much more interesting book than its predecessor. In the twilight of the early centuries of Rome, little more can be seen than the great outlines of political and social institutions, and the

* *The History of Rome.* By THEODOR MOMMSEN. Translated by the Rev. WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D. D. Volume II. New York; Charles Scribner & Co. 1870. 12mo. pp. 568.

progressive changes which they undergo. The first volume from the necessity of the case was mainly a constitutional history, without the interest which belongs to a continuous narrative and to personal characters and fortunes. But with the Punic wars we come to a period for which the sources of authentic history, though for times nearer to our own they would seem lamentably defective, are for the ancient world tolerably abundant. The events, too, unlike the petty wars of the early republic, are on a scale of imperial magnitude, and draw after them consequences of enduring and incalculable importance. The hundred years included in this volume are, on the whole, the best century of Roman history,—distinguished by the greatest vigor, the most heroic efforts, the severest sacrifices, and the most dazzling successes. The republic is now at the acme of its strength and glory.—The seeds of its decay and dissolution are, indeed, already sown,—especially by the devastations of the Hannibalian war, destroying that class of peasant proprietors, of small land-owners, which constituted the real strength of the state. But the symptoms of decline did not become manifest and alarming until some time after the battle of Pydna.

Of all the historic personages who appear in this volume, the grandest figure by far is that of the great Carthaginian, Hannibal. We quote the passage in which Mommsen introduces him to the reader :

“The voice of his comrades now summoned him—the tried, although youthful general—to the chief command, and he could now execute the designs for which his father and brother-in-law had lived and died. He took possession of the inheritance, and he was worthy of it. His contemporaries tried to cast stains of various sorts on his character; the Romans charged him with cruelty, the Carthaginians with covetousness; and it is true that he hated as only Oriental natures know how to hate, and that a general who never fell short of money and stores can hardly have been other than covetous. But though anger, and envy, and meanness have written his history, they have not availed to mar the pure and noble image which it presents. Laying aside wretched inventions which furnish their own refutation, and some things which his lieutenants were guilty of doing in his name, nothing occurs in the accounts regarding him which may not be justified in the circumstances and according to the international law, of the times; and all agree in this, that he combined in rare perfection discretion and enthusiasm, caution and energy. He was peculiarly marked by that inventive craftiness, which forms one of the leading traits of the Phœnician character; he was fond of taking singular and unexpected routes; ambushes and stratagems of all sorts were familiar to him; and he studied the character of his antagonists with unprecedented care. By an unrivalled system of espionage—he had spies even

in Rome—he kept himself informed of the projects of the enemy; he himself was frequently seen wearing disguises and false hair, in order to procure information on some point or other. Every page of the history of the period attests his genius as a general; and his gifts as a statesman were, after the peace with Rome, no less conspicuously displayed in his reform of the Carthaginian constitution, and in the unparalleled influence which, as a foreign exile, he exercised in the cabinets of the Eastern powers. The power which he wielded over men is shown by his incomparable control over an army of various nations and many tongues—an army which never in the worst times mutinied against him. He was a great man; wherever he went, he riveted the eyes of all.”

The current belief that the policy of Rome towards the republics of Greece was from the outset an aggressive one, designed to encroach upon their rights and crush their independence, is warmly combated by Mommsen. After describing the proclamation of freedom for the Greek states by Flaminius in 196, he says:

“ It is only contemptible disingenuousness or weakly sentimentality, which can fail to perceive that the Romans were entirely in earnest in the liberation of Greece; and the reason why the plan so nobly projected resulted in so wretched a structure, is to be sought only in the complete moral and political disorganization of the Hellenic people. It was no small matter, that a mighty nation should have suddenly, with its powerful arm, brought the land, which it had been accustomed to regard as its primitive home and the shrine of its intellectual and higher interests, into the possession of full freedom, and should have conferred on every community in it deliverance from foreign taxation and foreign garrisons, and the unlimited right of self-government; it is mere paltriness that sees in this nothing save political calculation. Political calculation suggested to the Romans the possibility of liberating Greece; it was converted into a reality by the Hellenic sympathies that were at that time indescribably powerful in Rome, and above all in Flaminius himself. If the Romans are liable to any reproach, it is that all of them, and in particular Flaminius, who overcame the well-founded scruples of the senate, allowed the magic charm of the Hellenic name to prevent them from perceiving in all its extent the wretched character of the Greek states of that period, and from putting a stop at once to the proceedings of communities who, owing to the antipathies that prevailed alike in their internal and their mutual relations, neither knew how to act nor how to keep quiet. What was really necessary, as things stood, was at once to put an end to such a freedom, equally pitiful and pernicious, by means of a superior power permanently present on the spot; the feeble policy of sentiment, with all its apparent humanity, was far more cruel than the sternest occupation would have been.”

The volume closes with a series of chapters on “the government and the governed,” on “the management of land and of capital,” on “faith and manners,” on “literature and art,”—which represent with masterly skill and power the social and intellectual conditions of the Romans during this period. From the last of these chapters we quote an impressive passage on the later

Attic comedy, which, as adapted to the Roman stage by Plautus, Terence, and others, forms the staple of the Roman comic drama:

“The national-Hellenic poetry has preserved, even in this its last creation, its indestructible plastic vigor; but the delineation of character is here copied from without rather than reproduced from inward experience, and the more so, the more the task approaches the really poetical. * * * Yet the blame of this want of depth in the portraying of character, and generally of the whole poetical and moral hollowness of this new comedy, lay less with the comic writers than with the nation as a whole. Every thing distinctively Greek was expiring; fatherland, national faith, domestic life, all nobleness of action and sentiment were gone; poetry, history, and philosophy were inwardly exhausted; and nothing remained to the Athenian save the school, the fish-market, and the brothel. It is no matter of wonder, and hardly a matter of blame, that poetry, whose office it is to shed a glory over human existence, could make nothing more out of such a life than the Menandrian comedy presents to us. * * * It is not a reproach to the poet that he occupies the level of his epoch. Comedy was not the cause, but the effect of the corruption that prevailed in the national life. But it is necessary, more especially with a view to estimate correctly the influence of these comedies on the life of the Roman people, to point out the abyss that yawned beneath all that polish and elegance. The coarseness and obscenities, which Menander, indeed, in some measure avoided, but of which there is no lack in the other poets, are the least part of the evil. Features far worse are, the dreadful aspect of life as a desert in which the only oases are love-making and intoxication; the fearful prosaic monotony, in which any thing resembling enthusiasm is to be found only among sharpers whose heads have been turned by their own swindling, and who prosecute the trade of cheating with some sort of zeal; and above all, that immoral morality with which the pieces of Menander in particular are garnished—Vice is chastised, virtue is rewarded, and any peccadilloes are covered by conversion at or after marriage. There are pieces, such as the *Trinummus* of Plautus and several of Terence, in which all the characters down to the slaves possess some admixture of virtue; all swarm with honest men who allow deception on their behalf, with maidenly virtue whenever possible, with lovers equally favored and making love in company; moral commonplaces and well-turned ethical maxims abound. A finale of reconciliation, such as that of the *Bacchides*, where the swindling sons and the swindled fathers, by way of a good conclusion, all go to carouse together in the brothel, presents a corruption of morals thoroughly worthy of Kotzebue.”

THE LIFE OF MISS MITFORD,* as told by herself in these volumes of letters to her friends, was a very sad life, darkened by constant shadows, which were as constantly lighted up by the perpetual sunshine of a buoyant and kindly nature. On the Thursday before her death, which was in distinct and near prospect, she thus wrote to a friend. “It has pleased Providence to preserve to

* *The Life of Mary Russell Mitford*, told by herself in letters to her friends. Edited by the Rev. A. G. K. L'ESTRANGE. In two volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1870.

me my calmness of mind, clearness of intellect, and also my power of reading by day and by night ; and, which is still more, my love of poetry and literature, my cheerfulness, and my enjoyment of little things. This very day, not only my common pensioners, the dear robins, but a saucy troop of sparrows, and a little shining bird of passage whose name I forget, have all been pecking at once at their tray of bread-crumbs outside the window. Poor pretty things ! how much delight there is in those common objects, if people but learn to enjoy them : and I really think that the feeling for these simple pleasures is increasing with the increase of education."

This letter, written at the age of sixty-seven, gives expression to certain prominent traits of character, such as were conspicuous in many of her writings. But they do scant justice to the more serious and noble traits of filial devotion and self-sacrifice, of constant and painful labor and sorrow—of sustained patience and sweetness under constant mortification, and of an honest religious peace and faith, long-delayed, but given at last when it was most needed. Few of the many who will read this life will fail to be the wiser for the reading, though all may well be the sadder. The multitudes who were delighted at the first and cheerful pictures which this merry writer gave them of nature and society in rural England, did not dream that these sketches were written under a constant pressure of sorrow, but those who learn the painful secret, will not admire the writer or her works any the less for this discovery, though they will wonder at both the more. The moral value of this collection of letters is of the highest, and it is still more highly to be praised in our country than in England, inasmuch as not a few of our gifted writers are somewhat morbidly disposed to cherish discontent and envy, under what they call their ill-requited services. In other respects than as they give us so ample a revelation of a very noble character and so beautiful and truthful a picture of a truly noble life, they will be variously estimated by different persons, according to the point of view from which they study them. Some will regard them as overloaded with petty personal and domestic details, as super-abounding in the small gossip concerning men and events that are now deservedly forgotten—a representation of a state of society which was in many respects more frivolous and petty than that which has happily taken its place in similar circles. Others will not agree with many of the personal preferences of the writer, as her de-

voted admiration for Napoleon, O'Connell, and Cobbett, and her equally unreasonable dislike of all descriptions of Conservatives and Tories. Her critical estimates of authors and their works, both living and dead, will be positively and sorely offensive to not a few. Their occasional capriciousness and superficiality will be more scandalous in the eyes of many men. She says hard things and pungent things of the works of Thackeray, Dickens, of Mrs. Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, and is not always complimentary to Walter Scott or Wordsworth, to both of whom she became more than reconciled at a subsequent period. But none of her caprices and prejudices and dislikes are malicious or inveterate, and all bear the marks of an honest, if it be a hasty mind, of an impulsive but true-hearted temper. One of the most interesting of her loves was that which she cherished for Miss Barrett, afterwards Mrs. Browning. The letters which she addressed to her, and the terms in which she spoke of her in her letters to others, are altogether delightful. To one class of readers these volumes may be of special service, as they will be likely to be of special interest to them—to the not few female writers of every grade in which this country abounds, and the very much more numerous class of female *littérateurs*, with which perhaps we super-abound. The lessons of wisdom, of patience, and hope which they inculcate for all such, will suggest themselves to every reader. Many blessings must follow the memory of so bright an example of brilliant and varied talents, consecrated to filial duty.

LIFE OF JAMES HAMILTON, D.D.*—The author of the "*Royal Preacher*" was himself a man of rich and royal mind, to whom nothing was too great and nothing too small in God's works for him to love. He was like the "Preacher" of old, conversant with every tree and plant, from the cedar of Lebanon to the hyssop that runneth on the wall. While yet a young man ministering to his rural flock at Abernyte, he was in the habit of carrying the wild flowers he had gathered on the way into the pulpit, and of expatiating upon them, much to the wonderment of his stern, old fashioned Scotch hearers; and on one occasion, having obtained possession of the big branch of a fig tree he used it to illustrate a scriptural lesson. A plain woman from a neighboring parish, full of fervid zeal for spiritual things, seeing the young preacher

* *Life of James Hamilton, D.D., F.L.S.* By WILLIAM ARNOT, Edinburgh. Second Edition. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1870.

flourishing his branch of green leaves above his head, was seized with a holy horror, and, after the sermon, waiting in the aisle for him to come down from the pulpit, she thus accosted him: "Oh Maister Hamilton, hoo do ye gie them fig leaves when they're hungerin for the bread of life." But Master Hamilton had something more than fig leaves to give his hearers; as a fruitful ministry of twenty-six years at the National Scotch Church, Regent Street, London,—the most important Presbyterian church south of the Tweed—might testify. Yet, eminent preacher as he was, perhaps he did more for the world by his pen, as a writer of tracts, essays, and short biographies, such as *Church in the House*, *Memoir of Lady Colquhoun*, *Our Christian Classics*, and above all, *The Royal Preacher*, which works have been extensively read in this country. His biographer, noticing this fact, says "it would not have been amiss, all circumstances considered, if our brothers beyond the Atlantic had *felt in their pockets* for the author of works they so much admired."

A contemporary and personal friend of Robert McCheyne and Edward Irving, he had something of his own—a tireless energy in doing good, and a literary genius of considerable power—to make him worthy of such companionship. His fresh love of nature and his vivid poetic fancy, vitalizing what he wrote, were his chief qualities as a writer. Genial, cheerful, sagacious, ardent, energetic, devoted, he filled an important place in the religious world, without being a man of extraordinary powers. This volume is a handsome one, and is accompanied by a good portrait.

MEMOIR OF REV. WILLIAM C. BURNS.*—In much the same style as the above volume, the Carters have just brought out a reprint of the biography of the saintly Scotch missionary, William Burns. A characteristic portrait of Burns, in his Chinese dress, adorns the volume. Burns was a life-long friend of James Hamilton's, and the two were brought up in neighboring parishes. He was also a friend of Robert Murray McCheyne's, and the first part of his life belongs to that circle of remarkable revivals of re-

* *Memoir of the Rev. Wm. C. Burns, M. A.*, Missionary to China from the English Presbyterian Church. By the REV. ISLAY BURNS, D.D., Professor of Theology, Free Church College, Glasgow.

"Watch those in all things, endure afflictions (or hardships), do the work of an evangelist, make full proof of thy ministry." 2 Tim. 4-5.

New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1870.

ligion in Dundee, Perth, and the north of Scotland, of which Dundee and McChayne formed the center. The life of Burns may, in fact, be divided into two distinct periods—the one, that of revival preacher, and the other, that of a foreign missionary. In his first capacity he visited Ireland and Canada. His preaching was attended with many of the powerful manifestations that signaled the preaching of Whitefield and Wesley. He endured the rage of men and of mobs. His preaching, whose effects in some instances were like those that followed the preaching of the apostle Peter, is thus described by one who knew him intimately: “He had no pathos, no fancy, little natural enthusiasm, and not much that could be called natural eloquence; but he had a firm grasp of gospel truth, a capacity for clear and forcible statement, and a voice capable of commanding any audience, however large, in the church, in the street, in the field; and when the power of the Spirit rested upon him, there were the thunders of Sinai in all their terrors, the still small voice of the gospel in much of its tenderness, the fervent fluency of a tongue touched with a live coal from the altar, the irrepressible urgency of one standing between the living and the dead, the earnest pressing of salvation that would accept no refusal; himself standing consciously and evidently in the presence of the great God, with heaven, and hell, and the souls of men, open before him, with Jesus Christ filling his heart with his love and pouring grace into his lips, and with multitudes before him weeping for sorrow over discovered sin, or for joy in a discovered Saviour.” But he was pledged to the missionary work, having formally offered himself at the age of twenty-four to go to Hindustan. Following out his early impulse, at the age of thirty-two, still a young man in years, though worn with manifold labors and journeyings for the cause of Christ, he embarked for China, to commence, as he regarded it, his real work of life. He plunged into that great empire, as if single-handed he expected to conquer it for his Master. He was all things to all men, that he might win some to Christ. He put off the European, and became, in all but his Christian heart, a Chinese. His method of operations was highly primitive and apostolic. Having learned the language, he preached, as he had opportunity, directly to the people, sometimes quite alone, or accompanied in his journeyings and boat excursions by a single native helper. But we refer the reader to the book itself, which deserves to stand by the side of Dr. Wayland’s *Life of Judson*—the two men not

being dissimilar in their energy of faith. Both were holy men, consecrated to a holy work. "Of the results of his work in the Chinese field, it is difficult to speak. Undoubtedly his life there was far more powerful as an influence than an agency. It was not so much by what he said or by what he did, as by what he was, that he made his presence felt over so wide a surface of that vast land." In these days, when the work of foreign missions seems to languish, the example of this fearless Pauline missionary is stimulating and salutary.

BELLES LETTRES.

TENNYSON'S HOLY GRAIL, AND OTHER POEMS.*—The mediæval legends of the Arthurian cycle seem to have had a peculiar interest and attraction for the mind of Tennyson. It is said that in his youth he formed the plan of composing an epic poem, extended and comprehensive, with King Arthur for its hero. In the collection of his poems published in 1843, there was a piece entitled "Morte d' Arthur," which was understood to be a fragment of the intended epic, and destined to form, in whole or in part, its closing canto. But nearly thirty years have passed, and the brilliant piece is still only a fragment. Perhaps the poet found his subject wanting in the unity of action and interest required for epic composition. Perhaps he distrusted himself, doubting whether his powers of construction and development were sufficient for a great narrative poem. At all events, he has contented himself with working up detached incidents and episodes of the great story. Four of these, entitled "Enid," "Vivien," "Elaine," and "Guinevere," make up the book called "Idylls of the King," which appeared in 1859. And now four others, "The Coming of Arthur," "The Holy Grail," "Pelleas and Ettarre," and "The Passing of Arthur," are found in the volume before us, and form about three-fourths of its contents. Only the last of these pieces is not wholly new; it consists of the "Morte d' Arthur," just mentioned, with a prefixed description of the battle in Lyonesse, that last weird battle in the West," ending with the single combat of Arthur and Modred, in which the latter is slain outright, and the former mortally wounded.

The maxim that "to the pure all things are pure" is strikingly

* *The Holy Grail, and other Poems.* By ALFRED TENNYSON, D. C. L., Poet Laureate. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1870. 12mo. pp. 202.

illustrated in our poet's treatment of these Arthurian legend: The easy-going morality of the mediæval story-tellers, their light tone of mockery, their gay and *riant* disregard of moral restraint—all this disappears under the hands of the modern reciter. Here the moral element is uppermost. The pleasant vices of men meet with no indulgence or tenderness. The ruinous effects of lawless passion are painted in the darkest colors. The very conception of his theme makes the poet a preacher of righteousness. It is the grand aim of his royal hero to be the founder of a society in which purity, justice, equity, charity, and every other virtue shall be exercised and exemplified, which shall redress all injuries, reform all abuses, and change the face of the world. Such was the purpose of his Round Table, "that goodliest fellowship of famous knights, whereof this world holds record." But this hoped-for paradise was lost through the weakness of its English Queen Guinevere was the loveliest and most gracious of mortal women; but she could not appreciate the transcendent greatness and nobleness of her lord, and had no sympathy for his lofty and far-reaching aims. Her affections became fixed upon Lancelot, the stoutest of Arthur's knights, a man brave and generous-minded, capable of high aspiration, capable of keen remorse, but without moral energy and steadiness. The guilty passion of Lancelot and Guinevere is the fatal cancer which eats away the strength and soundness of the Arthurian society, and at last destroys its existence.

Among the legends of the Round Table there is one which by its own nature is specially adapted to moral uses, such as our poet has in view. We refer to the story of the Holy Grail, the cup used by our Lord in his institution of the Eucharist,—or, as Sir Percivale describes it, when, having exchanged the helmet for a cowl, he tells the story to an old brother of his convent:

"The cup, the cup itself, from which our Lord
 Drank at the last sad supper with his own.
 This, from the blessed land of Aromat—
 After the day of darkness, when the dead
 Went wandering o'er Moriah, the good saint,
 Arimathæan Joseph, journeying brought
 To Glastonbury, where the winter thorn
 Blossoms at Christmas, mindful of our Lord.
 And there awhile it bode; and if a man
 Could touch or see it, he was heal'd at once,

By faith, of all his ills ; but then the times
Grew to such evil that the Holy cup
Was caught away to Heaven and disappear'd."

When it chanced that a holy nun, sister of Percivale, had an
inspired vision of the Grail, and, by reporting this, excited the
hope that the lost treasure might be recovered, "and all the
ill be healed." Then a sudden and strange appearance awak-
ened the enthusiasm of Arthur's knights, and the best among them
swore a vow to spend a twelvemonth and a day in quest of the
Grail. Arthur, who was not present at the time, heard of
it with disapproval and regret, foreseeing the dangers and
trials that would come of it, but did not interfere to prevent the
fulfilment of the vow. In the quest which followed, the only suc-
cessful seekers were Galahad, Percivale, Bors, and Lancelot. The
latter, on account of his secret sin, obtained only a troubled and
faint glimpse of the object sought. Galahad, the maiden
knight, whose heart was pure, enjoyed the fullness of the beati-
tude, but with it passed away from earth into the heavenly
land. Percivale, who followed him, and had a distant view of
the Grail, lost all relish for an earthly life and resolved to spend
his remaining days in a cloister. In describing the adventures of
these knights, our author has lavished all his wealth of imagina-
tion and expression. We quote the ending of Galahad, as told by
his companion, Percivale :

"There rose a hill that none but man could climb,
Scarred with a hundred wintry watercourses.—
Storm at the top, and, when we gain'd it, storm
Round us and death ; for every moment glanced
His silver arms and gloom'd : so quick and thick
The lightnings here and there to left and right
Struck, till the dry old trunks about us, dead,
Yea, rotten with a hundred years of death,
Sprang into fire ; and at the base we found
On either hand, as far as eye could see,
A great black swamp and of an evil smell,
Part black, part whitened with the bones of men,
Not to be crost save that some ancient king
Had built a way, where, linked with many a bridge,
A thousand piers ran into the Great Sea.
And Galahad fled along them bridge by bridge,
And every bridge as quickly as he crost
Sprang into fire and vanished, tho' I yearn'd

To follow ; and thrice above him all the heavens
 Open'd and blazed with thunder such as seem'd
 Shoutings of all the sons of God ; and first
 At once I saw him far on the great sea,
 In silver-shining armor starry-clear ;
 * * * * * *

And o'er his head the holy vessel hung
 Redder than any rose, a joy to me,
 For now I knew the veil had been withdrawn.
 Then in a moment when they blazed again
 Opening, I saw the host of little stars
 Down on the waste, and straight beyond the star
 I saw the spiritual city and all her spires
 And gateways in a glory like one pearl,
 No larger, tho' the goal of all the saints,
 Strike from the sea ; and from the star there shot
 A rose-red sparkle to the city, and there
 Dwelt, and I knew it was the Holy Grail,
 Which never eyes on earth again shall see."

It is evident that in this quest of the Holy Grail, Tennyson intends to symbolize the conduct of those who forsake the tasks that lie in their path, the necessary labors of life and society, to pursue a distant and lofty good, a virtue and excellence beyond the reach of common men. All who seek salvation for themselves or for the world by turning aside from the honest, faithful discharge of immediate and clearly indicated duties, may lay to heart the teachings of this poem. These teachings are best seen in the closing words of King Arthur:

" And spake I not too truly, O my knights ?
 Was I too dark a prophet, when I said
 To those who went upon the Holy Quest
 That most of them would follow wandering fires,
 Lost in the quagmire,—lost to me and gone,
 And left me gazing at a barren board,
 And a lean order—scarce return'd a tithe—
 And out of those to whom the vision came
 My greatest hardly will believe he saw ;
 Another hath beheld it afar off,
 And leaving human wrongs to right themselves,
 Cares but to pass into the silent life.
 And one hath had the vision face to face,
 And now his chair desires him here in vain,
 However they may crown him elsewhere.
 And some among you hold that if the king
 Had seen the sight he would have sworn the vow :

Not easily, seeing that the king must guard
 That which he rules, and is but as the hind
 To whom a space of land is given to plough,
 Who may not wander from the allotted field
 Before his work be done ; but, being done,
 Let visions of the night or of the day
 Come, as they will ; and many a time they come,
 Until this earth he walks on seems not earth,
 This light that strikes his eye-ball is not light,
 This air that smites his forehead is not air
 But vision."——

There has been of late a good deal of discussion as to whether Tennyson is really a great poet. A critic in the (London) *Quarterly Review* has undertaken to reduce the poet to his true dimensions. He finds him not to be a master in science and philosophy, and says that when he touches on social and political questions, he does it with much candor but little success. It can hardly be expected, even of great poets, that they should be present in these departments. But if it be the poet's duty to "touch what main currents draw the age" (the language is Tennyson's), we think that few have discharged it more faithfully and fully. The tendencies of advanced thought and the movements of society in the present age are, it seems to us, reflected with extraordinary vividness and force in some of his poems, particularly the marvellous "In Memoriam." That he does not stand aloof from the social progress of the time is abundantly shown by the "Princess:" twenty-five years ago, when as yet the *woman's* question was scarcely heard of, he felt its coming power and importance. But the critic to whom we refer has a heavier charge to bring. Tennyson, he tells us, is wanting in dramatic power. Are many of England's great poets are not liable to the same censure? Not Spenser, certainly, nor Milton (though some of his works are dramatic in form), nor Byron, nor Wordsworth. There are many who regard Browning as a dramatic genius; but his introspective monologues in which his persons go through a process of self-dissection, an elaborate analysis of their feelings and motives, are very different from those truly dramatic works where persons manifest their characters unconsciously in words and actions. That Tennyson does not regard himself as gifted with dramatic faculty may be presumed from the fact that, while he has exercised his powers in many directions, he has abstained wholly from dramatic composition. But one who had not a profound insight

into the human heart could never have written "In Memoriam." We find in that poem many passages where evanescent or rudimentary feelings are represented with a matchless subtlety of apprehension and expression. As we read it, we learn to know ourselves; we recognize states of mind that have belonged to our own past experience, but were so obscure, shadowy, undeveloped, that we were never properly conscious of their existence.

There is a place, doubtless, for negative criticism. It is proper to point out the deficiencies even of the greatest minds. But it is more gracious, more instructive, more useful, to criticise them from the positive side, to acknowledge and appreciate what is valuable in their works. What have they given to the world? What elements of truth and beauty, what sources of enjoyment or incitement, have they added to the common stock? Let the critic look at Tennyson in this way, duly considering the variety of his works both in substance and in form, considering their finish of workmanship, their perfection of rhythm, their condensed fullness of meaning, their moral elevation and purity; and, if he thinks as we do, he will conclude that, with the exception of Shakespeare, no English poet has been on the whole more richly endowed, or has left a more precious legacy to after times. Many, we know, will regard this as a most exaggerated estimate. We cannot here debate the point, even if any debate could be expected to give a result which all would accept. We will content ourselves with giving one more extract, taken from "The Passing of Arthur;" and if any one, having read it attentively, thinks that any but a great poet could have written it, we shall be willing to differ from him in opinion.

"Then rose the king and moved his host by night,
And ever push'd Sir Modred. league by league,
Back to the sunset bound of Lyonesse,
A land of old upheaven from the abyss
By fire, to sink into the abyss again;
Where fragments of forgotten peoples dwelt,
And the long mountain ended in a coast
Of ever-shifting sand, and far away
The phantom circle of a moaning sea.
There the pursuer could pursue no more,
And he that fled no further fly the king;
And then, that day, when the great light of heaven
Burn'd at his lowest in the rolling year,
On the waste sand by the waste sea they closed.

Nor ever yet had Arthur fought a fight
 Like this last, dim, weird battle of the West.
 A death-white mist slept over sand and sea :
 Whereof the chill, to him who breathed it, drew
 Down with his blood, till all his heart was cold
 With formless fear, and ev'n on Arthur fell
 Confusion, since he saw not whom he fought,
 For friend and foe were shadows in the mist,
 And friend slew friend, not knowing whom he slew ;
 And some had visions out of golden youth,
 And some beheld the faces of old ghosts
 Look in upon the battle ; and in the mist
 Was many a noble deed, many a base."

THE EARTHLY PARADISE—PART III.*—Here is Mr. Morris's second volume, with only half the number of stories that the first contained. He promises another to complete the full set of two each month in the year. What a marvel of productive power he can any other poet be named who would undertake such a task and perform it so successfully? The very promise to versify these ancient tales, and to supply a fixed number of them without losing hold on the interest of his readers, has some hardihood in it. Would Scott have ventured to predict the number of the *Waverley* novels, or Tennyson that of the *Idylls of the King*? Not less to be admired than this confidence is the success which justifies it. Readers of poetry know what the first volume was, and we can only assure them that they need not fear disappointment in going to the second. The skill in selection, the variety of treatment, the simple, steady progress of narrative, the delicate, sympathetic introduction of ancient stories, the purity and power of feeling—are here as they were there. But in this second instalment the portion of classic to Norse stories is changed. Only 88 pages of 382, if we may be pardoned for having counted, are given to the Greek myths, and they seem to us less valuable than the others. Yet the first one of all, the *Death of Paris*, we could not leave out, and the third one, the story of *Rhodope*, unclassical as it is in tone, carries the reader on with singular fascination and will linger long in his memory. If any one will look at the original story in a few lines of Strabo copied by *Ælian*, he will see on a slight hint Mr. Morris has built up this striking poem. It suggests the story of *Cinderella* by the main feature of its plot,

The Earthly Paradise. A Poem. By WILLIAM MORRIS, author of "*The Life and Death of Jason.*" Part III. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1870.

yet how unlike is the strange character it develops. A woman of perfect beauty in a lowly home, living her daily life in a cold, mechanical way, inspiring love in many hearts yet returning it not at all except in scant measure to her old father, a puzzle to others and to herself, and all because she has a mysterious consciousness that she is destined for a higher life—is it not a strange conception? It seems almost an allegory of the conflict between love and ambition. To us the most perfect work of art in all the book is the description of the killing of Paris in the first two pages. The picture of the Greek and Trojan armies, tired of the war and only keeping it alive by skirmishing, the gloomy discouragement of the Greeks, the awkward coming out of Philoktetes, the aimlessness of his shooting, the contrast between him and the dainty warrior whom he slays in the very feathers of their arrows, the weather itself in sympathy with the deed,—such things make the narrative wonderfully vivid and impressive. It strikes us as Homeric; there can be no higher praise.

When we turn to the Norse stories in this volume, we find ourselves in a very different world. The first and second have the same character that marked most of those in the first volume. A sort of magic rules in them, quite different from the supernatural action of the gods in Greek myths. In both appears the dream of a union of man with beings of another race, that wide-spread idea which shows the power of our desire to penetrate the mystery of the invisible world about us. In both too we find in different forms the deep feeling of unsatisfied longing which breathes in all modern literature. In each a man is put on probation, to show whether he can deny himself present gratification; he fails and loses all his happiness. He fails because he has not

“The calm, wise heart that knoweth how to rest,
The heart too kind to snatch out at the best,
Since it is part of all, each thing a part
Beloved alike of that wide-loving heart.”

And what is the “land east of the sun?” Is it not the land to which at first John was taken by his love? Is it not the unattainable land of our dreams, the “Earthly Paradise” itself? The last story in the book is the one which will probably most interest the majority of Mr. Morris’s readers, because it is the most real and human. It is a story of Iceland life at the time of the introduction there of Christianity. There is no magic in it. It is a plain story of human love and hate, with the wildness of the race and

the time, but with the nobility and tenderness of the men and women of the North in it too. It reminds one, in spite of the many points of difference, of the story of King Arthur and Guinevere. Both spring from the same general stock; both show nearly the same ideals of human character. Both are healthier reading than the morbid fantastic novels of our day.

Who will tell us whence Mr. Morris draws his Norse stories? No one of his reviewers condescends to so much pedantry, so far as we have seen. Yet we confess we should be very glad to be told. Are they all to be found in the "folk-lore" of northern Europe, or are they the rich outgrowth of his own Norse-born imagination? The power of invention shown in the prologue to the whole poem, proves him not incapable of producing them, yet we would rather believe that the germs of them all lie somewhere in the mass of stories with which the world delighted and instructed itself in the days of its ignorance. Who will answer our questions?

He who seeks charming stories, told in varied rhythm, for a leisure hour, can find them nowhere better than here. Here is the sensual love of the old world without impurity, the domestic love of the Germanic race without sentimentality; here are mysteries of fate and energies of human will; here are friendship, valor, truth, in all their might; and falsehood, self-seeking, and meanness, in their short-lived power; here is the tangled web of human life as men of all ages have looked upon and wondered at it.

LEIGH HUNT'S "DAY BY THE FIRE, ETC."* proves the words of Charles Lamb concerning him, to be literally true, that he was "matchless as a fire-side companion." The present volume contains almost the last gleanings from various periodicals, as "The Reflector," "The Examiner," "The Indicator," "The London Journal," "The Monthly Chronicle," and "The New Monthly Magazine," and "were written at widely different periods of the author's life—in his early manhood, middle life, and old age." Their topics are as various as the subjects of a midsummer night's dream, and bizarre, grotesque, and amusing, and they are as disconnected with one another. But they are all treated with a similar delicacy of handling—with a touch as light as that of a fairy's pencil, and the odor that is emitted from one and all is as sweet and as evanescent as that which is breathed in a summer's evening. The

* A DAY BY THE FIRE; and other papers, hitherto uncollected, by LEIGH HUNT
Boston: Roberts & Brothers.

mingled humor and wit—the subtle satire and kindness, are as interesting as the graver sentiment of love and duty which underlies many of the seemingly half profane and broadly spoken essays. Leigh Hunt is not to be judged or condemned for an occasional sneer at what he should have more carefully considered and would in that way have better understood. He was remarkable for his purity and elevation, considering the sad set of authors and critics of the Byron school with whom he was so intimately associated. The occasional slips which he makes bear no comparison with that which is good and charitable and soothing—and on the human side, and in the sphere of the minor moralities, is truly Christian.

GOETHE'S "HERMANN AND DOROTHEA."*—Miss Frothingham's translation of the favorite Idyll "Hermann and Dorothea" comes to us in beautiful form, which it well deserves for its skillful execution. To write English hexameters is not an easy task. We are by no means certain that it is any the easier because the original German is in the same measure. So far as we have compared the translation with the original, we find it not only faithful, but very dexterously composed, and the English is certainly as smooth and well chosen as could be conceived possible. Such a work is a positive addition to our literature, as it will give pleasure and tears to many readers, young and old. The simplicity, truthfulness, the wisdom and tenderness, of the poem will win many hearts.

AUERBACH'S WORKS.†—Leypoldt & Holt seem to be the legitimate and authorized American publishers of the tales of the celebrated Auerbach, which are now well known to multitudes of readers in our country. The *Villa on the Rhine* is a novel of great power in its description of scenery and its portraiture of character. We must confess, while we own its power and recog-

* *Goethe's Hermann and Dorothea.* Translated by ELLEN FROTHINGHAM. With Illustrations. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1870.

† *The Villa on the Rhine.* By BERTHOLD AUERBACH. Author's edition with a portrait of the Author, and a Biographical Sketch. By BAYARD TAYLOR. Two Volumes. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869.

‡ *Black Forest Village Stories.* By BERTHOLD AUERBACH. Translated by CHARLES GOEPP. Author's edition. Illustrated with facsimiles of the original German Woodcuts. New York: Leypoldt & Holt. 1869.

nize the genius of the writer, that we think it strained and sensational. It must seem much more so we believe to ordinary readers, were it not for its comprehensive and consistent philosophy. This philosophy is manifest upon every page, and made the controlling motive of almost every incident. The dialogues abound in the emphatic utterance and the elaborate defense of this subtle and yet passionately held doctrine, which evidently controls the faith and the devotion of its very able author. The leading characters whom Auerbach reverences in his heart of hearts, are Spinoza, Goethe, Franklin, and Theodore Parker. The American incidents, and character, and *dénouement*, give abundant occasion for reference to the last two. The philosophical and poetical life of this deep thinking and strong feeling writer is nourished by the former two.

The doctrine and tendency of the book is summed up briefly in a passage from his favorite hero: "Over against monarchy, aristocracy, monotheism, stand the republic, democracy, pantheism. They are merely three different names for three phases of the same principle." Upon the possible evil that may come of the influence of tales like this, we have no occasion to comment, for comment is unnecessary.

"The Black Forest Village Stories" are simple, homely, full of pathos and affection. And yet fair and charming as are these tales, there now and then emerges the tokens of the same defective, and worse than defective, practical philosophy, which is so obtrusive in "The Villa on the Rhine."

MISCELLANEOUS.

NEW EDITION OF THE ÆNEID.*—This volume contains only the first six books of the Æneid. The general plan of the work is worthy of being well carried out. It includes a brief account of the life and writings of Virgil; a map of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, from the Tigris on the east to Numidia on the west; the text; a Metrical Index; from fifty to sixty pages of explanatory notes, and a full Latin-English Lexicon. So far it

* *The Æneid of Publius Virgilius Maro*, elucidated by English notes, critical, historical and mythological, with a metrical Index and Map; and illustrated by antique statues, gems, coins, and medals. To which is added a copious dictionary, giving the meaning of all the words with critical exactness. BY NATHAN COVINGTON BROOKS LL.D., President of the Baltimore Female College. First edition. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen, & Haffelfinger. 1869.

does not differ materially from other editions of Virgil. But there are two other features of the work which give it a marked character, and which are adapted to add greatly to its value. The first is a copious addition of references in the margin of the text to similar or illustrative phrases in other parts of Virgil and in Homer, Horace, Juvenal, Lucretius, Livy, Cæsar, and twenty other authors in various languages, ancient and modern. The other and most striking peculiarity of the book is its illumination with more than two hundred and fifty engravings, drawn from the treasures of classical archæology. Most of these engravings are of a size which permits them to appear, as they do, among the marginal references by the side of the text. Others are larger and freer compositions, representing mythological or historical scenes, or groups of Roman celebrities.

It is by no means a new thing to make use of the remains of ancient art to illustrate classical authors, but we do not remember to have seen any other work of the kind in which such engravings were by any means so numerous. We anticipate, however, a constantly increasing use of the engraver's art, as a help in conveying classical knowledge. Quite probably the Latin lexicons of the next generation will be "illustrated with 3,000 engravings," after the manner of Webster.

But it is easy to do more harm than good by attempts of this kind. What is wanted is not a good picture-book, but knowledge, and help in acquiring knowledge. This may be either the knowledge of what the men of classical times believed to be true, or the knowledge of what was true. They believed in their mythology and embodied it in their works of art; and it is worth while for us to know the length and breadth of this belief and all their forms of mythological representation. But mythological characters should be distinguished from historical characters, except where early history runs back into myths; and even then we should take care not to confound a daring fancy with well established fact. Ancient art gives us, for instance, beyond a doubt, tolerably correct likenesses of the Cæsars. Their statues and busts, and bas-reliefs on coins and elsewhere, are so numerous and well preserved, that an American interested in antiquities in Rome becomes more familiar with their features in a few weeks than he has ever been with the faces of our successive presidents. Now these likenesses, copied with some good degree of correctness, may well be introduced into such a book as the manual before us, where, however,

they are valuable only as they are correctly given. But what does the learner gain, on the other hand, from the group of portraits on the 173d page, where the engraver seems to have expended his choicest skill in setting before us the seven kings of Rome? Even the existence of these kings is denied, and there is probably no man in the world bold enough to claim that any likeness of any one of them is to be found anywhere. It may be said, to be sure, that they are represented in the works of ancient art. So also ancient art has preserved to us, in one of its finest works, the wolf that suckled Romulus and Remus. But who would think of copying out of that celebrated bronze group at the Roman capital this wolf, as a likeness of the particular beast which nurtured young Rome? or of presenting the face of either of those bronze babies as a correct representation of the infant Romulus or Remus, although the Romans may have called them by those names for centuries? On the other hand, it would be quite a proper thing to give a picture of the whole of this ancient work of art on some page of an edition of Virgil, because it embodies one of the early historical myths which the Romans used to repeat.

The confusion which we criticise as marring the most attractive feature of this school book, and which runs in a measure through the volume, appears further from the fact that the same persons are differently represented in different parts of the book, and without explanation. This would be quite legitimate in the case of divinities, who appear in varying characters. But compare the Julius Cæsar on page 26 with the same on page 171, or on page 174. Or compare the Augustus on page page 171 with the same on page 236; or the Numa on page 172 with the same personage as he appears, back to back, with Romulus in that unique group of kings on page 173.

We must add a word on the engravings themselves. The best of these are such as are done in outline, or with the fewest lines. But of those which are most elaborated, many have caught a look so modern, as they have passed under the engraver's hand, that we cannot give them the names to which they are assigned without a lively sense of the ludicrous. Think of such an Ajax as figures on the 18th page! or such a god of the fierce winds as Æolus is represented to be on page 19! or impute majesty, even under the waters, to such a Neptune as holds the trident on page 22, or

to such a feeble figure as represents the *maxima Juno* on page 105!

But our readers must not suppose that all such richness of illustration is wasted. The coins, although they are left without much explanation, are adapted to stimulate inquiry, and familiarize the learner with some of the material of a very interesting science, and he will also find instruction in the representations of the implements of war and of religion, and of the emblems which distinguish the various divinities. We only wish that the editor had rejected all that seems to have been introduced merely to multiply ornament and had used instead more of the really instructive material which classical archæology so abundantly furnishes. Such illustrations, presented in an unambitious style, would have added much to the real value, and no less to the attractiveness of the volume.

We had it in mind to notice some other points which have attracted our attention, but will only add that the book is beautifully printed on tinted paper, and is withal of very attractive appearance.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON'S "SOCIETY AND SOLITUDE" ETC., needs no word of ours to extol its many excellencies or to bespeak a welcome from our readers. The other topics, besides that which is the title of this volume of Essays, are Civilization, Art, Eloquence, Domestic Life, Farming, Works and Days, Books, Clubs, Courage, Success, and Old Age. Some, if not all of these Essays, have been already published. They all have a familiar look and sound, perhaps because of a mannerism which Mr. Emerson, with all his resources of illustration, and with all his freshness of genius, cannot avoid. This mannerism sometimes becomes monotonous, perhaps from the very tension which it indicates in the writer and requires in the reader. For Mr. Emerson, with all his apparent directness and simplicity, is anything rather than a natural thinker and writer. His thoughts seem to fall from his mind like easy and almost unconscious utterances, whereas they are in fact jerked out with an ill-concealed violence and effort. His comparisons and metaphors, though always exciting, and full of interest, are sometimes so extravagant as to be sensational. Mr.

* *Society and Solitude*. Twelve Chapters. By RALPH WALDO EMERSON. Boston: Fields, Osgood, & Co. 1870.

Emerson is not above certain tricks of thought and expression, notwithstanding his apparent Yankee directness and simplicity. Indeed, the Yankee shrewdness is eminent in his quaint remarks on common things, and Yankee humor often twinkles in his eye, especially when he quietly strives to take down characters or opinions for which most people cherish a high esteem, as for example, Moses, and Jesus, and the Bible. Indeed we are not certain, but considering the country in which he lives, and that the people for whom he writes, are somewhat generally reputed to be Christian—Concord, perhaps, being an exception—Mr. Emerson carries this tendency a little too far, and sometimes beyond the limit which good manners, to say nothing of good morals, would perhaps prescribe. We are of course disposed to take into consideration the fact that he has become so satisfied with his own position of philosophic orthodoxy, as to be somewhat pharisaic in respect to the poor publicans who do not so much as lift their eyes to Heaven in the confident manner which he would recommend. We do not suppose he intends to wound the feelings of his unilluminated low-countrymen, and would therefore suggest that it is by this he pretty well understood in the most enlightened circles—which of course are the circles which read his Essays—what he thinks about Jesus and the various scriptural worthies, and that he might as well spare their feelings and be considerate of their prejudices. It seems to us that as a matter of taste, even if the law does not come under the statute *concerning cruelty to imbeciles*, he would consult his own influence and reputation as a writer, should he less obtrusively and less frequently, hoist his theological flag. We might cull out from this volume a score perhaps of passages which can serve no purpose whatever, except to illustrate his own ineffectual protest against popular faith, and to awaken towards himself feelings of neither honor nor respect, because they seem to be so thoroughly gratuitous and uncalled for.

With these abatements, which are no more applicable to this than to his other writings, this volume seems to indicate no falling off in the charm of thinking and writing which always attracts and holds multitudes of admiring readers.

PRINCIPLES OF DOMESTIC SCIENCE.*—This treatise is prompted by the conviction that womankind need special culture for home duties, and that higher honors, larger remuneration, and greater usefulness will surely follow, when women are thoroughly taught the principles of domestic economy, and trained with reference to their profession as “house-keepers and health-keepers.” How far the work may prove serviceable as a text book, we will not predict, though twenty pages of questions and suggestive hints for the use of teachers and scholars, vindicate the desire of the authors that it should be studied and recited in schools; but we are confident that its wide circulation would promote comfort, convenience, economy, and health, especially among people of moderate circumstances, living in small houses, with little or no “help,” and in a frugal way. Its hints on various departments of domestic economy, its suggestions about the necessities of the body and the mind, and its advice about the care of the aged, the sick, the ignorant, the homeless, the helpless, and the vicious, will prove salutary in thousands of families. This, however, is incidental to the design of the authors. They desire to magnify the calling of woman, and to convince or reassure intelligent, reflecting Christian women that it is a noble work which falls to their lot in training the whole race to the highest possible virtue and happiness with chief reference to the future world; and in this aim they have our most cordial sympathy.

ECCE FEMINA.†—Mr. Carlos White’s discussion of “the woman question” is very able and effective. The only objection which we make to his book is its title. The Latin in it, we mean for the epexegetis of the title, is sufficiently explicit and intelligible. Mr. White writes with great honesty, great candor, great patience of analysis, with a certain simple-hearted dispassionateness that is eminently refreshing—and a Yankee-like homeliness which makes

* *Principles of Domestic Science; as applied to the Duties and Pleasures of Home.* A text book for the use of young ladies in schools, seminaries, and colleges. By CATHARINE E. BEECHER and HARRIET BEECHER STOWE. New York: J. B. Ford & Co. 1870. pp. 390.

* *Ecce Femina.* An attempt to solve the woman question. Being an examination of arguments in favor of female suffrage by John Stuart Mill, and a presentation of arguments against the proposed change in the constitution of society. By CARLOS WHITE, Hanover, N. H. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1870.

his arguments home-thrusts against his antagonists. He is evidently a thoroughly honest and earnest man, to whom a joke would be as foreign as to a Scotchman, to whom anything like banter would be an amazing piece of impertinence. He takes up the subject with the confession that for certain solid and substantial reasons he was at first more than half inclined to accept the reform; but on a careful consideration of certain other reasons, which he finds more solid and substantial, he has been compelled to withdraw from all participation in it. The potent name of Mr. John Stuart Mill does not appal him. His arguments do not convince our imperturbable and honest New Englander. He even turns Mr. Mill's own logic against himself, and then proceeds to set forth certain cogent arguments which all the advocates of the opposite opinion would do well to consider, and will find it somewhat difficult to answer. To this contest we must come at last, and we hope Mr. White will find "his mission" in seeing that the republic of the male sex, as well as the republic of collective humanity and our Christian civilization, shall suffer no detriment.

COMMUNION WINE AND BIBLE TEMPERANCE.*—This work has been pretty widely and gratuitously circulated for the sake of convincing the public that the churches are bound to exclude all fermented wine from the Lord's Table. A good cause may be damaged by bad logic. It has been so with the temperance reformation. This book is an illustration. A book so full of misrepresentations, misprints, sophistry, and inconclusive reasoning, we have not lately read. We notice it only to disavow its fallacies. The money of a temperance society might be better spent than in perpetuating a work so weak as this.

* *Communion Wine and Bible Temperance.* By Rev. WILLIAM M. THAYER. New York: National Temperance Society and Publication House. 1869. paper. pp. 90.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS. .

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon, with Notes, critical, explanatory, and practical, designed for both pastors and people. By Rev. Henry Cowles, D. D. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1870. 12mo. pp. 868.

The Ministry in Galilee. By Rev. William Hanna, D. D., LL. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870. 12mo. pp. 860

Beginning Life; Chapters for Young Men on Religion, Study, and Business. By John Tulloch, D. D., Principal and Primarius Professor, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. American Tract Society, New York. 12mo. pp. 268.

Crowned and Discrowned; or, the Rebel King and the Prophet of Ramah. By Rev. S. W. Culver, A. M. With an Introduction by Rev. G. W. Eaton, D. D.; Pres. of the Theological Department of Madison University. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1870. 16mo. pp. 149.

Removing Mountains; Life Lessons from the Gospels. By John S. Hart. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1870. 16mo. pp. 306.

Questions on the Epistle to the Romans, with a theme from each verse. For Bible Classes and Sabbath School Teachers. By John A. Paine, M. D. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1870. 12mo. pp. 228.

A Manual of the Doctrines and Usages of Congregational Churches. Compiled by Rev. J. E. Roy, D. D. Chicago: 1870. 12mo. pp. 48.

Pearls of Wisdom. A Text of Scripture, with an appropriate selection from various authors. For every day in the year. By Rev. Samuel Hutchings. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau street, New York.

Fables of Infidelity and Tracts of Faith. A series of Tracts on the absurdity of Atheism, Pantheism, and Rationalism. By Robert Patterson. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 12mo. pp. 316.

BELLES LETTRES.

Mauprat. A Novel. By George Sand. Translated from the French, by Virginia Vaughan. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1870. 16mo. pp. 324.

The Spanish Barber. A Tale of the Bible in Spain. New York: M. W. Dodd. 1870. 16mo. pp. 309. [This is a new book by the author of "The Maiden and Married Life of Mary Powell, afterwards Mistress Milton."]

Stepping Heavenward. By E. Prentiss, author of the "Susy Books." New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1870. 12mo. pp. 426.

Hedged In. By Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, author of "The Gates Ajar." Boston; Fields, Osgood & Co. 1870. 16mo. pp. 295.

Wonder Stories told for Children. By Hans Christian Andersen. With illustrations by V. Pedersen and M. L. Stone. Author's edition. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1870. 12mo. pp. 555.

Warp and Woof. A Book of Verse. By Samuel Willoughby Duffield. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1870. 12mo. pp. 188.

Home Influence; a Tale for Mothers and Daughters. By Grace Aguilar. New Edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1870. 12mo. pp. 386. [This is the first volume of a new edition of Grace Aguilar's works, to be published in nine volumes, at \$1 per volume.]

The Spencers; A Story of Home Influence. By Rev. Stephen H. Tyng, D. D., Rector of St. George's Church, New York. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York. 1870. 16mo. pp. 588.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Shall our Common Schools be Destroyed? .An argument against the perverting the School-Fund to Sectarian Uses. By Joseph P. Thompson, D. D., LL. D. Delivered in the Broadway Tabernacle Church, Feb. 20, 1870. New York: 8vo. pp. 32.

The Nation; the Foundation of Civil Order and Political Life in the United States. By E. Mulford. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1870.

The Composition of Indian Geographical Names, illustrated from the Algonquin Languages. By J. Hammond Trumbull, President of the Connecticut Historical Society. Hartford: 1870. 8vo. pp. 51.

The Currency. Speech of Hon. W. A. Buckingham, of Connecticut, delivered in the Senate of the United States, Feb. 1, 1870. 8vo. pp. 8.

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ARTICLE I.—ST. FRANCIS AND HIS TIME.

RECENT events have turned the attention of historical students, both in Europe and America, to a review of those periods in the history of the Romish Church that have been most remarkable for their danger and their triumph. Of the different attempts that have been made by the human intellect to rise up against the Roman yoke and throw it off, there are two that may be deemed peculiarly worthy of careful study. The one, that which followed close upon the revival of classical scholarship, and the inventions and discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, is already for the most part well understood. With the other, that which occurred at the moment when Europe was emerging from the darkness of the Middle Ages, and men were showing the first symptoms of intellectual freedom, the world is far less familiar. At a time when so many possibilities are involved in the action of the Council now convened at Rome, it may not be without interest to pass in review

some of the events of that great struggle which took place in the thirteenth century.

One of the most brilliant administrations in the history of the Romish Church was that of Innocent III. Gregory VII., by the boldness of his ambition, did more perhaps to raise the hierarchy to an ascendancy over the secular governments; and, Sixtus V., by the skill with which he conducted his church through the most critical period of its history, earned the right perhaps to be regarded as a still greater statesman. But neither of these embodied in himself so completely all those attributes which are naturally associated with the name Supreme Pontiff, as did he who wore the triple crown and gave law to Christendom at the beginning of the thirteenth century. By the prominence which he gave to the Canons of the Church, by the steadiness with which he insisted upon the binding force of the Decretals, by the unity and coherence of his policy, as well as by the judicious exercise of the enormous power already vested in the pontifical throne, Innocent brought to its culmination that policy of papal ascendancy which for three hundred and fifty years had been slowly revolutionizing the constitution of the Church. That great revolution (for it can be called nothing less) which had begun about the middle of the ninth century with the fabrication of the Isidorian Decretals, and which had found its most powerful support in the forgeries of Gratian, reached its appropriate and complete fruition in the words of Innocent III., when he declared that "Christ had committed the whole world, temporal as well as spiritual, to the government of the Popes."

These extraordinary claims on the part of the pope were not without their influence on the political condition of the different European nationalities. Those who had come to look upon the Pontiff as infallible in all matters of eternal interest, advanced by an easy logic to have full faith in all his assumptions of infallibility in the minor and less difficult affairs of temporal interest. Thus the secular power of the pope came by degrees to be felt in all parts of Europe, and Innocent was able to convert into realities visions of temporal supremacy which had filled the mind of the great Hildebrand.

but which even Hildebrand himself had not been strong enough to realize. He not only succeeded in wrenching an oath of fealty from the temporal officers at Rome, and in bringing under his control several of the imperial provinces of Italy; but also in making the tremendous force of his power felt in every country north of the Alps. In Germany he annulled the election of one Emperor, and raised into the vacant throne another whom he in turn also excommunicated. In France he laid Philip Augustus under an interdict which absolved all French subjects from their allegiance, and which offered the French crown to any one who would take the trouble to accept and defend it. From Baldwin, the conqueror of Constantinople, he received the virtual control of the Eastern Empire, and from the hand of John he accepted that villanage of England which was to blacken forever the name of an English king, and secure the advantages of the Great Charter to the English people.

The boldness with which Innocent thus ventured to bestow kingdoms, and cite princes to his judgment seat, would seem to indicate either that the temporal as well as the spiritual supremacy of the Pontiffs had been established beyond question, or that, as a last desperate throw in a losing game, the pope, having abandoned all hope of convincing his opponents, was determined to stun them into submission by the very audacity of his pretensions.

But however this enormous display of temporal power is to be interpreted, it requires but a glance at the political and religious characteristics of the thirteenth century to see that there were to the church grounds for the most serious alarm. Though the material prosperity of the hierarchy was unabated, there were beginning to germinate in all parts of Christendom certain seeds of discontent. It began to be painfully apparent, not only to the clear intelligence of the pope but also to all the higher officers of the church, that there was need of the greatest wisdom in the administration of her affairs and in the direction of her councils. For it was in this very century that the darkness of the Middle Ages began to disappear. It was during this very reign of Innocent III. that the gray dawn of twilight gave the first promise of modern intelligence

and modern independence. Indeed new methods of thought had already begun to prevail. On every hand there was beginning to manifest itself a spirit with which the church was unacquainted. In every province of Europe the people had caught a spirit of menace which could not be overlooked or ignored. It was that disintegrating spirit which manifested a general distrust of all central authority, and that fraternizing spirit which discovered a universal tendency toward the establishment of free cities and independent brotherhoods. Already there were to be detected the active germs of the commercial cities of Italy. Frankfort and Bruges showed signs of independence; London and Norwich had just come into possession of corporate charters; and the cities of the Hanse were forming the league that was to secure for them centuries of commercial supremacy.

Nor were the independent religious associations of the period less numerous or less important. There was scarcely a corner in Europe in which there was not to be found a group of sectaries. These different groups were distinguished from each other usually by some slight differences of doctrine, but they were all united in their opposition to what they deemed the proud luxury and haughty dominance of their spiritual lords. These individual discontents considered singly would have been deemed of trifling importance, but reduced to an aggregate they afforded just cause of alarm. And the importance to the church of those manifestations was greatly aggravated by the fact that they found freest expression where there was the greatest political independence, and the most active individual intelligence. That such was the case, may be shown by a single illustration.

The most flourishing and civilized portion of Europe at the beginning of the thirteenth century was perhaps the southern part of France. This territory had a substantially distinct national character, and it was favored with some elements of civilization that were peculiarly its own. Its geographical position had ensured it against barbarian desolation, and it had thus been able to preserve a greater number of relics of Roman art and culture than almost any portion of Italy itself. Moreover it was beginning to have a speech

its own. As yet the different vernacular dialects, that since the fifth century, had been springing up here and there in Europe, were left to the monopoly of boors and outcasts. But the language of Provence was fast usurping the place of the Latin. The most elegant scholars and poets of Languedoc did not disdain to clothe their thoughts in their mother tongue.

And the people were as free in thought as they were elegant in literature. Of all the Europeans they alone had been brought into peaceful contact with the Moors of Grenada. While the Normans and the Spaniards were meeting the Mussulmans only to give and receive blows, the people of Provence were exchanging the most friendly hospitalities with scholars that were skilled in all the learning of the Arabs. Nor were these their only advantages. The marts of Narbonne and Toulouse were often sought by merchants of Athens, who brought with their merchandize, not only the literature of their fathers, but also their bold methods and theories in matters of philosophy and religion.

Now these combined influences could not be without their effect upon the enquiring intelligence of the people of Provence. Moreover when the bands which either in literature or politics or religion have bound a people to hereditary forms are once sundered, there is no longer willing submission to any kind of servitude whatever. Political and religious reforms have ever produced each other. The general outburst of intelligence which we have noticed in Southern France, would be likely, therefore, to be followed by a corresponding movement in matters of religion. And such, indeed, was the fact. A new system of theology combining some of the doctrines of the ancient Manichees, with a still greater number of those which were afterwards to form the creeds of the Protestants, was the result. And these new doctrines, whole pages of which would be accepted by modern Calvinists, spread with great rapidity. They extended to the North well on toward Paris, and found also a congenial home in the darkest defiles of the Alps. Over a large territory they almost completely supplanted the Catholic church. The regular clergy were either driven away or looked upon with disgust mingled with contempt.

Thus the heresy of the Albigenses, germinating in a soil so well prepared for its reception, and encouraged by so many favoring circumstances, grew to most formidable proportions. It was no trifling thing that the one transalpine nation or province that had emerged from mediæval darkness had thrown off all respect for Rome, and that the one modern language, fit for the purposes of poetry and philosophy, was devoted to the propagation of heresy alone. Nothing could be more evident than that this spirit of independence, that was every where raising its menacing front, if not either subjugated or controlled, would revolutionize the whole structure of society, both feudal and ecclesiastical. To control or subjugate the new spirit, was therefore the great problem presented to the church of the thirteenth century. It is easy to see that its solution called for the clearest intelligence, and the most far-seeing statesmanship.

Of the terrible crusade organized against the Albigenses, it is not necessary to speak. It is the saddest story in all the annals of a persecuting church, and the world gladly avoids a contemplation of its sickening details. But it is worthy of remark that although Simon de Montfort, and his compeers in crime and cruelty, were strong enough to destroy the heresy, they found themselves entirely unable to suppress that spirit of independence from which the heresy sprung. The Pontiff had demonstrated the strength of the church, but he had also revealed the strength of that spirit of independence that was every where lifting its head in protest. And that spirit would not yield to the sword or the fagot. If exterminated in one locality, it showed itself straightway in another. No temporary success of the church removed the ground of alarm. It was evident therefore that the whole system of ecclesiastical polity needed to be revised and strengthened. The hierarchy had plainly overreached itself, and if it would preserve its supremacy over the consciences of men, there was but one course for it to adopt, and that was to retrace its steps and return to those purer habits of faith and life which had given character and success to the primitive church.

It is said that one afternoon in the year 1210 a group of churchmen, in sumptuous apparel, were slowly traversing the

lofty terrace of the Lateran. At their head was one whose eagle eye, and capacious brow announced him as lord and ruler of the church militant. No prouder monarch had ever called the seven hills his own, and no one had ever been surrounded with greater perplexities. He was absorbed in thought, and his reverie seemed to be shaped and shaded by the dark clouds that were rising in different parts of Europe. His dress was studiously simple and it was evident to all that he was revolving in mind the difficulties that beset him in the control of his vast dominions.

In this unconscious condition Innocent found his meditations suddenly interrupted by a group of three or four mendicants who had approached unobserved and had prostrated themselves at his feet. For a moment he gazed at their emaciated faces, the squalid dress, and the bare and unwashed feet of his suitors; and then curling his lip with disdain he ordered them out of his presence, and retired again to the solitary recesses of his own thoughts. The mendicants withdrew as quietly as they had approached, but not until they had really accomplished their mission. They had left before the Pontiff the manuscript which it was the chief object of their visit to present. That parchment contained the Articles of Association of a new religious order, that had been formed for a purpose no less than the restoration of pure Catholicism throughout Italy, and perhaps throughout the whole of the Christian world. At the head of the company of mendicants was Francis of Assisi.

The Franciscan historians tell a charming story to the effect that after Innocent had sent the intruders roughly away, he withdrew to look over the paper which had been placed with so much humility at his feet. After its perusal he retired, but only to have a troublesome night. In his dreams all the difficulties of his position seemed to overwhelm him. At length a palm tree sprouted up between his very feet. Shooting rapidly up into the heavens it cast abroad its arms, and offered to him the grateful protection of its foliage. The vision of the night gave form and character to the policy of the morning. The dream was interpreted to signify that the new order of Franciscans would strike its roots deep into society, and, by its

wide-spreading branches, would afford that protection and refreshment which the church so much needed.

Early in the morning, Innocent recalled the mendicants to his presence. They had retired to spend the night in prayer, in full faith that the pope would yet summon them to an audience, and grant to their work the coveted seal of his benediction. And now their prayers were to be answered, and their faith realized. The desires and the promises of Francis were heard. The laws of the order were examined, and after discussion and deliberation were approved. Thus the founder of the new order received the solemn apostolical blessing. Inflamed with zeal to enter at once upon his great work of defending the church, he took his immediate departure from Rome, and returned to his native city.

The reception of Francis by his former associates at Assisi, can only be understood in connection with a remembrance of those checkered events and experiences that had thus far made up his life.

His father was one of the richest merchants of Assisi—so prominent, indeed, for his wealth as to be among the foremost of those whom the popes deemed it prudent to propitiate in the guilds of the nascent Italian cities. The son inherited not only the wealth, but also the business talent of his father. As a boy he was remembered to have been the brightest among the children of Assisi; as a youth, to have traversed the streets as the merriest of her troubadours; and, on arriving at his majority, as a merchant, he had been among the most devoted and successful. Everything seemed to indicate what the world calls a life of smooth prosperity. For a number of years nothing of importance occurred to disturb the even flow of his easy and successful activity. There was every promise of that mediocre life which is satisfied with temporary applause and respect, but which in the end is destined to be swallowed up and leave no trace of a name behind it.

But that prospect was suddenly interrupted. In a war that broke out, mediæval fashion, between Assisi and Perugia, Francis, as one of the most public spirited, was among the first to contribute his money and his sword. And he was one of the earliest to be taken prisoner. Twelve months he

languished amid the horrors of a mediæval dungeon. A severe illness carried him to the very gates of death, and his gaze was directed with more than usual earnestness into the abyss beyond. For weeks it remained uncertain whether he would be called to pass the barrier, or be allowed to retrace his steps to the material world. At length, however, he recovered, and was soon after released, but his whole nature seemed to have undergone a transformation. He had left his former self in the dungeon, and seemed to have come forth another. He brought to the companionship of his friends the air of one to whom had been revealed all the mysteries of the future, and upon whom those mysteries had made the deepest and strongest impression.

On his release the people of Assisi attempted to celebrate his recovery and return. Going out to meet him they placed in his hand the sceptre of the king of frolic, and on his head the crown of Momus. But amid all their festivities the voice of Francis was unheard. And with such a leader even the revels of his friends could not be completely joyful. After all their efforts, the streets echoed but faintly to the shouts and songs of the multitude. The painful shadow that had settled upon the countenance of their leader was not slow in gathering upon those of his companions.

At length one of the most familiar and jocund ventured to ask, "Why are you so grave, Francis; are you going to be married?" "I am," responded the leader, "and to a lady of such rank, wealth, and beauty, that the world cannot produce her like." And with that response, he burst from the throng to search out and espouse the lady of his choice. On that very day, before one of the altars in Assisi, he kneeled to consummate the purpose of his heart. And there, in the most solemn manner and in the presence of witnesses, he vowed to take her whom he had chosen as his wedded wife, for better, for worse, to love and to cherish till death should them part. And the name of his bride, was Poverty.

The marriage of St. Francis has been a favorite theme with several of the world's geniuses. It has been celebrated in some of the most graceful lines of Italy's greatest poet, and in an eloquent sermon by the greatest of French orators. But

after all the most touching tribute paid to these espousals, was by the greatest of the early Italian painters.

The traveler who in Italy to-day yields to the temptation held out by the picturesque situation of Assisi :

“ Fertile costa d’alto monte pende,
Onde Perugia sente freddo e caldo.”

will have his chief reward not in reminders of Propertius and Metastasio, but in the study of that curious old pile that is at once a mausoleum of St. Francis, and a sanctuary of early Italian Art. As one enters the Cathedral in high expectation of finding much that is of interest in the way of art, a temporary disappointment is sure to be felt amid the discouragements of Gaddi and Cavallini. But on reaching the High Altar all disappointment vanishes. Directly above are the four great frescoes by Giotto, the remarkable excellence of which placed the artist high above all his contemporaries, and compelled even Dante to acknowledge the superiority.

“ Credette Cimabue nella pittura
Tener lo campo, ed ora ha Giotto il grido,
Si che la fama di colui oscura.”

Those four triangular paintings are a real apotheosis of St. Francis. Three of them are designed in celebration of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience, the three cardinal vows of the Franciscans, and the fourth is a Glorification, as if to hint at the reward promised for the faithful. As a work of Art, the latter probably stands at the head of Giotto's works. But in those characteristics which address themselves to the soul rather than to the eye of the beholder, and fill it with an unspeakable sympathy and forgetfulness of all its temporal surroundings, the palm of excellence must be awarded to the Povertà. As the fittest representation of his subject, the artist, in this picture, commemorates the solemn union of Francis and his bride. The latter is clothed in sordid apparel and her feet are torn by the sharp thorns and stones over which she is passing. But above and around her head is a glorious crown of light and roses, as if to proclaim to every beholder that the soul may be elevated and purified by means of the severest corporal afflictions. The Saviour stands by

er side and is in the act of presenting her to Francis, who is about to place upon her finger the nuptial ring.

And that marriage of the founder of this new Order to his side Poverty, which was wrought out with so much sympathy and pathos by Giotto, was to Francis himself no unmeaning figure. From the day of his vow his conduct comported with his profession. His riches were lavished upon the poor until his last scudo was gone; but even then his conscience found no rest. He was dissatisfied with himself, and dissatisfied with the whole world. Society was to him only a complicated imposture. Days and nights were spent in self-condemnation and self-inflicted physical torture. Prostrate in the darkest recesses of the mountains, and even at times in the crowded aisles of the Cathedral, the contortions of his body bore frequent witness to the struggles of his soul. All men not devoted exclusively to the nurture of their spiritual life, were condemned to the most fearful torments. All the pleasures of his life were corrupting vanities, and the most substantial of earthly rewards were but empty shadows that flit away. He exchanged his own clothing with a mendicant, and believing that Christ had regarded the leprous with peculiar tenderness, he pushed his self-abnegation to the extent of pressing to his bosom a wretch rendered loathsome by the most repulsive of all diseases.

Had Francis lived in the nineteenth century, he would have been hastened to an insane asylum in spite of himself; but living in the thirteenth, a full century before Gilaberto Joffre gave to Europe the first hospital for lunatics, there was nothing for his friends to do but to await the more complete establishment of his health, in the hope that his insane spasm of piety would thus be driven away. But the hopes of his friends were not realized. Some degree of tone and vigor was restored to his body, indeed, and with this restoration came also a somewhat better control over his religious emotions. And yet, as his demonstrations of wretchedness became somewhat more infrequent, it was all the more apparent that a complete transformation had taken place. By degrees there became manifest a thoroughness of self-conquest, a firmness of conviction, and a resoluteness of purpose such as would

be satisfied with no mere personal and individual achievements. At one time he enlisted in the service of the church against the Emperors. But a voice whispered that the weapons for his use were not such as are wielded by an arm of flesh, but rather those weapons of a spiritual temper that are best directed against the powers of darkness. This voice was to him the command of God, and he hastened to obey it. Throwing off his armor he returned to his native town for the purpose of consecrating himself body and soul to the work of a reformation in the church. The same oracular voice that had so often sounded in his ear, whispered to him yet again, "Take nothing for your journey, neither staves, nor scrip, neither bread, nor money, nor two coats apiece." To Francis these words were as the words of the Saviour renewing his command to his disciples, and were of binding force upon his conscience. And he was no caviller. Even his present scanty clothing was reduced to the lowest limit. Henceforth his only apparel was to be his coarse brown cloak of serge, bound about his loins with a cord, the future emblem of his order. And then, as if to prevent the possibility of any pride in this humility, he inflicted upon himself various secret tortures. He sewed his coarse habit with pack-thread to make it rougher. He slept on the ground with a stone for his pillow, and even in secret often rolled his naked body in the snow and among the brambles. In this manner, merciless to himself, almost beyond belief, Francis not only subdued all his earthly passions, but he accomplished what was far more difficult, and that was to satisfy himself that it would henceforth be impossible for man or devil ever to arouse them.

Such was Francisco Bernadone at the age of twenty six. Five years before he had been the most assiduous in the counting house, the most successful in the market, the gayest at every festival, and the foremost in every feat of arms. Now he had not only abandoned his business and distributed his vast wealth to the poor, but he had absolutely deserted society and betaken himself to a life even more remarkable for its self abasement than his former one had been for its luxury and its success. Every longing and every ambition of his passionate nature had been turned into another channel. Henceforth -

all his efforts were to diverge from a single motive, and converge to a single end. Francis saw the wide departure in the church from the apostolic faith and the consequent necessity of reform. To the accomplishment of such a reform were now to be devoted all the energies of his passionate nature, and all the ingenuity of his fertile intellect.

And does any one deem it strange that Francis of Assisi, whose self-tortures were regarded as the wild vagaries of a madman, should succeed at length in making a deep impression upon his companions and neighbors, and finally in winning them to an acceptance of his own thoughts and actions? History is full of examples to show how easy it is for a man who devotes himself body and soul to the establishment of a religious idea, to gather around him disciples and followers who are willing to go whithersoever he may choose to lead. Even as late as the sixteenth century, a sect was built up around a creed, the cardinal doctrines of which were that the Supreme Being is only six feet in height, and that the Sun is only four miles above the earth. There is nothing so contagious as a genuine enthusiasm. The town of Assisi, therefore, otherwise as sluggish in the time of St. Francis as it had been when the boy Propertius played in its streets, began to be agitated with a strange emotion. And all classes were moved alike. The fiery nobility whose swords had long been active in defence of the church, gave him their immediate sympathy, and to some extent even their support. The common people, though accustomed to dawdle away their existence without a single elevating emotion, were unable to keep their hearts closed to his affectionate appeals. It was not long therefore before the grains of seed, which here and there he had been able to work into men's hearts, began to show signs of germination. And he had not long to wait even for the fruit.

The first convert to the enthusiastic fervor of Francis was a gentleman of wealth and distinction, Bernard de Quintavalle. One day, approaching with great emotion, he addressed the founder of the order as follows: "Tell me, if a slave receive from his master a treasure which he finds to be of no service to him, what ought he to do with it?" "Let him restore it to his master," said Francis. "Here, then," exclaimed Bernard,

“I render back to God all the earthly goods with which he has enriched me.” This example was immediately followed by the Canon of Assisi, who did not hesitate to make the same sublime renunciation. It was in the year 1210, that these three approached the high altar of the Cathedral together, and, bowed in humble consecration, took upon themselves the vows of *Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience*. Such was the first organization of the Franciscans, an order which was destined to accomplish a great reformation in its own century, and which, even now, after six hundred years, notwithstanding all its excesses and corruptions, continues to exist as an element of power in the Romish Church.

It was only a few days after this first consecration, before the followers of Francis had reached the number of the Apostles. He now deemed it time to send them forth on their mission and calling them from their home, which was a hut near Assisi, addressed them thus :

“Take courage and shelter yourselves in God. Be not depressed to think how few we are. Be not alarmed either at your own weakness or at mine. God has revealed to me that He will diffuse throughout the earth this our little family, of which He is the father. I have seen a great multitude coming to us to wear our dress, and to live as we live. I have seen all the roads crowded with men traveling in haste towards us. The French are coming. The Spaniards are hastening. The English and Germans are running. We seem contemptible and insane. But do not fear. Believe that our Saviour, who has overcome the world, will speak in us. But we will not despise the rich who live softly, and are sumptuously arrayed. If gold should lie in our way, we must value it as the dust of our feet. Go and preach repentance for the remission of sins. Settle in your hearts to endure all things with meekness and patience. Be patient in tribulation, fervent in prayer, fearless in labor, and the kingdom of God, which endures forever, shall be your reward.”

After this address, Francis arranged his brethren in the form of a cross, and gave to each of them his benediction. “Cast thy burden upon the Lord, and he shall nourish thee.” Then dismissing them to their work, he himself retired to draw up a preliminary charter of the Order, to be presented to the pope. And the articles of association thus drawn up were the ones that Francis and his companions placed at the feet of Innocent, as already related.

It is not strange that the founder of this new Order, on his arrival at Assisi, after having received the papal benediction,

found himself at once surrounded by a considerable number of enthusiastic admirers and followers. There is no limit to the homage which humanity pays to a will that is inflexible and on fire with some great purpose.

The number of mendicants increased with marvelous rapidity. Within two years from the time when Francis had appeared at the Lateran, he was able to send pairs of his followers into almost every hamlet of Italy. The founder himself visited the principal cities of the peninsula, preaching everywhere, and everywhere recommending the vows of his Order. At Perugia he received a present of Monte Alverna as the home of a convent. At Pisa he found that his fame had already preceded him, and a considerable number were ready to throw all aside, and assume the gown and cord. At Cortona, that most picturesque and interesting of all the ancient cities of Etruria, he founded his first convent. And from Cortona he visited other Italian cities, preaching and founding monasteries as he went. During two years his zeal was unabated, and his success was everywhere equal to his enthusiasm.

But as the Order became more and more extended, Francis became aware that a more perfect organization was indispensable to its fullest success. It was his ardent desire that the control of the Society should be entrusted to some person other than himself. He seems always to have preferred a life of solitary devotion to a career of active missionary labor. And yet, though often apparently on the point of surrendering himself to a life of private contemplation, he was always in the end brought to see that the Society was a child of his own, and that he was, therefore, under a solemn obligation not to renounce its parentage. In spite of his will, therefore, the question was always ultimately settled by a kind of paternal obligation. Of this obligation it was impossible to rid himself, and therefore, as the growth of the Order continued, he was more and more withdrawn from his favorite retirement, and more and more devoted to such a study of the workings of the fraternity as would enable him to settle upon its proper policy, and its most promising sphere of action. It was long before his plans were fully elaborated, but in due time they were made known.

On the 30th day of May, 1216, the first general assembly of all the followers of Francis was convened at Assisi for the purpose of establishing and proclaiming the future policy of the Order. Though the founder himself took but a humble part in the proceedings, he was manifestly the soul of the Council. There was free discussion, but the wishes and policy of Francis were at all times triumphant.

The first of the great questions to be settled was in regard to their field of labor. Many thought it impolitic to attempt anything beyond the limits of Italy. But the designs of Francis were as broad as humanity. With a gentleness of manner, but with a boldness of purpose that arose to sublimity, he declared to the assembly that under God it was their privilege and duty to make the whole world feel the benign influence of their brotherhood. Where the Church already existed it needed to be reformed. Where it did not exist it was their mission to plant it. Though there was some opposition, in the end there was no withstanding his earnest appeals, and as a result the whole world was divided into Franciscan Missions.

It was next necessary to establish the rules of the Order. Those which had been adopted before Francis appeared at the feet of Innocent had served their purpose, but now, as the fraternity designed to enlarge its sphere of action, it was evident that the Articles should have a corresponding breadth of character, and be fortified with every precaution. Francis knew well that the Benedictines before him had begun their labors under a code not essentially different from his own, and yet through laxity of discipline and consequent departure from their primitive virtues they had come to revel in every manner of debauchery and excess. It was not enough therefore that the Franciscans should take upon themselves simply the indefinite vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience. These vows must be amplified and elucidated. Accordingly the rules of the Order were embodied in a Code of twenty-three chapters, and a copy was given to every member of the fraternity.

The most marked peculiarity of this new Code was the additional stringency given to the three cardinal vows. Poverty was to be to all the members of the Order, an actual renuncia-

tion of all possessions even to the clothes they wore and the cord which girt them. Money was to be to them as if infected, and they were consequently never to receive it in alms even, except for the purpose of aiding the sick. No one might ever ride, if he had the power to walk; and though all might labor at any trade or vocation, they were not allowed to receive pay for their services. Food, clothing, and other necessities might be accepted in limited quantities, but money even when found must be trampled under foot. All luxuries were to be ignored; even the ordinary comforts of life had to be set aside; only the absolute necessities were allowed to be retained or received. All were to live in common, and even their scanty dress was to be the property of the Church. Lastly, no one could become a member of the Order until he had first rendered himself as destitute as the others.

As to the second of the vows it was to be preserved by the provisions of one sweeping clause. No one, excepting those whose age and severity of character entitled them to special privileges, and afforded them special protection, was ever to speak to a woman alone, and the barrier was even in such cases never to be lowered except for the purpose of urging repentance, or giving spiritual advice.

These two fundamental vows of poverty and chastity were vitalized and fortified by another which required absolute and unquestioning obedience to every superior. It was, moreover, especially enjoined that this obligation was not a mere matter of fact and form, to be submitted to with pharisaical moroseness, but that it must be accepted with the utmost cheerfulness and brotherly love.

After the appointment of the necessary officers, this first general council of the Franciscans dispersed, and its members took their departure for their respective fields of missionary labor. But although the meeting had declared the purpose of the brotherhood to be as broad as humanity itself, it was not until the convocation held three years later, that plans were matured for carrying their missionary work into the most distant parts of the world.

These ascetic observances enjoined by Francis upon his followers seem, at the first glance, to indicate a marked reaction

against the reform that had been instituted by St. Benedict, and a desire to return to all the excesses of the Anchorites and the Cenobites of the fourth and fifth centuries. But on looking further, it will be observed that in one important respect the Franciscans differed from the hermits who had preceded the Benedictines. According to the theory that prevailed in the earlier period referred to, a hideous maceration of the body was of itself a perfect proof of the highest excellence. It was not a means designed for the accomplishment of an end, but itself an end to be gained for its own sake. So far from being a method by which the body was to be reduced into subjection to the soul for the accomplishment of any general reform, or the more successful prosecution of any great religious work, it was simply a condition to be attained for strictly personal reasons,—an ideal of Christian excellence, whereby a man could at once secure his personal salvation, and testify to others the subordination of his own will to that of the Master. With the Franciscans, however, the purpose was quite different. In the early days of the Order there was something in the life of Francis that quite resembled the atrocious self-torture of St. Anthony and St. Simeon Stylites, but that terrible excess gradually wore away, and at length only so much was retained and enforced as would in the estimation of Francis best prepare his followers for their active life work. This asceticism was simply the method whereby they were to escape from the ordinary distractions and entanglements of human nature, in order to apply all their energies and passions to their work as missionaries and reformers. Though from the earliest history of the Order there were many individual instances of departure from this rule, yet, by the Society, as a whole, this purpose of their asceticism was kept prominently in view for a full century, or until the time when their influence began to deteriorate.

It is not possible in this connection to follow the Franciscans in their missionary labors, or to describe the methods by which their ends were accomplished. But the cord of their Order was soon seen in every corner of Italy and in every defile of the Alps. At the second general meeting held in 1219, the huts of straw and mud that had been erected by pious hands at Assisi, for the accommodation of the brother—

hood, afforded shelter for more than five thousand mendicants, who had come from all parts of the Peninsula, and even in some instances from the countries beyond the Alps. The first few days of the council were given up to congratulations and thanksgiving. But the eye of Francis was kept steadily upon the future, rather than the past, and the words of praise that sounded all about him fell but mournfully upon his ear. It was evident that he had visions of still greater achievements than any which had as yet been realized. A congratulatory address was delivered by Cardinal Ugolino, the General of the Order. It fell to the lot of Francis to make a reply. In doing so, however, instead of giving utterance to expressions of thankfulness for what had been already accomplished, he proceeded to lay before the assembled multitude details of the work that needed to be accomplished in the future. He gave a most elaborate and melancholy picture of the condition of the Church, and then proposed to the multitude his project; which was, indeed, nothing less than the conversion of the whole habitable globe. The plans of Francis were discussed, and at length adopted as the will of the assembly. To each of the most prominent of his disciples he assigned a separate mission, and armed them all with circular letters from the Pope, as well as from himself. And with these credentials they went forth to their work; some to establish monasteries in Spain; some to plant what they deemed a purer faith on the banks of the Rhone; some to elevate the standard of purity in France and England, and some to gather the purple flowers of martyrdom in Africa.

It was not long after the first organization of the Franciscan Minorites, before the founder himself saw that, as a working power, the Society was far from being complete. By the very condition of its organic laws, a half of the human race were denied the privilege of sharing either its benefits or its labors.

When Francis returned from his first visit to Rome, there was living at Assisi a maiden, who was remarkable for her wealth and beauty, but still more remarkable for her piety. Even before her birth a vision had revealed to her mother the fact that her life was to be illustrious, and, accordingly at the font she had received the significant name of Clara. And

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St. Francis and his Time.

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her earliest childhood she appears to have justified the
nation. If we may believe her biographer she constantly
a penitential girdle, and early had occasion to discharge
an aspiring suitor who attempted to win away her affec-
from her heavenly Bridegroom. The fame of Clara's
touched the heart of Francis, and the devotion of Fran-
s was an object of unbounded admiration to Clara. It is a
ity to be obliged to admit it, but it is nevertheless true, that
with his advice and assistance she determined to forsake her
father's house, and give herself up to a life of religious penance.
No mere filial obligation could weigh so much as a hair with
Francis in comparison with his duty to the Church. With
him, every other virtue was a slave to his devotion to the
Order. And he soon succeeded in inspiring Clara with senti-
ments of a kindred nature. The father protested, entreated,
and threatened. But even a military guard about his house
was not sufficient to prevent the elopement. The daughter
made her escape, and in company with Francis betook herself
to the Church of St. Paul, where she was welcomed by friars
chanting their matins by torch light, and where she remained
until a convent was founded for her reception. Meantime her
two sisters Agnes and Beatrice, persuaded partly by the enti-
cing words of Francis and partly by the prayers of Clara, read-
ily shared her seclusion. The contagion soon spread, and other
young women of Assisi hastened to imitate their example.
Neither armed retainers, nor enraged parents, nor unwilling
husbands were enough to prevent hundreds and soon thou-
ands from becoming, in the language of the time, the brides
and daughters of the Church.

The vows taken by the sisters were, for the most part, sim-
ple. Poverty upon his brethren. Obe-
dience to the Clarists was

The vows taken by the sisters were, for the most part, similar to those enjoined by Francis upon his brethren. Obedience and Chastity as well as Poverty were made imperative; but, from the obligations of ordinary fasting, however, to some extent, relieved. As a proper recompense, however, for these privileges, and for the purpose of guarding against what Francis, with a grim humor, deemed an especial weakness, they were required to subject themselves for long periods to a fast of absolute silence. These vows made by Francis, accepted by the Clarists, and confirmed by the Pope, were

o all the members of the Order as imperatively binding in spirit, and in letter, as were the vows of Francis upon himself and his followers. The founder herself lived to rejoice in the establishment of nunneries of her Order in her own, and in other lands, and to see them exert a considerable influence in softening the manners of the time. Immediately after her death in 1253, her name was added to the list of the Saints by Alexander IV., and if we may judge by the jingling Latin of her canonization, few among the Saints of the Calendar enjoy a higher renown.*

During a considerable period after the events just referred to, Francis gave himself up to most arduous missionary work. While his brethren were pushing their spiritual conquests into every part of Western Europe, he coveted for himself nothing less than the glory of converting the Saracens in the East. To this end, Francis betook himself to the army of Crusaders, then under the walls of Damietta. For a time he preached to the Crusaders themselves, denouncing the godless bearers of the Cross for their sins, and urging them to a purer life. But these were not the object of his mission. His chief inspiration was a desire to secure the conversion of the Saracen chief himself.

One day, after spending hours absorbed in prayer, he arose with a countenance radiant with joy and hope, and advanced at once to the infidel camp. He was, of course, instantly seized, and would have been slain on the spot, but for the respect which the Mohammedans always cherish for the insane. On being hastened before the Sultan, he did not hesitate to declare his mission. The Saracen listened with attention and respect. Francis offered to enter a heated furnace with a priest of Islam, and to stake the truth of his religion on the result. When the offer was declined, "Then I will enter alone," cried he, "only promise that, should I be burned, you will impute it to my sins, and, should I come forth alive, you will embrace the gospel." The gallant Mohammedan rejected the terms as unfair to Francis, and, offering him rich presents, sent him

* "*Clara, claris præclara meritis, magnæ in Cœlo claritate gloriæ, ac in terra miraculorum sublimium, clare claret.*"

back under guard to the Christian camp. So far as we are able to learn, the only result of the interview was to arouse the indignation of Francis to see himself so much respected by the enemies of his Master, and to provoke him to pour out a torrent of vituperation upon the Sultan, in order to win for himself the crown of martyrdom. He was obliged to abandon his enterprise and to return to the more promising field of Europe. And it was perhaps in the course of this homeward journey that his fame arose to its greatest height. His preaching was everywhere heard with rapture. Disciples flocked around him, and followed him by the thousand. His wondering admirers saw in his works perpetual miracle. On his return to Italy, he found that his fame had been greatly magnified in his absence. Such multitudes were induced to come into the Order that it threatened to become unmanageable and dangerous. The whole population of Canari offered themselves, either as his disciples, or as those of Clara, and the inhabitants of other towns were on the point of following their example.

But even Francis was not so insane as to be unable to see that the universal observance of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience is utterly inconsistent with the continuance of organized society. He had sagacity enough to discern that on such conditions, neither marriage, nor secular callings, nor civil rights could continue. Accordingly, a new provision was made, whereby the Order might be strengthened, the zeal of the community encouraged, and the laws of civil society respected. In the year 1221 a supplemental, or third order, known as the "Order of Penitence," was established. This was a species of outer court of the Brotherhood, and its members were allowed to retain their social positions in the world. There were however certain requirements that were vigorously enforced. The candidate was required to discharge all debts, and make restitution of all unfair gains. All were required to wear a dress of a prescribed color and form, and the furniture of their houses had to be plain, though not regardless of social rank. They were to avoid all public exhibitions, and under no circumstance to give anything to actors or jugglers. On entering the Order, they were required to make their wills that litigation might be prevented; they were never to take a non-judi—

cial oath; they were required to be constant in their attendance at church; they were under no circumstances to bear arms except in defence of their church or their native land; and lastly they could not leave the Order of Penitence except to enter the inner courts either as a Franciscan or a Clarist.

It would not be easy even in this enlightened age, to devise an organization that would have been better calculated to restrain the license, and soften the severities of the thirteenth century. Moreover the Order of Penitence came in a few years to have a membership which was counted by hundreds of thousands. They spread not only over Italy, but insinuated themselves into every corner of Europe. After making all abatement for the exaggerations of enthusiastic chroniclers and historians, it must be admitted that they exerted, at least for a time, an immense influence for good. The historians abound in passages to show that "through their organization, old enmities were reconciled, old debts were paid, old wrongs were duly atoned for, actors and jugglers forsook the boards, and abandoned women forsook their calling and repented of their sins."

The limits of time and space will not allow us to follow these orders of Franciscans on their pilgrimages of reform throughout the civilized world. A few words must be devoted to the subsequent life of Francis, and then we must hasten to note briefly the most prominent causes of the decline of the Order.

After the complete organization of the fraternity, Francis succeeded in transferring the superintendence of its interests to other hands, and in withdrawing himself more completely from an active life, to a life of exclusion. Then again as in the earlier days of his devotion, the rocks and the brambles became his bed, and his companions were the fowls of the air, and the creeping things upon the earth. It became his singular custom to address every one of God's creatures as his brother. For the lambs and the larks he had an especial fondness, deeming them images of the Lamb of God, and the Cherubim of Heaven. He composed sermons which in his wanderings he preached "to his little sisters," the swallows, and

they, in kind appreciation of his attention, ceased their twitterings during the service. Though scores of curious anecdotes are related illustrating this portion of the life of Francis, they are doubtless, for the most part, the mere figments of a too ready and fertile credulity. Enough must be believed, however, to show that his heart was permeated with a boundless love, and that he was allied with an active sympathy and relationship to all the workmanship of God's hands. In this manner the few remaining years of his life were passed. His favorite retreat was a wild and sequestered region near the summit of one of the Tuscan Apennines. To the last he would accept no home but that furnished by Him who provided his "sisters," the swallows, with their abode.

Of the countless miracles attributed to St. Francis, it is as vain to speak, as of those which one has to encounter in studying the lives of the Anchorites of the third and fourth century. They belong to the domain of fancy, and therefore form no part of history save as they illustrate either the extraordinary credulity of mediæval times, or the equally extraordinary mendacity of the mediæval annalists. But the story of the "*stigmata*" should not be entirely ignored, inasmuch as it is pure heresy to disbelieve it, and the 17th of September is still celebrated in its commemoration. It was on that day in 1224, that Francis, while praying, with unusual fervency, was gradually lifted from the earth. His body was surrounded with a bright radiance, and was carried heavenwards beyond the range of human vision. It is the testimony of his companions, that his voice was heard in conference with that of the Redeemer, and that on his return he was borne by a seraph on rapid wings. But, be that as it may, it was during his absence that Francis received his last marks of similitude to the Saviour. Two black excrescences had appeared on each hand in imitation of the nails, and in his side was a wound from which flowed blood in quantity sufficient to stain his garment. Notwithstanding all the modest attempts of Francis at concealment, the miracle of the "*stigmata*" is based on the testimony of at least fifty of his brethren and companions. If to the heretical student this evidence is still inconclusive, it cannot for a moment be so to any believer in papal infalli-

bility. For pope Alexander IV. publicly declared that he had the testimony of his own eyes; Gregory IX. confirmed the miracle in three separate bulls; Nicholas III. referred to it as of undoubted authority; and Benedict XII. closed the last avenue of doubt by establishing the Church festival of the "*Stigmata*" on the day of its occurrence.

St. Bonaventura, who has always been regarded as the most distinguished of the biographers of Francis, lived at a period too early to gather up the countless miracles that came in the course of the following century to be universally believed. Indeed the infant head of the future biographer had received a benediction from the very hands of his spiritual father and exemplar. The pages of this distinguished biographer are therefore disfigured by little that is absolutely incredible. But in less than a hundred years St. Francis came to be looked upon by vast multitudes, as a second Redeemer. In the year 1399, all the accepted traditions of the miraculous works of St. Francis were collected into a book by an Italian member of the order, Albizzi by name, and though the book was received by the Church with festive demonstrations of joy, it would perhaps be difficult in all literature to find anything to transcend its blasphemous extravagances. In this "*Liber Conformitatum*," it is solemnly declared that "Christ was transfigured once, St. Francis twenty times. Christ endured his wounds for a short time only, St. Francis for two full years. Christ changed water into wine once, St. Francis three times,"—and so on through forty different comparisons. The book, and the manner in which it was received, reveal to us at once the remarkable degeneracy of the Order, and the accumulated veneration in which St. Francis had come to be held.

The rapid growth of the Order of Franciscans is not entirely unique in the history of religious organizations, and yet its members were able to extend their influence over Europe in a period of time that seems almost incredibly short. Even in the days of its founder, the cord of the order was seen in all the countries of Europe. But it was not until after the death of Francis that the Minorites received those special marks of papal favor that gave them their greatest impulse. By Honorious III., they were allowed to hold religious service in inter-

dicted places, and with closed doors. They received special indulgences on the 2d of August, the day which commemorated the founding of the fraternity. But as the most important of all their favors, they were exempted from the control of the ordinary bishops. Wherever, for any reason, they wished to extend their influence, they had only to plant a cloister, and then declaring their independence of priest and bishop, to go forth preaching, hearing confessions, and granting absolution, accountable meanwhile to the general of their order alone. When it is remembered that, at this period the nomination of the bishops had fallen generally under the control of the secular princes, it will be difficult to exaggerate the influence, in behalf of the church, of a Society that was so perfectly organized, so devoted to its work, so numerous in its membership, and so completely under the control of the Supreme Pontiff.

The effect of these extraordinary privileges was not only to enlarge the influence of the Society, but also to introduce into its organization new and various elements. In the days of Francis, a vast majority of his votaries had come from the lower walks of life. But as the sphere of action was enlarged the fraternity began to hold out attractions to the ambitious as well as to the saintly. At first the doorkeepers had been instructed to practice the closest scrutiny, but within twenty years from the reception of the favors alluded to, the doors were thrown wide open, and the porters were discharged. Ten years later Franciscans were to be seen not only in the cloister, the camp, and the market, but also in the universities, before the tribunals, and on the throne. They had begun by preferring the "fervor of ignorance" to the "ostentation of learning," but before the end of a century their spirit had been completely transformed. Ugolino and Jerome of Arcoli, generals of the Order, had climbed into the papal throne, and the followers of Francis were vying with the learned men of every faith and order for the mastery in the proudest universities of Europe. While Thomas Aquinas, the pride of the Dominicans, was developing his "Sum of Theology" to future Kings and Popes, at Paris, the great Franciscan Roger Bacon was experimenting with, and describing certain mysterious combina-

ions of an explosive nature that were afterwards to play so important a part in the drama of modern civilization. And it was not a generation later that the still greater Franciscan Thomas Scotus gathered about his chair at Oxford thirty thousand students, and, dying at the early age of thirty-four, left behind him a record of mental productiveness which the distinguished historian of Latin Christianity has characterized as perhaps the most wonderful fact in the intellectual history of our race.

Thus the Order of St. Francis increased rapidly in members, and still more rapidly in influence. In less than fifty years after the death of their patron they could boast of 8,000 cloisters and more than 200,000 monks, exclusive of the countless number of the Order of Penitence. And yet the great secret of their power was not so much in their numbers, as in the fact that, like the Jesuits after them, they occupied all positions in society from the highest to the lowest, and were obedient, even unto death, to the will of a single master.

It could hardly be possible for an Order founded upon the severe discipline of the Franciscans to exist for any considerable time without developing differences of opinion as to whether their early vows should be rigidly enforced. Even in the first years of the fraternity the founder had reason to rebuke what he deemed the extravagance of his followers. But neither his prayers nor his irony could hold all the members to their primitive severity. What was at first a mere want of harmony came, ere long, to be a painful discord. Two factions were thus created and as time advanced the breach grew wider and wider. After the death of Francis the extraordinary privileges granted to his followers strengthened the dissenting party by offering an encouraging field to men who were more remarkable for their ambition than for their piety. And such a struggle as was now inaugurated between the asceticism of Francis on the one hand and the natural demands of humanity on the other could have but one issue. If the latter were once allowed to enter the contest, they would of course be victorious, and that at no very distant day. And such was the fact. The right of opinion was allowed, and the result was that "the reasoning party" so rapidly outgrew "the devotional party" that there remained nothing for Franciscanism to do

but to abandon St. Francis, or to be hopelessly riven asunder. It can hardly be deemed strange that the former course was adopted. But, be that as it may, St. Francis and his hard bride Poverty were thus early divided in the affections of their children. Though the offspring continued to revere the name, and worship at the shrine of the father, it was scarcely a half century before they had become utterly faithless to the memory of the mother.

This departure from the stern asceticism of Francis bore its natural fruit. So long as men and women were willing to endure great privations for the sake of the church, they were invulnerable to the attacks of ridicule. But in setting aside their self-sacrifice they threw away their only weapon of self-defence. Saints instantly began to denounce, and satirists to scoff. In less than forty years after the death of Francis, St. Bonaventura, as general of the Order, felt called upon to administer the severest and most sweeping reproofs. He charged them with an indolence that was opening a path to every vice; with a rapacity that made them a burden to every place that they approached; with habits of importunity that made them more dreaded than a band of robbers; with sumptuous methods of life that brought the Order into great discredit; and with those forbidden intimacies which brought scandal and reproach against all who bore the name. Nor is it probable that this picture was overwrought. There is in the fourteenth century scarcely an important writer either of prose or poetry, who might not be summoned to show that the characteristics which in the early days of the Order had been its power and its glory, had been so far transformed that its members were now almost as remarkable for their vices as their predecessors had been for their virtues. And the formidable list of charges preferred by such men as St. Bonaventura and Matthew Paris, and echoed by such as Dante and Chaucer, have been quite enough, to array against the Franciscans a prejudice that is well nigh universal. Those charges, doubtless in their time for the most part just, echoed and re-echoed these six hundred years, have well nigh unfitted mankind to judge of the true character of the Society in the days of its infancy and purity. But if we go back to the very beginning of the thirteenth century,

and then, after contemplating the corruptions that everywhere threatened to overthrow the spiritual power of the church, advance to the age of Duns Scotus and Robert Grostete and Roger Bacon, it will be possible to appreciate the nature and the extent of the reform wrought by the mendicant Friars. That they were able to effect a permanent change in the direction of the ecclesiastical current would perhaps be too much to assert. But it cannot be successfully denied that in the days of their vigor and purity they did accomplish something to help a struggling humanity grope its way out of the darkness of the Middle Ages. In an age of irresponsible tyranny, they became the protectors of the weak and the vindicators of the innocent. In the midst of unbridled license, they were the advocates of domestic virtues, and the exemplars of ecclesiastical purity. Sworn to avoid every corruption, and to encourage every virtue, Francis and his followers went forth to convert a degenerate church and to reform a corrupted society. The Pulpit and the Mission have been well called the two most efficient means of regenerating humanity. Of these the Franciscans had almost exclusive control for three-fourths of a century, and the reformation which they were able to effect was the most thorough and wide spread known to the church before the advent of Martin Luther.

ARTICLE II.—IS THERE A PROBATION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE JUDGMENT?

THE adherents of this view are not so numerous, or so pronounced in their peculiar notions, as to have taken to themselves a specific name. They are rather, persons who mean to be orthodox Christians, who eschew the doctrine of universal recovery. They would relieve their minds of the severity of the orthodox tenet, which makes character formed in this life the arbiter of destiny for ever, while at the same time, they hold to the doctrine of eternal punishment for those who shall come to the Judgment unregenerate.

This theory does not set aside the reality of a Day of Judgment when the future condition of all men will be irreversibly pronounced. It does not set aside the idea that Christ will then cease from his mediatorial work and assume his prerogative of Kingship. It does not alter the condition of salvation, repentance, and faith. It claims that it does not interfere with the legitimate working of the atonement. It simply teaches that during the intermediate state between death and the judgment, while Christ is performing the work of redemption among those who are alive upon the earth, He may still be carrying on the same process among departed souls, and that persons dying impenitent may yet repent, believe on Christ, be forgiven, and be put in possession of eternal life.

This view differs from that of the Romanists as to the intermediate state, in this, that with them, whatever there is of purification and discipline in Purgatory is limited to those who have begun to be saints. Catholics would offer prayers and penances only for those who die within the pale of their Church; while those who hold the other doctrine would be encouraged to offer prayer and exercise hope in behalf of any who had died in their sins.

The literature of this theory is meagre. The sentiment is rather a floating one, expressed here and there as a hope or a conviction. Lady Byron announced it to Mrs. Stowe concern-

ing Lord Byron. "Ever before her," says Mrs. Stowe, "during the remaining years of her widowhood, was the image of her husband, purified and ennobled, with the shadows of earth forever dissipated, the stains of sin forever removed,—‘the angel in him,’ as she expressed it, ‘made perfect according to its divine ideal.’" Mrs. Stowe echoes the same belief, when she suggests the reward that will meet her friend, "to see *that* spirit, once chained and defiled, set free and purified;" and then declares: "Of one thing I always feel sure, probation does not end with this present life." An able work, "The Tripartite Nature of Man," by Rev. J. B. Heard, a clergyman of the English Church, advocates a secondary probation. Lange, Olshausen, and other German commentators adopt an interpretation which allows opportunity for forgiveness after death. Is there reason to believe that such a probation exists? Let us consider the arguments in favor of it.

I. The Scripture argument. "Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come." Olshausen claims that this passage is not overstrained, if we infer that all *other* sins can be forgiven in the world to come, always supposing repentance and faith." But this is only inference. The Saviour did not say that any sin unpardoned here should be pardoned hereafter. Mark thus reports the idea: "hath never forgiveness but is in danger of eternal damnation." This fixes the meaning of the phrase. Christ, in cutting off the sin against the Holy Ghost from all hope of pardon, is not content simply to say, it shall never be forgiven, but intensifies his expression by adding, "neither in this world, neither in the world to come." Two parallel passages, used by Romanists to prove a Purgatory, are also relied upon in this case. "Agree with thine adversary quickly....lest thou be cast into prison. Verily, I say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing." "And his Lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due unto him." These expressions, it is claimed, designate a limit beyond which punishment shall not be extended. But the passage thus interpreted proves rather a purga-

tory than a probation, a deliverance by works rather than a salvation by faith in Christ. These seem to be only proverbial phrases, signifying that the offender shall be dealt with according to the extreme rigor of the law. As man can never pay his "debt" this is the strongest possible way of expressing the eternity of punishment. But the main scripture relied upon is that in 1st Pet. iii. 18–20: "For Christ hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us unto God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit; by which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which sometime were disobedient, when once the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was preparing, wherein few, that is eight souls, were saved by water." The common view of this passage is that Christ, by his Spirit in Noah, "a preacher of righteousness," before the flood, preached salvation to the disobedient, who dying incorrigible, are *now* spirits shut up in prison, the hell of the lost. The other is that Christ, while his body was in the grave, made his way in spirit to Hades and there preached. On this side two special points are made, (1.) "He," *πορευθεῖς*, "going, preached." Here is the *act* of going, and the redundancy of the phrase, "he went," if he did not go. This depends upon where he went from. Paul writes that Christ "*came and preached peace.*" Here is the same construction,—*ἔλθων*, coming, preached. And this the apostle said to the Ephesians, who had never seen Christ in the flesh. Then it is said, "The Lord *came down.*" So Christ came from heaven to preach to the people of Noah's day. (2.) The parity of the construction, "put to death as to the flesh," "made alive as to the spirit." There being no preposition used in either case, it is claimed that the parallelism must be observed, and so, as he was also put to death *in his flesh*, he was also quickened or kept alive, *in his spirit*, in which spirit-state of existence he went and preached to the spirits in prison. But the participle, *ζωοποιηθεῖς*, "made alive," can refer in fairness only to the resurrection of Christ. In the twelve places in which the New Testament uses it, once, in 1st Timothy, vii. 13, it refers to God as *giving life* to all creatures; thrice, Jno. vi. 33; 2 Cor. iii. 6; Gal. iii., 21, it refers to the *life-giving* power of the gospel;

and seven times, Jno. v., 21 ; Rom. iv., 17 ; viii., 11 ; 1 Cor. xv. 22, 36, 45, it is used with direct reference to the *raising of the dead*. Now in this, the twelfth case, to put upon the word a meaning entirely different is mere assumption. Then the parallelism applies equally well to the other interpretation, for it was by his own spirit, or in his divine nature, that he preached to the antedelvians. He “*was before Abraham,*” before Noah. It was the Spirit of Christ “*which was in the prophets,*” as Peter says ; and Enoch, before Noah, was one of those prophets. Then the *time when* Christ preached is indicated “*when once in the days of Noah,*” etc. This idea, it appears, was prominently in the mind of Peter, for he alone of all the writers of the Bible informs us that Noah was a preacher at all, “*a preacher of righteousness ;*” so that it was quite natural that he should refer, by way of illustration, to the preaching of Christ through Noah.

Why was it that this alleged mission of Christ was never even hinted at by any other of the New Testament writers ; while Peter is so obscure that his remark upon his beloved brother Paul may be turned upon himself : “*In whose epistles are some things hard to be understood, and which the unlearned and the unstable wrest to their own destruction.*” Why, then, was there never any prophecy of this important mission ?

But admitting the literal preaching in Hades, this does not prove a second probation. Dean Alford, who assents to the literal descent, but denies the theory that sin may be forgiven in the future world upon repentance, says, “*In the entire silence of Scripture on any such doctrine, every principle of sound interpretation requires that we should resist the introduction of it merely on the strength of two difficult passages, in neither of which does the plain construction of the words require it.*” Those who hold to this visit to the spirits in prison are much divided as to the time and the object of the mission. Some believe that he went while his body was in the grave ; others, that he went after his body had been raised. Dr. Bartle, President of Walton College, Liverpool, in his work, “*Hades and the Atonement,*” tries to prove that Christ went there to complete the atonement, that he did not preach there at all, but

cried aloud among those spirits as one of the suffering number. Some hold that he went to pronounce sentence upon the evil spirits; others, to deliver those who had become purified by purgatorial fires; others, such as Zuingli and Calvin, to preach to the waiting patriarchs the accomplishment of redemption; others, Luther and Bengel, to preach the glad tidings to those of Noah's time, who at the last moment repented; others, Athanasius, Ambrose, hold that the preaching was of two kinds, a saving message to the saints, and a sentence upon those who were kept in prison until the last day; while those who find in this obscure passage a warrant for a second probation have to stand against all of these others who agree as to the literal descent. So that even though Christ did go to Hades, it is unproven and altogether improbable that he there opened a way of salvation to those who died in their sins.

II. It is argued that the heathen, who have never heard of the Saviour, must have another probation. Bengel says, "From all that we experience and that is revealed to us respecting the divine mercy, we may fairly believe that there is an economy for the poor, ignorant heathen, apart from that with which we are concerned." Heard, in the "Tripartite Nature" connects Christ's descent into the under world with the salvation of some who have never heard the gospel preached when in the flesh. Lange, upon the same passage, says, "Holy scripture nowhere teaches the eternal damnation of those who died as heathens or non-Christians. Peter, by divine illumination, clearly affirms that the ways of God's salvation do not terminate with earthly life, and that the gospel is preached beyond the grave to those who have departed this life without a knowledge of the same."

It is to be said in regard to this argument in behalf of the heathen, that it gains nothing from the teaching of Peter, for the persons, whom he specifies, were not heathen. They not only had the bible of nature, but they had that portion of God's revelation, which he had made up to that time; they had the preaching of Noah for one hundred and twenty years, as we learn from Peter alone; they had the presence of God's

arning and converting Spirit, as God said in express reference to them, "My Spirit shall not always strive with man,"—all of which was enough for the salvation of Abel, of Enoch, of Noah's family, and, doubtless, of many others who died before the flood. If we turn to Peter's second Epistle we find his positive opinion as to the character and the prospects of these same antedeluvians. He classes them, as "the old world," with the "angels that sinned," and with the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah; and, using them all as an illustration of the certainty of the punishment of the ungodly, he says, "The Lord knoweth how to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished." No intermediate probation sought here. If Peter had had in mind the heathen as such, who were to have another chance, he certainly would have chosen some other people for his illustration, for these had not only enjoyed the preaching of God's word, but as his argument runs, they are reserved to the judgment, not to enjoy another probation, but to be punished. But the Apostle Paul has settled this question about the heathen in no obscure or hesitant way. They that have sinned without the revealed law shall be judged without the revealed law. And when? "In the day," he says, "when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel,"—not that the heathen would be judged according to the gospel, for he had just said to the contrary, but his gospel message was to teach that all men are to be brought to the judgment and that they who have not the written law shall be judged by the law "written in their hearts," the law of reason and conscience. What a fine opportunity here for the logical Paul, in discussing the equity of bringing the heathen to judgment, to put in an argument that their probation was to be continued after death and that Christ went and preached the gospel to them in prison. But Paul had no such gospel to preach. Nor was he troubled about the matter of equality in God's dealings with all, for he finds that those who have not the gospel, do yet possess light, "so that they are without excuse." "That which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath shown it unto them." When we consider, further, that Christ by his death has put all men unto a salvable condition, even though they may not

all have heard of it; that all those dying in infancy are saved; that adult pagans will be judged only by the standard which they have had; and that not a few may have such a disposition toward God as would incline them at once to accept a proffered Saviour; we may comfort ourselves that the number of the heathen who may be finally saved will not be small. He, who is to be the Judge and who will assuredly do right, will make all equitable discrimination, even as He taught that the people of Sodom and Gomorrah would have a better prospect at the Judgment—it would “be more tolerable for them—than the people of his generation.

III. A second probation is argued from the fact that the final decision is made, not at the moment of death, but at the last day, and from the fact that the Judgment is placed so far away, as if, meantime, to give space for salvation. Lange mentions this. True the final sentence will not be pronounced until the day of Jesus Christ; but this does not prevent a previous decision, or allotment of place and condition according to character. Through the course of a term of our Recorder's Court, criminals are found guilty and held in jail for final sentence upon a day appointed, when the whole number are called up, sentenced, and sent off to join the other spirits in prison. So in the Olympic games, the victors, as they came out, received the applause of the multitude and took their stand together, waiting for the official proclamation and the crowning until the whole process of trial had been completed. Though at death the wicked pass beyond probation, and though they do at once go to their own place, yet it is eminently fitting that, at the end of this present system, God should exhibit to the Universe the triumph of his government, not only in the exercise of his sovereign grace, but in the display of his justice, which sentences all incorrigible rebels to punishment. Then as to the distance of that day;—it is not really far away from the present state of things. It comes while the earth is yet in its full population. It follows immediately upon the close of the remedial system on this earth, when the rebellion shall have been so completely subdued that the condemned rebels shall be in proportion to the loyal as the

occupants of our prisons are to the good citizens,—a small number, not known to society, not reckoned in citizenship.

IV. A second probation during the intermediate state is argued from the theory of an intermediate *place*. Hades is held to be the common region for all departed spirits. It is divided into two apartments, Paradise and Gehenna, to which the good and the bad are respectively assigned at death, there to await the Judgment. During this state it is claimed that persons in Gehenna may repent, find forgiveness, and cross over to Paradise, or at least be transferred there at the last day. Even if this theory of Hades be true, that it is a common intermediate abode of the departed, this does not prove a probation during that state. Of the many Christians who hold to the intermediate place, almost all reject the idea that salvation can there be attained.

But is there such an intermediate *place* at all? We do not find it taught in the Word of God. "To day," said the Saviour to the penitent thief, "shalt thou be with me in Paradise." That place is heaven, and not an apartment in Hades. It is the place to which Christ went, when he prayed, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." Surely he did not expect to meet his Father in Hades, but in heaven, where the saved thief was to be with him that day; where he will have all his people, as he prayed: "Father, I will that they, whom thou hast given me, be where I am, that they may behold my glory." In the New Testament the word Paradise is used in only two other places, where it immediately refers to heaven: "To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the Tree of Life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God;" "I knew such a man that was caught up into Paradise." The first passage can mean nothing but the *final place* of reward, and the second, Paul, in the same connection, makes synonymous with "the third heavens." Other dying saints are represented as going directly to heaven. "Enoch was not, for God took him." Elijah "went up into heaven." Stephen, about to depart, saw the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God, and, in assurance of going thither, he prays, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." So our Lord prom-

ised: "I will come again and receive you unto myself, that where I am, there ye may be also." He says of his saints, they are "as the angels of God in heaven;" "equal unto the angels," and this, as the connection shows, is previous to the resurrection. Now if they are like and equal to the angels of God in heaven, are they not with the angels in heaven? So the Apostle Paul represents the whole Church of God as being, at present, not in any halfway place, but in *heaven* or on *earth*;—"Of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named;" and "the spirits of just men made perfect" he reports as already in the heavenly Jerusalem with Jesus and the angels. For himself he has a "desire to depart to be with Christ, which is far better." Surely he would not find Christ's residence in Hades.

Equally clear is it that the wicked, at death, go to their *final* place, the hell, prepared for the devil and his angels. It is said, on the other side, that the wicked dead, until the resurrection, are confined in Tartarus, the nether portion of Hades. Now in the only passage that uses the term Tartarus, 2 Pet. ii. 4, that word is made to describe the place prepared for the "angels that sinned," and is translated "hell," where they are "reserved unto judgment." So also the souls of the wicked are "reserved unto judgment" in Tartarus, in Gehenna, in Hades, along with the devil and his angels, for whom this hell was prepared, and into which, after the last day, they are again to be cast.

Nor can the view of an intermediate place be proven from the use of the word Hades in the Scriptures. In classic use, it is true, it had the idea of a common, but final abode. But God in giving a revelation had to use such words as were found in the language, supplementing their meaning when found wanting as to the divine idea, just as the missionaries do now in translating the same inspired Word into the languages of the heathen. Yet this word, Hades, came into the New Testament, not directly from Greek usage, but from the Septuagint of the Old Testament, where it stands for "Sheol," a word older than the classics. What then does "Sheol" mean? The word as shown by Professor Griffin, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xiii., has four different meanings,—the common idea of some-

thing dark and gloomy underlying them all, viz.: *the grave, death, a dark unseen region in contrast with heaven, and a place of extreme suffering*, never expressing a common abode for the righteous and the wicked, except as death and the grave are their common lot. Now Hades is used sixty-four times in the Septuagint, and in all but four it is the translation of "Sheol," and so is substantially its synonym. So then the word Hades comes from the Old Testament into the New with this color of meaning, and is used in the New eleven times, with the same general signification, while in no one case does it require the sense of a common abode of the dead. In six cases it refers unmistakably to the grave; and in the other five, like Gehenna, in its universal use, it refers to a place of punishment. If then there be no such intermediate place, no argument can be drawn from it for a probation during which departed souls may be transferred from the abode of the bad to that of the good.

V.—An argument for a second probation is based upon "learned ignorance." Says Heard: "We are not to argue from our ignorance of the plan of this future salvation to its impossibility. The intermediate state may be the scene of a display of the riches of God's long-suffering and grace as far transcending any we know of at present, as this dispensation transcends that of Judaism." Yes, and it may not. But there are some things that we *do know*. We know that *this life is a probation*, that a destiny of reward or of retribution awaits every soul after death. We do know that the Son of God, who has given the most full and positive revelations upon these profound realities of the future, has made them so clear and unequivocal that all adverse criticism, confessedly, has to go outside of the Word of God for support: that he did not make any like statement in regard to the reality or possibility of a probation beyond this life. If there be such a fact, of so vast moment, why did not the Saviour reveal it? If it be said that Christ did not reveal this future period of trial, in order to leave the utmost possible pressure upon men to repent in this life, intending to give another opportunity, we say that this does not accord with the frankness of our Lord, and that, if

space for pardon is still to be open till the judgment, it was of vast importance to the efficiency of that system of salvation that this continuance of the period of grace should have been made perfectly clear, for, otherwise, those who have departed this life without Christ are henceforth deprived of that benefit which comes from the prayers of surviving friends, from that travail of soul by which many in this life are born into the kingdom. Christ in his work is thereby deprived of that sympathetic aid, and his people are deprived of that privilege of "travail in birth until Christ be formed" in their departed dear ones.

Further, if we are not to argue from our ignorance of this plan for future salvation, neither are we to argue from our ignorance to its possibility. Surely ignorance is a bad premiss to base any argument upon, especially if its conclusion runs counter to the logical drift of much that is absolute truth, and if the consequences are ruinous to souls. Now if another probation is taught, men will take advantage of the doctrine, which, when it turns out to be untrue, will be found to have precipitated upon them irretrievable ruin. Just as men recoil from Christ's doctrine of eternal punishment and seek refuge in the view of restoration or of annihilation, as something less terrible, so will they much more take license from the notion of another period of grace, and run their chances.

VI.—An argument for a second probation is drawn from the abiding love and mercy of Christ. Mrs. Stowe writes: "It is evident to me that the spirit of Christianity has produced in the human spirit a tenderness of love which wholly revolts from the old doctrine on this subject, and I observe that the more Christ-like any one becomes, the more difficult it seems for them to accept it as hitherto presented." Noting the *petitio principii* in this statement, we pass to let the fair author answer her own argument, as in the very next sentence she recoils from her doctrine, and says: "And yet, on the contrary, it was Christ, who said, 'Fear him that is able to destroy both soul and body in hell;' and the most appalling language is that of Christ Himself." Yet who is more "Christ-like" than Christ, to find it difficult to accept the "old doctrine? Still she goes on to state that the present position of th

Church is wholly irreconcilable with the Spirit of Christ. "For, if it were the case that probation in all cases begins and ends here, God's example would surely be one that could not be followed, and He would seem to be far less persevering than even human beings in efforts to save." Turn over this assertion then in the light of God's own declarations. "What could have been done more to my vineyard that I have not done in it?" "All day long have I stretched forth my hands unto a disobedient and gainsaying people." "How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? Mine heart is turned within me; my repentings are kindled together." Take that fearful passage in the Proverbs, where God complains that all of his advances have been resisted, and then as though "every possible thing had been done" in vain, He turns to cut off probation and leave the incorrigibles to the logic of their own lives: "*Therefore* shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with their own devices." Take the Saviour's lament over the inhabitants of Jerusalem: "If thou hadst known, even thou, in this thy day, the things which belong to thy peace; but now they are hid from thine eyes." Mark that grief of the divine compassion: "*Ye will not come unto me that ye might have life.*" And does all this present an example of perseverance in efforts to save not worthy to be followed? Indeed, God, in this life, has seemed to exhaust invitation and warning and entreaty and perseverance in the same, and has endured abuse and neglect and contempt such as to put his example infinitely above the utmost that human nature could have attained unto. Besides, it is mere assumption that God can do anything more for a sinful soul in the future world than he has done in this. We have no evidence to this effect: the probabilities are against it.

We come now to the arguments against a second probation.

1.—Passages of Scripture which teach that probation is limited to this life. Eighteen centuries ago Jesus said: "Whosoever, therefore, shall be ashamed of me and of my words in *this* adulterous and sinful generation, of him also shall the Son

of Man be ashamed, *when he cometh* in the glory of his Father ;” and again : “ Whosoever, therefore, shall confess me *before men*, him will I confess before my Father which is in heaven ; but whosoever shall deny me *before men*, him will I also deny before my Father which is in heaven.” “ *Now* is the day of salvation ; *now* is the accepted time,” is the intensive appeal. “ Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap ; for he that soweth to his flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption ; but he that soweth to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting.” The sowing is in this life, in the flesh ; the reaping is in the life everlasting, or its opposite. “ It is appointed unto men once to die ; but after this the judgment,”—the plain implication being that no period of trial can be expected after death. We are told of those, who “ sin wilfully,” “ for whom there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain looking for of judgment.” In regard to such, the efficacy of the sacrifice for sins has ceased long before the judgment, of which there is fearful expectation. When we shall appear before the judgment seat of Christ it will be to “ receive the things *done in the body* ;” these things DONE IN THE BODY are to fix our doom. It is by “ patient continuance in well-doing” here that we are to gain “ eternal life ” from Him, “ who will render to every man according to his deeds.” Those who are “ faithful *unto death* ” are to receive the crown of life ; while it is in this life that men “ treasure up wrath against the day of wrath.” The preaching of the gospel, as the apostles and other ministers of Christ have preached it, in this world, becomes a savour of “ death unto death ” or of “ life unto life ” That solemn declaration of Jesus : “ Ye shall die in your sins,” implies that *dying* in sin is a sealing of destiny. If not so, the warning loses all its force. But, as if to make it clear that such a “ dying in sin ” is a perpetual separation from Christ, He says at once : “ Whither I go, ye cannot come.” Then the Pharisees, carping at this response, inquire : “ Will he kill himself ?” Jesus retorts : “ Ye are from beneath ; I am from above,” and repeats the original declaration as an equivalent to this : “ Therefore said I unto you, ye shall die in your sins, for if ye believe not that I am He, ye shall die in your sins,” which brings us back to those other words of his : “ He that

believeth not shall be damned." Of the rich fool in the parable our Lord declared : "THIS NIGHT thy soul shall be required of thee." "So is every one that is not rich toward God." Every one, who has not gained that true riches before his soul is required of him, is just such a fool. And so we find the Bible burdened with appeal and warning, as though the offer of salvation were limited to this life. "To day, if ye will hear his voice ;" "How shall we escape ?" "What shall it profit a man ?" "Strive to enter in at the strait gate, for many shall seek to enter in and shall not be able ;" "Let us, therefore, fear," lest we fail of entering into his rest. Such is the burden of admonition that fills the Word of God, implying that salvation can be attained only in this life.

II. Passages of Scripture which teach that there is no probation between death and the Judgment. Of the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, who had then been in the intermediate state for two thousand years, Christ avers that they shall appear at the judgment in their original character—their condition unchanged by the intervening period. So, too, did he declare of the people of Tyre and Sidon. No intimation does he give of any disciplinary process of salvation enjoyed by those people between the day of their overthrow and the last day. If in their day of probation they had had the light of Chorazin and Capernaum they *would* have repented long ago, the Saviour says : yet, with all of his disposition to palliate the case of those early sinners, he gives no hint that they were having another probation, but leaves them where death found them. Our Lord represents that at the last day many will put in a plea—not that they had repented since their dying—but that during life they, in His name, had prophesied, had cast out devils, had done many wonderful works." And to such he professes : "I never knew you," during that period of earthly activities ; "depart from me." Then, in that description of the process of the judgment, the decision is made upon what men did, or did not do, in *this* life. No praise or blame is attributed for conduct during the interim after death. Christ used the parable of the ten virgins to impress the need of being ready at the time of his coming : "Watch, for ye

know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of Man cometh." Before the coming of the bridegroom the door was open ; after, it was *shut*, and to those who come saying, "Lord, Lord," he answers, "I know you not." At death, he comes to all and shuts the door. When one came to our Lord with the inquiry, "Are there few that be saved?" He answered, strive to enter in at the straight gate, for many, I say unto you, shall seek to enter in and shall not be able. When once the Master of the house is risen, and *hath shut to the door*, and ye begin to stand without and to knock at the door, saying, Lord, Lord, open unto us, and He shall answer and say unto you, I know you not." Now observe that this is a pure question as to the ultimate salvation of souls. There is here no controversy with the Pharisees, no temporal consideration, by which the point of the instruction can be turned aside. And *when* is that door shut? that is our present inquiry. The answer comes in the reply made by those who are shut out. "We have eaten and drunk in thy presence and thou hast taught in our streets,"—all of which are matters that would occur in this life. They lay claim to good deeds done while they were in the flesh ; they put in no plea on the score of discipline or of repentance since the day of death, when the door was shut. And the Lord, by the phrase, "Ye workers of iniquity," implying that their doom had been sealed by those earthly acts, bids them depart.

Let us look now at the story of the rich man and Lazarus. This is not an allegory, which, like the printer's types, must be turned before it can be read. It is not after the pattern of the Sower, but after that of the Good Samaritan. It is history, real or fictitious ; it is not an allegory, in which Dives represents the Jews, and Lazarus the Gentiles. That is a critical expedient to get over a theological difficulty. But even if that view could be made to stand, the parable by its glancing into the future world, yet teaches its terrible realities. The essence of the parable, according to Trench, is that the Rich Man, for his sin of unbelief in the invisible world, showing itself in the setting of his heart on this world, in hardheartedness towards the poor and in prodigality toward himself, is made to realize the remediless doom of his soul. Now as to the bearing of

this parable upon our argument, observe (1) that both the Rich Man and Lazarus are *at once* assigned their places according to character,—one in bliss. and the other in torment. Both die ; one is immediately carried by angels into Abraham's bosom, and the other lifts up his eyes in hell. That this cannot mean that the two men were assigned to the upper and nether portions of Hades, is evident from the fact that the Bible, as already shown, does not sustain the idea of any such intermediate place. Besides, the original word here for "hell" is not Gehenna, or Tartarus, which, according to that theory, are the names of the nether portion of Hades, but it is Hades itself, in contrast with Abraham's bosom. The Rich Man went to "Hades,"—to Hell. Observe (2) that a "great gulf" is fixed between these states and places. But our Lord does not leave the idea in this merely figurative form, but gives it a literal interpretation : "So that they which would pass from hence to you cannot, neither can they pass to us that would come from thence." This is the bridgeless gulf between heaven and hell. No wire can ever be suspended across it ; no arch can be made to span it ; not even the ingenuity of Satan can invent, nor the enginery of hell project a passage way over it. As there can be no intercommunication, so there can be no discipline of those, who die in their sins, by association with the saints. Observe (3) that in this life all had been done that could be done. When Dives found that there was no hope for himself, he besought Abraham to send Lazarus to warn his five brethren, lest they also should come to that place of torment. Abraham declined, because they had the Word of God represented by Moses and the Prophets. Dives then plead that if one went unto them from the dead they would hear. Abraham cut off the appeal by declaring that if they would not hear the Word of God, neither would they be persuaded, even by one rising from the dead. In the world, where they were, all had been done for them that could be done ; they would not hear a preacher rising from the grave ; or, if they should be brought into the spirit world, they would no sooner believe here than there. The historical Lazarus *was* raised from the dead ; but while men had to admit the miracle, they yet would not accept the divinity of Him who wrought

it. But even admitting that Dives and Lazarus were in the upper and lower parts of Hades, this parable is proof that there is no probation there, for there is no passing from one condition to the other.

III. The Scriptural argument for the termination of a probation at death, is confirmed by the fact that it is found in accordance with the course of nature. Bishop Butler, in his matchless Analogy, has found confirmation of the Scripture doctrines that God has a moral government over his creatures, executed by a system of rewards and punishments, and that there is a future life, in which this moral government is thus maintained. In two chapters, by the analogy of the course of nature, he proves "the general doctrine of religion, that our *present life* is a state of probation for a future one." He does not specifically argue that this probation ceases with the present life; but this is the implication of the whole argument. *This life*, terminating at death, is found to be a state of probation, implying trial, difficulties, and danger, intended for moral discipline and improvement, and fixing destiny in the future. Yet, incidentally, he does find this limitation of probation, when he says: "Now the beginning of life, considered as an education for a mature age, in the present world, appears plainly, at first sight, analagous to this our trial for a future one;" and again: "The former part of life is to be considered as an important opportunity, which nature puts into our hands, and which, *when lost, is not to be recovered*. And our being placed in a state of discipline throughout this life, for another world, is a providential disposition of things, exactly of the same kind as our being placed in a state of discipline during childhood for mature age. Our condition in both respects is uniform and of a piece, and comprehended under one and the same general law of nature." Nothing, we find, is more common than regrets for misspent opportunities, which are considered lost. If I could live my life over again, I would do so and so, is a frequent confession that the period of preparing for the maturity of our earthly existence, once gone, cannot be regained. Multitudes of those social, intellectual, and moral habits, which go to make up our own character, were fixed

within the probation of early life and cannot be reset. The opportunity for maturing a virtuous life, once gone, cuts off the prospect of a happy old age. And so when the Bible makes death the limit of probation, "which when lost is not to be recovered," we find in nature no objection to the credibility of the arrangement, but indeed an analagous course of things, which confirms it. If objection is made that multitudes do not use this life as though it were the only probation, and so it could not have been thus intended, we point to the many seeds of vegetables and of animal bodies that never come to a state of maturity, and to the fact that those which attain that perfection do answer the end for which they were designed. As Butler says: "The *appearance* of such an amazing *waste* in nature, with respect to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable as, what is more terrible, the present and future ruin of so many moral agents by themselves." This author also advances another profound view which bears upon our question. It is that "this world, as a state of probation, is a theatre of action for the manifestation of persons' characters with respect to a future one." "Such a making manifest of what is in them may have respect to a future life as a means of their being disposed of suitably to their characters and of its being known to the creation, by way of example, that they are thus disposed of." And such a revelation of character during this probation may be a part of the process, by which, at the Judgment, God will justify every decision of his in the eye of the Universe.

In confirmation of this analogy of nature to the Scriptural doctrine that this life is a probation which ends at death, we have the conclusion to which human reason and conscience have come, unenlightened by revelation. It is one of the most striking facts of human history that God, by the reason and conscience of man, has made a universal impression that there is a future life, that there are two conditions there, and two places for the two grades of character. This natural theology also teaches that that destiny is sealed at death. According to the idea of the Armenti of the Egyptians, the Hades of the Greeks, the Tartarus of the Latins, the future lot of all men is decided when they depart this life, and they are at once

assigned their final places in the future world. Hear also the philosophical Plato: "Well know, O Socrates, that when one supposes himself near the point of death, there enter into his soul fears and anxieties respecting things before unheeded. For then the old traditions respecting hell, how those, who *in this life* have been guilty of wrong, must there suffer the penalty of their crimes, torment his soul. He looks back upon his past life, and if he finds in the record many sins, like one starting from a frightful dream, he is terrified and filled with foreboding fears." "The good man," Seneca says, "God accustoms to hardships and prepares him for himself. But the luxurious, whom he seems to spurn, and to indulge, he reserves for evil to come. The man, who has long been spared, will, at last, have his position of misery, and, though he seems to have escaped, it is only delayed for a time." All of this indicates, as a tenet of the religion of nature, that this life is the only probation, and with this doctrine God's Revelation is found in harmony.

Isaac Taylor's "Physical Theory of Another Life," in the chapter on "The Survivance of Individual Character," says:

"While, therefore, it consists perfectly with the abstract reason of things, and with what we see around us in nature, to expect that the future transition from the present mode of existence to another will be effected immediately by the divine power, it directly contradicts, not merely the reason of things abstractedly, but our actual knowledge and experience of the principles of the moral and intellectual system, to hope for any such sovereign renovation of our dispositions, as consequent upon an enlargement of our faculties, or upon a change of scene, circumstance, and society. That the Sovereign Benevolence may indeed, if it pleases, so touch the springs of our motives as to bring about a change of character, is by no means to be denied; and, indeed, such an act of grace lies at the foundation of that economy of mercy under which we are now placed; but then this exertion of spiritual influence always flows in the channel of moral means and inducements; nor are we entitled to look for it under any other conditions than those explicitly laid down, and solemnly insisted upon by the inspired writers, who strictly confine our expectations of efficacious grace to the present economy, and who, in the tones of awful warning, announce *this* to be the day of salvation, and *this* the accepted season of mercy.

IV.—This Scriptural view, confirmed by the analogy of nature, is still further sustained by the fact that the Intermediate State lacks the essential elements of a probation, and so cannot stand in that relation.

Probation implies the suspension of retribution. There is evidence that this condition is met beyond death, while the judgment is overwhelming that punishment begins at the cessation of life. Even upon the theory of an intermediate *place*, those who die in their sins, go to the nether division of Hades and suffer. If Dives were only in that halfway place, he was ready under the sweep of retribution, as Father Abraham bid him remember.

Probation implies the continued mediation of Christ. There is no evidence that this can be obtained after death. The only shadow of encouragement to this effect is that, *if* Christ went to Hades, *if* his preaching was anything more than the proclamation to the patriarchs of the accomplished redemption, *if* he appointed there any means of grace and made provision for the perpetuation of the same, it *may* be that His mediation can here be secured. Yet even this is to be believed without any knowledge that a single spirit did repent under the preaching of Christ, or ever will repent under that system of things, while the whole tenor of God's Word implies that Christ closes his work of grace with the closing of the life of each person.

Probation implies, as an element, the influence of the Holy Spirit. No man will ever repent without it. Even in this life the exhortation is needed: "Quench not the Spirit;" "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption." To have "done despite to the Spirit of promise," was a part of the solemn indictment against those who were worthy of the "sorer punishment" than that of the sinner against Moses' law, and to whom there is a "certain fearful reckoning for of judgment." God declared that his Spirit should not always strive with man. And there is no evidence that this gentle spirit, so easily to be grieved, will continue to strive with the souls of men after they have rejected a lifetime of his interposition. The sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be forgiven in the world to come; and who knows but that all who die in their sins, resisting the Holy Spirit to the very last, do thereby commit that remediless sin, and thus forever cut themselves off from forgiveness.

Is there a Probation after Death?

Probation implies, as an element, good social influence. We know not how much our virtue is indebted to the restraints and incitements of our surroundings. In the fellowship of a spiritual exaltation many a covenant with death is disannulled, which no ordinary agency would ever have shaken. But after death these social influences cease to operate. The departed spirit is removed from communion with friends on the earth and, impenitent, it is separated from the righteous in the unseen world; all of its associations are with the wicked, while its own depravity is let loose only to reveal new horrors in its vice, delights to torment the victim of his seductions.

Probation implies discipline. But in the world-to-come the helpful discipline of this life is turned to punishment, a penal infliction upon an obstinate sinner will never lead him to repentance and faith and love. It does not so work in this life. Criminals are rarely softened by imprisonment, while affliction is made a blessing to the righteous, suffering, even attended by the grace of God, does not prove reformatory even in this life. Confine an immortal soul in the agonies of Hades, and it will find no discipline there. Conscience, with renewed power, will continue its work of retribution, itself a hell. The sinful character will reproduce itself and so necessitate perpetual infliction.

And so in that period just beyond this life we find none of the essential elements of probation. What then will a sinful soul do, stripped of all this probationary interposition, but plunge deeper and deeper into perdition?

ARTICLE III.—HENRY WARD BEECHER.

The Sermons of Henry Ward Beecher in Plymouth Church, Brooklyn. From verbatim reports. By T. J. ELLINWOOD.

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ONE cannot help experiencing a twinge, call it of modesty or shame, when he attempts to forestall posterity and to write a critique of a living contemporary, of one whom he may call a friend. No one likes to praise or blame a man to his face. Mr. Beecher, perhaps, is an exception to other men. He has had praises that have exalted him till he has touched the stars with lofty head, and vilifications that have sunk him to the lowest abyss. He probably by this time is so used to such words that he “cares for none of these things.” We, however, must still confess to a certain shamefacedness in this matter, and for that reason declare that we are not talking of Mr. Beecher, but only of the popular preacher, the preacher to the people, although before we get through we may make some particular mention of him by way of forcible illustration.

Who are the *people*? When we speak of the people in connection with the monarchical and aristocratic countries of the Old World, we do indeed have a different idea in our minds from that which we have in speaking of the people of our own country. In the Old World the people form the lower classes, the subject and abject classes, with little or no cultivation, the idle, unwashed, unknown; but with us how different! Among what we call the *people* there are all grades of intelligence and education, as may be seen in any of our religious congregations or assemblages for political purposes. In fact, the true idea of the people is not that of the educated or the ignorant classes, but the great body of humanity, who have

the common attributes of humanity—reason, conscience, and heart—who have souls that Christ came to save. These are to be reached with the gospel. The truth is to be so preached as to pierce through the accidental, and to come to the essential, in humanity. Prejudices and opinions are not to be addressed, but minds and souls. These minds and souls made by God, under whatever garb or form of humanity they be, are to be reached by the truth which God also made. This is to be done *by having a genuine love and sympathy for the people*. Honor to the scholar who is a true-hearted loving man, for he holds the world in his hand; but the mere scholar sometimes loses utterly this power of sympathy with common men. He contemns and despises them in his secret heart because they do not know the things he does. He looks upon them as belonging to the barbarous world of *Philistinism*. He is not their brother. He does not love them. He can talk eloquently about humanity, but he can respect nothing but learning, and those whom he esteems learned. He belongs to a caste. He is of the few, not of the many. He has worked out of the ocean-currents of human life into a side-eddy, or pool, where he goes round and round in a ceaseless circle. He has in this sense at least become a smaller man, though a more learned one. Now with such a heart, though he may be a good man still, is he fit to preach? He has in fact too little of the spirit of the gospel. He has lost sight of the large interests of humanity, and therefore with all his scholarship and discipline of thought he is a dry man, an unmagnetic man, an ineloquent orator, a barren preacher, one who cannot reach a living soul; and what honest man with homely thoughts and common sorrows will care for what he says, or go to him for counsel or strength in his soul's troubles? There is too little common ground or love between them.

And, again, to win this royal name of a preacher to the people, one must be willing to preach *so plainly that the people can understand him*. He must come down from the high and lofty style to the plain style—to “the low style”—of Augustine. And since we quote Augustine, we will quote him again to the same point, which, great genius as he was, he faithfully illustrated in his own preaching; he says: “It is

better that the learned should find fault than that the people should not understand." The people must first know the truth, and then the truth will make them free ; and is it not a greater *intellectual* achievement to make an illiterate man clearly understand what the act of Faith is, than to construct a metaphysical theory of faith that shall interest the most philosophical mind in the audience ?

Then, again, to be a popular preacher in the true sense—one must preach *on the level of common peoples' thoughts and ideas*. Popularity depends on an intuitive perception of what interests the people—what ideas, facts, arguments, illustrations, come home to them and are received with eagerness and delight. The preacher must not strike too high nor too low, but must gauge the common mind with happy exactitude. Not that he may not sometimes lift himself and his audience into a higher plane of ideas, for the common mind is not devoid of strong sense, rapid perception, and the power of being moved by great thoughts ; but one may stray far out of the popular way of thinking, and get into abstractions. He must go right to the heart of the matter. He must be great enough to comprehend the popular mind, to know the avenues that lead to it, and he must especially be willing to confine himself to the present—to the last war rather than to the last Punic war—drawing his illustrations from the house, the field, the market, from the sky that every one sees every day, and the earth that every one treads every day. He must make use of the true, not the artificial proof. The motives that impel men to bargains and trade, they understand better than transcendental reasons. The real rather than the ideal interests them. There must be some foundation of practical truth in what is said, for the popular mind wearies of pure invention and keeps on the solid earth, where, too, there are springs of poetry and beauty. Such a preacher was St. John Chrysostom in the old Greek empire, of whom the people said, it was better for the sun to cease shining than for him to cease speaking.

And yet, again, in order to be a preacher to the people one must preach *with feeling and conviction*. It must be a real thing and not something put on. Here has been the power of

great preachers from the apostles down. They have preached not merely with the accent but the reality of belief. They have spoken with the enthusiasm of love and faith. And they have had good reason to do so; for this is the gospel which has proved stronger than Roman legions, which has subdued kingdoms, and proved itself the strongest thing in the world. The power of God has been in this gospel. Its new religion of love has been the only religion equal to the conquest of the world and of the unconquerable heart of man. It has gone forth in the power of pure goodness—the power of the Cross—and has shown itself to be the wisdom of God unto salvation. Now if such a religion which has renewed the face of the earth and which is the omnipotent word of Life, is not preached with enthusiasm and with something of the prophets' bold joy in the Lord and in the word of his power—then it will not reach the people, nor be the living word of God to their souls. Preachers cannot preach formal sermons and expect to hold the people. The age demands for its religion, either to be soothed or to be saved—either ritualism or a living faith. It will have a religion of pleasing forms, rites, images, processions, altar-dressings, incense-burning, candles, flowers, in which not only Protestantism but Christianity will prove a failure, or the primitive spirit of faith, and the true love of man, must be revived in the preachers of Christianity.

The field now opened in our country for the preacher is an inspiring one from its difficulty as well as from its greatness. There is a great want to be met as well as a vast field to be occupied. While every material interest is advancing, there is danger that true Christianity, or spiritual religion, will be left behind. The forms of Christianity are changing. Religious denominations are disintegrating, and reuniting, if they reunite at all, in new combinations. The strife is renewed between the ancient formalistic and authoritative idea of the church and the free idea (what in reality we esteem to be the Puritan idea) springing from a more popular theory, one not depending upon forms, or even upon rigid dogmas, but representing rather the inward spirit and life. The Church of the Future so much talked of will be the body of those who are

animated and unified by the spirit of Christ, who cherish a common personal love and obedience of him as Lord and Head, and who draw from him the principles of a divine life. Not dreaming philanthropists, or radical reformers, or Augustinians, Arminians, or Calvinists, but *Christians*—gathered out of all other churches and religious bodies, they will constitute a living church, organized from a similar principle of life, and comprising in a more comprehensive and vital analysis the faith, intelligence, and growing religious strength of the land. No genuine evangelical element, or true doctrine, will be lost, but it will find fit if simpler and diviner forms of expression than it now does in our best creeds and symbols—perhaps than our purest Puritanism exhibits. This Church of Christ will give its strength to works of real goodness and to the moral and spiritual redemption of man. It will oppose sin and selfishness in all their forms personal and social. It will be a church of living souls, not of dead formulas. Therefore we believe that for a true ministry of Christ, courageous, honest, pure, able, eloquent, spiritual, there never was opened in the history of the world or in any land such a field as in our country. Timid and time-serving preachers cannot stand up in the tremendous rush of material interests; they cannot stem the tide of scepticism; they cannot show their heads in the wild storm of conflicting opinions that darkens the heavens and confuses all things—but only the strong and true—those who resolve to serve Christ and preach truth to the people—who are men full of the Holy Ghost—they can rule the storm and make head against it. Such strong leaders of the people are called for, and we cannot longer forbear reference to one to whom these remarks have pointed, as to him who deserves above any other living American minister the name of a *great popular preacher*. Other ministers of Christ may be more singly devoted to the work of saving souls; other ministers may be a hundred-fold more profound theologians, but few preachers living, or who have ever lived, have greater power with the people to do them good, than Henry Ward Beecher. While he is pre-eminently a popular preacher, he is not, in the common sense of the term, a sensational preacher, whose false popularity has

been so graphically described by Dr. Chalmers in these words : " There is a high and far-sounding popularity which is indeed a most worthless article ; felt by all who have it most to be greatly more oppressive than gratifying ; a popularity of stare, and pressure, and animal heat, and a whole tribe of other annoyances which it brings around the person of its unfortunate victim ; a popularity which rifles home of its society, and, by elevating a man above his fellows, places him in a region of desolation, where the intimacies of human fellowship are unfelt, and where he stands a conspicuous mark for the shafts of malice, envy, and detraction ; a popularity, which, with its head among thorns, and its feet in the treacherous quicksands, has nothing to hold the agonies of its tottering existence but the hosannas of a drivelling generation ! " Not such a popularity is Mr. Beecher's. It rests on solider grounds. He remains rational, earnest, natural, scriptural, while mightily attractive to the popular mind and heart.

Mr. Beecher is a man of genius, and cannot be imitated. The imitations are conclusive failures, like the fox that tries to copy the lion in his roar and ramp, or the blackbird that essays to sing like the thrush. Some one has said of Mr. Beecher, that he is indeed a preacher for the common people, but he is not a preacher for the educated and refined class. This is the highest praise to say that a man is a preacher to the common people. He has Christ-like greatness who utters from the pulpit such words as these, and such words are sown all through Mr. Beecher's sermons : " I have seen the slave-woman whose fidelity was the means of the conversion of William Wirt—that eminent Richmond lawyer. I have known cases in which slaves carried salvation to whole plantations. I have known domestic servants that lived such disinterested and beautiful lives, that members of the household were converted through the influence of their example. The blossoms are not always on the tops of the trees. They are sometimes on the branches that are down near the ground. I have seen plain sewing women, I have seen the lowest in poverty, who stood with such erect, sweet, pure, heavenly-mindedness, that it was worth a man's while to go and look at them, to renew his own faith." Brave words ! But this preacher can also preach to the re-

finer. Where truly is to be found a better definition of refinement than this from the sermon entitled "Fragments of Instruction:"—"Because you are a citizen of no mean republic, and because you are men, it is right for every one to aim at refinement. By *refinement*, I understand, comprehensively, the bringing to bear of reason and the imagination upon qualities and things in such a way that you see finer elements in them than otherwise you would see; finer than your senses see; finer than your common reason sees. Do not suppose that refinement belongs to any place, or to any class. I admit that a man is better helped to be refined if he has the advantages of refined society; if he belongs to certain professions in which refinement is current; or if he has certain lines of education. In other words, there is greater facility for gaining refinement under these circumstances. But a man is not refined because he is a minister, nor because he is a lawyer, nor because he is a legislator, nor because he is an artist. He is refined because it is good for manhood to be refined." There is no absolute monopoly, he judges, in this much glorified refinement, nor in any possession or manifestation of the beautiful. This is the birthright of every soul. No artist could reason with feeling more aglow or fresher eloquence than does Mr. Beecher for the true place that the beautiful holds in religion, as the correlation of moral and spiritual forces, as investing the Divine nature itself with its ineffable light as with a garment; but the glory of Mr. Beecher, is not that he has said deeper or more beautiful things on this theme than other men—not at all—but that he claims these splendid gifts for all, for the slave, for the beggar, as well as for the rich and the educated.

On the other hand, no one who has studied Mr. Beecher's sermons, and more elaborate addresses, can affirm that he is wanting also in the logical faculty. Whether it was logic, or whatever it was, it was something of power, and tenacious grip, and weight, that wrestled with, fought, and overthrew that big, turbulent English populace that roared out in defiance against the American orator in those stormy Liverpool meetings so memorable in the history of the late war.

The first half of Mr. Beecher's sermons is commonly taken up in a kind of ratiocination, or in a logical development of

Henry Ward Beecher.

the pure philosophy of the text—showing its harmony with the constitution of the mind and with the facts of being. He builds up this philosophical argument with considerable care. His metaphysics, it is true, belong neither to the Scotch nor the German school, that we can perceive, and it has been whispered that he has elaborated for himself a system of mental philosophy founded mainly on the "science" of phrenology—but however that may be, he recognizes the need of his instruction of the people in divine truth.

In one department of reasoning, on the moral side of man's nature, that which has relation to his conscience, moral temperament, affections, sensibilities, will—in all that goes to make character—he is powerful and penetrating. His reasoning to the depths of human nature, sinking shafts as it were into the original soil of humanity, gives him a solid foundation to build on. The practical issues of the sermon thus have weight and authority, as if vitally connected with and springing from fundamental truth. After this philosophical or theoretical development of the text, exhibiting the harmony of its main idea with the moral constitution of man and the plan of his life under the government of God—striking the leading thought of the text and viewing it in its fundamental relations to moral truth—then comes the freer illustration and application; and here the sermon takes a broad range through the wide relations of human life, society, and business. The preacher still carries his philosophy along with him through these manifold applications of truth to life. He is ever pleading for the liberation of the true nature of man, or, as the old theologians would call it, the "supralapsarian" nature of man, from the servitude of his lower or animal nature. His great aim to bring out and build up a *genuine Christian manhood* made perfect in Christ. He says of man: "He is born free from his nature than any other nature on earth—that creatures are born right up to their nature. They have whole nature at birth; but man is ever striving to reach true nature, and sorrow is the true conflict in men's themselves." His conception of religion—and here, less, is the place where he most lays himself open to

so frequently made against him of a lack of the evangelic element—does not fasten itself upon the doctrinal idea, the dogma in form, but upon its underlying truth, or substance. “The interior spiritual substance of religion is transcendently of more importance than its formulas, than the idea-forms, government-forms, worship forms of the church.” He aims at that within the man that moulds his life—the soul’s interior and essential good. He says: “I am so far from the binding sympathy of the schools that it would cost me nothing in a purely philosophical point of view, to take one or another side of any doctrinal question.” No man can express himself more strongly upon the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, and upon the utter need of God to cleanse the heart and convert the soul. In the orthodox “plan of salvation,” however, in the employment of the words “atonement,” the “cross,” the “blood of Christ,” he does not come up to the requirements of the accepted theology of the church, and he would be indiscriminating, we judge, when pressed to close distinctions, and even to clear practical counsel to some minds seeking the way of forgiveness and eternal life, but he preaches what he claims to be the essence of the gospel,—God saving men in Christ. His theology may be summed up in the word—Christ. Christ is verily God, made personal to you and me—Christ dwelling in your hearts by faith—this is the sum and substance of his belief. He says to men—“You all have sinned, and are sinning. You don’t know the way to get back to God. Christ presents himself to you in the gospel and declares, I, your loving Lord, I, your Saviour, I, your Teacher and Friend, am the way. Love me, and let me walk with you all the time, and I will see that you have a perpetual consciousness of such a divine power as will give victory to the spiritual side of your nature over the sensual and lower side. Trust not your own strength. Love me, and let me love you, and I will save you.” And he says with feeling, “Tell me, have I failed to preach a living Christ? Tell me, have I failed to preach a Christ burning with sympathy for sinful men? Tell me, have I failed to show men, dying in their sins, that there was a love of God that could put its arms about them, and cleanse them, and lift them up into its own felicity, if they were willing?

Have I been faithless in this? Then God forgive me! for all my ministry has been empty. But to me the heaven has been one magnificent procession of divinities. To me Christ has been all in all, Alpha and Omega, beginning and end, ever-present, and ever-living. I have, to be sure, not preached a *system* of revelations. I have not used the abstract term *plan of salvation*. I have not talked about the *atonement*. I have not undertaken to sound abstract doctrines in your ears. I have done better than that; and I call God to witness that it is better. I have preached a living Jesus, as a Brother, a Friend, a Saviour, an everlasting God."

The sermon entitled "Sin against the Holy Ghost," is one of the most powerful and instructive doctrinal discourses upon that solemn and mysterious theme that we have read; and few sermons that have ever been written have less of the husk of dogma and more of the sweet fruit of spiritual doctrine in them, than his discourse on "The Comforting God."

But it is not as a doctrinal, it is as a moral preacher, that he excels. As a moral pathologist he is wonderfully subtle in his perception of purpose and motive, understanding the bad tendencies as well as the nobler instincts of the human heart, following out a moral truth that another preacher would give in some dry formalistic husk of statement into its living issues in character, enlarging, developing, showing how it works in real life, in the family, the street, the church, tracking meanness to its hiding places, unearthing concealed selfishness, rousing the indolent and sensual, encouraging the meek heart, helping the doubting, seeing good where others would see only evil, and striving to build up a true manhood in the erring, imperfect, and lost. He thinks that Christianity has established a new social standard, and that men are not to be judged by their rank, wealth, or accidental circumstances, but by their moral worth. He has practical faith in human brotherhood; and, in this connection we would say, that his ideas respecting the unity of the Christian church are nowhere more vigorously set forth than in the sermon on "The Apostolic Theory of Preaching." We should like to quote the whole of that broad and magnificent statement of Christian toleration ending with the apostrophe: "O sun! come from the winter to the

spring and let there be universal buds and flowers." We would only express a livelier hope than the preacher does, that even *outward* differences and sectarian distinctions that really exert vast evil influence on the inward life of Christian unity, as the spirit of peace and light makes progress in the church, will become less and less, and that there shall be, not indeed the rigid uniformity of death, but the living unity of one body, moving in unconscious harmony of parts, and joined in all its parts by one inworking spirit.

It is time that we should say a word upon the rhetorical characteristics of Mr. Beecher's discourses. While Mr. Beecher's thoughts are not always marked by originality, and there are evident signs that he seizes upon the living thoughts of the age, the best ideas in current literature, the fresh fruits of the advanced science and thinking of the best minds—that he is the expression rather than the original source of thought—yet his forms of thought and expression are only and inimitably his own. We do not recall at this moment but a single quotation from a foreign source, and that from Lord Bacon, in any of his discourses. With such an exhaustless fecundity of invention he has in truth no need to quote from others.

Especially in his illustrations, in which lies one great element of his popularity, he employs everything that his hand can lay itself upon, from the last truth of science to the most insignificant fact or object in nature. One can almost seem to trace the natural genesis of his illustrations in any given sermon. Let us take for example the discourse entitled "Soul-drifting." Our notion is, though we know nothing about it, that Mr. Beecher, when he composed that sermon, was living in the summer time at a farm or country house by the seashore. He might indeed have been living in mid-winter in Brooklyn, writing in his study by the light of a sea coal fire; but we only speak from the internal evidence of the production itself. He strolls in the afternoon sunshine along the beach in thoughtful mood, listening to the lapping sound of the little waves as they kiss the shore at his feet. He lifts up his eyes and catches sight of the mournful skeleton of a distant wreck lying on the sands. It stirs his thought and imagination. He begins on the spot to develop a sermon from the

text, "Which hope we have as an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast, and which entereth into that within the veil," in this striking and beautiful way—"When a ship is sailing, the anchor is of no use; but when the ship would lie still, it is the anchor that holds it. It is not alone a storm that requires the good offices of an anchor. In the calmness of a harbor, a ship needs it. In the fairest weather, when winds are as gentle as if a dove's wings had produced them, a ship will still drift. The silent current, the soft palms of the tiniest ripples that splash against the sides, gradually push her along; and she will ground upon the flats, or strike upon the shore, or grate upon the harsh ledges. So long as a ship is under headway, the rudder can hold her to her course; but as soon as she is sheltered, and would fain lie still, she must have an anchor. The soul is like a ship. So long as it is moving with strong impulsion, it holds its course easily. When earnest impulses cease, then, unless something holds the soul steadfast, it drifts; and drifting is far more dangerous to a soul than to a ship. It drifts into doubt; and out of doubts come morbid impulses, come reactions of the most dangerous kind. * * The soul, thus bestead, suffers, and despairs, and sometimes is driven up by the tides and winds, in some vernal or autumnal night, so far on the sand that the waters, once gone, never come up so high again. It lies wrecked. What a ship is on the sand, cracking in the sun, gaping at every seam, useless, pitiable, unable to help itself or be helped—that is the soul drifting, and gone up on the arid sands of unbelief."

But the evening shadows coming on, the sultry summer air upon the sandy ocean-shore is filled with stinging insects as well as beautiful moths and night-millers, and the preacher introduces the fanciful and striking image of the strange flitting thoughts that haunt the night of unbelief. On the morning, resuming his stroll along the sea, he sees some little children playing in a boat that lies half in the water and half on the sands, and who are striving to push the boat into deep water, and he draws from the scene an illustration of the instinctive desire of the sceptical mind to unloose itself from the familiar moorings of the fathers' belief, and to do something new in the untried realm of truth. He saunters back into the garden,

where a large vine lies prostrate and tangled upon the ground—its glories in the dust—having been brought to that low estate from the rash idea of its owner to improve its condition and to erect under it a more seemly trellis—and in this he sees the condition of those who abandon old faiths and creeds too suddenly, before they have obtained new props and pillars for their spiritual affections and growth to support themselves upon. A ladder leans carelessly against the house, where these improvements are going on; and this meditation upon the principle of faith still being the theme on which all these diverse figures are strung, he seizes also upon this ladder as a symbolism well fitted to its own climbing thought. Then the sermon which began by the sea-shore ends, too, as it were by the sea. Off in the bay some light craft swings indolently around, as it is lifted by the incoming tide upon its easy but firm cable, and the writer, his glance resting upon it as he muses, comes back from a long circuit of moral disquisition to the thoughts and courses of the ocean once more, and he says: “Here is the anchor. This is what the apostle was speaking of. This is the hope of immortality through Jesus Christ, which is ‘an anchor to the soul, sure and steadfast, and which enters into that within the veil’—into the very holy of holies. With his central and controlling power established, any soul may safely swing in any circuit it pleases, within due measure. Once let a ship anchor out in the bay, and though it may let out many fathoms of cable, and though it may, in swinging, become tangled with other craft, if the anchor has a good hold, and the cable is strong, the ship is safe. Once let a man’s soul get anchored upon God, and he may swing around in wide circuits of speculation and doubt, and he will not be materially hurt. He has an anchor that brings him up in due time. But a man that has no faith, a man that is without God, a man that is destitute of an anchor, and that drifts a wanderer in God’s universe—wo be to him! How helpless is a man that has no faith in himself, and not much trust in men, and no definite belief, and no God, and no hope!”

These are nearly all the figures, in the order in which they occur in the sermon, and they seem to come along in this natural, living, and fresh manner, starting up, like highlanders,

out of every hedge and hillock on the way. His illustrations are undoubtedly suggested by actual things, by those objects that lie in his path, whether he walks by the sea-shore, over the fields, through the streets of the crowded city, or, sitting at home he makes mental excursions, being quickened by the suggestion of some picture on the walls, or catches from the freshly-cut leaves of the book he is reading a glimpse of other scenes in the luxuriant tropics, or in the death-bound ice-fields of the polar regions. Nothing comes amiss to him. Everything is a winged vehicle of truth. We see in him as in the old preachers and prophets the high moral uses of the imagination. He has the poet's quick eye to see the spiritual sense in the homeliest things, in the most common facts and events. These are not always, it is true, of a highly religious character. Every one who has been a boy, is delighted by the humorous description of the school-boy on a Saturday afternoon who roams the fields and woods with an old rusty gun whose trigger is hopelessly out of order, and who makes heroic efforts at achievement under immense difficulties. Such an illustration forces a smile, perhaps broadening into a laugh, on the most solemn face, but it is by no means sure that wholesome humor in the pulpit, when it comes naturally, when sudden and irresistible, and when it is made subservient to more earnest objects, is always out of place. The mediæval preachers, Latimer, Luther, and most of the old reformers, did not think so. At least this is Mr. Beecher's effective way often of getting a hearing, of making his speech vivid, of rousing attention, of giving truth an incisive force, darting it into the open and unguarded place. Like Shakespeare, he first makes the people laugh and then weep; as he says in his characteristic illustration (not this we believe a pulpit one) of a milk-pan filled with milk, that to tip it on one side is of a certainty to ensure a corresponding rise on the other. This is very hazardous in such serious work as preaching, and few can imitate Mr. Beecher in this, and doubtless many people are justly offended even in him. But who is there that cannot feel the beauty and force of such a natural and simple illustration as the following from the sermon on "The Problem of Joy and Suffering in Life"—"When the rude ox or fierce wind has broken off

the shrub, and laid it down on the ground lacerated and torn, it lies there but a few hours before the force of nature in the stem and in the root begins to work; and some new buds shoot out; and before the summer shall have gone round, the restorative effort of nature will bring out on that shrub other branches. And shall the heart of man be crushed, and God send sweet influences of comfort from above to inspirit it, and that heart not be able to rise above its desolateness?" Mr. Beecher is a poet, and it takes something of a poet to preach Christ's gospel. Who cannot understand the rough vigor of words like these—"If you choose to take a pole and stir up men from the bottom, you will find plenty of mud"—or of the graphic and shrewd figure of digging up a tree and cutting off its long anchoring and holding tap-root, in the sermon entitled "The victorious power of Faith." Illustrations so fresh, apt, homely, natural, forcible form an element of style that may be called its *vital expression*, and which is, after all, nothing more than stating truth itself in such living forms that it comes home to the common mind, and, while it pleases, fastens as with a nail. Old truths are brought out in new and vivid lights. Abstract truth grows picturesque and concrete. It beats with the life-blood of the present. There is found to be instruction in everything, good in everything. The elements of common sense, of reasonableness, of nature, of a large humanity, are in such preaching. When he says of a child that as soon as he knows how to love father and mother, and to say "Dear father," and "Dear mother," then he knows how to love and worship God"—people say "that is true," and they think they have thought this themselves before Mr. Beecher thought it, notwithstanding that they have acquired a new idea. He thus makes the people a part with himself; he takes them into his confidence; he strikes into the real current of their thinking; he speaks as if speaking out of their thought. There is a strong propulsion given to his words by the combined unconscious consent of many minds who, as it were, listen approvingly as if to their own ideas. He has indeed found the great secret of popular power such as John the Baptist had, such as St. Bernard had, such as Luther had. He is a "king of men" in moral and spiritual

things. He takes hold of all classes. Old men read his sermons when they can read nothing else out of the Bible. In the log-house of the pioneer the "Plymouth pulpit" is preaching. Young men in the Universities go to his discourses as to fresh springs, and many a young man who has lost interest in the old doctrines has been brought back to the life and substance of truth by perhaps reading in the newspaper the reports of Mr. Beecher's sermons. He is encouraging to those in doubt. He is a hope-bringer. He believes in man. He helps men. He is sympathetic to every kind of mind. He does not croak or scold. He is not solemn and stately, though he is earnest, and sometimes terribly so. How impressive the conclusion of the discourse on "Preparation for Death!" Few preachers have pursued this awful theme with a tread of more prophetic majesty and power, and yet with more of the sweetness and light of Christian truth. But no one can trifle with such preaching as that. The most careless and profligate youth would be arrested by it as by the strong hand of an elder brother who knows the world and the human heart, who speaks not with a weak sentimentality but with the authority of love, of righteousness, and of communion with God. The influence of Mr. Beecher as a preacher to young men who swarm to the metropolis by myriads, and who crowd the galleries of his church Sunday after Sunday with eager and attentive throngs, is of incalculable good. They cannot hear his shrewd and plain-spoken counsel, sent home to the heart by all that rouses and attracts manhood, and go away and plunge into vice. It is impossible. The impression must wear off, the moral sense must grow dull, the nerve of manly self-denial must be relaxed, before the youth can turn again to low pleasures with any zest. Mr. Beecher doubtless himself might select a fresher illustration, but we would liken him to a moral light house standing on a dangerous reef, dashed by the waves that roar around it, and sending its warning and encouraging beams far over the wild waters; and who knows how many a bark half-wrecked and driving on to destruction has been saved by its light? Such preaching is better than the most dignified disquisitions on scientific theology, arranged according to the approved models and methods of systematic

discourse, cold, intellectual, shining like stars in the wintry night millions of miles distant in the firmament of heaven. Not that doctrinal preaching does not have its valuable office and place; there must be the stars in heaven as well as the fires on earth for our guidance and light. And Mr. Beecher does not, it seems to us, sufficiently prize the need of a clearly-defined theological philosophy—a consistent system of truth—which prevents incongruous and rash statement, and which appeals to the reason. The practical element which is so noble a one is indescribably aided by being grounded upon the speculative element, and he who preaches from a well-wrought philosophy of faith will bring to bear more of solid weight upon any one point than the preacher can who is no theologian; and, above all, he will not be obliged to construct a new philosophy every time he preaches. Such preaching has in it the prime qualities of instruction, authority, strength, and is really conservative of the evangelic element, which must have a dogmatic form as a covering to preserve the tender life-seed of divine truth. The preacher who neglects or despises the study of theology is like the scientist at the present day who should attempt to investigate and teach the phenomena of the natural world by the instrumentality of his own crude, brief, and incomplete theory, knowing nothing of the theories upon which science has progressively advanced step by step toward the broader and clearer, and, at the same time, more intimate knowledge of physical truth. And men should have given heed by the preacher of the New Testament, in clear statements, the vital truths of the gospel—not the formal plan of salvation it may be—but, at least, in what that salvation consists, and how it is attained. They should know Christ's real work, his true efficiency in men's spiritual redemption. They should be made to understand the way of eternal life through the mediation of the Son of God, and this should be definitely communicated, and not be lost sight of in generalities however noble and eloquent.

Mr. Beecher is an epoch-making man. We hold him to be the best exponent of that new style of preaching providentially adapted to meet the wants and the new spirit of this age, and to reach the great masses of the people, fast falling away

from the old formal and unsympathetic methods of teaching. He will have exerted more of moulding influence upon the style of preaching and modes of popular religious thought in his age, than any other man. Far less scholarly and philosophically profound than Robertson, though with much of his spiritual earnestness and contempt of mere orthodox cant without the truth's reality, less solid in argument than Thomas Binney, less original in thought than Bushnell, less learned as a theologian and exegete than hundreds of preachers in England and America, less brilliant than the great French preachers, dead and living, none of them may compare with him in popular power, in his sway over the minds and hearts of living men. This is not only because of his powerful genius but because of his true comprehension of the age and of the American mind, because of his large-souled human sympathy, because he preaches out of himself and his own intensely-felt *heart-wrought doctrine* instead of out of a *mere doctrinal system*, and, above all, because he is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the gospel of Christ, and speaks as it were from the radiant center of its divine heart of love and power. What a Unitarian preacher, or what radical reformer, even the greatest, can aspire to a tithe of his popular power in this country, or ever will?

The people are with him. They always hear him gladly! They throng after him in great multitudes that would fain be fed,—might we dare to reverently hint the shadow of the shade of such a resemblance,—fed in the wilderness of this barren world of selfish living with the bread of life! It is because they believe that he dispenses the true word of Christ, the nourishing, multiplying, divine word of life. His preaching has in it the vital element of divine love. He has living thoughts springing from fellowship with the spirit of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. The prime source of his thinking and preaching is ardent, personal love to Christ as God, even as in the primitive times of the church, that were the times of her greatest triumphs. He has brought hope, and brightness, and good cheer—as if we could hear the angelic song again more clearly—into the dulled and lifeless Christianity of the age. He makes people feel the sweet penetrative love of God

in Christ. He makes them feel their own meanness, and sin, and spiritual death without Christ. His language is often full of tenderest pathos and yearning over the souls of men. He has both a loving and a bold speech, one that scorches with unerring instinct the sins and follies of society, of the household, the pulpit, the bar, the bench, the counting-room, the fashionable world, high life and low life, and seeks to save the lost. His words have an immediate effect upon the morality of the nation and the salvation of the world.

How can we descend to notice the spots on this magnificent and beneficent orb,—the faults of style and the violations of taste? We would indeed but glance at them, and do so because young preachers sometimes unconsciously reproduce these while endeavoring to imitate his great qualities.

Mr. Beecher may perhaps afford to be a little careless now and then of the settled canons of good style, but others cannot; for, for men to become efficient in any art, they must learn to obey rules, they must patiently endure training in the principles of that art. This is the inexorable condition of success. No one can be at once free either in religion or in art. As in music, “until one has mastered every conceivable difficulty he cannot dream of producing the most distant musical effect,” so, in some sense it is true, that in writing and preaching one must come under instruction, and must master difficulties by painfully working through them. While Mr. Beecher has a wonderfully facile and beautiful use of language, he has not always a pure and correct use. His words are often obsolete, provincial, and inelegant, and his sentences are loosely and sometimes ungrammatically constructed, although the thought shines unembarrassed through this medley by its own light and clearness. The tendency also to lack of dignity of style may belong to a large nature that almost always has some streak of honest coarseness in its composition; but the thoroughly secular tone, the careless and jocular vein of remark in the pulpit, does sensibly wound the devotional susceptibility of some hearers, and rubs off harshly the delicate bloom of sacred awe in the worship of God’s house, though the sweetness and purity of the preacher’s unpremeditated prayers,

rising like streams of richest devotional music, would seem to go far to make up for any fault of this kind.

Then what earthly possible reason is there of Mr. Beecher's raving and bellowing, and tearing a passion to tatters, and being so unconscionably loud and explosive where there is no need of it, as if mere loudness were force?

The greatest men—for instance, Bismarck—are not always the best speakers; but we have wondered in listening to Mr. Beecher, why a man so constantly speaking as he is, and whose life and vocation it is to speak, does not perceive, that after a certain limit of stress and action has been reached, nothing of impressiveness is added to a thought by an additional violence of delivery—that the deepest volume of a torrent always goes smoothly. Wendell Phillips understands this thing better.

But we must close this spontaneous and quite unstudied strain of remark. The theme is so rich that it has been, we feel, most inadequately treated, but these words have come from a true pride in our great pulpit orator, from a sincere admiration and veneration of the man, and from a desire to point out, as well as we are able, to young preachers, some of the lessons to be drawn from such an example, that they must unbar their minds to nature and to every free spiritual influence, that they must love more fervently, that they must put down the animal in their natures, that they must lay aside indolence and self-conceit, that they must not only study books but men, that they must despise both the praises and the menaces of men, that they must struggle, and fight, and pray, looking to Christ as the sustainer and the crown-giver. To such, preaching to the people "the glad tidings" is the greatest and the most beautiful of human occupations.

ARTICLE IV.—THE FREE CHURCHES OF ENGLAND.

A History of the Free Churches of England from A. D. 1688 to A. D. 1851. By HERBERT S. SKEATS. Second edition. London: Arthur Miall. New York: Scribner, Welford & Co. 8vo. pp. 638.

IN a ponderous but very readable volume of more than six hundred pages, Mr. Herbert S. Skeats (of whom we know nothing more) gives the history of the Protestant Dissenters from the Established Church of England, beginning with the expulsion of the Stuart dynasty, and coming down to the census of 1851. We in this country are familiar with the story of Puritanism from the date of the Reformation—or rather from Wycliffe and the Lollards; for it is inseparably blended with our own ecclesiastical history. But this volume tells a story with which American readers are naturally less familiar.

Modern Dissent in England is doubtless the historic sequel of the old Puritanism. The names of the great Puritans, Baxter, Howe, Calamy, and the rest—the memories of the Westminster Assembly and the Long Parliament—are a portion of what the Free Churches of England have inherited from the past. Yet the men who occupy, to-day, the position once held by the Puritans, properly so called, are not the Dissenters, but rather the thoroughly Protestant members of the Establishment—the Calvinistic or Low Church party—those who regard Ritualism with a religious abhorrence. They are the modern Puritans, believers in a national church established by the State, but dissatisfied with the discipline and tendencies of the national church as it is. They are unlike their predecessors, the Puritans of the heroic age, in that they meekly submit to existing regulations, and do not brave the penalties of non-conformity. They are neither imprisoned nor silenced; they are not deprived of their livings; they are not driven into exile; they go not forth to plant in some wilderness a new church purified from all mediæval corruption; they

do not even agitate their native country for a further reformation; they satisfy their consciences with protesting against the antique novelties brought in by men who are trying to get rid of even that measure of reformation which was wrought by Queen Elizabeth. The Dissenters have been, in reality, ever since the date from which Mr. Skeats begins his story, Separatists from the Church of England, as by law established, and not a Puritan or reforming party within the Church of England.

Under the Long Parliament, the Church of England was essentially a Presbyterian establishment, though the details of a classical and synodical government, like that in Scotland, were never perfected. Under the Protectorate, there were some clergymen who preferred the Congregational polity, and were permitted to "gather" churches on the platform of that polity in their parishes or in the ecclesiastical edifices in which they ministered. But the restoration of the monarchy in the person of Charles II. was followed by the Act of Uniformity and the memorable expulsion of nearly two thousand non-conforming ministers from their places in the ecclesiastical establishment. Of those ejected ministers, very few were Separatists or Independents; the great majority were Puritans, heartily accepting the theory of a national church established by law. They were commonly known as Presbyterians though many of them repudiated that name, and, with Baxter, avowed their preference for a reduced or parochial episcopacy after the scheme proposed by Archbishop Usher. For nearly forty years they cherished a dying hope of so much reformation in the Church of England as would permit them to serve in its ministry. What they desired and waited for was not merely to be tolerated as seceders from the established order, but rather to be comprehended in the establishment. It was not till the great men of the Puritan age had gone to their graves, and the liberal intentions of William III. had been thwarted and finally baffled by the fanatical toryism of Parliament, that the Non-conformists generally accepted the situation and gave up their cherished hope of comprehension. Despair and the Toleration Act converted the Puritans into Protestant Dissenters. Thenceforward their congregations,

instead of being merely provisional arrangements to serve a temporary purpose, began to be permanent institutions independent of the state.

The revolution, then, of 1688, followed by the Toleration Act in 1689, marks the end of Puritanism as a struggle for reformation in the state church. Although the desire and the hope of "comprehension" lingered for many years in many minds on each side of the line between Conformists and Non-conformists, the story, from that date, exhibits the growth of religious institutions organized and maintained on what is now called "the voluntary principle." The Puritans, with their full belief that ecclesiastical reformation was the duty of the state, found themselves under a necessity either of compromising their consciences or of becoming reformers on their own account by gathering voluntary churches independent of the legally established Church of England. With all their dislike of Separation, they found themselves in the position of Separatists. They were "compelled to volunteer;" and the difference between a voluntary church established by Puritans or Presbyterians and a voluntary church established by Separatists or Independents became, as the hope of comprehension slowly died away, too little to be easily measured. Less than three years after the Revolution, less than two years after the passage of the Toleration Act, the difference was felt to be so slight, that a scheme of union between the ministers of the two denominations was contrived at London, and was joyfully accepted not only there but in many other parts of England. The platform of principles on which the union was affected, is said to have been drawn up by John Howe, and is singularly related to the history of American Congregationalism. Approved and commended by the Saybrook Synod in 1708, it acquired a sort of authority in the Connecticut churches, and became, in some degree, a precedent for later "plans of union" with Presbyterians. Its full title, as originally published, was, "Heads of Agreement assented to by the United Ministers in and about London, formerly called Presbyterian and Congregational; not as a measure for any national constitution, but for the preservation of order in our congregations that cannot come up to the common rule by law established."

The attempted fusion of the two denominations into one was baffled by personal and theological controversies that arose soon afterwards, and not by any incompatibility in respect to church government. The so-called Presbyterian churches in England at that time were mutually independent; and the "Hheads of Agreement" hardly differ from the Cambridge Platform except as it is less argumentative and theoretical, more compendious in its statement of principles, and generally more felicitous in expression. No good reason can be discovered for the failure of the attempt. Had the fusion of the two denominations in one confederation of churches been effected in accordance with the Heads of Agreement, the Free Churches of England would have been, from the date of the Toleration Act, a more powerful element in the religious life of the nation than they have ever been till within the last forty years.

The existence of Non-conforming churches in England, since the Toleration Act, as well as before, has been a continued conflict with the spirit of oppression. While they have been free in the sense of being constituted as voluntary associations, their freedom in relation to the civil power has been only a limited "toleration"—the very word implying that they existed not because they had a right to exist, but only by concession from a power which had a right to prohibit their existence. In order to understand the legal *status* of dissenters from the doctrine or ritual of the ecclesiastical establishment in England, at the date at which the old Puritanism was compelled to identify itself with Separation, and till the reign of George IV., it is necessary to recollect the gist and extent of the memorable Toleration Act which was all that William the Deliverer—could obtain from his Parliament, by way of concession to Protestant Dissenters. That act does not acknowledge at all the right of an Englishman to hold any opinion or to worship in any way different from the opinions and the worship established by Queen Elizabeth and reestablished under Charles II.—It grounds itself not on any consideration of justice, but only on the consideration of political expediency: "Forasmuch as some ease to scrupulous consciences, in the exercise of religion, may be an effectual means to unite their Majesties' Protestant

subjects in interest and affection.” In view of that consideration the legislative power of England enacted that persons dissenting from the Church of England might be exempted from the operation of existing laws against separate assemblies for worship and against absence from the parish churches, on condition of their making certain oaths and declarations supposed to be necessary for the security of the kingdom and of the established religion; but with a proviso that no meeting of dissenters held “with the doors locked, barred, or bolted,” and no person present in such a meeting should have the benefit of the exemption. Dissenting ministers were required to subscribe the thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England except three and a part of a fourth—an additional exception being made in favor of Antipedobaptists. A special provision was also made for “certain other persons” (Quakers), who, instead of the oath, were to make a solemn affirmation, and, instead of the Articles, were to subscribe a profession of their belief in the Divine Trinity. But no assembly of Dissenters could have the offered toleration unless it should be held in a place previously certified and registered as a place of worship. Assemblies of registered Dissenters, with registered ministers, in registered houses, were to be protected from disturbance and insult. Such was the Toleration Act under which dissent from the Church of England began to be, under the laws of England, not quite a crime.

To trace the limits of the religious liberty conceded by that memorable Act, we must remember what it did not concede. First, the Act itself provided explicitly that no Dissenter should be exempted from the payment of tithes and other dues for the support of the established worship. Secondly, by the Corporation Act, made in the height of the reaction under Charles II., they were excluded from office in every municipal corporation; a participation in the Lord’s Supper, according to the established ritual, as well as a profession under oath that it is unlawful, on any pretence whatever, to take arms against the king, being exacted of all persons elected to such offices. Thirdly, the Test Act, though it was made chiefly for the purpose of preventing Charles II. and his brother James II., then heir presumptive to the crown, from filling all offices of trust

and honor with Roman Catholics, was so framed as to be equally effective for the exclusion of dissenting Protestants from every office, civil or military; the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, received in some parish church, on some Lord's day, immediately after divine service and sermon, being made, as in the Corporation Act, a test or condition. No exemption from the demands or the penalties of that act was provided by the Act of Toleration. In the intendment of English law, a dissenter from the established Church, be he ever so able and upright, was unworthy to serve his country in any public employment—unworthy to sit in Parliament or on the bench of any court—unworthy to hold a commission in the army or navy—unworthy to be a custom-house officer or an excise-man—unworthy to hold the meanest office for which the most worthless man might qualify himself by profanely receiving the sacramental bread and cup from the hands of an Anglican priest. Fourthly, by similar tests, all dissenters were excluded from the national universities—not only from fellowships and offices of government or instruction, not only from degrees, but even from matriculation. In all these respects, dissenters, of every Protestant name, were still to be not outlaws indeed, but legally outcasts from English society. In the view of English law and statemanship they were a dangerous class that must be tolerated for reasons of political expediency, but could not be trusted; and that was therefore to be kept under, stigmatized, circumscribed with legal disabilities, and shut out from opportunities and means of liberal culture. So lately as twenty years ago, when the most offensive legal disabilities—had been taken off, the overbearing appeal of English society towards dissenters was such that an American in England, to whom an English friend was repeating the complaint, then so common there, of the treatment to which free negroes were subjected in our free States, replied, "Yes; it is a shame to our country that colored people in the free States are almost as badly treated as Dissenters are in England."

It is now a little more than two hundred years since the expulsion of the old Puritanism from the established Church of England; a little less than two hundred years since separation from the national establishment to worship God in free asso-

ciations of Christian believers ceased to be a crime by the laws of England, and began to be tolerated as an evil which could not be forcibly suppressed. The volume which we are commending exhibits the progress of religion and of religious liberty in those two centuries of English history. After an introductory chapter, reviewing summarily the conflicts and sufferings of Non-conformity from the Reformation to the Revolution, Mr. Skeats narrates the story of the Free Churches, including under that name Baptists and Quakers as well as Presbyterians and Independents. Of course the relation of those bodies to the civil government—the disabilities which were the penalty even of tolerated dissent from the Established Church—the harsher penalties which were sometimes ordained by acts of legislation—the methods of evasion, of protest, of passive resistance, or of petition and public agitation, which were from time to time employed—the steady malignity of Toryism, never yielding but by compulsion to the progress of ideas, and always ready to persecute when it had power—the slow concessions made to the discovery that Free Churches were a fixed fact, as intractable, at least, as any other fact of the British constitution, and were not to be got rid of without the total loss of English liberty—the growth of a more tolerant spirit, first spreading among the people, and at last registering itself in acts of Parliament—are a large portion of the history. But other topics are by no means neglected. The decay of spiritual religion; the coming in of religious indifference, polite but undisguised contempt for Christianity; the dead Orthodoxy and dead Unitarianism of the eighteenth century; the efforts of Dissenters (shamefully excluded from the universities) to provide for themselves (though under the ban of the law) such means of learning and intellectual discipline as were essential to their progress; the contributions of Dissenters to the theological and religious literature of the English language; their sympathy and activity in the religious awakening of England under Whitfield and the Wesleys; and their participation in the nineteenth century work of Christian propagandism, and of universal philanthropy prompted by Christian thought, are duly recorded.

ARTICLE V.—YALE COLLEGE—SOME THOUGHTS
RESPECTING ITS FUTURE.

THERE is a somewhat general feeling, we believe, among those who are most deeply interested in Yale College, that the institution is about entering on a new era of its existence. The work of the last seventy years, it is felt, has been a good and a great one, but it is mainly accomplished. Like that of the first century of the College history, and like that of every epoch in the progress of every growing institution, it has laid the foundation for what is larger and higher than itself—not higher, indeed, in the nobleness of the working, but in that the working is nearer to the final and full completion of the plan. The past now is to open itself toward and into the future, and a great step forward is to be or ought to be taken. Indications of this are seen on every side. The suggestions which are presented by those who think earnestly upon the subject of education; the criticisms of the College which, for some reason or other, have been so frequent of late and which, we regret to say, have not been always made either in a wise or a generous spirit; the proposition to change the governing board of the institution by the introduction of new members from the alumni; and the sentiments and aspirations of the instructors within the College walls, all alike bear witness that the coming years are looked upon as containing within themselves possibilities and hopes, which as yet have been unrealized. What are to be the characteristic features of the new era, and what its peculiar and distinctive work, are, therefore, questions of much importance, at the present time, and worthy of serious consideration. Our object in this Article is to present some thoughts as a partial answer to these questions.

The first and most important work to be done in the years immediately before us is, as we believe, a work of *unification*. Yale College, like most of the older American Colleges, began as a sort of high school. It carried forward the education of the young men who came to it beyond the point which they

reached in the lower schools of the time, and opened the way for them to enter upon their active life. But it was limited in its aims, and in the results which it accomplished, by limitations of the age. Men had not come, as yet, to take the widest views of education. The various sciences and branches of learning had scarcely begun to develop themselves—some of them had not begun to exist. Even in the department of theological science, which was nearest to the minds of the fathers, the demands and possibilities were comparatively small. A general course, moving on but a little, was all which, as it would seem, could be devised. The wisdom of the early founders was displayed, not in their accomplishment of the entire work, but in the fact that the plan which they formed was one which would, readily and naturally, enlarge itself to meet every requirement or change of the future, so soon as the demand should arise. The school, which they established, would become a university in the course of generations. The College, which, in their day, was whole in itself, would gradually become but one among several portions of a greater institution. It would lose something of its own prominence as it associated with itself other departments for more special training, but it would gain a new honor in their company, which it could never know without them. It was after the beginning of the present century that the change came. The new features of the times, and the growth to which we have alluded in all branches of knowledge, gave the opportunity, and, in giving the opportunity, they presented the call for a new work. The sagacious and seeing mind of the remarkable man who, at that period, placed the interests of the College in his special keeping, understood the call. He saw that, if the institution lingered in the old work, it might increase, indeed, in numbers and in influence, but it could never take the high place which was offered to it among the educational institutions of the country. Professional schools must be established, which should take the students at their graduation from the collegiate or academic department and fit them, by a special course of study, for their peculiar sphere in the world. The beginning, at least, must be made, which should prepare the way for future growth.

and render possible the completion of the work. Accordingly, at the earliest practicable moment, he established one of these schools, and devised the plan for another, which was founded a few years later. His immediate successors, who had been largely under his influence, carried forward the same plans. All the professional departments of the College were established, or strengthened until some of them attained a considerable eminence. Finally, within the past twenty-five years, the Scientific School and the department of Philosophy and Philology have made the institution complete in its parts. The work of which we have thus briefly spoken, together with the advancement of scholarship in every branch of learning within the College, has been the work of the past half-century. We have alluded to it, however, not for its own sake, but because we would call attention to a point which is of especial importance. The history of these two great periods of the past shows that the development in this, as in other similar institutions in our country, has not been a development of all the parts together. It has been, on the contrary, a growth for a hundred years of one department alone by itself, and then an addition to this one department of others, which, from their later origin, have seemed to be gathered around it as their center. The life and vigor of our American Colleges—even where they have widened into Universities, as at Yale and Harvard—have continued largely at this center; and the governing powers have regarded the academical department as the object of their peculiar and almost their sole care. The institutions have thus, with all their enlargement and success, been, after all, rather colleges with certain outside sections than universities made up of coördinate and coequal branches. They have not had a well-rounded and perfect development, but one which has been partial and one-sided in its character. This result has been a natural, perhaps in some measure a necessary, result of the origin and history of the institutions. But of the reality of the fact we think no intelligent observer can doubt.

Now the point, which we have to urge, is, that the future years must unite these departments into a common whole, giving the same care to the growth of all. The age of mere

colleges in this country, in a certain sense, is past. Not that colleges will not continue to exist, and to be needed, and to do a good work. But they are not to be the highest institutions to which we look and which we ask for hereafter. The great centers of education, like Yale and Harvard, must be centers of universal education ; and, if they cease to be so, they will sink to the level of a lower class of seminaries, which make no such claims as they are making. It needs no argument to prove this. The very peculiarity, which distinguishes these higher institutions as a class by themselves, is not the superiority of their instruction for undergraduate academical students or their superiority in respect to the number of their undergraduates. If these things be all which they have to elevate them, they will only reach the higher places among the institutions which have merely an academical course. They will be far in advance, indeed, of the colleges just established in the western states, but they will still belong in their company. If they are to leave their company altogether, they need something more than this. To the university—in the sense in which the word is most appropriately used, that is, as distinguished from the college—what have sometimes been called the “outside” schools are essential. They are, even, *the essential thing*. It will scarcely require any more argument to show, that, if these “outside” schools are to hold their proper place and to maintain a steady and permanent growth, this name, which has been assigned to them because their origin was later than that of the collegiate branch and they were thus added to it, must be laid aside as no longer suited to mark their real position. They must, in a word, become “inside” schools, having each and all of them the same rights and privileges and care with the original academic section of the university. If they do not have this, they cannot prosper in the long run. If they are left to provide for themselves altogether—in the expressive phrase of recent years, “hanging on the verge of the government”—they may succeed, for a while, through the power and self-devotion of the members of their faculties, but, when these men are called away or die, the institutions will prove to have little or no independent life of their own. They will show that they rested on the reputation

of individuals, and that the want of constant and watchful care from the central power has been fatal to them. We hold it to be even self-evident, that, if the governing body of any institution or of any country give their thoughts to one part of it alone, or if they manifestly place it in their thoughts above the others, these other parts will, sooner or later, suffer in their life in consequence. Neglect, if it be only partial, always checks and dwarfs the thing neglected. If it be total, it destroys it—not, perhaps, as speedily, but almost as surely as does a violent putting it out of existence. If the medical school of a university, for example, is looked upon as of little consequence, because its number of students is smaller than that of the undergraduate or some other department, or because it is very limited in its funds and it seems a difficult matter to increase them, or because medical science, for the time, is regarded with less favor than physical or theological science, or for any other reason, it will, after a few years at the latest, lose something of its vital energy. It will gradually move toward the level at which others would place it, and, if it finally falls even below that level, surely it need be no matter of surprise. The feeling must be—if success is to be attained—a widely different one from this. The spirit of the University must be the spirit of unity and fraternity. If one member suffers, the sentiment must be that all the members, of necessity, suffer with it, and if one member rejoices, that all the members rejoice with it. So far from leaving those that are weaker or younger to move on as best they can, these more needy portions must have so much the greater encouragement and aid. This is the rule in every other institution or body in the world, and the necessity of its observance in these great educational institutions requires only to be stated, in order to be admitted by every candid mind. It is a rule which, if it be not observed, will show, by the results of its violation, how essential and fundamental it is. The whole body will, in time, suffer if any part of it is disregarded. It will inevitably lose the fullness of its glory. It will meet the penalty of its own neglect. The history of our larger institutions, in the past even, has proved the truth of what we say, in greater or less degree. If the future should be like the past, the coming history will

prove it far more clearly. It will do so, because the past has been only the time of the beginning—of the arrangement and formation of the plan, so far as the more recent departments are concerned; but the future is to be the time of their progress and development—the time when the question of their permanent success, and, in connection with *their* success, of the success of *the University* is to be determined.

But how, it may be asked, is the unifying work, of which we have spoken, to be accomplished? If the result is demanded, what are the steps which must be taken in order to reach it? We answer, *in the first place*, that the general sentiment and feeling in the University must be in this direction, as we have already intimated. The old ideas, which have been the natural growth of the way and order in which the departments have come into existence, must pass away altogether, and in their place must arise the better and more correct views, which look upon the institution as made up of equal and equally important parts. Age or numbers, in this matter, must not be regarded as, necessarily, having any weight whatever. The branch of the university which was founded twenty-five years ago must be held as important to the completeness of the whole body as that whose origin was more than a century earlier. And while the success of any school is to be determined, in a measure, by the number of its students, it must not be forgotten, that a law school of sixty or a hundred, or a department of philosophy or philology containing even twelve or twenty, may be as successful as an academical department of five hundred or a thousand. We say as successful, because it as nearly reaches the present possibilities of its growth. But supposing any section of the university not to be successful, as measured by this standard, or to be beginning to lose ground, it must gather to itself so much more of the energy of the governing power and of the sympathy of the whole body, and thus it must be borne up and carried forward to a new life. We believe that every officer of a great institution, like Yale, should be as ready to give or to labor for the prosperity of every other department of it—so far as the calls of his special work will allow—as for the one with which he is more particularly connected; and that every trustee or overseer should be equally

and large-heartedly devoted to them all. There may be some apology if this has not always been the case in earlier times, but there will be none in the new era. It will be an abandoning of the work of the new era, at its very beginning, if these sentiments and feelings are wanting. But we rejoice to believe that they will not be wanting. There are unmistakable signs that these ideas are gaining ground in Yale College—whatever may be true of other colleges—and that the future, to see the completion of the plan here, which the past has only formed in its parts—the rounding out and perfecting of the University as a whole.

To the end of strengthening the sentiment to which allusion has been made, and as a further means of accomplishing the object in view, we think, *secondly*, that there should be not infrequent meetings of the several faculties of the university as one body, for consultation respecting the common interests. There are, in every such large educational institution, many questions continually arising, which have exclusive reference to particular departments. These should be reserved for the consideration and decision of the particular faculty of the department to which they belong. But there are, on the other hand, subjects of great importance, which pertain alike to the welfare of all, and to the advancement of the entire institution. Subjects of this nature, certainly, should not be limited to the deliberations of one or two of the separate faculties, but should be discussed in a general meeting. The interests of all should be fairly and fully represented, and the needs and claims of each should be urged, as they only can be, properly, by those who have the most intimate knowledge of them. The reasonableness and wisdom of such a course would seem to be evident at its very first suggestion. And yet, so strong has been the influence of the past history of our colleges and of the order of their development—that, as far as we are aware, such common meetings have never, as yet, been known anywhere. In the future, we anticipate that they will be known, and, so soon as they are, it will be a matter of wonder that they had not been held long before. Of the effect of such meetings on the harmony and good feeling of the faculties towards each other, there can be no doubt. The opposite

course, by which decisions affecting the general well-being are made by a part only of those interested, seems really a sort of interference with privileges, much as if one of the faculties should attempt to control the affairs which are properly under the supervision of another. Whenever there is such interference or want of kindly consideration, there can scarcely fail, at times, to be a greater or less sense of a sort of injustice and a weakening, in some degree, of the ties that bind all together. But when every one has free opportunity to say and to do all that he can for the common benefit—to make suggestions, and urge needed improvements, and meet all others in friendly discussion, and influence them, or be influenced by them—he will be, almost of necessity, a hearty well-wisher and helper to his associates. When he is in the minority, or when he is in the majority, he will be equally ready to aid in carrying out the decision, or, at least, will feel that his views have received respectful attention and will, thus, be so far satisfied. The university and the collegiate department of it—it cannot be too often repeated—are not the same thing. And, in the matters which have reference to the university, the members of the several faculties of the university should be consulted, just as truly as, in those which bear upon the collegiate department only, the discussion should be open to all the members of its particular faculty and not be limited to a selected portion of them. It must be so, as we believe, if the harmony of the faculties is to be always unbroken. It must be so, also, if the highest good of the institution is to be attained. The members of one faculty are, almost necessarily, limited in their views and sympathies to some extent. Men look upon subjects from their own standpoint, and they need to be influenced and modified in their opinions by the sentiments of those who have a different position,—or the common welfare will often be lost sight of. The officers whose daily work and thoughts are within the sphere of a theological department may feel as kindly as possible toward those belonging to the associated scientific school, but they cannot determine *alone* what is best for the two schools together. The two bodies need to confer freely with each other—the two sides need to be fully represented—in order to reach the most enlightened and liberal decision

The same thing is true of any other two departments, and ever more true, if possible, of any one as related to all the rest.

And here, lest we may be misunderstood as giving to the faculties the power which belongs to the trustees or corporation, let us say that we have no such intention. The sphere of the two bodies are distinct, and the final controlling power is with the trustees. But we believe that all persons who have been familiar with our colleges or universities will agree with us in holding, that a very large proportion of the measures which are adopted by the trustees must originate with the faculties. The members of the corporation are generally non-resident. In many matters, they cannot watch the progress and wants of the institution from day to day. They must look to the members of the board of instructors, oftentimes, for information and advice. If they attempt to go forward alone, mistakes of a very serious nature will, inevitably, be made. The faculties and the trustees should be in reality, if not in name, two houses in the government, and many measures should have their beginning only in the lower house. A college can be governed to death, as well as any other organization, and one of the dangers, to say the least, which is incidental to that change in the corporation, which meets so much favor at present, is that it will bring more interference from the higher powers with the freedom of the working of the University. This freedom has been the glory of Yale College in the past—even beyond all other colleges. We have heard the present President of Harvard University speak of it as one of the inestimable privileges of this institution, as compared with his own. The traditions and influences here are all in favor of it. The success and harmony of the college have depended more upon this, perhaps, than upon any other single cause. We hope the day may be far distant when it shall be lost in any measure. The ideal way, beyond all doubt, is that of a wise and hearty coöperation between the two bodies; and, wherever there is such wise and hearty cooperation, the faculty will have very large influence in the counsels and acts of the government. This influence, however, ought, in those cases where the University at large is concerned, to be the combined influence of all the faculties. But in order to this end, there must

be not infrequent meetings of the several faculties as one body. The recommendations made must come from the whole body. The University must be carried forward by a common impulse.

As a *third* means of accomplishing the unifying work, of which we have spoken, we mention the raising of a large fund for *the University*. Efforts made heretofore for the collection of money have always been put forth for some specific object or for some special department. Such efforts have been repeated, from time to time, and have met with gratifying success. They have proved beneficial to the whole institution, in so far as they have strengthened one or another of its larger or smaller parts. But no general and wide-extended plan has been entered upon, which should embrace all the departments and should continue until its complete accomplishment, no matter how long a period might be required for that end. The need of such a plan, and of an energetic prosecution of it, we believe, is apparent. Every other plan, involving efforts only in a single line, must be partial in its character. Two or three such partial plans, if entered upon at the same time, will, almost necessarily, interfere with one another's success in considerable degree. If, on the other hand, in order to avoid such collision, they are entered upon successively, a large amount of valuable time is lost for one portion of the University in waiting for another. Yale College, too, can speak to its alumni and its friends with more emphasis and impressiveness than can any of its separate departments by itself. Moreover, the other methods have been tried long enough, and everything is now propitious for a general movement for the general interests. What has been already done has shown that there is a vast amount of money in the country, held by persons who are desirous of using it for the highest benevolent ends. It has, also, become equally clear, that energy in the work of making known the wants of the college and the good it is accomplishing will be rewarded. The story of the necessities and the work of this institution has never failed to meet a favorable response from the generosity of many benefactors. And, from the experience of years past, we are constrained to bear testimony, that the want of a more perfect supply of the needs of the College is owing as largely to the want of con-

stant and untiring energy in the work of solicitation, as to that of willingness on the part of men, who fully understand the case, to give with liberality. Giving, we are well aware, is a slow work for most men. Asking men to give is a still harder work. But the man whose cause is a good one, and who does not grow faint-hearted in his labors, will, finally, receive full measure for the asking. We know this, because we have been associated intimately with a small circle of men who have been asking for one of the good causes of this institution. They have been earnest in their labors, but they might have been more so, and we have no more doubt of their having attained a far greater success, if they had been, than we have of the success already gained. Yale College is the largest and highest educational institution, under real and pronounced Christian influences, in the country. It has a past history of nearly two hundred years. Its graduates, in the past, have been among the noblest men in the former generations. Its living alumni are scattered everywhere through the land. They are men of eminence, of large means, of Christian usefulness, of wide-spread influence. Its friends are more numerous than either they or itself know. What cause is better than its cause? What asking will meet a readier and heartier answer than its asking? Why should it not ask for all that it needs now?

There have been, as we conceive, two unfortunate things, in respect to this matter, in the history of this institution. The first is a despondent feeling as to the likelihood of success, if solicitations should be made, and the second, which is closely allied to the other, is a shrinking from a constant and earnest pressing of the wants of the College on the attention of those interested in it. We hope that the many gifts, which have been received in recent years, may, gradually at least, remove these things in the future. Certainly the work of the future cannot be accomplished unless they are removed. A grand, combined movement, which shall appeal to and interest every friend of the College and every graduate of any of its departments, is the thing which is needed. The widely extended impression, that the College is wealthy—even with a superabundance of riches,—must be carefully counteracted by repeated

presentations of the facts of the case. The specific wants must be made known with all clearness and fullness. Men must be urged to give to anything which awakens their special interest ; and all, who will do so, must be urged to give to the general fund of the whole University. When this general fund is gathered in, it must, if the end of which we speak is to be attained, be divided among the several departments according to their need. Everything must be done with a view to the common good of all. This work, also, must be entered upon not for a few months, but for years. The enlistment must be for a long period ; and, under the guidance of the central power, every man, who can be called on to aid, must be summoned to do good service in the cause. The sum aimed at must be a large one—sufficient to cover all necessities. The age is ready for large things, and more likely to do them than it is to do small ones. And there must be no faltering or faint-heartedness to the very end. There is no real occasion for any such feeling, for the dangers of failure in this matter are such as always pass away before a determined energy. There is not a department of the University, we verily believe, which,—starting, by itself alone, with a heroic energy worthy of its cause,—would not obtain, within a single year, an amount of aid surprising, in its largeness, both to itself and to all its friends. Fear and the weakness of effort which follow upon it are the worst of enemies in such a cause. They bring their own defeat—a defeat just proportioned to their magnitude.

If such a fund should be raised for the University—and that it can be, in case the work be undertaken in the spirit and with the energy indicated above, all the lessons of our past experience, so far as they teach anything, clearly show—and if, as and after it is raised, it is divided according to the dictates of those feelings which, as we have said, ought to characterize the new era, it would greatly help the University to grow in all its parts, and to become what it ought to be. There are departments here, which are suffering, to day, beyond measure because they are almost entirely without funds. They ought to be provided for, first and most carefully, in such a distribution. The attention of the governing powers ought to be at once and earnestly given to them, that they may be

strengthened according to their necessities. When this is done, every other section of the University—every minor branch of every department of it—should have its wants thoroughly investigated and proportionately provided for. We believe that a million of dollars can be collected from the friends and graduates of Yale for the promotion of its means of instruction within the next ten years. We believe that measures should be at once introduced, looking toward the accomplishment of this result, and that those whose proper office it is to institute and carry out these measures should say to themselves continually, “There is for us no such word in the English language as *failure*.” We believe that every year’s delay in this matter is a loss of opportunity, and an endangering of the final issue. The present is a golden period. It is being taken advantage of on every hand. If men here defer their working, or go forward with little efficiency, other men, elsewhere, will bear away the rewards, because of their greater promptness and vigor. We hope the new era will be one of as much energy in respect to the gathering in of funds to the treasury of Yale, as the past has been of skill in the management of funds already gathered in—that the new era will be one of forth-putting power, and will not exhaust itself on what it already has. But, however great may be the results, if they are not used with a true impartiality toward all the departments—if they are devoted to the collegiate school alone—the University-life will die away or be destroyed, and its destruction will be owing to the want of any true idea of what the University is, or any true desire to have it grow in power. We can hardly persuade ourselves that the friends and governors of Yale College will, in any such way, reject the possibilities, which are offered them, of making this institution one of the great Universities of the country. If they do, they will prove themselves unworthy sons of those noble men, who, in the day of small things at the beginning of this century, had a vision of the possible future, and, with their scanty means provided for the realization, at a later period, of what they saw only in the distant prospect.

We add, as a *fourth* means of bringing the whole institution into unity, and thus of accomplishing the work of the new

era, a suggestion as to the chief office of the University. The President of Yale College is the presiding officer of the Board of Trustees, and is the head of the faculty of each and every department. He is, thus, the one person who, according to the theory of the institution, meets with and forms the center of all the official bodies within it. In the practical working of the institution, however, the theory is not fully carried out. The institution, in this point as in all others, feels the influence of its origin. It began as a collegiate school, with its presiding officer as one of its teachers. When, in subsequent times, other schools were added to the original one, new bodies of instructors were appointed for their peculiar work, but the President did not extend his teachings into these new departments. In this respect he has always been limited, (except, indeed, in the giving of a few lectures, in special cases, of late years,) to the college or academical branch of the institution. He has met with the faculty of that branch only, in their regular meetings, and his work has been mainly in association with them. Having so many duties in that department—more, even, at times, than ought to be imposed upon any single man—he has scarcely been able to take upon himself similar duties in other departments. The necessities of the case have made him, in reality, the president of one faculty only, while, in name, he has been the head of all. If we look back thirty or forty years, we doubt whether the College President ever, (except in the most extraordinary emergencies,) sat in session with the officers of the professional schools. In late years, such meetings have been more frequent, but, even now, they take place only at intervals, while with the academical faculty he has one session in every week. The difference is owing to the impossibility that one man should do everything. Human powers cannot go beyond certain bounds; and, so long as the President has, in the college department, daily recitations to hear and daily lectures to give, and all the work upon his hands of what is known to college men as a “division” officer (involving the hearing of excuses and other such petty duty,) and is, it would seem, almost an office-clerk for everybody to write to or to call upon, it can scarcely be demanded of him that he should give himself largely to the professional and scientific schools. But,

if he does not devote himself to all, and meet often with all faculties, the inevitable result will be, that he will not have the same minute knowledge of the life and wants of all,—and the almost inevitable result will be, that his personal interest in all cannot be like that which he has in the one department, into immediate connection with whose daily life he is constantly brought. He must be a larger-minded and larger-hearted man than most men are, if he is able to overcome these limitations which beset him, and to feel, at all times, that every department of the University is just as important as his own. But, if he does not feel this,—inasmuch as he is the center of power and influence, and the sole representative of the faculties in the corporation—the other schools will, sooner or later, suffer in comparison with the one to which he especially belongs; and the danger of this result will be increased, because the officers of that school have nearer and more constant access to him than those of any other.

Yale College has become a wide-extended institution. Its growth, within the last twenty-five years, has been very great. It seems to us a question worthy of the most serious consideration, whether it has not become so large as to require the old system of things to be modified. Is it not time, or is not the time approaching—we do not say *it is*, but *is it not*—when the chief office in the University shall be changed in its character, and shall no longer bear such a special relation to a single department? Does not the work of the new era, which is to change the institution from a College with outside schools into a University composed of coördinate and coequal branches, require for its accomplishment that the head of the institution shall have precisely the same relation to all the branches? We have, already, seen that there is work enough, and more than enough, for such an officer as the academical department needs to preside over its affairs. But to those who thoughtfully observe the common life and interests of the whole University we believe it is equally clear, that there is work enough connected with those common interests to occupy the mind and the time of the ablest man who can be found to discharge it. If, however, this be so, it becomes, to say the least, an important point of inquiry whether the first-mentioned work

should not be done by a dean of the academical faculty, (with similar officers in the other faculties, so far as needed,) while the President should be connected alike with all faculties *in reality* as well as *in name*, and should have especial charge of the great common interests and life. Of the uniting power of such an office—of its immediate tendency to promote the growth of the University as distinguished from the College—it would seem that there could scarcely be any doubt. Unless, therefore, some weightier argument from some other source can be brought against such a change in the constitution of affairs, it ought to be made. And to the consideration of the whole question the minds of the governing powers, as it seems to us, may well be given at the proper moment. Why should not the remaining period of the present administration, whose past years have been so useful and so honorable, and whose continuance for years to come the graduates of Yale so generally desire, be a period in which this change should be inaugurated? Or if this be for any reason impracticable, why should not the succeeding administration begin with the assignment of these new duties to the highest officer of the institution? Certainly, at some time in the new era, this matter will press itself, and, we can hardly doubt, will be decided in favor of the change. All that we would hope is, that its discussion may not be deferred so long as to lose any advantages to the University in consequence.

The change here referred to need not, as it seems to us, and ought not to diminish the intellectual or religious influence of the President upon the students of the University. It might even increase that which should be exerted upon those belonging to the other departments beyond the academical. The President, in our view, ought never to be a mere business agent of the University. He should have some share in the instruction of the students, and should have the opportunity of coming in contact with them. Otherwise the office will have less attraction for men of eminent intellectual ability, and, on the other hand, there will be a great loss of possible good influence. His very office gives the President—if he meets them and they know him in the class-room—two or three times the power with the students, which even the same man would

have as one of the professors. This power ought to be used. But it is not essential to his discharging the duties of instruction, that he should be confined to the collegiate department. He can be a University lecturer, lecturing on subjects which are of importance and interest to the students of all the schools. He can give different courses, to a certain extent, adapted more particularly to the wants of each of the separate schools. If he is set apart by ordination to the office of the ministry, as always has been, and we hope always will be, the case in this institution, he can preach frequently in the University Chapel, or meet the students in their special or general meetings of a religious character. We know of no nobler work—more worthy of the highest powers, or more truly honorable for a man who is fitted for it—than to stand thus at the center of a great and growing University, with his heart and mind open to the wants of its every department—with his efforts ready to bear it forward in all parts alike—with the influence of his character and the impress of his intellectual power coming upon every student who finds his way anywhere within its walls. The constantly increasing fame of the institution would be his fame. The lives of thousands of students would bear within themselves, and would transmit to a future generation the lessons which they learned from him. His office would be even a higher and better one than it can be now, just in proportion as it would have a wider sphere of working, and a greater end to accomplish. It would be to its former self almost as the University is to the College.

Before closing our consideration of the means of accomplishing the work of unifying the institution more perfectly, we desire to add one or two suggestions of minor importance. One of these is, that, in addition to the present honors given to students of merit in the different departments, there might be established prizes or rewards which should be open to those of all departments. The degree of Doctor of Philosophy is now offered to students of the schools of science and of the higher philosophy and philology. Might not this degree, or some similar mark of distinction, be made a University honor for *all* who should prove themselves worthy of it? Or if not this, might not university prizes be proposed for all, to be given as

the result of examinations in the several lines of study pursued by different classes of students? Of course, from the nature of the case, such rewards could not be offered to undergraduates in the department of arts or in that of science, because they do not stand upon a common level with the graduated students who are found in the professional schools and the higher and more professional branch of the scientific department. But this exclusion of such undergraduates would be incidental to their position, and it would be no injustice to or real exclusion of the departments to which they belong, because each of these departments extends itself into the higher schools of philology and science already referred to. There would, therefore, be nothing in such a plan to oppose the University idea, but, on the other hand, there would be everything to favor it, and more perfectly carry it out. Such a plan would, of course, require careful thought before its adoption. Difficulties in the way of its successful accomplishment might present themselves, at first. But it is deserving of consideration and, as we are inclined to believe, will demand consideration in the coming years. If it is wise to adopt the plan, the influence of its adoption on the end which we now have in view—namely, the establishment and growth of the University as distinguished from the mere college, or the making of the University to be one body with coöordinate branches—is almost beyond question. In this way, the University will appeal to all its students alike, and they will feel that they are united in one company.

Another suggestion which may be offered is, that the graduates of all the departments should be regarded equally as sons of the University. This is the case already, in a certain measure. The students who have completed their course of study in the various schools are recorded in the general catalogue of the college. But it is evident to every observer, that those whom the college regards as its alumni, in the full sense of the word, are the graduates of the academical department only. This sentiment is a growth of all the past history of the institution and of the way, already pointed out, in which it has become what it is. A college, which has, so to speak, taken on, in the progress of years, certain outside schools, will

naturally feel itself to be the central and essential thing. It will claim for its graduates the privileges of the household. It will look upon others as holding only an inferior place. Every one of these graduates will look upon himself as belonging to the innermost circle, and will appropriate to himself the name of the institution in a sense in which he concedes it to no other. But, so long as this continues to be the case, the University spirit will suffer in its development. The insensible but inevitable influence of such feelings in the academical department and its graduates upon the other departments will be a depressing influence. Their graduates will see that they are regarded as a less privileged order; and, because they are not of the collegiate school, they will lose something of the spirit of the place. The recent years have, already, witnessed a considerable change in this respect. The growth in numbers or in what we may call the "institutional" life of some of the other schools has, in a measure, broken in upon the old feeling, and we anticipate in the future a far more complete change. And why should there not be such a change? The student in theology or law is pursuing a no less noble branch of learning than the student of the pure mathematics or of the ancient languages. The person who enters upon the general course in the scientific department, whatever may be thought of the comparative value of the education he receives, is as truly a son of the University as the one who gives himself to the regular course of the department of arts. The old idea has had a very natural origin and growth, but it is, nevertheless, a false one. Every man graduating at Harvard or Yale—whatever degree he may have taken—is a son of Harvard or Yale. He ought to have all the privileges of such sonship. He ought to be recognized everywhere as on an equality, as a graduate, with every other; and we are sure that he will be hereafter. Of the uniting influence upon the life of the University of his being thus recognized, we say again, as we have, already, repeatedly said in other connections, there can be no doubt.

We suggest further, as another step in the same direction, the adoption of the name *University*. There has been a sort of satisfaction, we confess, in the minds of the friends of this institution, that it has always had the name of *College*. So

long as schools of scarcely the dignity of our higher academies, and with no pretence to any department except the collegiate, and with not even students enough for a respectable class, are calling themselves universities, it is pleasant to think that a great institution like Yale has always kept its old unpretending name. But if we look at the facts of the case, the time has passed for the appropriateness of this title. It no longer describes what the institution really is. It creates endless confusion, because the word *college* must be used in two senses,—at one time, referring to the academical department only, and, at another, to all the departments as united together. A man may thus be a professor or a student in the college and not in the college at the same time, and what the college is becomes a matter of uncertainty to the outside world. It tends, also, to give the collegiate branch the preëminence above all others and to perpetuate the want of coördination among the various schools. Names are very important, oftentimes. They represent things. They are, as it were, the things themselves. They ought, therefore, to be given according to the nature of the things. Yale College, as a mere college, is only a part—it is only one of five branches of the institution which is known by that name. There is a university at New Haven, which includes the college, which has grown out of, indeed, but far beyond the limits of the college. Why should it not designate itself by a name which is suited to distinguish its peculiar character? It is a university—why should it not be called one? But, whatever may be the desirableness or undesirableness of adopting this name on other grounds, it appears to us that its adoption must tend to the accomplishment of the object of uniting the departments by a common bond. These various departments would, at once, become, to their own apprehension and the apprehension of the world, members of the one body—members with equal privileges and an equal rank. The constant use of the new title would be a continual reminder to all of their relations to one another, and would be a sort of outward manifestation and declaration of the true idea of the university.

These last mentioned suggestions, as we have intimated, may be considered of minor importance, as compared with

those which were previously presented. They are not, however, without weight. The institution is not beginning now, without any old traditions. It is bearing in its life the influences of a history of nearly two hundred years. These influences, so far as the point now before us is concerned, have been largely in a direction opposite to the university idea. They must, therefore, be counteracted, if that idea is to gain its proper place. Everything may well be done, under such circumstances, which, by any means, can remove the wrong notions and establish the right one. Even names, and things of inferior consequence, if they will prove helpful to the end, may wisely be cared for, and, as it appears to us, those who may have in charge the great and special work of the coming era should thoughtfully consider every measure which may bear upon this work; and if, after such consideration, any means, even the least, shall seem adapted to bring the end in view, they should promptly decide to use them.

The American University—in the highest sense of that word—is a thing of the future. But it is not to be originated in the future. It is not to be established by the resolutions of a mass convention, or by the efforts of a few reformers in education, whose only aim is to overthrow established systems, and all whose ideas are the outgrowth of modern American society. It will have its life rooted in the past. It will have a historic character. Where it will be located, or whether there will be one institution, or more than one, which will deserve and bear the name, it may be presumptuous, at this period of the country's progress, to attempt to determine. But it is not too much to say, that those great institutions which have been growing in strength and solidity and numbers for two centuries have great advantages over all others in respect to the coming time. They have a past history, which is secure. They have the traditions of the past to hold them to a true conservatism. As they are not the creatures of the present, they need not succumb to the passing notions of the hour. They can pass, in their life, from all the sound thoughts of former generations to the still higher ideals of scholarship of a coming age—and can take from the present, as they pass onward, only that measure of its influence which is good. Their

growth is the only healthy growth—that which starts from the beginning of the nation's life and keeps steadily on into the indefinite future. So far as the possibilities of human vision go, therefore, we may predict for them—if their course is directed by wisdom—more safely than for any others, the realization of this high idea. Surely, every friend of theirs and every well-wisher of his country ought to desire for them this honorable future, for it will be a glory to the nation if its noblest and highest universities are, in all time, those which have grown with its growth and strengthened with its strength. But, if they are to attain this end, they cannot linger in the sphere of *mere colleges*. They cannot neglect the development of any of their parts, but must see that all the parts increase together in the unity and harmony of a common life. A grave responsibility will rest upon those who have the positions of authority in them in the coming years. It will be, however, as in all great works, a responsibility only commensurate with the good to be accomplished and the reward to be attained. We believe that the time is close at hand when the University idea must be taken as the true guiding thought of all the future—when the old notion of a college with minor schools attached to it must be abandoned forever, and the several departments must be regarded as altogether coequal—when all portions of the institution must be pressed forward with the same energy, and watched over with the same minute and constant care—or the hope of the future will be lost. Other institutions of later origin and less noble past history will take the honor which is ready and waiting now for these.

We have spoken of Yale College because we are deeply interested in it. Much of what we have said would apply elsewhere, but our thoughts and those of our associates are naturally upon the future of our own University. We hope that future may be marked by wisdom as great as has characterized the past. Through the wisdom of the past, the institution has grown from its small beginnings, in the times of the early fathers, to the greatness of its present numbers and the wide-ness of its present fame. It has developed itself outward from its original center into new departments as they were needed, until now it is a complete University *in its plan and form*.

It needs only that continual growth, which is the necessity of all life, and that more perfect unity of all its parts which shall impart to it still greater strength and vigor for its future course, in order to make it all that its most ardent friends could desire it to become—a *complete University in the highest sense*.

And now is the time to move forward. To-day, in the advantages which it affords, Yale College is unsurpassed. In the plan by which it has determined the question between classical and scientific education most favorably to both, it has been wiser than any of its sister institutions. In the number of its students, it stands in the front rank. The incentives which come from past success, and those which arise from dangers in the future, all point to earnest action. We have attempted to show one of the lines in which such action is needed and the ways in which its energy may be directed. There are other lines which might be traced out—there are other works which, as we think, ought to characterize the new era; but we have trespassed upon the patience of our readers in this article so long that we pass them by unnoticed.

ARTICLE VI.—HOW THE REV. DR. STONE BETTERED HIS SITUATION.

The Invitation Heeded: Reasons for a Return to Catholic Unity. By JAMES KENT STONE, late President of Kenyon College, Gambier; and of Hobart College, Geneva, New York; and S. T. D. Catholic Publication Society. 1870. 12mo. pp. 341.

WE remit to a future opportunity the exposure of the latest statistical vagaries of the *Catholic World*, beguiled from that duty by the attractions of the latest issue of the Catholic Publication Society. This is one of the most interesting specimens of a very interesting class of books—those written by converts to or from Romanism in vindication of their change of views; and when that good day comes when we all have time for every thing, we shall count it well worth while to criticize it in detail. At present, we undertake no more than rapidly to state the upshot of the Rev. Dr. Stone's religious change, as it appears to us, and to foot up the balance of spiritual advantage which he seems to have gained by it.

A year ago last October, the Rev. James Kent Stone, D. D., a minister of excellent standing in the Protestant Episcopal Church, received, in common with the rest of us, a copy of a letter from the pope of Rome, in which he was affectionately invited to “rescue himself from a state in which he could not be assured of his own salvation,” by becoming a member of the Roman Catholic Church,—which teaches, by the way, that as soon as a man becomes “assured of his own salvation” it is a dead certainty that he will be damned.*

Accordingly, the Rev. Dr. Stone, deeply conscious how uncertain and perilous is the position of those who merely commit themselves in well doing, with simplicity and sincerity, to the keeping of the Lord Jesus Christ, according to his promises, “hastens to rescue himself from that state, in which he

* Act. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI., Capp. IX., XII., XIII.

cannot be assured of his own salvation," and betters himself wonderfully, as follows :

I. His first step is to make sure of his regeneration and entrance into the true church by the door of the church, which is, according to his new teachers, not Christ, but baptism.* To be sure he has once been baptized, and the Council of Trent warns him not to dare affirm that baptism administered by a heretic (like his good old father) is not true baptism.† But as all his everlasting interests are now pending on a question which no mortal can answer, to wit, whether at the time of the baptism of little James, being then of tender age, the interior intention of old Doctor Stone corresponded with a certain doubtful and variously interpreted requirement of the Council of Trent—that he should “intend to do what the church does”‡—it is well to make his “assurance of salvation” doubly sure, by a “hypothetical baptism” from the hands of a Roman Catholic priest, with some accompaniments which although “not of absolute necessity to his salvation, are of great importance”—such as a little salt in his mouth to excite “a relish for good works,” a little of the priest’s spittle smeared upon his ears and nostrils to “open him into an odor of sweetness,” a little of the essential “oil of catechumens” on his breast and between his shoulders, and of the “oil of chrism” on the crown of his head, with a “white garment” on, outside of his coat and pantaloons, and a lighted candle in his hand in the daytime.§ If there is a way of meriting heaven by a process of mortification, we have little doubt that it must be for a respectable middle-aged gentleman who has learned, by being president of two colleges, the importance of preserving his personal dignity, to be operated upon in just this way. Nothing, we should imagine, could add to the poignancy of his distress, and consequent merit, unless it should be to have the members of the Sophomore class present while he was having his nose “opened into the odor of sweetness.”

* Concil. Florent., “*vitae spiritualis janua.*”

† Concil. Trid., Canon 4, De Bapt.

‡ Conc. Trid., Sess. VII., Can. 11.

§ See the Roman Catechism.

Doubtless the object to be gained is amply worth the sacrifice, since it is to "rescue oneself from the state in which he cannot be assured of his own salvation," and avoid that "eternal misery and everlasting destruction," which, according to the authoritative catechism of the Roman Catholic church is the alternative of valid baptism. This second ceremony, be it remembered, is only a hypothetical one, calculated to hit him if he is unbaptized, but, in case it should appear in the judgment of the last day that old Dr. Stone *had* intended to "do what the church does (it being, at present, not infallibly settled what such an intention is) then this latter and merely hypothetical ceremonial to be held to have been no baptism at all, but null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever. But considering that the issues of eternity are pending on the insoluble question as to the validity of the first baptism, considering that a defect here can never be supplied to all eternity, whether by years of fidelity in other sacraments, or by years of torture in purgatorial fire, since it is only by baptism that "the right of partaking of the other sacraments is acquired,"* it is nothing more than common prudence to adopt a course that diminishes by at least one-half the chances of a fatal defect. It must be admitted that there still remains a possibility of the defect of intention in the second act as well as in the first; such things having been known in ecclesiastical history as the purposed "withholding of the intention" in multitudes of sacramental acts on the part of an unfaithful priest. Still, it may be held, perhaps, by the Rev. Dr. Stone, that the hypothetical transaction makes the matter nearly enough certain for all his practical purposes (as the old arithmetics used to say) although it falls a good deal short of that "assurance of his own salvation" to which he was invited in the pope's letter.†

* Dens, De Bapt. Tractat.

† It is very pleasant, from time to time, as one traverses the dreary waste of "commandments contained in ordinances" which make up the Romish system, to come upon some admission or proviso which fairly interpreted nullifies all the rest. The Council of Trent, for instance, declares that "without the washing of regeneration (meaning baptism) or the desire of it, there can be no justification," and teaches that an unbeliever brought to embrace Christianity, not having

But presuming that between his two baptisms Dr. Stone is validly entered into the Roman Catholic Church, may we not now congratulate him on the (hypothetical) assurance of his own salvation? Not quite yet. To be sure, he has received the remission of all his sins, up to that time, both original and actual, and the remission of the punishment of them, both temporal and eternal, and has been (as the Holy Father promised in his letter of a year ago last September) “enriched with unexhausted treasures” of divine grace.* But it is damnable heresy not to acknowledge that “he may lose the grace,” or to hold “that it is possible for him to avoid all sin—unless by special privilege from God, such as the church holds to have been granted to the blessed Virgin.”† Grace may come and go, but orthodoxy agrees with experience in teaching that “concupiscence which is the fuel of sin remains.”‡ It is damnable, therefore, to affirm that the rest of the seven sacraments are not necessary to Dr. Stone’s salvation;§ and especially to affirm that “it is possible for him if he shall fall” [as he inevitably will] “after baptism, to recover his lost righteousness without the sacrament of penance,”|| which is “rightly called *a second plank after shipwreck*,”¶ and equally damnable to “deny that sacramental confession is necessary to salvation;”** or to “affirm that in order to re-

the opportunity of baptism but yet desiring to receive it, is “baptized in desire,”—the desire supplying the place of the actual sacrament. [See *Concil. Trident. Sess. VI., Can. 4; Sess. VII., Can. 4.* Also Bishop’s Hay’s “*Sincere Christian*,” Vol. I., Chap. XX]. It is obvious enough that the just interpretation and application of these very Christian teachings would blow the “doctrine of intention” and of the “*opus operatum*” to pieces. But the thorough-going Romanizers scorn to take advantage of such weak concessions. Cardinal Pallavini says decidedly, “there is nothing repugnant in the idea that no person in particular, after all possible researches, can come to be perfectly sure of his baptism. Nobody can complain that he suffers this evil without having deserved it. God, by a goodness purely arbitrary, delivers the one without delivering the other.” [Quoted in Bungener’s *History of the Council of Trent*, p. 159]. This line of argument will be of no small comfort to Dr. Stone in his disappointment about the “assurance of his own salvation.”

* *Catech. Roman.*, 152–169.

† *Concil. Trident.*, Sess. vi., Can. 22.

‡ *Catech. Roman.*, *ubi supra*.

§ *Concil. Trident.* Sess. vii., Can. 4.

|| *Ibid.*, Sess. vi., Can. 29, De Justif.

¶ *Ibid.*, Sess. xiv., Can. 2.

** *Ibid.*, Sess. xiv., Can. 6.

mission of sins in the sacrament of penance it is not necessary, *jure divino*, for him to confess all and every mortal sin which occurs to his memory after due and diligent premeditation—even his secret sins.”*

We find, therefore, that our estimable friend is very, very far indeed, up to this point, from having got what he went for. He thought he was stepping upon something solid, but finds himself all at once in great waters, and making a clutch at the “second plank after shipwreck.”

A certain embarrassment attends him at his first approach to the sacrament of penance. He has a distinct understanding with the church that all sins incurred before baptism, both original sin and actual sins, and all the punishment of them, both eternal punishment in hell, and temporal punishments in this world or in purgatory, are absolutely and entirely remitted in that sacrament, and that no confession or penance is due on their account.† But now the painful question arises, when was he baptized? He may well hope that the transaction of his good old heretic of a father and of his sponsors in baptism, when they called him M. or N., was only an idle ceremony; for in that case the long score of his acts and deeds of heresy and schism all his life through is wiped out by the hypothetical baptism, and he may begin his confessions from a very recent date. But if his father had the right sort of intention, then this hypothetical baptism is no baptism at all, and he is to begin at the beginning with his penances. Inasmuch as neither man nor angel can settle the question, he will act wisely to follow the safe example of St. Augustine, and begin his confessions with owning up frankly to the indiscretions (to use the mildest term) with which, in early infancy, he aggravated the temper of his nurse, and peradventure disturbed the serenity of his reverend parent. Doubtless it will make a long story, but what is that, when one is seeking for the “assurance of his own salvation?”—and O the joy—the calm, serene peace when he shall hear at last from the lips of the duly accredited representative of the church the operative sacramental words, *Ego absolvo te*, and *know*, at last,

* *Ibid.*, Sess. xiv., Can. 7.

† *Catech. Roman*, *ubi supra*.

fter all these forty or fifty years of painful uncertainty, that, at least for this little moment, he is in a state of forgiveness and peace with God!

But softly! We are on the very verge, before we think of it, of repeating that wicked calumny upon the Roman Catholic church against which Father Hecker so indignantly protests, saying:

*"Is it HONEST to persist in saying that Catholics believe their sins are forgiven, merely by the confession of them to the priest, without a true sorrow for them, or a true purpose to quit them—when every child finds the contrary distinctly and clearly stated in the catechism, which he is obliged to learn before he is admitted to the sacraments?"**

Of course it is not honest! We have not examined the catechism in question, for the reason that if *we* were to quote it against the church of Rome we should be told that it was not authoritative, and be scornfully snubbed for pretending to refer to what was not one of their standards—but of course it is conclusive against our honesty when *they* quote it. To be sure, the priest says in so many words, "I absolve thee from thy sins, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost;" and Bishop Hay, in a volume commended by the proper authorities to the confidence of the faithful, declares that "Jesus Christ has passed his sacred word that when they [the priests] forgive a penitent's sins by pronouncing the sentence of absolution upon him, they are actually forgiven."† But then nothing is better established than that these authorized books of religious instruction may be repudiated at discretion as of no authority at all, whenever the exigency requires it. Then the Catechism of the Council of Trent says in terms "Our sins are forgiven by the absolution of the priest;"‡ "the absolution of the priest, which is expressed in words, seals the remission of sins, *which it accomplishes* in the soul;"§ "like the authority given to the priests of the old law, to declare the leper cleansed from his leprosy, the power with which priests of the new law are invested is not simply to declare that sins are forgiven, but as the ministers of God, real

* Tract of the Catholic Publication Society. † Sincere Christian, Vol. II

‡ Catech. Roman., p. 239.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

absolve from sin.”* Thus the Catechism of the Council of Trent; but bless your simple soul! it is not the Catechism of the Council that is infallible, but only the *decrees* of the Council; and although these do, in their obvious meaning, seem to say the same thing, nevertheless Dr. Stone will find, when he comes to search among them in hopes to “read his title clear” to divine forgiveness, on the ground of having received absolution from the priest, that what they say is qualified by so many saving clauses, and modified by so many counter-statements, that the seeker for the assurance of his own salvation is as far as ever from being able to

——“ bid farewell to every fear,
And wipe his weeping eyes.”

Only one thing is absolutely certain; and that is that it is impossible for him to be forgiven without absolution,† but whether he is forgiven, or is going to be, now that he has received his absolution, does not by any means so distinctly appear. For “if he denies that in order to the entire and perfect forgiveness of sins, *three* acts are required *in the penitent*, to wit, Contrition, Confession, and Satisfaction, he is to be Anathema,”‡ which, if we understand it correctly, is quite another thing from being forgiven and assured of his salvation. Now Contrition, according to the same infallible authority, “is the distress and horror of the mind on account of sin committed, with the purpose to sin no more.” “It includes not only the ceasing from sin, but the purpose and commencement of a new life and hatred of the old.”§ It is “produced by the scrutiny, summing up, and detestation of sins, with which one recounts his past years in the bitterness of his soul, with pondering the weight, multitude, and baseness of his sins, the loss of eternal happiness, and the incurring of eternal damnation, together with the purpose of a better life.”|| Now it is important for Dr. Stone to understand (as doubtless he has been told, by this time) that although this will be of no avail

* *Ibid.*, p. 242.

† See the various Canons of Sessions vi. and xiv., of the Council of Trent, above-quoted.

‡ Conc. Trid., Sess. xiv., Can. 4.

§ *Ibid.*, Sess. xiv., Cap. 4.

|| *Ibid.*, Sess. xiv., Can. 5.

to him without the absolution, or at least the desire for the absolution,* nevertheless the absolution will be of none effect unless the contrition shall have been adequately performed.

Furthermore, a second part of the sacrament is confession, and there is an awful margin of uncertainty about this act; for it is damnable to deny that “it is necessary, *jure divino*, in order to forgiveness of sins, to confess all and every mortal sin which may be remembered after due and diligent premeditation.”† But which of his sins are mortal and which venial, it is simply impossible for the Rev. Dr. Stone to know by this time, for it is a life’s labor to learn the distinctions between them from the theologians, and when you have learned the distinctions, you have no certainty about them, for they never have been infallibly defined, and the doctors disagree. It may be tedious, but it is obviously necessary, in order to the assurance of his salvation, for the Doctor to make a clean breast of all the sins, big and little, that he can remember “after due and diligent premeditation.” But what degree of premeditation is “due” and “diligent,” is painfully vague, considering how much is depending on it. It were well he should give his whole time and attention to it. But even then he would be unable to judge with exactness when it was accomplished.

“Exactly so!” doubtless the Rev. Dr. Stone would say; “and herein consists the happiness of us who have ‘rescued ourselves from the state in which we could not be assured of our own salvation’—that we have the advantage of a divinely authorized priest, with power of binding and loosing, who shall guard us from self-deception and mistake, and certify us with sacramental words that all these uncertain conditions are adequately fulfilled, and assure us, in so many words, that our sins are remitted. O the comfort of this distinct assurance from the Church!—this blessed sacrament of penance!—this second plank after shipwreck!”

Poor man! He has learned by this time that his priest does not undertake to certify him of anything of the sort—that the absolution is pronounced on the *presumption* that his own part of the business has been fully attended to, but that if his

* *Ibid.*, Sess. xiv., Cap. 4.

† *Ibid.*, Sess. XIV., Can. 7.

contrition or his confession has been defective, that is his own look out, and he must suffer the consequences, even be they everlasting perdition. The absolution, in that case does not count at all.*

“But,” thinks the Rev. Dr. Stone, a little concerned about the assurance of his salvation, “if all the issues of eternal life are to turn on a question of my own consciousness, of which no one is to judge but myself, I do not see how I am so much better off on the point of assurance than when I was a Protestant, and had the distinct, undoubted promise of the Lord Jesus Christ himself of salvation on condition of Repentance and Faith.” We feel for the honest man’s disappointment, but can only recommend to him, in his present situation, to carry his trouble to his new advisers. The best advice they can give him will perhaps be that which certain other high ecclesiastics, of unquestionable regularity of succession and validity of ordination once gave to a distressed inquirer—“What is that to us? see thou to that!”

It begins to look extremely doubtful whether we shall be able to get the Rev. James Kent Stone to heaven at all, on this course, notwithstanding he has come so far out of his way to make absolutely sure of it. But supposing all these diffi-

* “As the Church may sometimes err with respect to persons, it may happen that such an one who shall have been loosed in the eyes of the Church, may be bound before God, and that he whom the Church shall have bound may be loosed when he shall appear before him who knoweth all things.” Pope Innocent III., Epistle ii., quoted in Bungener’s History of the Council of Trent. We beg pardon for citing the language of a pope as authority, since it is recognized on all hands that hardly anything is more unauthorized and fallible than the sayings of a pope, excepting only on those occasions when he speaks *ex cathedra*,—and precisely when that is, no mortal can tell with certainty.

Let us try what a cardinal will say: “Without a deep and earnest grief, and a determination not to sin again, no absolution of the priest has the slightest worth or avail in the sight of God; on the contrary, any one who asks or obtains absolution, without that sorrow, instead of thereby obtaining forgiveness of his sins, commits an enormous sacrilege, and adds to the weight of his guilt, and goes away from the feet of his confessor, still more heavily laden than when he approached him.—Wiseman on the Doctrines of The Church, vol. ii., p. 10.

There would seem to be nearly the same amount and quality of comfort for tender consciences, and “assurance of salvation” here, as may be found (for example) in “Edwards or. the Affections.”

culties obviated, and that by a special revelation (it is impossible to conceive of any other means of coming at it) he discovers that his baptism, and contrition and confession are all right, and furthermore that the priest has had the necessary "intention" in pronouncing the absolution, and supposing a number of other uncertainties incident to this way of salvation, but which we have no time to attend to, to be entirely obviated, how happy he must be, *post tot discrimina tutus*, assured of the forgiveness of all his sins, and how delightful the prospect set before him!

" Sweet fields arrayed in living green,
And rivers of delight!"

Alas, no! If the Rev. Dr. Stone has any such idea as this, it is only a remnant of the crude notions which he picked up in the days of his heresy, by the private interpretation of the Scriptures. Let him now understand that it is damnable error to hold "that when God forgives sins he always remits the whole punishment of them."* The *eternal* punishment, indeed, is remitted; but the temporal punishment which remains to be executed may reach so far into the world to come that it is impossible to predict the end of it. In fact the characteristic vagueness in which all the most important matters that pertain to one's salvation are studiously involved in the Roman Catholic Church is remarkably illustrated in this matter of purgatorial torment. The *nature* of it is doubtful. The majority of theologians hold that it is effected by means of literal, material fire—but that is only "a pious opinion," and will not be known for certain until the next time the Pope speaks "out of his chair." The *degree* of it is doubtful. St. Thomas Aquinas thinks that it exceeds any pain known in this life; Bonaventura and Bellarmine guess that the greatest pains in purgatory are greater than the greatest in this world; but they are inclined to think that the least of the pains of purgatory is not greater than the greatest in this world.† But the *duration* of purgatorial torment is the most uncertain thing of all. Some think it will last only a little while; others that it

* Concil. Trident. Sess. XIV., Can. 12. See also Sess. VI., can. 30.

* Dens, De Purgatorio.

will endure for years and ages. The Church either don't know or won't tell. The most distinctly settled thing about the whole business seems to be this: that no one was ever yet known to be delivered from purgatory so long as there was any more money to be got out of his family by keeping him in.

Is it not, now, rather a rough disappointment to a man who has done so much, and traveled so far, on the promise of a clear and "assured" view of his future happiness, to bring him through all those perils to the top of his Mount Pisgah, and bid him look off on a — lake of fire and brimstone? We put it to the pope, in behalf of our deceived and injured fellow citizen—is it the fair thing?

Well, after all, ten thousand years of purgatory, more or less, will not so much matter to our friend, so long as he is "assured of his own salvation" from eternal perdition. Ay; there's the rub. He is not assured. Supposing it is all right thus far, with his baptism and confirmation and penance (and we have not stated a half of the difficulties of this supposition) he is now indeed in a state of grace, and all his sins are forgiven, albeit part of the punishment of them is liable still to be inflicted, in purgatory. If he dies now, happy man! for (always *supposing* as above) he is sure of being saved, sooner or later. But he has no certainty of remaining in this state of grace for an hour. And the Church (kind mother!) has provided for the security of her children by other sacraments, notably by the sacrament of the eucharist. Dr. Stone had undoubtedly, in his heretic days, read the sixth chapter of John, with the query, What if the Roman interpretation of these promises is the true one, and in order to have eternal life, I am required to eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of man, literally, in the transubstantiated bread and wine; and he now recalls the Lord's promise, "if any man eat of this bread he shall live forever?"*—"Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life;"† and he finds no small comfort in it. It is not pleasant to discover, indeed, that the Church, even granting its interpretation of the passage, de-

* John vi., 51, also 58.

† *Ibid.* vi., 54.

clares it of none effect, giving it to be understood that thousands upon thousands have eaten the veritable “body and blood, soul and divinity” of the Lord, and gone nevertheless into eternal death.” But yet our “anxious inquirer” does seem to come nearer now to what he was looking for—a sacrament that shall do its saving work on him independently of the presence of that, the necessity of which casts such a doubt on all Protestant hopes,—faith on the part of the partaker. This is the satisfaction of the doctrine of the *opus operatum*, that it makes the saving virtue of the sacrament to depend, not on what it is so difficult for the recipient to ascertain—his own faith; but on what it is absolutely impossible for him to ascertain—the intention of the priest. And not this alone. Before the priest, even with the best of intentions, has any power to consecrate the bread, and transform it into “the body and blood, soul and divinity” of the Lord, he must have been ordained by a bishop who should, at the time of ordaining, have had “the intention of doing what the Church does,” and who in turn should have been ordained with a good intention by another bishop with a good intention, and so on *ad infinitum*, or at least *ad Petrum*. And when we bear in mind that the validity of the *baptism* of each of these depends just as absolutely on so many unknown and unknowable “intentions,” and that in case of the invalidity of their baptism, which is “the gate of the sacraments,” they were incapable of receiving ordination themselves, and so incapable of conferring it, the chance of poor Dr. Stone’s ever getting a morsel of genuine, certainly attested “body and blood, soul and divinity” between his lips, becomes, to a mathematical mind, infinitesimal. There have been cases of ecclesiastics who in their death-bed confessions have acknowledged the withholding of multitudes of “intentions.” Who can guess what multitudes besides have been withheld with never a confession, or the confession of which has never been heard of. But the wilful withholding need not be supposed. “The smallest mistake, even though made involuntarily, nullifies the whole act.”* †

* Pope Innocent III., Ep. ix. “The Council of Florence had pronounced the same opinion. . . . Let an infidel or a dreamy priest baptize a child without having seriously the idea of baptizing it, that child, if it die, is lost; let a bishop

The hope of salvation through the sacraments of the Church grows dimmer and dimmer. It is well for our neophyte to cast about him and see if there be found no adjuvants that may reinforce in some measure that "assurance of his salvation," to which the Holy Father has somewhat inconsiderately invited him. "It is a good and useful thing," says the Council of Trent, "suppliantly to invoke the saints, and . . . to flee for refuge to their prayers, help and assistance." It is commonly represented to Protestants that this a mere recommendation, and that nobody is *required* to invoke the saints; but Dr. Stone has by this time been long enough under discipline to have found out that that is nothing but a polite pretense, and to be convinced that if there is anything to be gained by

ordain a priest, without having actually and formally, from absence of mind or any other cause, the idea of conferring the priesthood, and behold, we have a priest who is not a priest, and those whom he shall baptize, marry or absolve, will not be baptized, married or absolved. The pope himself without suspecting it, might have been ordained in this manner; and as it is from him that everything flows, all the bishops of the Church might some day find themselves to be false bishops, and all the priests false priests, without there being any possibility of restoring the broken link." Bungener, *Hist. of the Council of Trent*, pp. 158, 159. The author evidently mistakes in making the validity of *baptism* to depend on priestly ordination. That alone of the sacraments is valid if administered (with intention) by a "Jew, pagan, or heretic."

Bungener need not have put the case hypothetically. Writing at the period of the great Western Schism, "the papal secretary, Coluccio Salutato, paints in strong colors the universal uncertainty and anguish of conscience produced by the schism, and his own conclusion as a Papalist is that as all ecclesiastical jurisdiction is derived from the pope, and as a pope invalidly elected cannot give what he does not himself possess, no bishops or priests ordained since the death of Gregory XI. could guarantee the validity of the sacraments they administered. It followed according to him, that any one who adored the eucharist, consecrated by a priest ordained in schism, worshipped an idol. Such was the condition of Western Christendom."—*The Pope and the Council*, by Janus, p. 240.

It is, doubtless, with reference to difficulties like these that saving clauses are introduced into the utterances of the Church:—"Without the sacraments *or the desire* for them;" "if any man *wilfully* separate from the communion of the Holy See," &c. But if these clauses save the difficulties of the Church's doctrine, then they destroy the doctrine itself. If the good intentions of the penitent are what secure to him the grace of the sacraments, then that grace does not depend on the intention of the priest; and the provision which so many souls are yearning for, of a through ticket to heaven that does not depend on their own interior character, is miserably cut off.

saint-worship, he had better be about it, for “help and assistance,” are what he is sadly in need of. But which of the saints shall he take refuge to?—for there is an *embarras de richesses* here. As to some of them, there is a serious and painful uncertainty, as in the case of Mrs. Harris, as to whether there is “any such a person.” As to others, there is strong human probability that, in the “unpleasantness” that prevailed between heathen and Christian in the early times, they were on the wrong side. And in general, the Church fails to give certain assurance, as *de fide*, concerning them, that they are yet in a position to act effectively as intercessors—whether, in fact, they are not to this day roasting in purgatory, and in sorer need of our intercession than we of theirs. The Church, we say, has not pronounced assuredly and *de fide* on this point; and what Dr. Stone is invited to by the Holy Father, and what doubtless he means to get, is assurance, not “pious opinion.”

It will be “*safer*” for Dr. Stone “to seek salvation through the Virgin Mary than directly from Jesus.” So at least he is taught in books authorized and indorsed by the Church. But this is a very slender gain, for the same books assure him that without the intercession of Mary there is no safety at all—that “the intercession is not only useful but necessary”—that “to no one is the door of salvation open except through her”—that “our salvation is in her hands”—that “Mary is all the hope of our salvation;”^{*} so that the amount of this assurance (if one could be assured of its authority) is only this, that it is better than nothing at all.

* See “The Glories of Mary,” by St. Alphonsus Liguori, approved by †John, Archbishop of New York; chapter v., on “the need we have of the intercession of Mary for our salvation.” It has been certified by the pope in the act of canonization that the writings of St. Alphonsus contain nothing worthy of censure. But as it is, up to this present writing, impossible to say certainly whether this was one of the pope’s infallible utterances or one of his fallible ones—there we are again, in an uncertainty.

For a full collection of authorized Roman Catholic teachings, to the effect that “it is impossible for any to be saved who turns away from Mary, or is disregarded by her,” see Pusey’s *Eirenicon*, pp. 99, seqq.—bearing in mind, however, the claim of the defenders of the Roman Catholic system, that their Church is not to be considered responsible for its own authorized teachings.

Undoubtedly, the Rev. Dr. Stone would do well to get him a scapular. "About the year 1251, the holy Virgin appeared to the blessed St. Simon Stock, an Englishman, and giving him her scapular, said to him that those who wore it should be safe from eternal damnation." Furthermore, "Mary appeared at another time to Pope John XXII., and directed him to declare to those who wore the above-mentioned scapular, that they should be released from purgatory on the Saturday after death; this the same pontiff announced in his bull, which was afterwards confirmed by "several other popes."* This, declared in a book which is guaranteed by a pope to contain no false doctrine, is really the nearest that we can find in the entire Roman system to an assurance of salvation. But to the utter dismay of poor Dr. Stone, just as he is on the point of closing his hand on what the pope had invited him to,—“laying hold,” as an old writer expresses it, “on eternal life” in the form of a scapular,—he discovers not only that Pope Paul V., in 1612, added a sort of codicil to the Virgin’s promise, which makes it of doubtful value, but in general, that the inerrant author of the *Glories of Mary* “protests that he does not intend to attribute any other than purely human authority to all the miracles, revelations and incidents contained in this book.”† But “purely human authority” is not exactly what we care to risk our everlasting salvation on; is it, Dr. Stone?

Nothing seems to remain for our bewildered friend, but to apply for indulgences. To be sure he does not yet know that he has ever been effectually loosed from mortal sin, or if he has been, that he will not relapse into it and die in it; and in either case indulgences will do him no good. He will go down quick into hell—and not get his money back either. But supposing him to have escaped eternal perdition, it will be well worth while to have secured indulgences,—which may be had of assorted lengths, from twenty-five day indulgences for “naming reverently the name of Jesus or the name of Mary,” up to twenty-five thousand and thirty thousand year indulgences, granted for weightier consideration. But inasmuch as Dr. Stone has not the slightest idea how many millions of

* *Glories of Mary*, pp. 271, 272, 660.

† *Glories of Mary*, Protest of the Author, p. 4.

years he may have to stay in purgatory, if he ever has the happiness to get there, it will be best for him to go in for plenary indulgences, and save all mistakes. There are various ways of securing them; and it may well employ all Dr. Stone's unquestionable talents to decide how he shall get the amplest indulgence at the least cost of time and labor. On a superficial examination, we are disposed to think that there is nothing better to recommend than the wearing of scapulars. Says St. Alphonsus de Liguori: "The indulgences that are attached to this scapular of our Lady of Mt. Carmel, as well as to the others of the Dolors of Mary, of Mary of Mercy, and particularly to that of the Conception, are innumerable, daily, and plenary, in life and at the article of death. For myself, I have taken *all* the above scapulars. And let it be particularly made known that besides many particular indulgences, there are annexed to the scapular of the Immaculate Conception, which is blessed by the Theatine Fathers, all the indulgences which are granted to any religious order, pious place or person. And particularly by reciting 'Our Father,' 'Hail, Mary,' and 'Glory be to the Father,' six times in honor of the most holy Trinity and of the immaculate Mary, are gained each time all the indulgences of Rome, Portiuncula, Jerusalem, Galicia, which reach the number of four hundred and thirty-three plenary indulgences, besides the temporal, which are innumerable. All this is transcribed from a sheet printed by the same Theatine Fathers."* O if the Theatine Fathers were only infallible, or if we could be sure that indulgences were absolute and not conditional upon sundry uncertainties, how happy we might be! But a great theologian, afterward a pope,† declared that "the effects of the indulgence purchased or acquired, are not absolute, but more or less good, more or less complete, according to the dispositions of the penitent, and the manner in which he performs the work to which the indulgence is attached." And one has only to glance through the pages of some approved theologian, like Dr. Peter Dens, to

* *Glories of Mary*, p. 661.

† Pope Adrian VI., Comm. on the Fourth Book of *The Sentences*, quoted by Bungener, Council of Trent, p. 4.

find that this whole doctrine of indulgences is so contrived as to be, on the one hand, indefinitely corrupting and depraving to the common crowd of sinners, and on the other hand to give the least possible of solid comfort to fearful consciences. With every promise of remission that the Church gives—for a consideration—she reserves to herself a dozen qualifications and evasions, which make it of none effect.*

In the dismal uncertainty which besets every expedient for securing one's salvation which we have thus far considered, our friend will devote himself in sheer desperation to works of mortification, which are alleged by his advisers to have a good tendency to "appease the wrath of God." Fastings and abstinences are good; but a hair shirt is far more effective, if his skin is tender; and we cannot doubt that flagellation is more serviceable than either. A good scourge is not expensive, but it should have bits of wire in the lashes for a more rapid diminution of purgatorial pains. Sundry contrivances applied to one's bed, or to the soles of one's shoes, are recommended by the experience of some eminent saints, as of great efficacy in securing one against future torment. It would not be well for Dr. Stone, in his quest for assurance, to omit any of them. But alas! when he has done all, he is in the same dreary, dismal darkness as before.

Through such dim and doubtful ways the poor Doctor treads halting and hesitating till he comes toward the end of this weary life. Of all his friends who have departed this life before him, he has no confident assurance that they are not in hell; but he cherishes a hope that they may be roasting in the fires of purgatory, though he is aware that there is even a faint chance that they may be in heaven; but he pays for daily masses and indulgences in their behalf, being assured by

* Deus, Tractat. de Indulg. passim. Notab. 34, 37, 38, 39. Says Cardinal Wiseman: "For you, my Catholic brethren, know, that without a penitent confession of your sins, and the worthy participation of the blessed Eucharist, no indulgence is anything worth." *Doctrines of the Church*, vol. ii., p. 76. This, however, is said in a course of Lectures designed to commend the doctrines of the Church to Protestants; when the object has been to comfort the devotee, or to raise revenue for the Roman treasury, the tone of the authorized representatives of the Church has sometimes been far more assuring.

theologians that if these do not help his friends, they may in all probability be of service to some one else.* The nearest to certainty that he comes, on any such question, is in the belief that his godly parents and friends that have lived and died in simple faith on the Lord Jesus Christ, are suffering everlasting damnation—and even this is doubtful. As the hour of death draws near, he feels for his various scapulars, and finds them right; he sends for his confessor, and makes one more confession which is subject to all the doubtful conditions of those that have gone before, receives once more an absolution which is absolute in its terms, but conditional in its meaning, and receives the half of a eucharist the efficiency of which depends on an uncertain combination of conditions in his own soul and history complicated with an utterly unascertainable series of facts in the hidden intention of every one of a series of priests and bishops back to Simon Peter himself. This done, the church approaches him with a final sacrament which promises once more to do what it thereby acknowledges that the other sacraments have failed to accomplish—to “wipe away offences, if any remain, and the remains of sin”—to “confer grace and remit sins.”† But it is entirely unsettled among theologians what this promise means. It cannot be the remitting of mortal sin, for if the penitent have any such unforgiven, he is not allowed to receive the unction; and it cannot refer to venial sins for a good many reasons that are laid down; and it cannot mean “proneness or habit left from past sin,” for “it often happens that they who recover after the sacrament feel the same proneness to sin as before.”‡ In fact, at the conclusion of the sacrament, Dr. Stone will send for his lawyer, and if any thing remains of his property after his heavy expenditure in masses and indulgences for the benefit of his deceased friends, he will leave it by will to be given for masses to shorten up the torments which after all these labors and prayers to Mary, and mortifications, and sacraments, he still

* Deus. Tract. de Indulg. No. 40.

† Conc. Trid., Sess. xiv., Can. 2.

‡ Bellarmine, De Extr. Unct. i. 9, T. ii., p. 1198. 9. Quoted in Pusey's Eirenicon, 209–211.

perceives to be inevitable.* But even in this, he bethinks himself of the uncertainty whether masses paid for in advance will ever be actually said or sung.† But, poor soul, it is the best he can do, and so he gets them to give him a blessed taper to hold, and gives up the ghost while it burns out, and they sprinkle his body with holy water and bury it in consecrated ground to keep it safe from the demons, and his children give their money to get him out of purgatory (in case he is there) and down to the latest generation never know (unless their money gives out) whether they have succeeded, or whether in fact he has not all the while been hopelessly in hell along with his good old father and mother.

We cannot better wind up this exhibition of the way in which the church of Rome fulfils her promise of giving assurance of salvation, than by quoting the language of a most competent witness, the Rev. J. Blanco White, once a Roman Catholic theologian in high standing in Spain, afterwards a Protestant, whose trustworthiness is vouched for by Father Newman, from intimate personal acquaintance.‡ Mr. White says :

* A most striking instance of this is recorded in one of the most interesting and recent records of Roman Catholic piety—the Life of the Curé d' Ars. The old Curé of Ars, had lived a life of preëminent holiness, in which his acts of self mortification had been so austere and cruel as to have broken down his health—such that others could not hear them described without a shudder. As his death drew near, he “desired to be fortified by the grace of the last sacraments; and the Abbé Vianney then heard his confession, and administered to him the last rites of the church. . . . The following day the Abbé Vianney celebrated a mass for his revered master, at which all the villagers were present. When this service was concluded, M. Balley requested a private interview with his vicar. During this last and solemn conversation, the dying man placed in his hands the instruments of his penitence [scourges, &c.] ‘Take care my poor Vianney,’ he said, ‘to hide these things; if they find them after my death they will think I have done something during my life for the expiation of my sins, and they will leave me in Purgatory to the end of the world.’” *The Curé d' Ars: A Memoir of Jean-Baptiste-Marie Vianney.* By Georgina Molyneux. London: 1869.

† There will hardly fail to occur to him the scandalous *cause célèbre* tried a few months since, in Paris,—the case of a large brokerage in masses for the dead, which undertook to get the masses performed by country priests at a lower figure than the ruling city prices, but was detected in retaining the money without securing the saying of the masses at all.

‡ “I have the fullest confidence in his word when he witnesses to facts, and

"The Catholic who firmly believes in the absolving power of his church, and *never indulges in thought*, easily allays all fears connected with the invisible world. Is there a priest at hand to bestow absolution at the last moment of life, he is sure of a place in Heaven, however sharp the burnings may be which are appointed for him in Purgatory.

"But alas, for the sensitive, the consistent, the delicate mind that takes the infallible church for its refuge! That church *offers* indeed certainty in every thing that concerns our souls; but Thou, God, who hast witnessed my misery and that of my nearest relations—my mother and my two sisters, knowest that the promised certainty is a bitter mockery. *The Catholic pledges of spiritual safety are the most agonizing sources of doubt.*"

"The Sacraments intended for pardon of sins could not (according to the common notions) fail in producing the desired effect. For, if, as was subsequently given out, all those divinely-instituted Rites demanded such a spiritual state in the recipient, as without any external addition would produce the desired effect, what advantage would be offered to the believer? If absolution demanded true repentance to deliver from sin, this was leaving the sinner exactly in the same condition as he was in before even the name of the pretended Sacrament of Penance was heard of in the world. But if these conditions alone can give security, no thinking person, and especially no anxious, timid person, can find certainty in the use of the Sacraments. And none but the naturally bold and confident do find it. To these, the Sacraments, instead of being means of virtue, are encouragements of vice and iniquity.

"O God! if Thou couldst hate any thing thou hast made, what weight of indignation would have fallen upon a Constantine, and an Alva! And yet the former having put off baptism till the last opportunity of sinning should be on the point of vanishing with the last breath of life, declares the heavenly happiness which filled his soul from the moment he came out of the baptismal water; the latter, that cold-blooded butcher of thousands, declares that he dies without the least remorse. On the other hand, have I not seen the most innocent among Thy worshipers live and die in a maddening fear of Hell! They trembled at the Sacraments themselves, lest, from want of a fit preparation, they should increase their spiritual danger."*

It might be very tedious to read, but it would certainly be very easy to present, like proofs to show that in "heeding the invitation" of the pope to come to him for infallible teaching in matters of *belief*, Dr. Stone has come only to like grief and anxious uncertainty. He has stated very neatly the fallacy of those who have sought for an infallible interpreter of Scripture in the writings of the Fathers. "They do not see that

facts which he knew." He was one "who had special means of knowing a Catholic country, and a man you can trust." *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England*, by John Henry Newman, D. D. 1851.

* Life of the Rev. Joseph Blanco White, written by himself. Edited by John Hamilton Thom. London: 1845. Vol. III., pp. 256-258.

in place of acting upon a new rule, they have only increased the difficulties of the old ; that instead of obtaining an interpreter, they have only multiplied the number of the documents which they must themselves interpret or have interpreted for them ;” and “are in fact resorting to what has been aptly called ‘the most ingenious of all Protestant contrivances for submitting to nothing and nobody.’ ”* Marvelous ! that a man who is so shrewd to perceive this fallacy in the system he has just left, should be so blind to the same fallacy in the system he has just adopted ! He had

——“jumped into a bramble bush
And scratched out both his eyes ;

“ And when he saw his eyes were out,
With all his might and main,
He jumped into *another* bush
To scratch them in again.”

By just so far as his new teacher is infallible, it is simply documentary—paper and printer’s ink—Fathers, Councils, Bulls, Briefs, more Bulls, more Briefs, and another Council again, documents upon documents, all in the Latin tongue (which, happily, Dr. Stone is able to read) until the world cannot hold the books that have been written. But, on the other hand, just so far as he has access to his new teacher as a *living* teacher—a representative of the Catholic hierarchy—he finds him confessedly fallible—an uninspired priest or bishop, likely enough an unconvicted heretic, and at least liable to all human blunders and endless “variations” in expounding and applying the faith of the church. So that the certainty of poor Dr. Stone’s faith, unless he chooses the alternate risk of going to the documents himself and taking his chance of being “saved by scholarship,” or by “private interpretation,” is resolved into the mere “*fides implicita*,”—of being willing to believe the truth if he only knew what it was—and *that*, if we understand him, is just what he had before he got the Pope’s letter, with the exception that at that time there were fewer elements of uncertainty in his mind.

* The Invitation Heeded, pp. 158, 159.

And just as with questions of truth, so is it with questions of duty. In search of definiteness and certainty he has gone voyaging upon a waste of dreary casuistry, upon whose fluctuating surface he lies becalmed, tossed to and fro between "probabilism" and "probabiliorism," and O, how sea-sick! There is nothing for him but to "do as they do in Spain;" and how that is we learn from Father Newman's friend, Blanco White:

"In a country where every person's conscience is in the keeping of another, in an interminable succession of moral trusts, the individual conscience cannot be under the steady discipline of self-governing principle; all that is practised is *obedience* to the opinions of others, and even that obedience is inseparably connected with the idea of a dispensing power. If you can obtain an opinion favorable to your wishes, the responsibility falls on the adviser, and you may enjoy yourself with safety. The adviser, on the other hand, having no consciousness of the action, has no sense of remorse; and thus the whole morality of the country, except in very peculiar cases, wants the steady ground of individual responsibility."*

The sum of the whole matter seems to be this: that the certainty and confidence of the disciple of the Church of Rome, whether regarding matter of belief or matter of practice, consists in putting his head in a bag, and giving the string to his confessor.

The "invitation heeded" by Dr. Stone contains other seductive promises which it would be well for us to consider, if there were time. We can only allude, with a word, to the excellent things which his Holiness offers, in this invitation, to society and government in Protestant countries, in pity of the misfortunes under which he perceives them now to be suffering.

"Whoever recognizes religion as the foundation of human society cannot but perceive and acknowledge what disastrous effect this division of principles, this opposition, this strife of religious sects among themselves, has had upon civil society, and how powerfully this denial of the authority established by God to determine the belief of the human mind, and to direct the actions of men as well in private as in social life, has excited, spread, and fostered those deplorable upheavals, those commotions by which almost all peoples are grievously disturbed and afflicted." "On this longed for return to the truth and unity of the Catholic church depends the salvation not only of individuals, but also of all Christian society; and never can the world enjoy true peace, unless there shall be one Fold and one Shepherd."†

* Life of J. Blanco White, I., p. 83.

† Letter of Pope Pius IX., Sept. 13th, 1868.

We see here the value of an infallible teacher! If it had not been revealed to us thus from heaven, we never should have guessed that what secured national tranquillity was national adherence to the Holy See. But now we see it—by the eye of faith. Poor England, racked with intestine commotions!—if she could but learn the secret of Spanish order and tranquillity and prosperity! Unhappy Scotland, the prey of social anarchy, and devoured by thriftless indolence! Will she not cast one glance across the sea, and lay to heart the lesson of Irish serenity and peace and wealth? Poor Protestant Prussia, and Denmark, and Scandinavia “grievously disturbed and afflicted” by “those deplorable upheavals and commotions” which his Holiness talks about, and yet so pitifully unconscious of them all! How slight the price,—a mere “Fall down and worship me”—with which they might purchase to themselves the sweet calmness and good order and unbroken quiet that have characterized the history of Catholic France and Italy, and even the ineffable beatitude of those happy States of the Church, which, ungrateful for their unparalleled blessings, have been waiting for twenty years for a good chance to put the pope (in his temporal capacity) into the Tiber! Nay, nay! Let us not refuse to bring home the teaching of our Shepherd to our own bosoms. What land has been more the victim of “this division of principles, this opposition, this strife of religious sects among themselves,” than our own unhappy country? Ah! were the people wise! Do they not feel the “disastrous effects” of their refusal to submit to the Holy See—the “deplorable upheavals and commotions,” and all? Can they resist the allurements of those examples of national happiness which fill the whole Western Hemisphere, save the two pitiable exceptions of Canada and the United States? Speak, dear Dr. Stone, speak once more to your infatuated fellow countrymen, and persuade them, if you can, to end this hundred years’ history of commotion and revolution and disastrous change which they have nearly completed, by substituting the majestic stability of Mexico, and Guatemala and Colombia, and all the Catholic continent down to the Straits of Magellan!* Already a ray of hope shines in upon

* Father Hyacinthe does not seem to come up to the standard of Roman doctrine on this point. “Ah, well I know—and many a time have I groaned

the darkness of the Protestant land. One bright spot is irradiated with the triumph—the partial triumph—of Roman principles of government. Can it be irrational to hope that when these principles prevail in the same degree throughout the land, we shall have everywhere, under State and general governments, the same placid order, the same security for life and property, the same freedom from turbulence and riot, the same purity of elections, the same integrity in the discharge of public trusts, the same awfulness of judicial virtue, as prevail in the Catholic city and county of New York?

We have left ourselves very little space to express as we would like the real respect which, after all, we feel for this book, and still more for its author. With here and there a slip in grammar or diction, and with no more of pedantry than can easily be pardoned to the author's vocation, the work is beautifully written; and if there does seem to be a dreadful gap between what the author intended when he started, and what he found where he stopped, it must be acknowledged that he passed from one point to the other with consecutive steps along an intelligible path. His argument, although encumbered with mistakes, is, nevertheless, good against any opponent who accepts his premiss,—that the Church Universal is a visible corporation. His appeal to all Protestants to examine with candor the grounds of their belief, and bravely and sincerely accept the consequences, is earnest, tender and touching—all the more so, as the unhappy author in his very exhortation, evidently looks back upon those generous moments when he himself was practising these virtues, as Adam

within myself to think of it—these nations of the Latin race and of the Catholic religion have been of late the most grievously tried of all! Not only by intestine fires, by the quaking of the earth, by the intruding of the sea. Look with impartial eye, with the fearless serenity of truth, with that assurance of faith which fears not to accept the revelations of experience, and then tell me—where is it that the moral foundations quake most violently? Where does the current of a formidable electricity give the severest, the most incessant shocks to republics as well as monarchies? Among the Latin races; *among the Catholic nations*. Yes, by some inscrutable design of Providence, they, more than others, have had to ‘drink of the cup deep and large;’ they have wet their lips more deeply in the chalice in which are mingled ‘the wine, the lightning, and the spirit of the storm;’ and they have become possessed with the madness of the drunkard.” Discourses of Father Hyacinthe, Vol. I., p. 155.

might have looked back upon Paradise. Those hours can never return. Never more may he exercise the manly virtue which he now commends to others, and which we doubt not he faithfully practised until it became a prohibited good. Let him *now* attempt to look into the writings of those who differ from him, with a view to "examining candidly the grounds of his faith," and the thunderbolt of the excommunication *latæ sententiæ* breaks forth upon him from the Bull *In Cœna Domini*.* We are so affected by the honest Doctor's exhortation to candid inquiry, that we shrink from putting ourselves, like him, in a situation in which if we candidly inquire we are damned.

The little volume will reasonably be expected to be more effective as a fact and a testimony than as an argument. As a testimony, its precise value is this: Until two years ago, the author, believing himself to be entirely sincere and candid, held, as the result of private judgment, a system (according to his own statement) wildly inconsistent, illogical and self-destructive, which he vindicated to himself and others by arguments plausible and satisfactory. Within two years, after candid but astonishingly brief examination, in the exercise of the same private judgment, he has dropped that system and adopted another, also with entire sincerity, and vindicated by plausible arguments, which he is not permitted candidly to re-examine. It is solely by the use of the same private judgment that played him so false before, that he has come to embrace this other system.

Qu. :—What is the probability that he has got the truth now ?

This is what he may never know.

One thing alone he holds intelligently—that the Roman church is the true church of Christ; and this he knows only by his poor private judgment, which he is not permitted to revise. Every thing else, he takes on the authority of this. And this, being known only by private judgment, may be a mistake !

Poor man !

* Ligorii Theol. Moral. 68, 785.

ART. VII.—THE BIBLE AND THE SCHOOL:*

An Address of M. E. de Pressensé before the Evangelical Alliance at Amsterdam, held in August, 1857.—Translated for the "New Englander," by PROF. J. P. LACROIX, of the Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio.

ALL who have any correct appreciation of the age in which we live, and of the future which is preparing for us, admit without hesitation that the great question of the day is that of popular education. Democracy is everywhere gaining ground; it flows not only, as Royer-Collard said, with full banks, but it is breaking beyond its proper bounds. Political institutions have little to do with the matter. Where they yield to the popular pressure, there is less observable friction than in such countries as try to resist it. But all institutions that presume to offer it stubborn defiance are sure to be swept away in the end; for its floods are constantly mounting, with the regularity of natural law. This fact is not a mere political phenomenon, it is a social fact of momentous import. Everywhere the masses are becoming conscious of their might; they have found, in the principle of association, an irresistible lever; for they have numbers on their side, and where numbers are organized and of one mind, what can resist them? Whether this state of things be welcome to us, or not, does not affect the matter of fact. Gladstone has justly said that the nineteenth century is the century of the laborer, meaning, that in this age, for the first, in the history of the world, the laboring classes have attained to a real participation in political and social life. From of old they have been kept in the back-ground, have been simply permitted to prepare the costumes for the great actors, or to handle the machinery which

* This Address of the distinguished French Protestant Pastor, M. E. de Pressensé deserves just now more than ordinary attention in this country, as it brings to view the way in which the question of "the Bible and School" may be regarded by a Protestant minority in a Roman Catholic country.—*Editors of the New Englander.*

gave glory to the action. But in our day all this is changed. The *people* has become one of the principle actors, and that too not simply to take a sudden part in revolutionary crises, but to play a direct and constant *rôle* in shaping the face of the world.

Such is the situation—at least for those who have eyes to see it. I will say at once, that I think we should accept it resolutely and without regret. It has, it is true, its immense perils, but it has also its providential phase. I believe it is as God would have it be. That the classes of society should approach each other by the enjoyment of equal rights, by freedom of person and labor, by a common prosperity, is surely in harmony with that religion which knows neither bond nor free. Notice that I have no thought here of touching on political ground; I consider simply the social fact. From this point of view I hold, that Christianity has a moral tendency to sweep away all barriers to equal rights among the redeemed of the same Saviour. And I am convinced that nothing could be more unfortunate than to make religion seem distrustful and inimical in regard to the privileges of the masses; for, the weal of the future depends entirely on the influence Christianity shall exert upon them. Nor is this a mere matter of prudence, it is a question of truth and justice.

But in any view of the case the situation is grave and fraught with peril. What will be the nature of this immense weight which the masses are to throw into the social balance? Will it or not be a blind force, shaped by every wind that may blow, and destructive, like the tempests of nature? In other words, will it be an intelligent, or an unintelligent force? Let it not be forgotten that the spirit which fills out a political frame-work is infinitely more important than the frame-work itself. The French politicians of 1789 fabricated an admirable constitution; but they thought very little of those who would have to put it into practice. They constructed their theoretical system in the brilliant circles of Paris, but none of these reformatory philosophers thought of descending into the hovel and workshop to dissipate the ignorance of the masses. Hence their work was in vain. The blind rage of blindly-led masses swept away, in 1793, the brilliant constitution of the Mirabeaus and Lafayettes. Much, it is true, depends on political

constitutions, but much more on those for whom they are made. Let us not place in the second rank that which is of first importance—popular education.

The nations that were born of the Reformation have constantly aimed to instruct the masses; with them it was a necessity of self-preservation. In fact, the Reformation itself was based upon a Book,—a book by whose divine authority it shielded and upheld liberty of thought, and withstood traditional servitude. It whispered into the ears of the Middle Ages, those words which gave St. Augustine to the Church: *Tolle et lege*, take and read. We see, therefore, clearly enough, why the Reformation taught the masses to read—why the Church, which has for its motto, *Lege*, should be more zealous for popular education than the Church which esteems the utterances of the priest as higher than the sacred Word. There is, therefore, a religious cause for that great diffusion of elementary education which characterizes Protestant nations. Yes! It is the Bible which has created the school, especially the Protestant school. Elsewhere it is not so. We may truthfully say that the natural tendency of modern Romanism is to increase and intensify popular ignorance. It is true, this Church has its teachers and schools; but it imparts knowledge only in very limited degrees. It instructs its masses only where its influence is contested by powerful rivals. Hence we see, that where Popery has exclusive sway, the people are covered with thick darkness. It desires to retain within its own grasp the keys of knowledge, lest some other sentiments than its own should be taught. Under such circumstances it is, in fact, safer to teach nothing at all beyond the catechism; for the taste for knowledge, once indulged, is no longer easily controlled.

However, the condition of the world is now such as to render this system difficult of practice. In France, an impulse has been given to general education which cannot be checked. The government, the various Churches, and societies of every description, are taking part in it. Schools are multiplied and encouraged—schools for the young and the adult, schools for each sex, schools for the learned callings. The cause of education may be said to be gained. And to the question which we have proposed, viz.: Will the masses, on arriving at polit-

cal influence, be instructed, or ignorant? we may answer: They will be instructed. But this leads to a second question: In *what* will they be instructed? what will they have adopted? And this question is even more important than the first.

Instruction, education, *per se* will not suffice. It may produce as much evil as good. A gifted poet has warmly maintained this thesis: that education banishes moral evil as the sun banishes night. He would have been right provided evil had its seat only in the mind, and not in the heart. But it is fruitless to have knowledge while the will is enslaved to the passions; in such a condition a man is more guilty and dangerous than if he were utterly ignorant. No! it is not true that the spread of knowledge will do away with police and with prisons. "Education," said Benj. Constant, "is the most dangerous of powers when it is not in the service of conscience." Suppose that the youth are taught in school that there is no God above, no immutable law in the heart, and, above all, no sanction to this law in a future life; suppose that they be taught that man is "but an animal which has occasional odd freaks," but which, like all other organized beings, is governed by instinct and irresistible natural law; suppose in a word that they are imbued with those sceptical notions that so largely pervade the literature and society of the day—and, then, say, what will be the fruit of such schools, what destiny will they prepare for the world? And above all what will be the individual *moral* fate of such unfortunate children? Let us not deceive ourselves. Education, isolated from moral training, is not a good. It is with the greatest danger that we separate that which should be united. The higher that general education is carried, the more imperative is it to train the heart and conscience—it is in fact the first of all duties. Now, for us Christians, this education of the conscience is not far to seek for: we know who is the sole Master who can give it effectually; this Master is the God of the Bible. And this brings us to the heart of our subject.

There is one point upon which all Evangelical Christians are unanimous: it is, that the Bible should form the corner stone of all education. We would all like to see it hold the place of honor in every school. This wish interferes with no real right,

provided it does not assume the form of a legal obligation. But this conviction, that the school cannot fulfill its mission without the Bible, meets with vigorous opposition from some quarters. It is asserted that the Bible is not a proper book for youth, for the reason that it spreads before their minds, recitals of crimes and immorality. But it is at the same time forgotten that these crimes are recited *as crimes*, that they are recorded only to be condemned, and that the uniform moral tendency is, to inculcate the purest morality. We are ready to concede that it is not prudent to read every part of the Bible indiscriminately to all ages and under all circumstances. The Bible is a history boldly sincere, depicting man as he is, without any lying flattery. Though its language is uniformly chaste, it nevertheless holds up a terrible picture of our shame and depravity. It does not clothe evil with the pernicious seductiveness of poetry, but it refuses to cast a veil over its warning reality. Now, this picture cannot with safety be offered to childhood. We do not hesitate, therefore, to say that some parts of the Old Testament should, in some cases, be omitted by the discreet parent and teacher.

With these unessential concessions, we insist that the school cannot, by any means, dispense with this venerable book. For us it is the message of redemption and life. Hence, we would wish to see it in the hands of all, young and old; we consider it as a crime against God and man, to hinder in any way its general diffusion. To fetter the Bible, is, to hide the truth, to shut up the fountain that refreshes the weary pilgrim of the desert. For us who believe that humanity is fallen, there is no higher duty than to hold open the sacred pages so that they first shall strike the gaze of infancy, and, last, the weary look of old age.

But leaving these generalities, let us consider the Bible from an educational standpoint. And here we see its most admirable phase. How vast the scheme of education which it unfolds to the world—that of God as relating to his moral creatures! It takes man in his rude infancy, and raises him to the heights of spiritual religion. It is a luminous ladder whose first step is so near the earth that the child can easily reach it, and whose summit loses itself in the infinitude of the heavens.

In the Old Testament, calumniated as it has been, we discover the first condescensions of the eternal Word, tempering his glory to the feeble and fearful eyes of sinful humanity, and clothing the sublimest truths in an easy popular form. And individual infancy, as well as humanity, has need of the ferule of the law, has need of these earnest portrayals of God's holiness and justice, in order rightly to appreciate the grace of the Gospel. The sight of Sinai, crowned with its thunders, is fruitful and salutary. It is well that the child should see in God's judgments on his chosen people, what it costs to violate his law, and that it should feel that eye which never sleeps, looking down into the secret of its, and of all others' hearts. Compile Catechisms of moral duty from Plato and Zeno, from Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus—and the child will turn away with *ennui*. But place before him the living God, the God of the patriarchs, of Moses and David, and he will receive a heart-conviction that nothing can eradicate. These serious conceptions, and these alone, will give the young conscience the necessary independence and authority.

But the Old Testament is only a preparation for the New. It leads, through its seeming severities and terrors, directly to the centre and essence of the perfected Revelation—to the cross of Jesus, to the love of the Father. It enables us to see and appreciate these, as nothing else could do. We are now enabled to understand, as the ancient saints could not, how God can be just, and yet, at the same time, so merciful. For we have now fully displayed before us, in the completed Bible, the whole plan of God for the moral education of humanity. Viewed in the light which the Gospel casts upon it, the seeming harshness of the Old Testament vanishes at once; and its stern and magisterial earnestness appears as but the appropriate setting for the gentleness and charity of Jesus. And I think that in this day especially, when earnest beliefs and serious convictions are so little prevalent, the youth have great need of familiarity with the masculine and solemn accents of the Old Testament.

But need I speak of the New Testament—of its admirable adaptation for seizing upon, and moulding, the hearts of the young? This is conceded universally. When taken in its

simple and natural sense, what could more powerfully stir and refine the heart than familiarity with the matchless life of Jesus, his serenity and tenderness, his tears, his parables, his crowns of thorns and tragic death ! And the scenes of Lake Tiberias, and under the fig-tree of Bethany, would not make less happy or durable impressions. The youth who has been once made familiar with these *may* stray away into sin, but, like the name of Jesus, as learned from the lips of his mother by St. Augustine, they will be pretty sure, soon or late, to call back the wanderer to the fountain of truth. And the schools have no higher mission than to continue the work begun by such pious mothers. Let them engrave the name of Jesus on every young heart that comes within their walls.

But the Gospel is admirably adapted to children, not only because of the moral attractions of the Redeemer, but also because it presents truth under its most accessible form. The young do not grasp abstract truth ; they cling to the concrete and living. They get at principles only as couched in envelopes. The great instructor of youth is narrative, history. And what is the Gospel but a history, in fact the history of a single person. "I am the truth," said Jesus ; that is, the truth was so fully manifested in him, that there is need but to have eyes and ears, to seize and retain it. "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." Say to a child that God is personal, free, holy, just, and supremely good. It will not understand you. But show him the only and well-beloved Son of the Father, and he will at once comprehend the significance of divine love. Show him the accursed cross, and say that it was thus far that the divine love stooped, and he will have an idea of God which surpasses all that philosophy could give him. Attempt by the aid of the first elements of psychology to explain to a child the nature of good and evil, and your effort will be in vain. But show him the meek and lowly Jesus, going about healing and consoling, welcoming the poor and outcast, doing not his own will but that of the Father, rejecting glory and pleasure, and finally giving up his life for others—and the child will know at once what holiness and sin, good and evil are. And he will not only *know* these things, but in the presence of the Saviour he will *feel*

himself a sinner, and see the need of redemption. Presented in a doctrinal form, the plan of grace leaves the heart cold and indifferent. Take a shorter course. Show the child redemption in its concrete form—the life, the passion, the death of Jesus. Show him the scenes of the Acts—the Holy Spirit descending upon the feeble and ignorant, making of trembling disciples the heroes and pillars of the Church,—and he will know what the power of God can bring forth out of our infirmities. It is thus that, in the Gospel, the truth stands forth bright and living; it is the pure and spiritual milk adapted to the mind of childhood.

Nor is there any compromising adaption in this. The truth has not disguised itself in legends and myths to render itself accessible to the simple. There are not two Gospels, one for the young and feeble, and the other for the sages; the one historical and personal, and the other abstract and ideal. There is but one Gospel, and the peculiar glory of it is, that it presents the truth as *realized* in a divine person. It is not the cup with honeyed borders to tempt the feeble to the salutary draught. It is the food of adults; its method is not simply good for the young, it is the one and sole true method. It is a divine realism which not only demonstrates the truth, but also places it before our eyes all embodied and aglow with divine life. We can, therefore, afford to feel honored by the disdain of certain philosophers who pretend to rise above our religion, and soar to the realms of the pure ideal; we have more than ideas and abstractions; we have the ideal perfectly realized. We sympathize with the profound word of Stilling, when, wearied of vain abstractions, he cried out, towards the close of life: “Yes, Christianity is a fact.”

But the Bible is not simply valuable as the balm of souls it is also one of the most admirable means of intellectual and æsthetic culture. No other book is so many-sided; it is history, law, poetry, doctrine, and that too under the most varied forms. The ancient Orient revives to new life in its pages; and what is better adapted to rivet the attention of old and young than the grand scenes of patriarchal and desert life, of war and victory, of captivity and restoration? It contains a perfect and the only true philosophy of history, explaining the

world's destiny by the working of free agencies. What psychology is to be compared to its portrayal of man's inner and outer life, just as he is in all his grandeur and misery? And what poesy approaches in simplicity and naturalness that of David and Solomon? Take up Pindar or Homer: you need a vast apparatus of erudition to be able to appreciate them; but the Psalms are appreciable by everybody. Hence, wherever the Bible is read, it stamps itself upon the national spirit, giving birth to a refined taste, cultivating the sentiment of the dignity of man, and awakening all the powers of the soul to vigorous and harmonious action. Let the Bible, therefore, be put into the hands of all. It must go into the school; no school from which it is banished can accomplish its mission. We not only desire that it shall be read as a part of worship; we desire that it be made the very centre of education,—that from which all proceeds and to which all is referred—the soul of mental training, the daily bread.

Our conviction on this point is clear: the school without the Bible is the school without a soul; or more truly, it is the school materialized and deprived of the most effectual instrument of accomplishing its proper purpose. But a new question here rises before us. Should the Bible be placed, *by law*, in all our schools, and especially in those supported by the State, or should there be guaranteed on this subject an absolute liberty? On this point good and Christian men may differ. I must, therefore, examine this grave, social problem with all possible candor, if I would not incur the charge of slighting the most delicate phase of my subject.

This problem is new and peculiar, like the times in which we live. A century ago it would not have been thought of; for, the whole social fabric of ancient Europe was based on an intimate alliance of things spiritual and temporal. It was the period of State religions! Doubtless, many breaches had already been made in that social edifice in which the throne was supported by the altar. The breath of free thought had penetrated those fissures; it was as impossible to check it as to beat back the wind; unbelief had sapped more than one social custom; still the external ancient form of things continued nevertheless. The civil power was the guardian and soldier of

the official faith. In such a state of things the school belonged exclusively to the spiritual power; it was given over to it as its reserved field to be cultivated as it saw fit. Public instruction from the lowest to the highest grade was the prerogative of the clergy. Laymen taught only by their sufferance; each church imposed its whole *Credo*, and taught its catechism by authority. But this system was often a poor success. Voltaire and the Encyclopedists graduated from the colleges of the Jesuits! The eighteenth century, though an emancipated son, was, still, a son of the Church; it had drunk her milk, and set out in life under her leading-strings.

But in our day all is changed. Save in Russia, Spain, and the Papal States, state religions have little hold in the world. Austria is in process of throwing off hers. No one now claims that government schools should be connected with the church, and for the simple reason, that there is no longer one sole church, all forms of belief having equal rights of existence in the same country. It would be a flagrant injustice to give preponderance to one church at the expense of others, especially in a sphere which has to do with immature minds which can be biassed at will. Such a course would violate the most sacred of parental rights. We must leave to ultramontane presumption the iniquity of seizing on the young generation to stamp it, whether or no, with its fatal effigy. This system does not, like Christ, invite the children to come; it siezes upon them, declaring that its rights are absolute. Now, any Protestant church which should raise such claims, would deny its own first principle; under pretext of preserving its creed, it would sacrifice the spirit, without which the creed is but an empty husk. And more, it would be certain of defeat, for on the field of authority no church can rival the organic power of Romanism. There is no system so admirable as this, when the object is to crush out human individuality.

But it is said, the question is not as to subjecting the schools to an ecclesiastical *régime*, but simply as to causing to be taught in them those primary principles which form the basis of all religion. In this view of the matter, has not the State the right of making of the Bible the first reading book in its institutions? To answer this, we must go back to first princi-

ples. We insist on the most absolute liberty in matters of instruction. We reject with our whole soul all educational monopoly. Nothing could be more tyrannical than the pretension of the State to be the sole instructor. We claim, therefore, the most perfect liberty of founding and multiplying schools alongside of the government schools. Every church, every phase of belief, should be allowed to have and teach its school on the sole condition that it does not violate public morality and order. These conditions once conceded, the question before us loses much of its importance. Should the State not impose the reading of the Bible in the public schools, then those dissatisfied with this system will establish and resort to private schools. And, in fact, it will always have to come to this, where a seriously-religious education is desired. The reading of Scripture passages, or the giving of moral lectures by worldly teachers is of little avail. We are, therefore, forced to look to select and denominational institutions, to complement the inherent defects of public schools. Nor need it be said that this will incur too much expense. No expense is great when conscience is at stake. And earnest convictions ask only for perfect liberty; they will readily and gladly find the means and found the schools.

We are now able to face our question without the least hesitation. Ought the State officially to decree that the Bible shall be the basis of the instruction given in its schools? We do not think so. And to justify ourselves, we need only resort to the great principles which, in our opinion, should regulate the relations of the spiritual power. I reject most positively the notion of the Christian state, by which I mean a State that assumes to interfere directly in religious matters—to support one doctrine, and impose more or less its practice. The notion of the so-called *Christian State* is, in my opinion, the pagan notion of the State, for it includes one of the worst features of paganism, the absorption of the individual conscience in that of the public.

The State shows its respect for Christianity by fixing the boundaries of the domain of law at the precise line where the domain of conscience begins. It should guarantee liberty to religion, but further than this it should not go. The State, in

the Christian sense of the word, is the State which abstains from meddling with what does not belong to it, which leaves to God that which is God's; and whatever appertains, nearly or remotely, to belief and worship, is the reserved domain of God. Such are the principles which must settle the great question before us, a question which the circumstances of the age invest with unprecedented importance. The State is everywhere in the presence of different religious forms. No one has precedence of another in point of right or law, the quality of citizen being absolutely independent of the religious profession. And, alas! we must also take account of those who reject all religion. The State, as State, should not favor any one of these opinions or beliefs. Now, this is precisely what it would do, should it impose in its schools any form of religious instruction. It is in vain to say that the Bible is the common basis of all Christianity; this would be to forget that there is, between the great branches of the Church, a radical difference of method as to the use of the sacred book. Catholicism does not concede the reading of the Bible, save under its own guidance. And Jews could not desire their children to hear the Gospel. And there are many phases of unbelief, which, however, groundless, would yet have a right, from a political standpoint, to object to the reading of the Bible in the government schools. This unbelief, this prejudice, cannot be ignored. The State has not even the right to criticise them, much less to violate them; for this would be to trample under foot the rights of many families. Speak not of the necessity of saving the soul of the child, for this would open free course to inquisitorial tyranny. From this standpoint the canton of Appenzell would be right in compelling Baptists to suffer their infants to be baptised; and Rome would be right in kidnapping Jewish children, to save them from being led by their parents to hell. The moment you infringe on the rights of the family, you open the gate to all iniquities. In presuming to save souls, aside from the practice of simple justice, we apply to religion the iniquitous system of the public safety. The interests of the soul are so paramount, that the moment we sacrifice to them a single right, there is no possibility of stopping. The very first step is in itself fatal.

We have as yet looked at the question only in the interest of the learners ; but there is another conscience concerned, that of the teacher. Certainly it were to be hoped that he would have the proper religious spirit. But the State cannot presume to judge of and exact these qualifications, under pain of meddling with the conscience. It may require of its employees knowledge and outward morality, but not religion proper, nor even any definite religious belief. Now, it would be degrading and tyrannical to ask of teachers to read a book in which they do not believe ; and the effect of such hollow reading would be equally unfortunate on the pupil.

But aside from all these considerations, the State has no *right* to impose the Bible on the public schools ; for in so doing it takes a positive position on the religious question, it chooses among the different religious theories and sects, it intervenes in the domain of conscience ; that is, in our opinion, it steps entirely outside of its own sphere—for it has no competency to interfere with the relations of the soul to God. Mark well, that if you once admit to it this right when it favors your sect or party, you cannot complain when it favors another sect, (Romanism or Atheism). But to take another view, the State must be a government of some kind, absolute, limited, republican. If it may impose the Bible on the public schools, it may, likewise, as has been done in Spain, proscribe it, or it may impose upon them some Positivist catechism denying the existence of the soul and God. It will, then, do wrong, you may say. Very well ! it *will* do wrong, in point of truth. Still it will only use the right which you have conceded to it, of deciding the religious question ; and you cannot expect it to decide it otherwise than as to it shall seem good. The only and sole means of averting this danger is, absolutely to refuse to it the right to tread upon the sphere of conscience. Say to it: Thus far but no farther ; levy taxes, regulate civil and public life, but cross not this sacred limit. This *noli me tangere* of religion is its only safeguard.

Say not that we indulge in groundless fears. The school is becoming more and more the rallying point of the different parties ; for all know that he who controls the children is the master of society. Call to mind what actually took place at

the congress of Bern ; with what passionate earnestness atheistic Positivism claimed its right to sieze upon youth and stamp them with its own doctrines. Should the power ever fall into the hands of these unbelievers, it is very evident what they would do. Doubtless they would sever the Church from the State, but it would only be to unite all the closer with it the school, in order to make it a hot-bed of Positivism and Materialism. Full of inward contempt for liberty, these self-styled free-thinkers would impose their godless catechism upon our children by law. Let us not open the way for them by imposing ours ; nor give them the fatal example of violating a single conscientious scruple. And it is not only prudence that dictates these counsels ; they are also the dictate of justice.

Thus, in conclusion, we do not believe that the State has the right to require by law the reading of the Bible in the schools which it controls ; but it has not the right to forbid it. It should remain neutral, by leaving the teacher to follow his own conscience, at the same time consulting the preference of the parents. A knowledge of sacred history should be required in all public examinations ; for, that so important a page in general history should be understood, is a dictate of simple science. But the State may not go further. But if it be objected that such public schools will only furnish a very defective education, we admit it. We see in it another reason for founding competing schools. Perhaps the English system is preferable in this respect. There, the State has no schools of its own ; but it grants aid to such as do exist and conform to certain conditions. These grants may amount to an immense sum. Thus the schools might have all necessary help, and what is equally important, the requisite liberty. I think the solution of the school question lies in this direction.

Such, then, is one of the great questions of the age ; and such is the only answer we can give it. It places us in the presence of the sublimest duties and the most imminent perils of the times. How it is decided, will determine whether the in-rushing tide of popular sovereignty is to turn to the weal or the woe of the world. Now, in point of fact, it is undeniable that a spirit of impiety is tending to lay hold on the masses.

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And when the government of nations falls into the hands of an unbelieving multitude, it is impossible to overdraw the deplorable consequences. To conjure these perils, two radically-opposed systems present themselves—the system of authority and the system of moral liberty, the system of state churches and legislated religion, and the system of free churches and free state, free schools and free conscience. For our part, the choice is not difficult to make. The system of authority is long ago condemned by its own fruits: its tyranny, its persecutions, its inquisitions, its now dying state churches, and its impotency to reform the masses—its whole past record in fact forbid us to put our hopes in it. Our hope is in liberty—in liberty and the almightiness of the truth when allowed fair play. Give us the liberty of teaching and writing—the liberty of proclaiming and defending the truth, and we fear not for the incoming into power of the masses. The Gospel can transform them, the truth can banish their errors,—but only on condition of absolute liberty, liberty on the part of those who proclaim it, and liberty on the part of those who oppose it.

ARTICLE VIII.—PRESIDENT McCOSH'S LOGIC.

The Laws of Discursive Thought: being a text-book of Formal Logic. By JAMES McCOSH, LL. D., President of New Jersey College, Princeton; formerly Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Queen's College, Belfast. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1870. 12mo. pp. xix. 212.

It is well remarked by Dr. McCosh in the preface to his work that "the lingering life maintained by that old Aristotelian and scholastic logic, in spite of the ridicule poured upon it by nearly all the fresh thinkers of Europe for two or three centuries after the revival of letters, is an extraordinary fact in the history of philosophy." We think that the fact can be partially accounted for, as he says, "by supposing that the syllogism is substantially the correct analysis of the process which passes through the mind in reasoning." But beyond this, we think it can hardly be questioned that this remarkable pertinacity of life in logic is owing mainly to the instinctive demands of the human mind, when once it has awaked to the desire of knowledge, that there be given to it a knowledge of itself, so far at least as concerns the properties and laws of its own action. If we can know what thought is; if we can in any way learn what are the marks of legitimate and valid thought, how it can be recognized, how empty pretensions to knowledge can be detected and exposed, how the steps to knowledge can be guided and facilitated, how attained knowledge can be tested and assured, certainly it is a most desirable knowledge, and the fact that the science which professes to be the revealer of this knowledge has survived the assaults of the bitterest hostility raises a fair presumption that this knowledge is attainable as no one can question that it is desirable. An instinct so strong has the Creator's warrant to seek with the sure confidence of finding. The search may be long, but it shall triumph.

Who has a right to question the possibility and worth of such science? Not the lover of science, certainly; for what rational ground has he for seeking knowledge if he cannot know whether he knows? He may reasonably reject arrogant pretensions to a science of thought. He may reject erroneous or imperfect expositions of the nature and laws of thought. But to ridicule an honest effort to investigate what true knowledge and worthy thought are, or to ridicule a science of thought as in itself unworthy, savors of an arrogance, and presumption, and narrowness, that is itself most ridiculous. Men may, in overweening estimate of the higher importance and dignity of their own pursuits, underrate any other science or calling and be pardoned in the interest of human weakness. But it is too late in the age of the world and of human progress to decry science in any department of knowledge on any other ground than that of imperfection. We have had much of this in the recent times. Men in every department of human pursuit, from the agriculturist up to the orator, critic, and poet, have scouted scientific expositions of the principles of art. Instinct, genius, tact, with the casual crumbs of intelligence that can be picked up under the tables of orderly spread science, are enough for them; systematic knowledge only cumbers and hampers. But reason and common sense have succeeded in most quarters in exposing this shallowness and narrowness. The grand truth is that all human culture, as all rational activity, must proceed in intelligence; and the more full and perfect that intelligence, the higher and more perfect will be the attainment. We have only to place side by side with this fundamental principle another truth equally undeniable, that all art, all eminence in human effort, is as dependent on practice as upon knowledge. The acquisition of intelligence must not displace active endeavor, but ever guide and foster it.

Logic professes to be a science of thought. It claims that there are principles which underlie all thought, to which thought must conform or be abortive. It claims that these principles may be ascertained and scientifically unfolded. It claims that a practical knowledge of these principles is as es-

essential to the perfection of the thinker as a practical knowledge of the principles of music to eminent musical skill, as a practical knowledge of the processes in any art to any great success in that art; that although a great mind may achieve great results in thought without systematic training in the processes of thought, just as great musicians have appeared who have never opened a musical primer, in this age of the world it is as preposterous to expect high intellectual skill or in fact high intellectual culture generally, without some practical acquaintance with the nature of thought as the product of the intelligence, as to expect a Mozart or a Beethoven with no systematic training in the principles of music. If logic can make its claims to appear valid, if it can show that a science of human thought can be constructed which shall so exhibit its nature, its laws, its forms, that it may surely be known what is sound and legitimate thought, and that practical thinking may proceed intelligently and surely, it is a science worthy to be honored and also worthy to be studied in all intellectual culture.

The present is an age of unwonted intellectual activity. It is characterized by being specialized to a wide diversity of pursuit. A natural consequence is that science at this time is characteristically isolated and exclusive; that it is arrogant and pretentious in respect of its own field and work, and disdainful and contemptuous in respect of others. This great evil to scientific culture generally is to be attributed mainly, we believe, to the general exclusion of logical studies from our seats of education and means of intellectual training. A true science of thought is the one adequate bond of the sciences. It is the indispensable condition of the harmonizing of the divers sciences, as it is the condition of that cordial respect and courtesy which ought to reign between all classes of true thinkers and scholars, and which will bring them together in helpful intercourse and sympathy.

Particularly is the present age of science characterized by a predominance of observation over reflection. One would think from the general tendency in this direction that science was little else than gathering of facts. So it has come to pass that a fresh discovery gives warrant for any inference,—for any

theory. In truth, the theory is held of little account; it is only valuable for the sake of facts, as helping to further discoveries or to easier recollection. That facts should be valued mainly for the principles they reveal, modern scientism could hardly understand, much less believe. The cause of this most unscientific tendency is to be found, we believe, mainly in the fact that the attention has been turned away from all criteria of valid thinking, indeed from all inquiry as to what constitutes true thought and makes it valid and valuable. The most superficial glance over the divers fields of recent science, so called, while it discovers marvelous activity and keenness in observing, discovers also the wildest theorizing, the widest contradictions in results, and at the same time the most contemptuous indifference for these contradictory results in other fields. Assuredly the times call for an exposition of the nature and principles of true thought, of worthy science. We are in danger from the want of this of running off into the wildest skepticism and the most superficial yet most arrogant scientism.

We rejoice, therefore, in the assurance which Dr. McCosh gives us, that for a time back "Logic has had a greater amount of interest collected around it in Great Britain than any other mental science, and has become incorporated with the freshest and brightest thought of the country." We rejoice in this contribution which he himself has made to the study of the science; and we avail ourselves of the occasion which its publication gives of making it, so far as we can, serviceable to the interests of the science of which he has in this volume testified his high appreciation. He will welcome, in this regard for the science, any suggestions which the perusal of his volume may prompt, looking towards a farther advancement of the science, even although he may not be able to yield his unqualified assent and approval to their soundness and correctness.

We propose to demonstrate, and chiefly from admissions and teachings which Dr. McCosh has actually incorporated into his volume in accordance with the best logical authorities, that there is a true science of logic attainable, and that we have now the materials and conditions generally for such a science;

that a true science of logic must be one that will expound the nature, the laws, the forms of all valid thought; and that such a science must by every thinker be recognized as of sovereign absolute authority throughout the whole domain of thought; that hence it is an indispensable condition of any assured scientific progress as it is an indispensable instrument of any complete intellectual culture. We shall in this indicate wherein this volume, as well as other logical contributions to Anglo-British literature, are chiefly defective. It is proper to remark here that Dr. McCosh formally avows that he is not sufficiently acquainted with logical treatises in Anglo-American literature to undertake a criticism of them. It is proper to add to this remark, that Anglo-American logical literature presents three dominant tendencies and characteristics. We have, first, treatises of the general Anglo-British *a posteriori* type; we have also the proper Hegelian logic; and we have, thirdly, the *a priori* treatment of the science. Our American literature has abounded with recent offerings in this department of science. The fact as concurrent with the vigorous revival of the study in Great Britain, we notice as of significant and happy augury.

“Logic,” says Dr. McCosh, “may be defined as the Science of the Laws of Discursive Thought.” This definition does not differ materially from the definitions given by the other British logicians. Thompson, in his “Laws of Thought,” defines pure logic to be “a science of the necessary laws of thought.” Dr. Mansel, in his “Prolegomena Logica,” follows Kant in treating logic as “the science of the laws of formal thinking.” Sir William Hamilton defines logic as “the science of the laws of thought as thought.” All agree in defining the immediate object-matter of the logic to be *laws*. The questions at once arise: what is meant by *laws*? Whence are these *laws* derived to the science? What must be the method of a science which proposes *laws* for its immediate object-matter?

The term *laws*, as here used, obviously suggests the idea of arbitrary prescription as dominant over thought only in a remote and indirect way. It does not compel us to imagine that the sovereign of all thinking natures has drawn up a code

of laws founded on his own will, a code to be sought outside of thinking itself, by which such natures are to govern themselves or be held to certain imposed penalties. It points us rather to certain properties or attributes of thought which are essential to its being; attributes which must enter into and mark all intellectual activity in order that there may be any true thinking. These essential attributes of thought are the laws of thought. If we would search for the laws of thought, therefore, we are to search for the essential attributes of thought.

The definition implies that there are such laws—such essential attributes; and the very attempt to construct a logical science implies not only that these attributes are discoverable, but that they have already been discovered, at least to a partial extent, and distinctly recognized.

Further, these laws or essential attributes can be learned only from the investigation of thought itself. They are not revealed in any supernatural way. They are not to be found in anything extraneous to thought. They are to be found only by a careful observation of what takes place in thinking. No one can question the correctness of Hamilton's statement, that "the empirical observation of the phenomena necessarily precedes their speculative analysis." It only surprises us that in the full light of this truth, Hamilton should have accepted his laws of thought not at all from any direct examination of the phenomena of thinking, but should have contented himself with accepting them as they are arbitrarily given by certain writers. As thus laid down, they appear stripped of all claims to authority. Only as they are shown to be the essential attributes of thought have they any right to be recognized as laws.

Once more: if logic is a science of the laws of thought, then it is clear that the method of the science can be only in the unfolding of those laws. An enumeration of phenomena is not a science of laws. Insofar as laws are evolved from the phenomena, insofar as these laws are modified in their application to phenomena, which here are only the forms of thought as they appear in language, phenomena come into consideration in a science of laws, and no farther.

Here is to be found a fatal deficiency in all the logical treatises mentioned. In Dr. McCosh's treatise more than in the others, the laws of thought are exhibited only in the most incidental way. Most astonishing is it that after setting forth this definition of logic as concerning itself with laws, and laws alone, instead of following this lead, he drops laws from sight, and only at the very end of his book gives the enumeration with the strangely unscientific introduction: "*they are such as the following.*" He enumerates eight fundamental laws; but we know not why he stops here;—why the number may not be increased indefinitely. They are enumerated with no indication of their grounds or of their relation to one another. They are not so much as coördinated; and consequently there is no *science* of them, even in the lowest and loosest sense of that term. Of course, as thus presented, they have no claim to authority. They are unworthy, indeed, of the name of laws. A logic which is but a science of laws so presented, is of little worth for disciplining or for validating thought.

There is in this treatment of logic a retrogression from Hamilton, who at least recognized the fundamental laws of thought at the outset and actually applied them to the general forms or products of thought, however imperfectly and immethodically.

But the term *laws* imports universality and necessity. That there are laws of thought implies that if those laws are observed in thinking, the thought or the product is valid; it must be accepted as true thought. In other words, the products of thought which have in their production been conformed throughout to the laws of thought, are necessary thoughts:—are thoughts which mind as mind, universal mind, must of necessity accept as true thoughts. To deny them, to question them, is to abnegate all power to distinguish truth from error. And precisely here we find the great worth of a true logical science. It teaches us what is necessary in thought, and enables us to discriminate it from what is contingent, possible, or probable. Thinking, governed by the laws of thought, necessitates conviction in every free intelligence. Whatever of contingency comes into a product of rightly conducted thinking, of thinking governed throughout by the laws of

thought, must come from the matter about which thought is employed. It is one of the great utilities of a true logical science that it enables us at once to discriminate the necessary which belongs to the thinking from the contingent which belongs only to the matter of thought.

Hence arises the indispensable necessity in a logical system of so unfolding the laws of thought that not only those laws shall be shown to be veritable laws, founded in the very nature or attributes of thought, but also be applied to every generic form of thought which appears in human experience.

In the next place, the definitions agree in recognizing *thought* as the sole object-matter of logic—thought, however, as has been indicated, only in respect to the laws which govern it. We are led to inquire what is meant by *thought* in the definition. The term is used in varying latitudes of meaning. Prof. De Morgan makes it include “all mental action,” even “that lower degree which appears to be possible by brutes.” Dr. Mansel would have us believe that “logic is exclusively concerned with thought, and thought is exclusively concerned with concepts.” Hamilton is more restrictive in the use of the term. With him thought is “the cognition of one thing by the cognition of another thing;” it is accordingly the act “of the understanding properly so called, that is, of the faculty of comparison, or that which is distinguished as the elaborative or discursive faculty.” Dr. McCosh uses the term in a wider sense to include all cognitions and distinguishes it into two kinds:—intuitive thought and discursive thought. Logic considers only the discursive acts of the mind. He thus agrees with Hamilton in limiting the province of logic to the acts or products of the discursive intelligence. The question then is, what precisely is meant by *discursive*, as the term is used in modifying *thought*? It is obvious that Dr. McCosh uses the term in a broader sense than older logicians. Aldrich limits *discursus* to one of the three acts of the intelligence—to reasoning. *Discursus est motus sive progressus mentis ab uno judicio ad aliud*. Dr. McCosh extends it over all three—simple apprehension, judgment, reasoning. Discursive thought, he says, is that “in which we proceed from something allowed to something else derived from it by thinking.” All discursive

thought accordingly presupposes "something allowed"—a *datum*. All discursive thinking proceeds from that. In simple perception "there is no discursive thought." "But on the bare inspection of the object the mind can distinguish between it and any of its properties, or between one property and another. This is *abstraction*, a simple and elementary exercise of discursive thought." Certainly this is meager enough and vague enough in a scientific exposition of laws which we are told we may discover "by carefully observing the acts of the mind in thinking." But it is very satisfactory, so far as it goes. It seems intended to be an advance in distinctness upon Hamilton, who, although he identifies the discursive faculty with the judgment, fails to indicate clearly the line between the presentative and the discursive intelligence. Discursive thought, then, according to Dr. McCosh, begins when the mind distinguishes between an object and any of its properties or between one property and another. This is, we believe, excellent doctrine and most important doctrine. The genesis of discursive thought, of all thought in Hamilton's view, who holds that all presentative intelligence is but preparatory, and therefore must hold that it is ever in itself immature and incomplete, and ever hastens on to consummation in discursive thought, is, accordingly, a starting movement of the intelligence from a *datum*, and primitively a *datum* in sensible experience, an object of sensation and perception; next, a distinguishing between this object as a whole and one or other of its properties; and thirdly, a completed or consummated act of intelligence in a comparison of the object and the property. This consummated act is a proper judgment. This, we believe, to be true teaching; but it is fundamental, not to say revolutionary, so far as formal and organic recognition is concerned, in logic as well as in psychology. Hamilton, it should be observed, rather incidentally gives the same genesis, except that without good reason, he maintains that the elementary act in the discursive process is a comparison of the given object, not with an attribute of property, but with an attribute of relation. He insists everywhere that in every act of consciousness there is a judgment affirming the existence of the conscious subject.

But the important point is that the elementary act of discursive thought is a discrimination of a given object from one or another of its properties. Yet this step is simply elementary; it is not complete. It hastens on to a judgment which is a consummated act of the intelligence, in which alone all presentative knowledge can rest. Not till we reach a judgment do we reach any truth, in fact, any complete thought. Percepts and intuitions are by the necessity of this logic shown to be but elementary to perfect thought. A system of logical science which should have firmly laid hold of this essential nature of discursive thought and as, Dr. McCosh teaches us, is practicable, out of this act of thought from its essential nature derived the laws of all thought, and then proceeded to unfold them in their various modifications and applications, would have been a logical science worthy of the name—a science competent to rule in all thought, to try and adjudicate all science and all knowledge—a science truly grand, admirable, as unfolded from a simple germinal principle easily apprehended into a broad system of laws and products comprehending all possible forms of valid human thought. Nothing further is requisite but a rigid scientific method that should necessitate every utterance, whether of law or exposition of process. We have nothing of this in the work before us. The nature of all discursive thought vanishes from our view as we move on from the introduction. Dr. McCosh seems to have proposed to himself nothing of all this unfolding and application of laws derived from the nature of all thinking. His highest aim is to coördinate what can be observed in the acts of the mind in thinking. His method is avowedly the inductive, the *a posteriori* method of observing and coördinating. The most that can be said of it is that it is, in the language of the Duke of Argyll, a “mere ticketing and orderly assortment of facts.” It is anything but a science of laws discovered by carefully observing the discursive operations of the mind.

If we turn now to the body of the work, we shall find the legitimate results of such a conception of logical science as a complement of merely coördinated observations. The general plan does not differ materially from that which we find in the generality of logical treatises in recent English literature, both Anglo-British and Anglo-American. There are three operations of the mind in thinking:—Simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning. “The object or objects apprehended,” says Dr. McCosh, “constitute the notion.” It does not appear how earnest Dr. McCosh is in making the notion to be not the mind’s apprehension of an object, but the “object apprehended.” In another place, in treating of the judgment, he cautions us against supposing that it is the “mental states as such,” which we compare in it. “When we say Alexander the Great was ambitious,” he says “we are comparing Alexander the Great” and ‘ambitious,’ and not mere ideas of the mind.” Nor does it appear precisely what difference he would make between “a mental state” and “an object apprehended,” and between this and the object itself. It seems to be an intermediate, a *tertium quid*, but as much beyond our power to conceive as the old *species* that passed from the outer object to the mind in perception. The distinction, whatever it be, seems to be a novel one, and peculiar to Dr. McCosh, who, perhaps, had this in view when he objected to Hamilton’s views of the notion as “altogether erroneous.” At least Hamilton’s doctrine is, that thought every where respects only what is already in the consciousness, being introduced there by the presentative faculties. So Thompson unqualifiedly asserts that “every act of judgment is an attempt to reduce to unity two *cognitions*.” Mansel also defines a judgment as “a combination of two concepts.” And Dr. McCosh himself every where uses language that is irreconcilable with this singular view of his. Yet this objective tendency, this disposition to merge the proper subjective, the thinking, into the object as extraneous to the mind—this disposition, in other words, to regard all thought as purely objective, may account for some other somewhat peculiar expositions of logical subjects in the work before us. This tendency is in rather curious parallelism with the tendency of the Hegelian logic to merge the ob-

jective in the subject. We have in the two tendencies an objective and a subjective monism, both of which are in sharp opposition to the decided dualism of the school of Reid and Hamilton.

Dr. McCosh makes "a threefold division of notions—the singular, the abstract, and universal." He sets out with the assertion that all notions are either concrete or abstract; and again, all notions are either singular or universal; but "all notions which are singular are also concrete." If we inquire for the grounds of this enumeration and classification, we obtain no light from the volume before us. We are not told any where why there should be just such notions and none others—nor why there may not be a singular abstract as well as a singular concrete. Dr. McCosh tells us expressly that "just" denotes only one attribute. Why is it not a singular abstract? But these are matters simply of observation, and must be accepted on the testimony of the observer. He has observed, and on grounds satisfactory doubtless to him, but not necessary to be given, he has coördinated them in this threefold way.

It is likewise to the peculiarity of this observing and ticketing method, that we must attribute the novel enumeration of general abstract notions and general concrete notions. The assigned distinction seems to us shadowy; it is that in one class the attributes are specified, in the other they are not defined. We cannot see, in any light furnished by this discrimination, why "just" should be a general abstract, and "vertebrata" a general concrete. Are we to account for this novelty on the ground of the objective tendency mentioned, which here as also elsewhere recognizes nothing but the word-form in which the notion is embodied? Is not in fact the whole distinction between abstract and concrete a purely grammatical distinction, entirely foreign to logic? Every discursive notion, it is expressly taught, is the result of a process which begins with abstraction. Is not every discursive notion, then, logically an abstract? If we go to the definitions we get but little satisfaction. "A concrete notion is of objects as they are with an aggregate of qualities. An abstract notion is of part of an object as a part, more technically

of an attribute of an object." "Wisdom" and "learning" are instanced as abstracts; but are they not "objects as they are with an aggregate of qualities," and therefore according to the definition concrete? Is not "wisdom" qualified as "heavenly" or "earthly," as "speculative" or "practical," as "acquired" or "instructive;" is it not aggregated of "intelligence," "directiveness," and the like? And "learning," is it not qualified in manifold ways as "sound," and "solid," and "broad," and the like; and aggregated of such qualities as "intelligence," "acquired," "orderly," and the like? In short, has not this method of observation brought in facts that have no relation to logic; that are the product of other departments of human activity? It seems to us that the whole exposition of the doctrine of logical notions is loose, obscure, confused, because the method of observation has not been guided and limited by the method of reflection.

But we pass to what must be deemed here a worse defect, and one very liable to attend a method of observation in such a science. It is the omission of an integral process in thought—that of the analysis of the abstract notion. "Division" is the process by which a general notion is analyzed; and "partition" is recognized as the process by which an individual notion is separated into its spacial parts. No indication is given that there is such a process as the analysis of an attribute. A proper *a priori* method would have led directly to the recognition of the process by which an attribute is analyzed as soon as the parallel analysis of a subject by division should be reached.

Even this is not all or the worst of the evils of this kind of method in logical science. It easily overlooks in its single chase after phenomena, and in its one aim to observe and to coördinate, the vital relation between them. "The mere ticketing and orderly assortment" of facts necessarily brings in no organic science. Here we find the fatal defect in the great mass of logical treatises which have hitherto appeared. They are mere collections of observed facts in human thought, in no vital relation to one another. This is the one great cause of the decay of logic in schools and of its neglect by men of culture. "Logics" have been dictionaries, collections

of words, coördinated not alphabetically indeed, yet on no principle of genetic affinity. Modern science has advanced beyond the mere anatomies of organic products. It demands physiologies. Aristotle was a mere anatomist. He dissected with marvelous patience, with marvelous skill. He dissected thought as expressed in discourse; he laid out part by part in admirable discrimination, the life only left out. His logic was an enumeration of these parts of thought well named, well described, so far as he carried his dissection, for he left behind him little besides expositions of a single generic product of thought—the deductive syllogism. Through all this one member of the body of thought, following every minutest cell and fiber with his scalpel, he pushed his dissection and finished for the ages the anatomy of deductive reasoning. Beyond this, logical science has until the most recent times made little progress. Men in an age when this anatomic science had given place to a higher, a proper organic science, in which genesis, evolution, vital functions, become constituent and shaping elements, could not but lay these catalogues and indexes on the shelf, to use, perhaps, for occasional reference, for suggestion of facts, but to be left one side as uncongenial to the newer methods of study and wholly unprofitable for culture. Sir William Hamilton seems to have had a notion of what was indispensable to any revivification of logical science in the present age. He hints at an “articulate development;” but “for convenience,” in order perhaps to get off his three lectures a week, he failed to carry out his better convictions. Dr. Mansel, while hoping “to see logic finally freed from the unsightly excrescences with which it has hitherto been deformed”—to lie no longer “unprofitably buried in the earth of an isolated and barren formalism,” looks only to a separation of logic from psychology, of thought from experience, for the consummation of his hopes. Dr. McCosh, still fascinated with these “excrescences” so unsightly in Dr. Mansel’s eyes and so cumbrous and illusive in Hamilton’s, and satisfied to anatomize still the dead body of logic that Dr. Mansel had with such revolted feeling contemplated as “buried in the earth of an isolated and barren formalism,” presents us still with these severed, lifeless limbs as of old, with no idea of any genesis,

any evolution, any vital relationship between the dead members.

He gives to us the notion, the judgment, and the reasoning, as the three general products of discursive thinking. Two notions appear in every judgment, and three, he tells us, in every reasoning. This is about all that we can learn of any consanguinity between them. Of course, nothing in the expounded nature of either product serves as any guide to its legitimacy. Here are three things, three phenomena; they have certain observed marks or signs as externally viewed. They are all that have as yet been observed, or rather all that it has been as yet deemed convenient and orderly to tabulate. But experience has been well ranged, and the leading forms of thought have been collected and designated. Definitions, so far as this method requires, are merely some marks by which the objects treated of may be identified. The notion is "an object apprehended;" a judgment compares two notions, and declares agreement or disagreement, either on the bare contemplation, or by means of a third notion, in this latter case becoming a reasoning. This is all the description that a science of logic thus conceived deems necessary. Dr. McCosh has not fallen behind his predecessors in Anglo-British Logical Science in this conception of its scope. We have from Aldrich, who wrote in the middle of the seventeenth century, down to the volume before us, much the same informal enumeration, much the same loose description of the three great forms of thought. More prominence has been given, in some cases, as by Whately, to one of the three—the reasoning; and certainly Dr. McCosh has done a commendable service in giving its due rank to the notion. But with many valuable observations, there is not in all Anglo-British logical literature more of the "articulate development" which Hamilton required than the hint of it to which we have adverted. We regard it as the one fatal defect in them all, and the one cause of the general repudiation of logic by men of culture in these recent times. We fearlessly advance the declaration that there is not a definition given of these three leading forms of thought which can be accepted as having the scientific character demanded in this age of science. These defini-

tions run thus :—A notion is “an object apprehended ;” “In judgment, proper, we compare immediately the two notions, that is, the things apprehended, and declare their agreement or disagreement ;” and Reasoning is defined as “the act of proceeding from certain judgments to others founded on them.” The most precisely stated characteristic in these definitions is that denoted by the term “agreement,” in the definition of the judgment. But what fatal lack of definiteness, of scientific precision, in the term ?

And if even in the definitions of the capital terms there is such vagueness and inexactness, what can be expected of the elaboration of the matter generally from such originals and germinals ? Can a truly logical science be raised on such foundations—a science which shall set forth the essential characteristics of all valid thought so clearly and unmistakably that whatever pretends to be thought can at once be tested and its validity or invalidity be tested ? Can a system so feebly grounded speak with any authority ? Can minds trained in such inexactness and mistiness be disciplined to firm and sturdy thinking ? Can such a logical system but be repudiated by the solid thinkers of the present age ?

Yet even in Hamilton we find this same radical weakness and unsoundness. He gives us the same three products of thought under the names of the concept, the judgment, and the reasoning. He presents them in the same order. Yet he says, they “are all in fact, strictly, only modifications of the second, as both concepts and reasonings may be reduced to judgments.” And a judgment he defines to be a recognition of “the relation of congruence or confiction in which two concepts, two individual things, or a concept and an individual, compared together, stand to each other.” “Congruence” and “confiction” are as vague as “agreement” and “disagreement.” It is plain that no laws can be derived from a principle which is apprehended no more clearly than this which is here given as the essential principle of all thought. Thompson and Mansel are equally wanting in precision. Aldrich, too, is similarly inexact, and, besides, introduces altogether extraneous matter.

As we have intimated, we believe that it is practicable to construct a logical science of the most rigidly scientific character from *data* and by a method which logicians generally agree in admitting; a science which shall commend itself to all as a true science of thought, and as such worthy to rule all thought, and fit and necessary to discipline all valid thinking. Our space forbids citations. We restrict ourselves from this necessity to mere outlines.

Thinking is the exercise of the so-called Discursive Faculty; otherwise termed the Understanding, the Faculty of Comparison.

All discursive intelligence is primitively a cognition of the relation of subject and attribute. Its primitive form is the judgment.

The judgment ever respects cognitions, which are the necessary *data* of its action. They are percepts, intuitions, or other forms of the intelligence already in the consciousness. The simplest type of discursive thought emerges when, as Dr. McCosh indicates, an object perceived, a percept, is recognized in relation to an attribute; as when "the Sun" is perceived we recognize it as "bright," and judge "The Sun is bright." If two objects or two truths or judgments are compared and judged, the one is recognized in the relation of attribute to the other. This recognition of the relation of subject and attribute is proper discursive thought. A percept consequently becomes discursive when, and only when, it is recognized under this relation.

But this relation is essentially a relation of identity. In every judgment we do nothing more or less than identify a subject with its attribute. As this identification is with one or more, or with all of its attributes, it is total or partial.

Hence the law of all discursive thought which is nothing but the essential principle of thought, is simply that of identity and its opposite, of difference. The two phases of this fundamental law, thus, are the two positive laws, so called, of identity and contradiction. But as thought can only identify or the contrary, and is shut up to the one or the other of these contradictory procedures, we have at once given us the two

parallel laws of Disjunction and Exclusion. All thought proceeds under one or the other of these four laws.

The judgment assumes different forms according as it proceeds under the one or the other of these four fundamental laws. They are also diversely modified in respect to the thought itself, whether pure intelligence or not, as also in respect to the *datum* or matter of the judgment. All possible classes of valid judgments are thus directly formed under the fundamental laws of thought which themselves are but the essential principle of all thought diversely modified as to its phases in application to the matter given to it.

But judgments stand in certain relations to one another. Their very nature, as founded on the principle of identity, but, as applied to a subject and its attributes as parts, becoming the principle of quantity, involves the idea of combination, and its opposite the idea of separation. In other words, thought is in its nature analytic, and synthetic. By synthesis, the subjects of two or more judgments having the same attribute or predicate are combined, and thus form subject-concepts, which, from their formation, are generic or class terms. Their nature and their laws are given at once in their very genesis. By synthesis, also, the predicates of two or more judgments having the same subject are combined, and thus form attribute-concepts. Thus we have the simple laws of all those notions, the terms for which make up the great mass of words in our vocabulary. And analysis proceeds in a manner exactly parallel—the principle of identity given in the common predicate of the primitive judgments, in case of generic terms, and in the common subject in the case of all abstract notions, ruling here as in all synthesis. In other words, this common subject or predicate is the base of all concepts, extensive or comprehensive; and regulates all movements of thought in all analysis, whether by division or by partition, and in all synthesis whether in subject-concepts or in extensive quantity so called, that is in all generalization or classification, or in predicate-concepts, that is in comprehensive quantity by aggregation of attributes.

Just here we feel constrained to notice the fact that it is just this doctrine of quantity, as an essential property of all

discursive thought, in the specific case of the quantification of predicates which Dr. McCosh assigns as one of the grounds of his rejection of Hamilton's new analytic. The rejection of the doctrine, the ignoring of the quantitative nature of all discursive thought, of all predicates consequently, is, we conceive, one of the radical defects in his treatise. The defect shows itself every where. Hence he treats comprehensive quantity as the merest accident of a notion, never seeming to conceive of it as the proper quantity of an attribute in distinction from extension as the proper quantity of a subject-term. Hence, too, he has no place for partition as the analysis of what he calls an abstract, that is an attribute term. Hence, moreover, there is no attempt to explain the fundamental nature of the reasoning when it turns on the attribute terms of the primitive judgments. The whole exposition is consequently but one-sided and deformed.

The same simple exact method, giving like valid results, bearing the clear marks of necessary thought, carries successfully through all the diverse forms of the reasoning. While in the concept synthesis leads, in the reasoning the opposite process of analysis is most prominent; yet, in both products, each movement has its application. The reasoning and the concept are both derivatives from the judgment, and can be fully validated by reference to that. All the generic forms of both derivatives are easily enumerated and expounded with the peculiar modifications of which they are susceptible.

This meager outline may suffice to show what is our conception of the logic which the present state of intellectual progress requires. Observation guides to its single foundation—the essential principle of thought. Observation suggests to us the various modifications which this principle of thought takes on in actual experience. A true science seizes this principle; evolves the laws which are involved in the principle; applies these laws to all the possible movements of legitimate thought. It is a necessary science; for its laws and applications are all in the strict lines of thought. Mathematics itself is not a more demonstrative and necessary science. It is complete, being rounded out to the full circumference of all ob-

served experience. There are no other laws; there are no other forms or products of thought; there can be none. Every newly discovered form, if any there be, must be subordinated to the generic forms which the science thus elaborated enfolds. The whole structure is one of perfect beauty, carried up in the most exact symmetry and order. It becomes the rightful arbiter in all matters of valid science, and thus the harmonizing principle of all the different sciences—of all human thought. It is the one antidote to the prevailing scientific skepticism of the times. It becomes the indispensable instrument of all discipline in thinking. In spite of Dr. Mansel's fear or prophecy, it will never become necessary for a science so built up to abase one whit its "once towering ambition" to be esteemed "the Art of Arts and Science of Sciences."

ARTICLE IX.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

THE WORD, OR UNIVERSAL REDEMPTION AND SALVATION.*—This volume, which is published in the best English style, comes to us from the author himself. According to his own description of himself—on the title page, which we give exactly, exclamation points and all, at the foot of this page—he is simply “a septuagenarian optimist;” but, from the “Testimonies, Extracts, Quotations, &c.,” which the publishers have inserted between the cover and the first page of the book, we learn that he is a professor, the author of at least seventeen other volumes or pamphlets, and the instructor of various prominent personages, such as viscounts, generals, and officers of the Guards. The Queen is said to have expressed her approbation of his writings, and this approbation, we are assured by Her Majesty’s Secretary, is owing “entirely to their intrinsic merit.” The French Emperor, also, “has been a long time acquainted with” the author’s “name and talents” The other works, however, which the professor has prepared, are either dictionaries and grammars, or romances in French or English. At the age of seventy, he has undertaken to discuss one of the great subjects in the theological field, and, in undertaking it, has dedicated his views “to the faithfully evangelical and fervently Christian clergies, ministries, and laities of all kingdoms and nations.” The new volume containing these views is, certainly, a remarkable one. It appears to us to indicate, very clearly, that the author is an “optimist,” and that he is, also, a “septuagenarian.” Perhaps, it may be regarded as indicating some other things of which some of his readers would speak with less favor, but we leave this point to be determined by them. Adverse criticism—beyond what the author calls “necessary corri-

* *The Word! or Universal Redemption and Salvation: “Preordained before All Worlds.”* A more¹ Evangelical, Philanthropic, and Christian Interpretation of the Almighty God’s Sacred Promises of Infinite Mercy, Forgiveness, and Grace! Reverently submitted to Christendom, by GEORGE MARIN DE LA VOYE¹, a Septuagenarian Optimist. London: Whittaker & Co., and Trübner & Co. 1870. 8vo. pp. 320.

genda"—does not seem likely to please him, or to be looked upon as, in any degree, just. We should be sorry, by making it, to be classed among those whom he styles "uncharitably-disposed readers," for we have, certainly, no intention of doing what he expects them to do—namely, to "pour upon him torrents of fanatical and bigoted maledictions with the utmost rancor of mistaken professional zeal." We would carefully avoid any suspicion, even, of this. In the line of necessary corrigenda, we think we might suggest a few points, were it not that the author intimates that he is "inspired." Precisely what he means by inspiration he does not define—he leaves the definition for a note which is to be published in another volume, whose appearance is promised when it becomes indispensable. But, so long as it is undefined, it *may*, of course, be such inspiration as excludes all suggestions from uninspired minds. We think it is better, therefore, to leave the question respecting the "corrigenda" undetermined, until the author's expected notes shall make this point clear. The lucidity of the style, the sharp conciseness of the sentences, and the plainness with which important points are set forth and determined will be seen from the following extract, which we take much pleasure in quoting. It has reference to the question why the first-born child of Eve was a fratricide, and must, we think, be regarded as quite exhaustive on that point. It reads as follows:—[the figures in this extract, and on the title page, refer to the annotations mentioned above.]

Here is another exceedingly material question, regarding a vastly important point, which enables us better still to establish our positive angelical identity as transmigrations,¹ "by earthly incarnations" of those heavenly bodies of spirits and angels, which occupied and constituted, with myriads of others, still there, the kingdom of God.

Was not the first born child of Eve the grandson of God, not begotten, but created with Adam, in Adam,² and consequently made in the image of the Father, after His own likeness?

At such an early and critical period of the population of the earth the smallest event, the most trifling circumstance, becomes highly worthy of notice, especially when it serves to demonstrate more forcibly the doubted primogenitive³ filiation of mankind.

And that well-defined filiation is all the more indispensable as we dive deeper into the sacred arcana of those most miraculous seven days of Genesis, introductory to the subsequent mundane eras,⁴ during which we hope to prove that the souls of the fallen angels and spirits first began, by Divine permission, their successive transitions into the material bodies of human beings.

A terrestrial Medium having been mercifully considered necessary by the Almighty (in gracious compliance to the all-sufficient⁵ mediation of Jesus Christ)

for the reception of the spiritual souls, no longer now spotless since their fall, Adam was intentionally formed from the dust¹ of the ground.

In this mortal state alone could those corrupted souls be redeemed through infinite grace; and that only after having undergone a succession² of purgatorial worldly trials, by voluntary incarnations, more or less often repeated,³ according to their deserts and the boundless mercy of God.

The human body, therefore, of the first created man was "purely and completely earthly," because the Lord God, foreknowing that Adam would be the father of a countless number of generations to come, knew furthermore that each child born from that ordeal stock would receive "a soul" at its birth already stained⁴ with sin (its real original sin) committed during its pristine state "in heaven," whence it had been but too justly driven.

It was also foreknown of God that the soul of Adam, which had been breathed by him in his nostrils, would return⁵ to himself again when Adam died.

Not so the soul of Eve; not so the souls of Adam and Eve's generations!

Adam's individual soul and body were both wholly and exclusively God's own—never meant to fare the general human fate. They were graciously brought into existence solely for the purpose of first spreading the preordained blessings of redemption and salvation, universally granted through the all-sufficient intercession and oblation of his well-beloved and only-begotten Son.

Excepting the soul Divine of Adam, consequently, every soul, angelic or spiritual,¹ that has been permitted by the Triune God to incarnate itself, voluntarily,² for the sake of Christian purification and sanctification, during the incessant miracles of human generations, procreations, and nativities³—and every soul that shall hereafter be permitted so to incarnate itself; until all⁴ have been incarnated, redeemed, brought to judgment,⁵ and finally saved,—shall continue to undergo (themselves consenting) these Christ-bought incarnations, as sin-attainted angelic souls, waiting for judgment.⁶

We have humbly presumed to imagine that two⁷ materially different means of human incarnations, having evidently been preferred by the Almighty God, when he set Adam asleep, for the creation of Eve, he had considered it essential that the souls of the two creatures He created, perfect as they were all in other respects, each, respectively, should not be perfectly the same, regarding their ethereal essence.

We cannot discard the excusable notion, which we entertained, *prima facie*, touching the connubial consanguinity, divinely meant to be understood as a "sacred, union of bodies," inseparably commingled for their lives, if not for ever, between those two supremely favored beings, so solemnly allied, *actione verboque Dei*.

The corporeal connection of Adam and Eve, created, brought together at their formation, married,⁸ by their God and Maker, was undoubtedly to serve as a consecrated type, for the future enactment and observance of civil and ecclesiastical laws and rites.

Our principal intention, besides all this, is meanwhile to open your minds more and more convincingly to the existence of a mystical revelation, purporting that, in the extraordinary Divine and terrestrial endowments of our first parents, the Lord God had in view to contrive a suitable and satisfactory first ingress,¹ into this world for the souls of those condemned angels, whose gracious commutation of eternal chastisement into temporal ordeals, our adorable and infinitely com-

passionate Saviour had obtained from His Father, the Omnipotent Dispenser of all mercies.

Adam and Eve were thence to be no other, from the first day of creation, but "unconscious Incarnations^s of accepted Representatives," mercifully authorized, through infinite grace; and entrusted by the Almighty Jehovah to the Divine Intercessor, aided by the Spirit of Truth,

Towards the preordained accomplishment of Universal Redemption and Salvation.

After the perusal of this passage, we think our readers will appreciate and sympathize with the feeling of General Sir Charles W. Pasley, when, according to the "Testimonies" above referred to, he expresses the hope, that Professor De La Voye "will be appointed the Teacher of the Royal Children." Such simplicity of language and clearness of style must be very valuable elements in the education of English families, and, if Her Majesty should set the example by employing such an instructor, perhaps the way might be opened for this wide-spread influence. In our own country, we know of no position so favorable for the author, who fortunately is so far advanced in years and fame as probably not to desire a change of residence.

In reading over what we have written, we notice, with some mortification, that we have not stated the object and design of the volume. This, doubtless, should have been indicated at the outset, but we have been so much interested in the author himself and his style, that we must find our excuse in this fact. We trust that the author is enough of an optimist to feel that our notice of his book is a satisfactory one, notwithstanding our infelicitous omission to introduce this matter in its proper place. And even at the end—which is so inappropriate a place to speak of it—we scarcely know what to say. It requires six pages for the author himself, in his own concise style, to explain his design—or three pages, even if we exclude the astronomical and doctrinal observations, which he seems to consider important for a clear understanding of it. We should despair of being as brief as he is, and we have hardly space enough at command to give more than six pages to this matter. On reflection, therefore, we have thought it best to recommend to our readers, in case they desire a clear and full appreciation of the object of the work, to purchase the volume for themselves, and attentively read the author's own remarks in his introduction. To those who do not have this desire, but only a wish to know, in one word, what the aim of the writer is, the title is sufficient, for it shows that he attempts to prove

universal salvation to have been “divinely provided for before all worlds,” and that the Scriptures, when fairly interpreted, declare this to be the fact. We only add, in closing, that the publication of the proposed volume of notes, at the earliest practical moment, is greatly to be desired if everything in the present volume is to be accepted intelligently by “pious readers of all persuasions.”

ECCLESIA: a series of Essays on Church Problems, is an inviting volume, representing the views of a number of writers of the Congregational body in England. Since the publication of the now well known Essays and Reviews, several volumes have been issued upon substantially the same plan, consisting of a series of independent treatises, for which the authors were severally responsible. Thus two, we ought rather to say three, series of essays in reply to the original Essays and Reviews were speedily reproduced by different representative persons. Several volumes of a series, under the title of “Tracts for the Day,” have been edited by Mr. Orby Shipley, in the interest of the Ritualistic party. Latest, but not by any means the least able, there appear in the field the representatives of the free churches of Great Britain. The volume which they have published, though issued but a few months, has already enforced the respect and will command the thoughtful consideration of many of the leading minds of the established church. It cannot fail to do much for the cause of the Dissenters—if in no other way, at least by furnishing the amplest evidence that in point of learning and culture, they are not behind their co-religionists, while in respect of a catholic and comprehensive spirit, they are very greatly in advance of them. Indeed, the sentiment which at no distant day is to contest the destinies of the British Empire, so far as it will be a Christian sentiment, is more perfectly represented by the leading writers in this volume, than it is by any of the leading parties in the Church of England.

The interest and value of this volume is by no means limited to the people of Great Britain. One or two of the topics only have a special or local application, but the discussion of these is scarcely less interesting or important to Englishmen than it is to Americans. The remaining topics are of common interest to both. It

* *Ecclesia*; Church Problems considered in a series of Essays. Edited by HENRY ROBERT REYNOLDS, D. D. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 27 Paternoster Row. 1870.

is worthy of notice, and the fact is abundantly significant, that the questions concerning faith and worship which agitate the minds of the more active spirits among the Congregationalists of England, are the same which are thought of among ourselves, and in consequence the book seems as well adapted to meet our necessities, as it is to meet those of the English Congregationalists. The titles of the Essays are as follows: I. Primitive Ecclesia: Its authoritative principles and its modern representations. By John Stoughton, D. D. II. The Idea of the Church, regarded in its historical development. By J. Radford Thomson, M. A. III. The Religious Life and Christian Society. By T. Baldwin Brown, B. A. IV. The Relation of the Church to the State. By Eustace Rogers Conder, M. A. V. The forgiveness and absolution of Sins. By the Editor. VI. The Doctrine of the Real Presence and of the Lord's Supper. By R. W. Dale, M. A. VII. The Worship of the Church. By Henry Allon. VIII. The Congregationalism of the Future. By J. Guinness Rogers, B. A. IX. Modern Missions and their Results. By Joseph Mullens, D. D.

We could wish that these Essays could be extensively circulated and read in this country. They would serve many very important purposes, in the way of elevating the aims, of enlarging the knowledge, of increasing the catholicity as well as of refining the culture of many American readers.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE GREEK PHILOSOPHY.*—We are obliged to limit our observations upon this work to a few lines, although the subject is one of the highest interest to students of philosophy and theology. The book gives evidence of wide reading on the part of the author, and of sound thinking. The later Greek systems are insufficiently treated; those of Aristotle and Plato, more fully. There are two criticisms to be made upon this work. The first is, that, professing to give a discussion of the ancient system, the author devotes a great deal of his space to the modern ones,—to that of Comte, for example. The second is, that the style is somewhat more ornate, not to say declamatory, than is suited to a severe handling of the themes.

* *Christianity and the Greek Philosophy; or the relation between spontaneous and reflective thought in Greece and the positive teaching of Christ and his Apostles.* By B. F. COCKER, D. D., Professor of Moral and Mental Philosophy, in the University of Michigan. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1870.

LEA'S STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY.*—In his *History of Clerical Celibacy*, Mr. Lea gave full proof of his intimate acquaintance with the original sources and monuments of ecclesiastical history. He has explored with diligence the numerous and multiform documents on the foundation of which a record or picture of society in the middle ages must be constructed. The present collection of essays relate mostly to the Papacy and the Papal Hierarchy, and deal with topics which have now a fresh interest, derived from the Latin Council and the measures proposed for adoption in this ecclesiastical assembly. They are treated in a clear, instructive manner, and in an enlightened spirit. The learned author abstains, generally speaking, from referring to modern writers on the subjects to which his essays relate,—preferring to resort exclusively to the primary authorities. His work loses something from this severe method of authorship. The combination of original researches with a judicious use of the labors of others who are at work in the same field, is the course which is adapted to yield the best results. At the same time, Mr. Lea's error—if it be an error—is on the right side, and no one can complain much of a quality so rare as that of exclusive attention to documentary evidence.

GUERICKE'S CHURCH HISTORY.†—In a notice of the first volume of this work, we referred to the merits and defects of it, and to the excellent manner in which Professor Shedd had performed the task of rendering Guericke's rugged German into perspicuous, flowing English. He has now carried the translation forward to the age of Hildebrand and the era of Scholasticism. Students of theology will find this history a valuable text-book.

NEWMAN'S GRAMMAR OF ASSENT.‡ In the entertaining autobiography which Dr. Newman, a few years ago, gave to the

* *Studies in Church History. The Rise of the Temporal Power—Benefit of Clergy—Excommunication.* By HENRY C. LEA. Philadelphia: Henry C. Lea. 1869.

† *A Manual of Church History.* By HENRY F. GUERICKE, Doctor and Professor of Theology in Halle. Translated from the German by WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, Baldwin Professor in Union Theological Seminary. *Mediæval Church History, A. D. 590—A. D. 1073.* pp. 160. Andover: Warren F. Draper, Publisher. 1870.

‡ *An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D. D., of the Oratory. New York: The Catholic Publication Society, 1870.

world under the title of *Apologia*, he intimated that he had been hindered by Church authorities from fulfilling the purpose of writing a work on the Evidences of Religion. Whether the present book is the accomplishment of that intention, or a substitute for a work upon another plan which he has been prevented from carrying out, we are not informed. Like everything from Dr. Newman's pen, it is marked by a felicitous use of English, subtlety and grace of thought, and by a seeming confidential tone, which wins upon the reader. The nature of mental Assent is philosophically discussed, with close reference throughout to religious problems and difficulties. Among the propositions defended is, that we may be as free from doubt in cases of probable reasoning as in those of strict demonstration. This is a just doctrine. I am as certain of the existence of London, as I am that the sum of the angles of a triangle equals two right angles. But Newman goes farther, and disputes Locke's statement that we may have different degrees of belief, from certainty to a state bordering closely on doubt. Although much ingenious argument is brought forward to sustain the opposite theory, namely, that Assent is a perfect act and exists, where it is present at all, without admixture of doubt, we think that the effort is a failure: unless, indeed, Assent is defined in such a way as to limit its sense to suit the author's proposition, in which case the question is one of logomachy. There are propositions which we, on the whole, believe to be true and on the truth of which we might deem it safe to stake valuable interests; and yet we are not perfectly certain of their truth. Dr. Newman inadvertently declares his opinion on various philosophical points in controversy. Thus, he holds that the principle of causation is not that every event must have a cause, but that every effect is from a personal will; it being a generalization or inference from our own conscious exertion of power. He manifests here and in other writings a tendency towards Berkeleyism. One of the fundamental distinctions of the book is that between notional and real Assent, the one being the result of abstract or conceptive thinking, and the other being the imaginative or "realizing" act, whereby life is given to the object of belief, which is a concrete reality. This is an important and fruitful distinction, and it is easy to anticipate what application Dr. Newman would make of it, in the province of theology. The two sorts of faith, for example, doctrinal and practical, are correlated to the two species of Assent. The chapter on the Trinity is quite able. The separate

propositions—the *disjecta membra*—it is claimed, of this Article of Religion, are capable of receiving a *real* Assent. Taken together, they authorize and require that Assent which is termed notional. The sections on the Illative Sense, illustrate the different conclusions which different minds come to, respecting historical and other questions, according as they vary in their antecedent tempers and habits of thought. An example is taken from the dissonance among the ablest writers, upon the subject of the early history of Greece and Rome. The entire work, though containing matter to which, as we think, just exception may be taken, is an awakening and instructive consideration of the foundations of belief.

STEPS OF BELIEF.*—Rev. James Freeman Clarke's *Steps of Belief* is a valuable addition to the apologetic literature of the day. Following the general title, it is divided into four "Steps," which are arranged in order thus: "First Step from Atheism to Theism," four chapters; "Second Step from Theism to Christianity," four chapters; "Third Step Romanism to Protestantism," four chapters; "Fourth Step from the Letter to the Spirit," two chapters. The lectures are timely and able—they are also interesting and popular. They have the interest and freshness which characterize all the well-meant and useful writings of their author. We always find in him much that is quickening and truthful—not a little earnestness and devotion in the service of important truth, a clear style, familiar and varied illustrations and practical aims. We are forced to add, that there are occasional weaknesses of thought and feeblenesses of illustration, which seem to belittle his subject, and almost to insult the understanding of manly and earnest enquirers after truth. The remarks upon eternal punishment and on the relation of religion to theology, in the present volume, are neither true nor strong. Mr. Clarke would be not a whit less liberal, in the best sense of the word, were he sometimes not a little less superficial.

THE ANTE-NICENE LIBRARY.†—The two latest volumes of the

* *Steps of Belief; or Rational Christianity maintained against Atheism, Free Religion, and Romanism*, By JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 1870.

† *The Ante-Nicene Christian Library*. Vols xv. and xvi. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark & Co. 1870. New York: Charles Scribner & Co.

series are the "Apocryphal Gospels, Acts and Revelations," translated by Alexander Walker, Esq, and the second volume of Tertullian. It is stated that five or six volumes more will complete the Ante-Nicene period. These, it is presumed, will consist, partly at least, of writings of Origen. Only the *de principiis* and a small portion of the treatise against Celsus have, thus far, been introduced into the collection. The Edinburg publishers announce a new edition of the select writings of Augustine, which will include the most important of his polemical treatises, together with the "City of God," etc.

AMERICAN EDITION OF SMITH'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE.—The xxvii.th and xxviii.th numbers of the Dictionary have been received. The last (unfinished) article is "Syria." The learned editors deserve congratulation that so solid and useful a work and one which involves so much labor on their part, approaches its completion.

PROFESSOR HOPPINS'S HOMILETICS.—A new and revised edition of this treatise has just appeared. The wide circulation and cordial reception of the work among ministers and theological professors affords a gratifying proof that the subject attracts attention, and that Professor Hoppin's treatment of it is justly appreciated.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF MARRIAGE.*—Dr. Evans' treatise on the law of marriage has the air of one of those exhaustive and learned works upon special themes, which are more satisfactory and convenient for reference than attractive for the common reading. The titles of the fifteen chapters and the intermediate sections would indicate that most of the aspects of this important relation of life are considered in the light of the teachings of the Scriptures and of sober human experience. The author was a distinguished member of the Episcopal Church, well known as a writer upon topics connected with ecclesiastical matters, and who merited the high esteem of the community in which he lived. Dr. Evans' treatise is timely in its relations to a subject which is now so earnestly discussed by moralists and divines and which deserves to be pondered by every lover of his

* *A Treatise on the Christian Doctrine of Marriage.* By HUGH DAVEY EVANS, LL. D. With a Biographical sketch of the author, etc., etc. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1870.

country and his kind, in view of the fearful laxness of sentiment and practice which prevail among us. It deserves a place in every library, for its exhaustiveness and sobriety.

FAIRBAIRN ON THE TYPOLOGY OF SCRIPTURE.* This book has been so well known for several years both in England and in this country, that we only deem it necessary to call attention to the fact that it is now issued in a fifth edition. The fourth edition was published in 1863, and was very carefully revised and re-written, with a view to recent discussions and views upon the subject of Typology. The present edition is only a reprint of the fourth with very slight changes or improvements.

ASPECTS OF HUMANITY.†—WINDFALLS.‡—The anonymous author of "Aspects of Humanity" and Windfalls," is at once gentle and profound in his musings upon Science, Theology, and Human Life. His spirit has been largely moulded by Christianity according to William Penn, and consequently is always refined and thoughtful, while it is in a good sense independent and individual in its movements and products.

HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

MOMMSEN'S HISTORY OF ROME, VOL. III§—The interest of this remarkable work deepens with each succeeding volume. The one now before us takes up the history of the great republic at the close of the third Macedonian war in 168, and traces the progress of its external growth and its internal decay for nearly a century, closing with the death of the dictator, Sulla, in 78. It rehearses the extinction of Grecian independence, the destruction of Carthage and Numantia, the reforming and revolutionary career of the Gracchi, the first great aggressive movement of Ger-

* *The Typology of Scripture*, viewed in connection with the whole series of the Divine Dispensations. By PATRICK FAIRBAIRN, D. D., Principal and Professor of Divinity, Free Church College, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1870. 2 vols. 8vo., pp. 504—550. New York: Charles Scribner & Co.

† *Aspects of Humanity, brokenly mirrored in the over-swelling Current of Human Speech*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1869.

‡ *Windfalls*. By the author of "Aspects of Humanity." Philadelphia: 1870.

§ *The History of Rome*, by THEODOR MOMMSEN. Translated by Rev. WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D. D. Volume III. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870. 12mo, pp. x, 571.

manic barbarians (the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones), the tremendous convulsion of the Social War, the bitter and bloody party-struggles under Marius and Sulla, and the short-lived organism of the Sullan constitution. In his estimate of the Gracchi, Mommsen differs from most historians, treating Tiberius as a well-meaning booby, and showing an evident preference for the unscrupulous but clear-headed and capable Caius. The narrative of the Social war is a marvel of historical construction. The interest and importance of this mighty contest have long been recognized, but the materials for tracing its course are so amazingly scanty, that the historians have generally given it up as an insoluble problem. Mommsen alone has worked it out into a continuous and intelligible story.

The portraitures of character scattered through the volume are singularly vivid and intense. We are strongly tempted to quote the description of Mithradates, which sets forth with impressive power the combination of boundless activity, ever-wakeful suspicion, and unrelenting cruelty, in that old sultan of the Orient. But the passage is almost too long for quotation, and we must be content with commending it to the attention of our readers.

THE PRIVATE LIFE OF GALILEO.*—The anonymous author of the *Private Life of Galileo* has compiled from authentic documents a very valuable sketch of this most remarkable philosopher. It is unpretending and seemingly dry, even to repulsiveness at first, but as the narrative proceeds and the reader is taken up by the details of the story, his imagination is kindled, and the inner and outer life of the great discoverer are recreated before him. The letters from his daughter, in the trivial details which they contain, enable him to understand the life of those times. The sad replies of the father reveal the mortifying humiliations to which he was subjected and expose the horrible nature of the machinations by which he was surrounded. The sentence of the inquisition concerning the doctrine of the motion of the earth, in all the grim solemnity of its asseverations, is an excellent travesty of the approaching declaration of infallibility. It was lucky that only seven cardinals signed this sentence, in their official capacity as inquisitors, and that the wily Jesuits who

* *The Private Life of Galileo.* Compiled principally from his correspondence and that of his eldest daughter, Sister Maria Celeste, now in the Franciscan Convent of St. Matthew, Arcetri. Boston: Nichols & Noyes. 1870.

moved the process, withheld the Pope from any official connection with a declaration which the world now jeers at with a division too complete to admit of scorn.

MISCELLANEOUS.

MR. LOWELL'S "*AMONG MY BOOKS*."* To attain to high eminence both as a poet and a critic, presupposes a rare combination of powers, and has, therefore, seldom been achieved. Johnson is not an instance, since neither as a poet nor as a critic does he maintain the rank accorded to him by his over-admiring contemporaries. Lessing, in Germany, and Coleridge, in England, are the most prominent examples that occur to us, of this double success and felicity. There is now to be added to them the name of our own countryman, the mention of which carries with it pleasant associations to the ear of all cultivated readers of the English tongue. Even beyond the circle of those who read the best poems and the best essays, the name of Mr. Lowell is familiar; for who has not read with delight the Biglow Papers, both those of the earlier and the later series? The volume of Essays before us contains articles on "Dryden," "Witchcraft," "Shakespeare once more," "New England two centuries ago," "Lessing," and "Rousseau and the Sentimentalists,"—each of which is a masterpiece in its way. We fancy that most persons who take up the book, without a previous acquaintance with the prose writings of the author, will be first struck with the wide range of his reading, which covers not only the classical works in the literature of the European languages, ancient and modern, but embraces a vast catalogue of works "rare and curious," which would attract the notice of none but an insatiable lover of books. That Mr. Lowell should bring poetic insight and an inexhaustible fund of playful humor to the discussion of literary themes, was to be expected. There is not a page which does not sparkle with bright thoughts and images. What, however, is most worthy of attention in this assemblage of excellent qualities, is the power of philosophical observation, the keen and profound perception of human nature, in its most occult and subtle workings. The Papers on Shakespeare and on Rousseau, are fine illustrations of this most delicate psychological analysis. We are inclined to judge that nothing has been written on Hamlet to equal certain passages in the for-

* *Among my Books*. By JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, A. M., Professor of Belles-Lettres in Harvard College. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co., 1870.

mer of these Essays. The type of character which Hamlet represents is unfolded and depicted with admirable acuteness and aptness of phraseology. "Of deliberate energy, he [Hamlet] is not capable; for then the impulse must come from within, and the blade of his analysis is so subtle that it can divide the finest hair of motive 'twixt north and northwest side, leaving him desperate to choose between them." "A critical insight so insatiable that it must turn upon himself, for lack of something else to hew and hack, becomes incapable at last of originating anything except indecision." "Like a musician distrustful of himself, he is forever tuning his instrument, first overstraining this cord a little, and then that, but unable to bring them into unison, or to profit by it if he could." "He is unconscious of his own peculiar qualities, as men of decision commonly are, or they would not be men of decision. When there is a thing to be done, they go straight at it, and for the time there is nothing in the whole universe but themselves and their object. Hamlet, on the other hand, is always studying himself. This world, and the other too, are always present to his mind, and there in the corner is the little blaak kobold of a doubt making mouths at him. He breaks down the bridges before him, not behind him, as a man of action would do."

Mr. Lowell would do an excellent service to all young students (and old ones too), if he would write critical lectures upon the various plays of Shakespeare. His knowledge of the Greek tragedies would qualify him to bring out the Christian elements in the Poet, while his taste, erudition, humor, and exquisite feeling, would disclose riches of meaning in these greatest of modern dramas, such as, but for this aid, would remain concealed from the ordinary reader.

ANTONIA,* is the second of the series of George Sand's Select Novels which are now in course of publication by Roberts Brothers. We infer that the publication will include in the series no tales which are not fit to be circulated and read, from the fact that they have appended to Antonia two able critiques upon her writings, in one of which we find all the concessions which should be asked for in respect to those of her works which are neither suitable *virginibus puerisque*, nor for any person who has not some special calling to collect and examine offensive specimens of morbid anatomy.

* *Antonia*. A novel. By GEORGE SAND. Translated from the French by Virginia Vaughan. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1870.

"THE NATION."*.—This treatise on the nature and foundations of civil society, is the work of an educated and reflecting man who has devoted a number of years to the conscientious study of the subject. He has called to his aid the best authors in the field, and has carefully pondered their opinions and arguments. It may be that his intercourse with German philosophers has affected unfavorably, in some degree, the sharpness and perspicuity of his style; but it is satisfactory that he has not passed by difficult writers who so well deserve attention. Mr. Mulford discusses the question of the origin of society, in a spirit of opposition to all the empirical and superficial theories which refer social life and organization to causes more or less accidental. He adopts the profounder view that the individual does not exist for himself and that by himself he is incomplete, and that society has thus a necessary and rational ground of existence. A *quasi* realistic mode of thought pervades the entire work, imparting a certain charm as well as depth to passages, the exact purport of which it might not be always easy to convey in the terms of another philosophy. Mr. Mulford does not confine himself to the region of abstract thought, but he takes up the American political system, and he enters into the subject of the relation of each State to the government of the Union. It will not be practicable for us here to present a full analysis of the author's doctrines, or an account of the arguments on which they rest. We commend the work as the product of an able and thoughtful scholar, and as well worthy to be studied by students of the science of politics. The broad, underlying principles of political society are examined by him, in themselves and in their bearing on the problems of American statesmanship. It is not the work of a partisan, but of a scholar and philosopher.

AMERICAN COLLEGES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.†—Professor Noah Porter has presented to the public, in this volume, an interesting discussion of many of the questions connected with our colleges which are now largely occupying the American mind. A thorough examination and review of the work—such as it deserves—would require an extended Article. But, though it has

* *The Nation*: The foundations of civil order and political life in the United States. By E. MULFORD. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1870.

† *The American Colleges and the American Public*. By NOAH PORTER, D. D., Professor in Yale College. New Haven: Charles E. Chatfield & Co. 1870. pp. 285.

come to us from the publishers too late for any such notice, we cannot pass it over altogether in our present number—and we take this opportunity to commend it heartily to all our readers who are interested in the subject of University education. Professor Porter's views will receive, as we cannot doubt, the attentive consideration which they merit, both because they are the result of his long experience of college life and because they are the views of an earnest advocate of the classics and of the best parts of the established college system. A portion of the book is made up of the Articles on the subject which, it will be remembered, were published in the *New Englander* during the last year. But those who have already read those Articles will be glad to see them in their new form and to read the additional chapters that the author has added to them.

WARP AND WOOF.*—Mr. Duffield indicates in “Warp and Woof,” a rare and almost fatal facility in versifying, which seems to serve the author equally well whether the theme is grave or gay, whether it is profound or common-place. His grace and ease are certainly uncommon, and the elevation of his sentiments is always conspicuous. With concentration of his powers and condensation of his work he will rise to high achievements.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

Life at Home; or, the Family and its Members. By William Aikman, D. D. New York: S. R. Wells. 1870. 16mo. pp. 249.

Summer Drift-Wood for the Winter Fire. By Rose Porter. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1870. 16mo. pp. 175.

Lifting the Veil. New York: C. Scribner & Co. 1870. 16mo. pp. 200.

The Life of Our Lord. By Rev. William Hanna, D. D. LL. D. In six volumes. 12mo. Price, \$1.50 each. Consisting of—I. The Earlier Years. II. The Ministry in Galilee. III. The Close of the Ministry. IV. The Passion Week. V. The Last Day of our Lord's Passion. VI. The Forty Days After the Resurrection. These volumes are now all published by Robert Carter & Brothers. New York.

Christ in Song. Hymns of Immanuel. Selected from all ages, with notes, By Philip Schaff, D. D. New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1870. [The fourth edition of this admirable compilation of Hymns which has been made by Dr. Schaff, has been published to meet the demand for a cheaper edition. The price of it is \$2.25.]

* *Warp and Woof.* A book of Verse. By SAMUEL WILLOUGHBY DUFFIELD. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. 1870.

A History of Christian Doctrine. By William G. T. Shedd, D. D. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870. [A new edition at the reduced price of \$2.50 a volume.]

Homiletics and Pastoral Theology. By William G. T. Shedd, Baldwin Professor in Union Theological Seminary, New York City. Eighth edition. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870. [A new edition at the reduced price of \$2.50.]

Our Father in Heaven. The Lord's Prayer explained and illustrated. A Book for the Young. By Rev. J. H. Wilson, M. A., Edinburgh, Scotland. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1870. 16mo. pp. 325.

God is Love; or, Glimpses of the Father's Infinite Affection for his People. From the ninth London edition. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1870.

The Inner Kingdom. By a Member of the New York Bar. 1870. 12mo.

MISCELLANEOUS.

In Spain and a Visit to Portugal. By Hans Christian Andersen. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1870. 8vo. pp. 289. [This is the latest volume of the Uniform Series of Hans Christian Andersen's writings, published, by Hurd & Houghton, according to an arrangement made with the author.]

Grace Aguilar's Works. Each volume illustrated and bound in cloth. The Mother's Recompense, a sequel to "Home Influence," 1 vol., 12mo. Woman's Friendship, a tale of Domestic Life, 1 vol., 12mo. Home Scenes and Heart Studies, 1 vol., 12mo. The Vale of Cedars, a Story of Spain in the 15th Century, 1 vol., 12mo. [This is a new edition of Grace Aguilar's Works, published by D. Appleton & Co., at \$1 per volume.]

A Race for a Wife. By Hawley Smart. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

The Woman of Business; or, The Lady and the Lawyer. A Novel. By Mar-
mion Savage, author of "The Bachelor of the Albany." New York: D. Apple-
ton & Co. 1870. 8vo. pp. 288.

Passages from the English Note Books of Nathaniel Hawthorne. Two vols. Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co. 1870. 16mo. pp. 410, 398.

American Political Economy; including Strictures on the Management of the Currency and the Finances since 1861; with a Chart showing the Fluctuations in the Price of Gold. By Francis Bowen. New York: C. Scribner & Co.

Outlines of Lectures on History. By Andrew D. White, President of Cornell University, Ithaca. 1870. 8vo. pp. 75.

The First Book of Botany. Designed to cultivate the observing Power of Children. By Eliza A. Youmans. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1870.

Sanctum Sanctorum; or, Proof Sheets from an Editor's Table. By Theodore Tilton, Editor of the *Independent*. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1870. 8vo.

Cæsar's Commentaries on the Gallic War; with Explanatory Notes, a copious dictionary, and a map of Gaul. By Albert Harkness, LL. D., Professor in Brown University. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1870. 12mo. pp. 377.

Alone in London. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York.

The Band of Six; or, A Hundred Dollars. By Mrs. M. E. Berry. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York City.

Life in Utah; or, the Mysteries and Crimes of Mormonism. By J. H. Beadle, Editor of the Salt Lake Reporter. National Publishing Co. 8vo. pp. 540.

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THE
NEW ENGLANDER.
No. CXIII.

OCTOBER, 1870.

ARTICLE I.—PRESIDENT FAIRCHILD'S MORAL
PHILOSOPHY.

Moral Philosophy ; or, the Science of Obligation. By JAMES
H. FAIRCHILD, President of Oberlin College.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY is a branch of science upon which many books have already been written, and still there is room for improvement. No two writers are entirely agreed except in the more prominent principles of the science ; yet they agree much more nearly in ideas than in forms of statement. In prosecuting this most important branch of study, one which occupies no secondary place, we need a text book which shall be an improvement on those hitherto in use ; and one that shall, if possible, harmonize the differing views of Philosophers.

This book professes to be especially adapted to the use of pupils in schools and colleges. As such we hail its appearance

with great satisfaction. It certainly is an improvement upon most text books heretofore used. The author has adapted it very well to its end,—in size, arrangement, and matter. He tells us he wished to make a small book, but we cannot help regretting that he did not give some extended explanations and illustrations on several important subjects, even at the risk of enlarging the book. We think that this might have been done without any enlargement, by condensing some portions of less importance and by leaving out repetitions of the same or similar ideas. We are much pleased with the catch words placed in the margin of each page, designating the leading ideas treated of. On the whole the arrangement and manner of treating the subjects are such as will assist instructors in imparting, and pupils in acquiring a knowledge of the truths developed.

The principles of psychology and of moral philosophy which the author adopts and makes the foundation of his reasoning, are mainly correct; indeed we think that scarcely any *erroneous* principles can be found among them. This is saying considerable of any writer on moral philosophy. We do not think, however, that these true principles are as clearly stated and as fully and correctly carried out as they should be. While we are aware that it is much easier to find defects than to correct them, we shall proceed to point out as clearly as we can, what we regard as defects or failures in the development of these true principles of the science,—not all that might be stated, but only the more important ones.

The psychological principles stated in this book are very few—hardly sufficient we think to give a full and solid foundation on which to rear the science of moral philosophy. What the moral faculties are, and how known, we think should have been a little more fully illustrated. Conscience, the great moral faculty of the soul, is in no sense treated psychologically. The authority of its acts, as well as its operations and limitations, are very fully and ably discussed; but we think its *existence* and our knowledge of it should have been carefully considered, as the great distinctive faculty of *moral agency*.

The three-fold division of the faculties of the soul into “intellect, sensibility, and free will,” which are clearly the same as

the faculties of knowing, feeling, and willing, is adopted very correctly by the author as the true division. The faculty of free-will is described as the "power of choosing or refusing," that is, of choosing any given object or its opposite. The possession of this faculty he affirms "is implied in the very idea of obligation," and "is an essential attribute of personality."

The *faculty of feeling* is described as "the susceptibility to pleasure or pain," good or evil. This idea of good or evil, revealed in the sensibility, is declared to be "the necessary antecedent of that of obligation." Here the author states very clearly two of the necessary conditions of obligation, viz. free-will or freedom, and a "good" in the sensibility. If he had added to these "a good as an end," that is, a good seen or known by the moral agent to be within his power to choose, he would have given all of these conditions.

The author makes happiness the *true good*. On page 25th, he says, "well-being, satisfaction, happiness then is the true good—the *summum bonum*, not merely in the sense of the highest good, but of the final, ultimate, absolute good, that in which all other goods terminate and find their value." "Relative good on the other hand is good, that is valued for its uses." Again he says, "the term happiness is used in this treatise, not in the low, restricted sense given it by some writers, but as comprehensive of all satisfaction, blessedness, well-being, from the lowest forms of animal pleasure to the highest joys which dwell in the bosom of God." "In this sense, it is absolute good and the *only* absolute good." Here we have happiness the good, the only good that is absolute, and all other things good only as uses: as tending to promote happiness. The opposite of happiness is *misery, pain, or suffering*. The only absolute evil and all other things are evil only as tending to produce misery or to destroy happiness. This should have been added as a first truth.

These are all simple ideas, primary, fundamental, and universal. They might and we think ought to have been laid down as axioms in morals in the very commencement of our author's work. They are axioms which form the necessary

basis of any moral reasoning, and through which every one cognizes his own being as *moral* and *responsible*.

Now with these *moral axioms*, evidently regarded as such by our author, where is obligation found? and how does it originate? The author answers this question fully, thus, "In the presence or thought of this good (absolute good) obligation is perceived. The intelligence sees the good to be an object of value, and with that perception *arises* the idea of obligation." With this clear statement of the origin of the idea, it is marvellous that in his opening chapter the author should have affirmed that "obligation, the theme of ethical philosophy admits of no definition, except by a synonym. The idea is a simple one incapable of analysis." Can that be a simple idea which originates from several other ideas as antecedent and necessary conditions as the author affirms the idea of obligation does? Such a concept admits of a definition. It cannot, with any reason, be disposed of by the mere synonyms, *ought*, *duty*, *right*, and the like words, which equally demand explanation. The idea of obligation is, indeed, a universal idea, though not simple. Had the author put his own ideas concerning it as expressed in various forms and places, into a full definition, it would have stood thus: Moral obligation is the binding force or influence of the highest good, seen and known by the moral being at the time to be within his power to choose. Here are all the conditions of obligation, viz. a free agent, a person, a good to be chosen, seen to be the highest good, and within his power to choose as an end. When these conditions exist in the mind conjointly, obligation, as Dr. Hopkins says, is necessarily affirmed. On these conditions existing for the first time the feeling of obligation is produced in the sensibility and the idea is originated—makes its first appearance and is cognized by the moral being. What then is it that originates the feeling of obligation, first brings it into the field of every one's consciousness? Only one answer can reasonably be given to this question, which is the answer given by this author. He says, "In the presence of this good is obligation perceived, and the idea of obligation arises." It is *the good*, the *absolute good*, blessedness, happiness, that which is valuable in itself in some mode presented, that always gives the idea;

and if it gives or originates the idea, it certainly imposes the obligation. This is the thing that influences—binds with its own inherent force to the required choice. It is usually, perhaps always, some specific good in the first instance—some good, embodied in some distinct object—which originates the idea and imposes obligation,—*i. e.* : *specific* obligation.

We shall reach the same result if we proceed to examine the origin of the *generic obligation*. This is an obligation to choose the good, happiness, or well-being distinct from any particular object, being, or action in which the good may be found. Our author describes this generic good in the following language. “Well-being, satisfaction, happiness is good independently of any desire which may fasten upon it, and of any relation whatever.” This is good in the *generic sense*. Happiness, blessedness, or well-being, stands thus on its own independent merits of inherent value; deriving none of its value from any thing beside. But when our author describes it as a good, independent of any desire or relation, he evidently means any *specific* desire or any specific relation. He certainly does not mean to deny that it stands related to the moral being or any and every moral being as an object to be chosen, and chosen for itself; for he repeatedly affirms this: nor does he mean to stultify himself by declaring that it awakens no movement in the sensibility, nor tends to do so; but that happiness or well-being is a good. This is the generic good which our author tells us the intelligence sees to be an object of value.

Now as this good is generic, so must the obligation also be *generic*. He describes the obligation to be “The duty to respect it, to treat it as good, to will it to all sentient beings, to stand ready to promote it.” Here is a state of mind that is purely *generic*. Not a specific volition fastening upon any specific good, or object of good, which passes out of the mind as soon as it is formed; but a generic state of mind—a “willing to all sentient beings” “not to any one in particular.” “It is a standing ready to promote the good as occasion or opportunity arises,” the choice of a good which is always present and one which never can be absent. Thus the mind is placed upon the watch tower with a will ready to act with energy, looking out for the coming of this generic good in some specific form. It

is a will or purpose to direct the powers of being to the production of good. This is seen to be a continuous state of mind, covering time, not originated to-day and as quickly abandoned to-morrow, but as our author says, existing "entirely independent of the relation (specific) of the good to ourselves or to any other particular being." Covering even the time when "the being whose good is contemplated may be wholly beyond our reach, the obligation to choose the good is still the same." Though it may be impossible or even improper that any thing should be done to promote that good; that is, no way be seen at the time by which it can be done, "this does not affect the obligation to will the good," that is, in this generic sense, to control and direct the powers to secure it. Here, then, is described fully and minutely the *generic obligation* to choose the *generic* good.

It is in point here to inquire when does this generic obligation originate, and what imposes it? Our author answers in the following language: "Thence to every moral being the *only condition* of obligation is the perception of the good," meaning this generic good. Here the only condition to any and every moral being is the *perception* of his generic good—the good of being in general. It is seen by the moral being. It is always within his power to choose it—to will it in the highest degree of which he is capable. These things being true our author says this generic obligation arises. But what originates it? The perception, as he says, is the *condition*—the only condition. And what is more, it is nothing but a condition. The only thing which brings upon the moral being this generic obligation is *the good*, this generic good, the "blessedness or happiness" of being in general. This is the binding force—this influences—this imposes obligation by its own inherent value. This is the one idea or truth which more than any other pervades the whole of this author's reasoning. The truth that happiness is the ultimate good—the absolute good, the only thing valuable in itself—that which gives to government its right to be and invests the ruler of every name, both divine and human, with his only right to rule. All individual rights have their basis in susceptibilities, or capacities to enjoy—and all duties in capabilities of producing blessed-

ness. Surely no one can fail to see that in the view of this author happiness is the one broad foundation on which all obligation rests. This being so, it is one grand failure in this work that the author did not in the commencement of it give to moral obligation a distinct definition instead of asserting that it could not be defined. He should have clearly and fully announced that the foundation of moral obligation is happiness, *i.e.*, generic obligation is imposed by the general good and founded upon it.

To meet this generic obligation by willing the highest good of being in general, is, according to our author, *right action*. This is *benevolence*. In this alone resides right moral character or goodness, while the opposite, a refusal to meet this generic obligation is sinful action—wrong moral character. To one or the other of these two opposing states of will, every specific moral act is to be traced, and derives its character from it.

The term *benevolence* is here used in a broader sense than is commonly given to it. It is perhaps more generally applied to denote the choice by a moral being of the highest good of others than himself, excluding his own highest well being; but in this treatise it includes both the highest good of the individual and that of all others. Thus developed it is a universal law. It is applicable to all moral beings; both to the creator and to creatures. It makes happiness the ultimate good; the end for all, giving the character for goodness to all who choose it. But in its application to creatures, finite and ignorant, it needs some distinct embodiment, some directing force, by which the created and the finite who cannot be supposed to have a perfect knowledge of duty depending on the seen tendencies and relations of things may be guided. Such a directing force is the being and will of God. He is infinite in knowledge, goodness, and power, and has all resources of good treasured up in his own being. He alone is able to instruct, and guide, as well as bless. His will, ascertained, becomes the highest, yea, the infallible evidence of what will secure the highest good to each and to all. This generic principle of benevolence directs at once to the choice of Him as the supreme good for all created intelligences, and his will as their sure guide to the

complete realization of the end of their being. Thus the law of love to God becomes the law of benevolent action for all creatures. If the author had illustrated this relation of the generic principle of benevolence more fully to the law of love to God, it would have added much value to his work. This principle is the same as Dr. Hopkins's *Law of Love*. This most generic principle divides itself into two distinct forms ; one the choice of one's own highest good ; and the other the choice of the highest good of others, as required by the law of God. These two obligations are perfectly distinct, and yet sustaining to each other the most important relations. We think the author has failed to draw out fully this distinction, and to illustrate their relations. He admits that the generic obligation of *benevolence* embraces our own good, as he says on page 27 : " Our own good is included in this absolute good ; the good of being, and hence is a proper **object** of our regard. It is as valuable as that of our neighbor, and no more valuable. It lies within our reach as no other good does, and hence a special *obligation* to promote it." But what is this obligation ? Is it generic or specific ? What are its relations to the obligation to promote the well being of others than myself ? What is its extent and limitations ? Are these two obligations ever in conflict ? If so, which must yield ? These are points on which the author has failed to furnish us any light except what we may gather from his general discussions. Here are two distinct obligations, one to promote my own highest well being, the other the highest well being of others. Each of them are only branches of the generic obligation of benevolence as defined by the author ; yet each is a generic obligation in itself. To choose my highest good is to choose the highest happiness of which my being is capable ; not as it is found in any specific object or course of action, but in any and every possible way in which my faculties can secure it to myself. This is evidently a generic choice. Equally so is the choice to promote to the extent of my abilities the welfare of others. Each is the choice of absolute good for its intrinsic value. Both of these choices, though generic, must exist in the mind at the same time. They may and will extend over the whole of my immortal existence, unless they conflict one with the other, so

that one must yield to the other. But this can never be, for they are both imposed upon every moral being by the Creator and by the absolute good of each dependent on choice.

But how can they both be met? Will not *specific* objects of good to my neighbor and to myself often come in conflict? Most assuredly they will. What then? Is there any *necessary* conflict in these generic obligations? Never. The preponderating evidence for the highest good must always decide the choice whether it be my own good or my neighbor's. The highest good always has in it binding force, it imposes obligation. But suppose there is no clearly perceived preponderance of evidence? Instead of it, let there be doubt, or a known equality of good in the specific objects to me and to my neighbor, say twenty degrees to each, and only one can be secured by me—but either may. What, then, shall decide? Manifestly the divine principle of self denial for the good of my neighbor in accordance with the Apostolic declaration, “that it is more blessed to give than to receive.” My neighbor receives the good, and I an increased amount. This self-denial, this doing good to others, is the highest source of blessedness known to moral beings. It is the universal moral law—that by which God regulates his own being and fills himself with blessedness. To *seek* to fill my being with blessedness by doing good to others has no drawback in it, either to myself or to my neighbor. There is no selfishness here. It meets the highest obligation resting on me, and secures the end of my being. On this principle will the awards of the last judgment proceed, as we are informed in Romans ii., 6, 7, “Who will render unto every one according to his deeds—to them who by patient *continuance* in *well doing*, *seek* for glory, and honor, and immortality,” eternal life. One's highest blessedness, not simply taking it because it can't be helped; but seeking it by well doing, is rewarded by the judge with eternal life. So, too, it is affirmed of the Saviour, that he endured the cross, despising the shame for the joy that was set before him, *i.e.*, his own highest blessedness secured by suffering to save the world. Thus these two generic obligations are perfectly consistent, and never in conflict. The same road must be traveled over to reach either of them, and both at the same time. What if my highest bless-

edness is reached only through the way of blessedness to others? Their blessedness is not simply a *means*. It is absolute good, as well as my own—and both are ends to be chosen—ultimate ends.

In failing to state and illustrate the generic obligation to secure one's highest happiness, the author seems to us to have failed to develop fully the principle of selfishness as being the source of all wrong moral character. He does not indeed anywhere say that this choice of one's highest happiness is selfishness; and yet, in some statements, he leaves the impression that he so regards it, or something akin to it. The two things in many minds are confounded; which would seem to have required a clear definition of selfishness. On page 52, he says: "Selfishness, as a *special* vice, is subjection of the will to the desire of good, involving an over estimate of one's own importance and a disregard to the equal rights of others." This definition is too indefinite to give us a clear idea of the author's meaning. Is the choice of good, or any object of good in each and every instance, where there is any desire for it, selfishness? If so, then to choose one's highest happiness under any circumstances must be selfishness; for no one can secure his highest blessedness without desiring it. Indeed, can he choose any good, whether his own or that of others, without desiring it? Can good or happiness in any form be presented to any moral being without some movement of the susceptibility *i.e.*, without awakening some desire, even though it may not be within the compass of his power at present to secure it? Good, perceived, moves susceptibility; creates obligation, as the author often affirms. What, then, is the subjection of the will to the desire of good, which is selfishness? Is it a choice of some good, as the author says, which involves "a disregard of the equal rights of others?" If this, and this only, is the meaning, then the definition is correct and intelligible. It is a subjection of the will to the desire for a good which conflicts with the highest good, and is the true and commonly received idea of *selfishness*.

But is this state of the will, in view of our author, permanent and abiding, a generic state, or is it simply a succession of individual and independent acts, transient and temporary?

On page 52 he says: "Theological writers often use the term as expressing the opposite of benevolence, or the essence of all sin; an unfortunate use of the word, as we have seen, and implying a state of facts which does not exist." Page 33 the author says,—“In sinful action we find no general, comprehensive end, which is the object of pursuit in all forms of evil doing, corresponding with the good of being in right or benevolent action.” This seems a rejection of the commonly received doctrine that selfishness is a permanent, controlling state of mind—a generic state of the will to use the faculties of being to minister to self-gratification—to bring good to self irrespective of the highest good of being in general and in conflict with it. And yet, notwithstanding this language and some other expressions like it, we do not believe that the author really rejects the commonly received idea of selfishness; for he often uses language that fully expresses this idea. He says on page 50, “It lies in the refusal to regard the well being of all, and in this respect, it is as it should be, the contradictory of benevolence,” the very language which he says, when used by theological writers, “implies a state of facts which does not exist.” Again on page 30, “Wrong or sinful action is a refusal to meet obligation or duty, a refusal to be benevolent. “But this unreasonable action must have a motive. This is found in the impulse of the desires and passions. The form of the sinful action depends upon the *ruling* desire. In general, these desires change. In all these cases the sinful element is the same, the neglect of good; the refusal to be benevolent.” Apart from this element there is no sin in yielding to desire. It is right for moral beings to gratify desire when the gratification is not in conflict with benevolence.” As opposed to benevolence, on page 259, it is described as a “life of self-pleasing,” and on page 291, “a life of self-indulgence, nursing of one’s own ease or comfort or pleasure.” Here we have the fact clearly stated that sin does not consist in yielding to desire merely, but in that state of mind which refuses to be benevolent; and for this unreasonable action there must be some motive, and that this motive is some object of good awakening desire, and that this desire is a *ruling* one, so completely as to be called “a life of self-pleasing;” “a life

of self-indulgence ;” a life fixed, settled, and growing ; but not so completely controlling that one object of desire may not be changed for some other, and this again for another still ; and beneath all these changing desires is the refusal to be benevolent, which is called the life of self-pleasing, self-indulgence. And what is this but a generic state of mind—the source of all specific sin ? It has ruled out one controlling desire for another, and then another, and each one in conflict with the generic obligation to be benevolent, and must of necessity be itself generic—the exact counterpart of benevolence. It matters little what this generic state of mind is called. The author in discussing the subject on pages 34, 35, 36, and 37, may say, as he does, that it is not properly called self-gratification—not supreme regard for self ; not selfishness. Still the facts remain admitted by him that this generic state is fundamental sin—the sum and substance of all wrong doing—the whole of sinful character. But the author’s real views are, perhaps, more fully disclosed in his discussion of the question “Where is found the moral element ?” This will be found on page 16—and onward. He says “it is not found in the outward act ;” “it is not in the intelligence ;” “it is not in the sensibility ;” “but it is found in the act of the will alone.” He traces it thus : “But voluntary action exists in different forms.” “Does the element of morality attach to all these forms ?” Nearest to our observation are the series of volitions which cause the outward act ; but these volitions do not reveal character, because they do not involve it. The good and the bad alike put forth their volitions. Back of these volitions we find a more general purpose from which the volitions spring—the purpose to secure an education (in the case of a student), or still further back, the purpose to gain influence and power, to which education is a means. But in these more general purposes, although voluntary states, we find no revelation of moral character. The good and the bad alike cherish the same general purposes, and pursue them by the same means—sit side by side in the same class. We find in one a voluntary choice of the proper end or object of life ; that end which the intelligence approves. His other purposes and volitions are all subordinate to this ultimate choice, and are executive of it. Another does not

accept this end of life, but freely declines it. Some other scheme or impulse of desire or passion occupies him; and with reference to this unworthy end, he forms his purposes and puts forth his volitions. Here we have the key to the character of the action and of the agent; and in this ultimate choice of the right end, or refusal to choose it, which is still a choice, we necessarily locate the moral element. In this respect the two agents and their actions morally differ, while in their subordinate purposes and executive volitions and outward actions, they may be alike. One conforms to obligation and the other does not. Two kinds of moral actions, and only two are possible. The agent may accept the right end of life, and thus his action become right, virtuous, or he may reject that end, and thus his action becomes wrong, sinful." I have quoted thus largely to show that in the view of this author these two opposite states of will are permanent and controlling and ultimate states, beyond which no responsible action is to be sought or found. According to his description they control subordinate purposes, and very general purposes, such as extend over many years of life, if not over the whole of it. They are called *ends*; one the right *end*, and the other the *unworthy end*. They are described as ends chosen, in every sense voluntary, and directly opposite the one to the other. In these ends, or the choice of them, resides all moral character. One by the author is called *Benevolence*; the other incidentally he calls a "life of self-pleasing," or a life of "self-indulgence." Facts teach us that the "self-pleasing" is the more vigorous, persistent, and energetic of the two. We have often witnessed its permanent, persistent, controlling nature when it fixes on wealth, power, or some other generic worldly good. We think the author would have done essential service if he had more distinctly and fully drawn out this generic principle of wrong doing and given it an appropriate name. It is marvellous to us, that with these views he could declare that selfishness was not this appropriate name.

The author's discussion of the various theories of obligation in two chapters is both the strongest and the weakest part of his work. It is the strongest in ably refuting the theories of those who make the foundation of obliga-

tion solely in the will of God in various forms—in worthiness of being, in goodness, and in abstract right as an ultimate and necessary idea. But it is the weakest in his attempts to answer those who make happiness the ultimate good, and, in his opinion, stamp their system with the degrading idea of *utilitarianism*. He fails to comprehend their views or to state them correctly, and draws from them unwarrantable inferences. In a difference between himself and them, he is forced into the necessity of affirming that on his own theory, obligation is founded solely in the *nature* of things, when his whole reasoning shows that it is founded in happiness—the ultimate and absolute good. He is also forced to affirm that the generic choice of good has no tendency to produce good, and that the idea of its tendency does not enter into the obligation; and yet to be consistent he cannot well avoid admitting this truth. It would seem that the matter of the tendency of the benevolent choice could be settled in a very few words. The most surprising thing about it is, that it should ever have been called in question. The author often ascribes such a tendency to executive acts or volitions. On page 66, he says: “That action which tends to promote the good is right action, and will be performed by virtuous, intelligent men.” So on page 70, he says: “That and that only must be done, which, on the whole, seems profitable; that is, conducive to general good.” On page 40, he calls this benevolent choice the “controlling principle,” out of which particular right acts proceed; so on page 64, it is called the “ultimate governing choice.” And what does this ultimate choice govern and control except these executive volitions, which he says proceed from it? But if these executive acts or volitions have a tendency to promote the highest good, certainly the *executive governing* power, which brings them into being, must have in it such a tendency.

Again on page 81, the author declares “these” executive acts having a tendency to secure the absolute good, “are but outcroppings of the principle of benevolence which constitute the right character.” Then surely the very heart and body of which these executive volitions are only the hands and the feet that do its bidding, must have such a tendency. On page

112, the writer says: "This choice puts one in the attitude to promote the good—a readiness for the work—but it precedes all purpose," meaning, as he has said, particular purpose. Here is described the peculiar nature of this generic choice. It is not the choice of any particular good or object of good, but of good in general, to be reached in the particular good by an executive act whenever an opportunity presents. The benevolent choice respects mainly the use which is to be made of the faculties to this end. It is a determination firmly settled and permanent to hold the faculties, as the author says, in the proper attitude to promote the good, to keep them in readiness for the work. And has not the generic choice, this central power, which places and holds these faculties in the proper attitude, and keeps them ever ready to perform the work of promoting the good, any tendency to secure it—to reach the end of the choice by executive acts? It is perfectly absurd to exclude all tendency from this generic choice, and yet admit it its executive acts.

Again; the nature of the obligation itself unfolds this tendency. The thing which imposes the obligation is the absolute good. Hence the author says on page 112, "This benevolent choice is grounded in the value of the good; not in any tendency in the action whatever, either to promote the good of the agent or of any other being." This is a perfectly correct statement. The *ground* of the obligation is the absolute good, the only thing valuable. This is the end to be sought. But there is a wide difference between the *ground* of the obligation and the obligation itself, between the end and the choice of it. It is the nature of the thing itself—this generic obligation which we are inquiring after. We ask has *this* a tendency to the highest good, not on what it is grounded; it cannot be grounded on itself. The very idea of obligation includes this tendency; it is the main idea in it. The absolute good, the only thing valuable, does not impose upon the moral being a mere regard for it, *i.e.*, an involuntary state or mere impulse toward it; but it imposes an active choice, one on which the good depends, a generic state of mind, such as the author describes it to be, an attitude of the will to promote the good—a watchful readiness of all the powers to improve every opportunity

presented to secure the end—the highest good of being. Here is a powerful tendency. This tendency is a main element or quality of the obligation itself—not the ground of it. Excluding this tendency, and there is no obligation at all. This then is the central engine that drives all the subordinate wheels to the good result; and if there is an adaptation, fitness, or tendency in the saw attached to the engine to cut the timber presented to it, then, surely, there is a tendency also in the engine driven by steam to reach this result. The result fails without it.

Now whether this system shall be called utilitarian or not, is of very little consequence. The *fact* is here, and it is useless to deny it, that the thing required of the moral agent, that which is obligatory on him, is this fitness, this tendency, this voluntary state that has this tendency in it to secure the end—the highest good of universal being. It is called *love*—and is the fulfilling of the law, because as love, it is its tendency, its fitness to secure the highest blessedness of all, and that of nothing else. Being a generic and subjective choice or state, its essential nature is at once recognized in consciousness. The question of tendency properly pertains only to the relative good, the subordinate choices, whether they do tend to promote the ultimate good, to secure the end chosen. The decision of this question settles their character for utility which the author fully admits. And had he been consistent with himself and carried the views which he adopts to their logical conclusions, he would have given to the generic choice its appropriate tendency, as he has to the subordinate choices of which they are the only development. Then instead of differing from those who adopt the system that happiness is the supreme good, he would have found himself in almost perfect agreement with them. The philosophers of this class cannot essentially differ upon the foundation of obligation. The author's system, correctly understood and correctly stated, is as fully open to the charge of utilitarianism as the system of Dr. Taylor; not that every statement of Dr. Taylor or of this author are the most correct that could be made, but that in the great essential principles their systems are the same. We say this because we think we know what Dr. Taylor's system is, and we have

studied this author pretty thoroughly. A striking proof of the correctness of this statement is founded in the fact that the author professes to have embraced essentially the system of Dr. Dwight, but puts Dr. Taylor in a different and opposing class to that of the venerated teacher whose system he ever professed to adopt. He has misrepresented Dr. Taylor, and done him injustice—we think not intentionally—but from a misunderstanding of his views.

We come next to notice the chapter on simplicity of moral action.

The question discussed is—Can virtue and sin coexist in the same heart? In his reasoning on this question the author is half right and half wrong. He is certainly right in the position that the virtuous man can become sinful, and the sinful man can become virtuous, and equally so in the conclusion that the two generic and opposite principles of moral action to which all sin or all goodness pertains cannot coexist in the same being. No man in this sense can serve two masters. But when he affirms “that with few exceptions writers on morals and theology have answered this question in the affirmative,” he is certainly wide from the truth. For the import of his affirmation is that these writers have held that these two generic principles of right and wrong may and do coexist in the same heart. This is the issue which he discusses all the way through as is seen from the following answer. “The two forms of action are directly contradictory to each other, and in the very nature of the case must exclude each other.” Whereas, probably not a single writer to whom he refers ever believed or said that these two opposing principles ever did or can coexist. On this point they all coincide with the author. He misses the issue. It is entirely a different question whether the generic principle of benevolence may not be *imperfect* and still remain in the will or heart, *i. e.* in no sense be abandoned so that its opposite is installed in its place; and at the same time the agent be held responsible for some wrong doing. This question the author does not meet. He interprets the views of those who differ from him wholly from his own standpoint—on his own theory. Having established the truth that these two generic principles of right and wrong cannot coexist

in the same heart, he assumes that nothing morally wrong,—nothing for which the benevolent man is responsible and ought to confess—can exist except that which involves the abandonment of the benevolent principle. He accounts for all sin in the benevolent on the theory of alternation. The good man—the holy benevolent Christian man—performs some good acts and some wrong ones, perhaps more good ones than bad ones, and thus to-day he acts on the principle of benevolence and to-morrow he abandons it and acts on the sinful principle of “self pleasing.” We cannot give this theory a full and exhaustive discussion at the present time—such as its importance demands—we propose only briefly to state a few things. This theory of the author fails, in our judgment, to account for the facts. The nature of these generic principles forbids such alternation. No such alternation is recognized in the consciousness of the good man. He knows that he has not always done his duty, has failed to do it when he might, has at other times done things of which he is ashamed—knows to be wrong, and for which he is sorry—at the same time he knows that the generic end and aim of his life to do good has not been abandoned.

The theory of benevolence adopted by those who differ from the author we think will account more rationally for these failures in duty. This theory is, that the generic principle is weak and imperfect in energy. We lay it down as a *fact* that every generic principle of moral action whether good or bad may continue to exist while things are done or failed to be done—whose doing or failure is wholly inconsistent with the *perfect, complete*, and possible development of the generic principle. The youth who has started in a course of education has formed a generic purpose to be educated—a purpose that is to cover many years of toil and perseverance, more or less severe. Now can any one show that every such youth gives perfect development to this generic principle; never fails to do what might be done to realize most perfectly his end—a complete education? Has he never done things which in the time allotted were a drawback to the completeness of his education? And yet he knows that at no time has this purpose to be educated ever been abandoned.

All orthodox men, and this author among them, believe that sinful, worldly men are wholly depraved—have not a benevolent heart—but who believes that they are as wicked as they might be, unless it be in some very rare cases! They might, years ago, have worked out a more aggravated character for wickedness than they thus far have done. One man of the most renowned character for money getting gave in our day ten thousand dollars to the Sanitary Commission, and never dreamed nor showed that by so doing he abandoned his end of money making. The same possibility pertains to the supreme choice to do good. It covers the entire life. And what is the measure of his obligation? The wicked man, the selfish man is not obligated to make his wrong choice as bad as it can be, but he is obligated to abandon it—to change it for the opposite. But the good man is obligated to give to his generic choice of good the most *complete* and *perfect* development possible, *i.e.*, His ability here is the measure of his obligation. Now we affirm that the failure to give it complete development in execution does not necessarily involve its abandonment any more than the failure of the wicked man to carry out perfectly his wrong choice involves its abandonment. The author has not shewn this nor can he. Yet these failures while the generic choice exists is a failure to do what the benevolent man might have done and ought to have done. It is a wrong which he ought to feel and confess. But it is as unlike the sin of the selfish, worldly man as can well be imagined. He cannot work sin in this latter sense, for he is born of God, and his seed remaineth in him. The generic principle of goodness abides, and is not relinquished by these failures.

In giving definitions, we think the author has some times failed. Accurate and clear definitions in a work of science, and especially moral science, in a work designed as a text book, are of the highest importance. While the subjects in this work are generally well discussed, and the ideas clearly and fully developed, the author is not always successful in framing his definitions.

One very general failure is to defer giving the distinct definition until after something is stated which is like it, and leads the student to think it is, while it is not the same thing.

The true definition comes afterward. An illustration of this is found on page 21, in defining the right. "Right or virtuous action is the action which we morally approve and for which we pronounce the agent praiseworthy." This statement is true; and it has the form, but none of the elements of a definition. The distinctive definition follows thus: "It consists in the choice of the right end of life." This is clear and intelligible; but it should have been stated in the outset. The same criticism holds good in respect to the author's definition of wrong action on page 30. "It is a refusal to meet obligation," which is a short, clear and accurate definition, and should have been stated first instead of placing it after things said which seem to be a definition, and are not in fact.

Another defect is to embrace in the definition itself some things which do not belong to it.

An instance of this is found in our author's definition of government, on page 137. "Government is a systematic arrangement for the exercise of power and authority over moral beings to secure their conformity to obligation and thus promote the individual and general well being." Here are several things that do not belong to the one idea of government. It is called an *arrangement*, but arrangement is only a mode of constituting government or of administering it. An arrangement may be made and no actual government exist. Or there may be an efficient government without any arrangement at all, as in the case of a skillful navigator in a storm, stated by the author on page 139. Much less is any *systematic* arrangement necessary to the exercise of government. It is stated to be "to secure conformity to obligation and thus to promote the individual and general well being." These things are the object or end of government, or should be, and not government itself. It is called "the exercise of power and authority," whereas authority includes power. If he had simply stated government is the exercise of authority over moral beings through the medium of law, he would have given all the necessary ideas, and included a very important one, that of law, which he has omitted.

We name only one more instance of defective definition. It is found on page 229. He says, "Liberty is the opportunity

for the free exercise of our faculties in the performance of duty and in the pursuit of good under the law of benevolence." Now liberty must be freedom to be something or do something which is a personal right. But *opportunity* does not come within the scope of this right, or at least may not; nor does the pursuit of every kind of good included in this right even under the law of benevolence, constitute liberty. If our author had simply affirmed that "Liberty is the free exercise of one's faculties in the pursuit of his highest happiness," he would have given all the ideas and the necessary limitations. Every moral being has a personal right to happiness and a right to the free exercise of his own faculties in securing it. His highest happiness is the chief end of his being—to secure which he has a right to the use of his faculties—no government, human nor divine, can rightfully restrain him from this legitimate pursuit. The pursuit of his highest happiness can never conflict with the welfare of others, nor with the legitimate interests of government. This pursuit of happiness was the right which our fathers, in the declaration of independence, intended to assert.

There is also, we think, a defect in the author's presentation of the subject of penalty. What he has said on this subject is in the main well said. The object of the penalty, its effects, its tendencies, and its distinction from natural consequences, are mainly correct and very important exhibitions. But penalty, as a necessary revelation of the moral governor's character and its tendency *as such* to sustain his authority, and thus to influence to obedience, is left out. Its relations in these respects are scarcely hinted at. It is stated indeed, to be evil inflected as an expression of the guilt of the transgressor, and its effects as evil to awaken fear, lead to reflection, and in this roundabout way to secure true obedience, are presented. But this is very far from being the full nature and the subduing power of a penalty.

The first and chief necessity for a penalty is laid deep in the character of the moral governor. To possess uprightness he must not only have a decided preference for right over wrong conduct, but he must have a proper feeling toward these opposing moral actions, whether in himself or in his creatures. He

must feel a strong approbation of the one and disapprobation of the other; feelings directly opposite the one to the other; feelings in kind and degree appropriate to the differing natures and tendencies of these things. To be without them would deprive him of moral integrity, even if there were no created beings to whom the revelation might be made. But when created beings come into existence a new necessity arises. It is just as necessary to the preservation of the integrity of his character that these feelings should now be appropriately manifested, as that he should have them. The moral subjects must know who and what their ruler is. These feelings can be manifested only by proclaimed good from his hand to the obedient and evil to the disobedient. These are the only two things that can stand as monuments on which his heart toward right or wrong in action can be read by intelligent beings. As a manifestation then of his character for integrity, the proclaimed penalty, evil inflicted or to be inflicted is as powerful to move the moral being to love the excellence embodied in this pledged evil, as is the good promised at his hands. When rightly viewed this is the appropriate tendency of a penalty. It is direct and immediate in its subduing power. It does not necessarily reach the soul in the roundabout way of fear and reflection as stated by the author; but in its direct bearing on the soul which apprehends the manifestation. And to fail to present the penalty as flowing directly and necessarily from the very excellence of the Divine Being is to fail to give it its proper subduing power. The first and chief effect of penalty, either pledged or inflicted, is to sustain the moral governor's authority, by preserving his integrity and thus by its influence, to secure obedience, protect rights, and promote the general good.

Authority is right to command, imposing obligation to obey. But if the moral governor has no distinctive and appropriate feelings toward right and wrong, he is utterly destitute of any right to command. He has not the requisite qualifications. He fails in the required integrity of character. Equally destitute of such a right will he be if he fails to manifest these distinctive feelings. Hence not to pledge a penalty or to remit it after it is pledged, and deserved, is to deprive him-

self of the requisite qualifications to command. The penalty is a monument of feeling that must stand the same uncontradicted to all eternity. It can never be remitted when once incurred, except by some substitute that shall make the same manifestations of the moral governor's heart which the penalty would have done. Hence a penalty is a necessary *part* of law, as is also reward. The mere will of the moral governor, without a penalty expressed or implied, never can have the force of authority. It is no command. It contains no expression of his heart, as it must in order to constitute a law. The author is manifestly in error when he separates penalty from law, as he does on page 137.

In taking leave of this work, we are free to say that it would give us much satisfaction to dwell upon its excellences, which are many; but these will commend themselves, and afford much profit to any who may give the work a thorough perusal.

ARTICLE II.—THE STUDY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.

ANCIENT writers have left us a curious account of the conquest of Great Britain, which the Roman Emperor, Caligula, projected, but can hardly be said to have achieved. A large number of men were marched to the coast of the narrow seas which sunder the island from the continent. The troops were drawn up in battle array, the charge was sounded ; then, after these imposing preparations were ended, the soldiers were commanded to fall at once to work and gather the shells lying on the shore. With these spoils of the vanquished ocean, as he complacently termed them, the Emperor returned to Rome, and no doubt found there admirers eager and able to celebrate his courage in disregarding established methods of carrying on war, and the unexampled success which had attended his exploits. Some such course of action, followed by some such result, has not unfrequently formed part of the history of many modern reformers in their work of overthrowing old and establishing new systems of education. We are informed beforehand confidently, though vaguely it is true, of the glorious achievements that are to be accomplished. Old things, they tell us, are passing away ; the golden age of instruction is about to be ushered in ; and the adage that there is no royal road to learning will be quoted no more. We have only to wait until the new macadamized highway to wisdom, constructed with all the modern improvements, is laid open for travel, in order to find our soldiers marching easily from victory to victory. So, with drums beating and banners flying, army after army sets out to demolish ancient strongholds of erroneous education, and to rear over their ruins the standard of the pure and perfect system. We read in the newspapers that the assault has been begun ; we hear details of the battle that is raging ; we await with anxiety the result, and are at last assured that a glorious victory has been gained. But when we come to inquire what has actually been accomplished, to ask

for the trophies of the conquest, we usually find that it is only a collection of shells that has been gathered.

And yet so numerous are the imperfections in existing systems of instruction, that it is melancholy to think that so much honest effort to remedy these defects should, through misunderstanding and misdirection, come to nothing. Above all, it is painful that men, who talk so long and learnedly of the evil of studying other languages, should not have as yet thought it worth while to suggest some satisfactory plan of studying their own. For in no department of education is there a louder call for reform than in the one which has been taken as the subject of this Article. To assert that to the members of an English-speaking race no language can be so important and no literature so interesting as their own, would not be likely to subject any man to the accusation of making a statement either very original or very striking: and yet, if one considers solely the actual amount of attention paid in our schools to both our language and literature, it might not unreasonably be deemed an idea that had never occurred to any human being before. So thoroughly, indeed, has this particular branch of learning been neglected, that the very ideas in regard to the proper method of its study, which to the outside world of scholars will appear commonplace and matter of course, will to many of those engaged in the business itself of teaching, seem radical and revolutionary. For of all the cultivated languages to which, with us, the attention of students is directed, English is the one in which the least instruction has been given, and in which the little that has been given has been of so unsatisfactory a quality. In a large number of our institutions of learning, it is, strictly speaking, not taught at all; and it is in very few, indeed, if in any that the study has been carried on in a scientific spirit. Assuredly it is no wild statement to make, that in many of our colleges a man might go through a four years course, and never hear once from the lips of any of his teachers the names of Shakespeare or Milton; and there are still very few of our schools in which he would ever be reduced to the necessity of reading a single line of their works.

It is undoubtedly quite true that not everything can be studied in a four years course, though that fact has apparently es-

caped the attention of some. But without entering into any argument as to the comparative importance of different branches of learning, it is sufficient to say, that with us, men sometimes make use of Latin, Greek, French, or German, but they always speak English; that they are occasionally lawyers, clergymen, physicians, engineers, and chemists, and as such are necessarily conversant with the literature of their respective professions; but they all without exception are members of an English-speaking race, or at least of an English-speaking people, and as such are bound to be acquainted with the literature of the language they hear and employ. For it is here that the men of all occupations, however wide apart they may be, can meet on common ground; it is here that tastes, however diverse in other respects, can feel the bond of a common sympathy and the unity of a common interest. Yet up to this time no attention has been paid to these considerations. In our schools, scarcely any preliminary preparation has been furnished. The student either picks up at hap-hazard any knowledge he may acquire of the structure of our own tongue, or he does not acquire it at all: and where instruction is ostensibly given in the literature, it is in most cases taught at rather than taught.

If these seem to be strong statements, we hope in the course of this Article to make it clear to every thinking man that they are neither exaggerated nor unjust. No one, indeed, will see his way clearly to any reform in this matter, unless he fully comprehends how thoroughly existing systems have solved the problem of how not to do it; unless he is fully persuaded in his own mind that English should never be taught in the way it is taught, whenever instruction in it is given at all. The subject, therefore, naturally divides itself into three parts. First, what is the study which in our schools now usually goes under the name of "English Language and Literature," and what is its value? Secondly, what should the study be? and thirdly, how should it be carried on?

Nearly all our higher institutions of learning go upon the principle that the whole duty of man, so far as regards instruction in English, has been fully and faithfully performed, when some exercises in composition have been required of the

student, and when some manual of our literature has been gone over. This, at present, seems to be the Ultima Thule upon which our educational pilots have fixed their eyes; it is but few of them that dream of the possible existence of a continent beyond. The subject of essay-writing, as it is only indirectly connected with this question, need not be spoken of for the present. But as there is a vague popular impression as to the immense benefit to be derived from the study of textbooks treating of English literature, as from them alone the student usually gets all the knowledge which, as a student, he does get, it will be well to ascertain precisely the value of all such manuals, and to examine critically the nature and importance of the information they furnish. Histories of every literature do unquestionably have a certain value: yet it can hardly be doubted that in the vast majority of cases they are immensely overrated. To some it will seem almost a sacrilege to deny the value of works of this kind, held, as many of them are, in high repute. Yet in spite of the great scholars who have been employed in the composition of them, there can hardly fail to lurk in every reflecting mind a suspicion that there must necessarily be a vast deal of deception in the pretensions which such histories make, and in the results they purport to accomplish. When we consider how immense is the literature of any one cultivated people; how profound a study is required of the writings of any great author before, in any proper sense, they can be said to be understood; how long a term of years is required to master any one system of philosophy; how vast is the number of inferior writers, whose works are of value, if not so much in themselves, for the effect they have had upon their own and upon succeeding times: when we bear all these things clearly in mind, and many other things closely related to them, we can hardly fail to find ourselves feeling considerable distrust of all histories of literature, of the accuracy of the knowledge they impart, of the justice of the criticisms they make, and of the general conclusions to which they come. For most of those who have written these works are not content with the literature of any one people or of any one limited period, though either, if faithfully executed, is apparently a sufficiently arduous task for a life-time. But projects so

petty are usually spurned by authors of this class. They "ransack the ages, spoil the climes." There is no height which their strong-winged thought does not attempt to scale, no depth which the plummet of their wisdom is not disposed to sound. Sometimes one, uncommonly moderate in his ambition, contents himself with undertaking to give an account of the literature of four or five great nations through four or five centuries. Yet, under these circumstances there are croakers who will feel distrust; for it is evident that, even in such a case, it is an impossibility, in these post-diluvian days, for any one man to go through with the mere physical labor of reading, in the most hasty manner, the books of whose contents and character he professes to give an account, let alone doing any thinking about them.

It is a necessary inference from this that all histories of literature must, to a large extent, be made up at second-hand, and consequently must to a greater or less degree be worthless, even as regards giving any exact knowledge of the contents of the books they describe. Naturally there would be some improvement, where the literature of only one people comes under consideration. Yet in the case of our own language, how unsatisfactory, as a whole, are all the works upon the subject which have yet been produced, every scholar is painfully conscious: while for those designed for students, the best that can be said of any is, that it is not positively bad. Take, for instance, Shaw's "Manual of English Literature." We mention it because it is the text-book usually employed in American institutions of learning, and because it is, apparently, as good as any, if not better than all the manuals upon this subject, which have been gotten up for the use of schools. Yet numerous instances occur in this work of mistakes, or rather of misstatements, which it is charitable not to ascribe to ignorance, though doubtless they are due to it: for ignorance in the getter-up of a text-book is not simply a misfortune, it is a crime. Take for illustration Udall's drama of *Roister Doister*, a work of no special importance in itself, but possessing a curious interest as being the transition-play between the ancient mysteries and moralities and the modern comedy. Of this Shaw gives the following account. "The action takes place

in London, and the principal characters are a rich and pretty widow, her lover, and several of her suitors, the chief of whom is the foolish personage who gives the title to the play. This ridiculous pretender to gayety and love, a young heir just put into possession of his fortune, is surrounded by a number of intriguers and flatterers, who pretend to be his friends, and who lead the dupe into all sorts of absurd and humiliating scrapes; and the piece ends with the return of the favored lover from a voyage which he had undertaken in a momentary pique. The manners represented are those of the middle class of the period, and the picture given of London citizen life in the middle of the sixteenth century is curious, animated, and natural." Shaw's knowledge of this play was evidently derived, not from reading the comedy itself, but from reading the account of it in Collier's *History of Dramatic Poetry*, and reading that too very carelessly. Now the actual facts of the case furnish a curious contrast to the foregoing statements. The scene is nowhere indicated; it is merely a supposition that it is in London. The several suitors of the heroine spoken of in the account above given, dwindle to one in the play; and the number of intriguers surrounding the hero suffers a similar reduction. There is not the slightest hint that the favored lover went off on his voyage in a moment of pique: until his return, there is no trace of disagreement between the betrothed couple. The author of *Roister Doister* was Master of Eton, and the play was doubtless written for the boys of that college to act—a proceeding which was quite the correct thing then, though not likely to find many imitators just now in the heads of our great public schools. As might naturally be suspected, the work is modelled throughout on the Latin comedy, especially upon the *Eunuch* of Terence. To the *Gnatho* of that drama the *Matthew Merrygreeke* of the English play is an exact counterpart; and not only is one whole character borrowed, but one whole scene is closely imitated. *Roister Doister* attacks the home of Christian Custance, after she has rejected him, in precisely the same way as in the *Eunuch* *Thraso* prepares to assault the residence of *Thais*. The curious, animated, and natural picture of London life in the sixteenth century after Christ, belongs really to Athens in the

fourth century before Christ. At least we shall be hardly justified in supposing that in the former place and period it could have been natural, though it certainly would have been curious and animated for a rejected suitor to relieve his feelings by leading in broad daylight an organized storming party against the house of his scornful lady-love.

But this comedy, however important in the history of literature, is not important in literature itself; and it may therefore be well to consider our author's description of a work which holds a commanding position in English letters. Spenser's *Fairy Queen* is a poem familiar to every one by name, if not by actual knowledge: all of us have talked about it, and some of us have read it. Now, of the way in which the action opens, and especially of the leading hero, Prince Arthur, the following account is given. "This fabulous personage," says Shaw, "is supposed to become enamored of the Fairy Queen, who appears to him in a dream: and arriving at her court in Fairy Land, he finds her holding a solemn feudal festival during twelve days. At her court there is a beautiful lady, for whose hand the twelve most distinguished Knights are rivals; and in order to settle their pretensions, these twelve undertake twelve separate adventures, which furnish the materials of the action." Some of us, it was asserted, have read Spenser's poem; but it is certainly an open question whether the author of the above ever did. It is not impossible, indeed, that more blunders could have been crowded into these few lines, but it would certainly have been a matter of some difficulty. For instance, Prince Arthur, unquestionably saw the Fairy Queen in a dream, for he says so himself; but that is the only way he ever did see her, for he never arrived at her court. But the introduction of the beautiful lady, for whose hand the twelve most distinguished Knights are striving, is a decidedly startling addition to the original story, and proves plainly that the mind of the historian was altogether free from the commonplace feeling that it was at all necessary to rigidly adhere to facts. The absurdity of the statement is evident at once to any one, who is only slightly familiar with the poem; for in nearly every one of the six books which were completed, the hero is either furnished with a mistress on the start or finds one

in the course of his adventures. In addition to this, the Knight of the third book not only has a lover, but is herself a female warrior, so that in this case the question of suitorship becomes exceedingly complicated. Some may hesitate to believe that so gross a misrepresentation of a poem so well known could have passed all this time in a popular text-book unquestioned; but the incredulity of all such will be speedily removed by a perusal of the poem itself. If, however, the reading of the thirty-four thousand six hundred and forty-one lines which constitute the *Fairy Queen* be deemed too arduous a task for this limited life, let any one who doubts the assertions here made, examine the letter to Sir Walter Raleigh, which Spenser published as a sort of explanation of his allegory, and in which he gives an account of his plot. *We* may be mistaken; *we* may have overlooked facts and incidents which would fully bear out the account above given; but it is difficult to disbelieve the statement of the author himself: for the unfortunate writer, unlike his reader, could never skip anything, and therefore had to know something about the contents of his poem whether he cared to or not.

Instances of this nature might be multiplied indefinitely. Still they are of no importance except as illustrating the dishonesty with which works of this kind are apt to be put together—for they cannot justly be said to be composed—and as showing the necessity of caution in the use which should be made of the statements they contain. But granting, for the sake of the argument, that a text-book of English literature can be made absolutely accurate, there is nothing which can prevent it from being absolutely worthless, so far as regards the communication of any real knowledge upon the subject of which it treats. For such works deal merely with the externals of literature, they do not deal with literature itself. They profess to give no account of it beyond a catalogue of names and titles;—and however valuable a catalogue may be for reference, it is not usually very spirit-stirring in its character, nor stimulating in its influence, nor very broadening in its effects upon the mind. The lives of authors, which are usually the only part of such treatises that are endurable, are, it must be remembered, only indirectly connected with literature. They are not in themselves of any

special interest, they are not in themselves of more value than the lives of the common men about us : but they are made of interest and value through the reflex light they receive from and impart to the works which those authors have produced ; yet works of which the student has not necessarily read a single word. So the pupil might learn the contents of a manual of English literature by heart, and yet not have the slightest conception of what English literature really is, or of what it has accomplished. He would in such a case know the names of the authors, the times when they lived, and the titles of their works ; but of what they have written, which is the one important thing to know, which is the only thing that can properly be termed literature, he may not have the shadow of an idea. And yet as this branch of learning is usually taught, the attention of the scholar is directed to these matters, comparatively of little importance, while English literature itself remains an unopened volume.

So far it has been assumed throughout that the student has really studied the text book faithfully. As an actual fact it is a thing that is seldom done faithfully, and in the few cases where from a sense of duty this unfortunately does take place, it is apt to be attended with feelings of disgust, which are liable to be most unjustly transferred to the whole subject of English literature proper. It could not well be otherwise. The manual is crowded with accounts of men and titles of books, of which the student has never heard before, and which he never expects or cares to hear of again. The remembrance of them is purely and constantly an effort of will. The mind is burdened with names and dates, which are gladly forgotten as soon as the necessity of retaining them in the recollection is felt to be past. In such a study, indeed, it is nothing but a pure exercise of memory that comes into play ; absolutely no exercise whatever of judgment or critical taste. One fact is followed by another fact with which it has no necessary connection, one title of a book by another, one name of an author by another. The student is jolted through English literature over a mental "corduroy road," and the only permanent impression left upon the mind by it is of the discomfort of the

journey, and the only effect upon the life is the very solemn resolve never to take that particular trip again.

At the same time there is no need of denying that such works have a certain value. They are useful in various ways, and especially to him who has become familiar with the writings of any author or with the writings of any particular period, and is therefore naturally interested in all that relates to the men and the times with whose productions he is in a measure conversant. Nor is it at all improbable that they sometimes stimulate students to read the work they are reading about, though it is hard to see why this should be brought forward as a reason for preferring the history of the literature to the literature itself. The study of alchemy may induce one to take up the study of chemistry: yet it would hardly seem worth while to substitute the former for the latter, for the sake of such a possible occurrence. But works of this kind are often an unmixed evil, because they lead men to think they know something of English literature, when they only know something about it: and there is certainly no doubt that, looked upon as a contrivance to attain the maximum of display with the minimum of real knowledge, they are frequently quite invaluable. For it is not impossible to suppose that the student can commit to memory and retain in it, for a while at least, all the contents of his text-book. Accordingly, without having seen anything for himself, without having investigated anything for himself, he has, nevertheless, his mind stored with a multitude of facts, which, properly introduced and skillfully managed, will frequently be of as good service to him as actual knowledge; and with them he can occasionally make an imposing show in times like these, when conversation often assumes the form, not of an interchange of ideas, but of information; when indeed, it not rarely becomes a sort of intellectual base-ball, in which one is liable to be stunned at any moment by some surprising statement, or knocked down by some unexpected fact. A temporary triumph in some verbal encounter may sometimes fall to the lot of him who has thus sacrificed genuine knowledge and insight for the display of second-hand information and criticism; but no contrivance however skillful, no tact however exquisite can long hide the real nakedness which all shams must

in the end exhibit. The man whose acquaintance with European scenery is derived from resolutely staying at home and studying Murray's guide books, may chance to correct in some unimportant particulars the most extensive and observant traveller. But who would compare for freshness, fullness, and accuracy, the knowledge acquired by the two?

We have laid so much stress upon this particular matter, because, though individual schools may here and there diverge from it, this method of studying English literature is the one now almost everywhere in vogue, and because the belief in it as the best method is widely spread and firmly held. In approaching the second part of our subject, much that has previously been said will lead the reader to anticipate the answer belonging to the question as to what should be studied. A knowledge of English literature can not only be best gained by studying the works of English authors themselves, but it can be gained in no other way. It is necessarily a slow process of acquisition, but it is a thoroughly honest one. Whatever knowledge any one gets in this manner becomes an integral part of the man himself, and forms a center about which new accretions of knowledge constantly fasten. And it is a curious fact in connection with this, that we never think of studying any other language as we do the English. In Greek or Latin, in German or French, we read the works of the greatest authors, and the external history, if taught at all, is made entirely subservient and subordinate to the knowledge of the literature itself.

If the position taken is a true one; if English literature can only be known by studying the writings themselves of English authors, some other considerations come immediately into view which have a vital relation to the subject. The first is, that such a study cannot, from the nature of things, be complete. It is the work of a life-time, and in the limited number of hours assigned to it in our schools, there is no hope of covering more than a small portion of the ground. It becomes, therefore, a matter of first importance to know what we shall study. The only fair course must necessarily be, to confine the student to the greatest authors. For instance, Chaucer, Bacon, Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton, Dryden, Pope, may be

taken as the representatives of their times, and about them the literary history of their contemporaries must center. It is not meant to be asserted that the attention of the student must be limited to the particular persons here mentioned. English literature is not so poor that it can never furnish more than one great name to a generation. But it is meant to be asserted that the works of the greatest writers, whoever they are, must be made exclusively the subject of examination. It might be interesting to know and read others; but short as is life, a college course is much shorter, and it is not to be forgotten that the study of an inferior author necessarily involves to a greater or less extent the neglect of a superior.

But, again, not all the works of the greatest writers can be studied. What rule shall we adopt in selection? That does not seem a difficult matter, provided two things are kept clearly in view. The first is, that whatever is chosen shall represent fully and fairly the mind and spirit, the essential characteristics of the author; the second, that it shall be complete in itself. Either a whole work should be selected, or a part forming by itself a whole. A tale of Chaucer, a book of the *Fairy Queen*, a play of Shakespeare, anything which will enable the student to examine and to comprehend the movement of the writer's mind, from the beginning to the end of a finished production, is indispensable to any thorough knowledge of his character and genius. "Elegant extracts" will not do the work required. Not to speak of the injury done to such extracts by violently wrenching them from their context, it is not simply unjust to the author, but it has no beneficial effect upon a man's own mind to study a great writer only in his moments of exaltation. Indeed, it is difficult to see more than one conceivable use of these "typical selections" and so-called "elegant extracts." As labor-saving inventions for getting up an acquaintance with an author without the drudgery of reading his works, they doubtless serve a certain purpose. They are better than nothing, to be sure; but what we are seeking is not something that is better than nothing, but something that is best of all.

We have said that a real knowledge of English literature can only be acquired by studying the works of English authors themselves; that in our schools that study must be confined to

representative authors and should embrace complete works. We now advance one step farther and say that these authors should be studied in the order of time. The reasons for this course will appear at length in the third division of this subject. At the same time it is confessedly an open question whether in the present limited knowledge possessed by school-boys of the structure of our tongue, it is desirable to begin with an author so ancient as Chaucer. But if he be regarded as an exception to the general rule, there can certainly be no objection to our entering upon this course with the writers of the Elizabethan era, who present no peculiar difficulties of construction or expression.

Assuming that the writings themselves of English authors should be studied, the third and by no means the least difficult part of our subject remains to be considered;—that is, how shall they be studied? It is hardly necessary to say that in the present state of instruction furnished in our language and literature, any method proposed must be in great measure a tentative method throughout. In such a branch of study, as yet everywhere in its infancy, in many places not even recognized as existing at all, we cannot expect to see developed at once the system and perfection of detail under which other branches of learning are taught, nor even to find it supplied with the mere mechanical apparatus of good text-books with which the labors of generations of scholars have enriched every other object of investigation embraced in the college curriculum. Everything at first will necessarily be crude, many things will be imperfect. We shall content ourselves here with proposing what seem the chief things required to be aimed at and to be accomplished to make the work both interesting and profitable to the student. Others may be able to suggest other and better methods; at any rate, it is to be hoped, many improvements upon this.

The first thing, then, that should be sought for in this study, is to put the mind of the scholar, so far as is possible, into such sympathy with the author he is reading, that he will appreciate him fully and therefore enjoy him,—appreciate him in his spirit, his style, his manner of presenting his thoughts, in everything, indeed, even to his weaknesses, which displays the

essential characteristics of the man. There is nothing really so important as this. A close and constant intimacy with the words and ideas of a great writer, will not only save the individual from all vulgarizing tendencies of thought and expression, but cannot fail to have an influence on the development of the character, such as is rarely to be attained by any other agency in instruction; and the influence must necessarily be far greater in the case of an English author than of a foreign one, because in the latter the attention of the student is always more or less diverted from the thought by the difficulties of the language in which it is clothed. Such an intimate acquaintance with the works of a great writer is always followed by an enlargement of mind, by a purification of taste, by an increase in the power of expression, which are very marked, even when the study has been carried on in a desultory and unsystematic manner. And yet while this is the most important end to be aimed at, the end to which all else should be made subsidiary, it must be confessed that to securing it the direct instruction of the teacher cannot much avail. Indirectly he may be of service; but whatever of such benefit the student receives, must be acquired mainly by himself. Little can be directly done by the instructor, save to bring the weight of his own more cultivated taste to bear upon the mind of the scholar, to assist, to enlighten, and to stimulate.

It follows in the second place as a direct corollary from this—for it is involved in any proper idea of appreciation—that the subject itself taken by the author and his method of treating it, should be studied. The arrangement of sentences, the subordination of parts, the logical sequence of ideas, the many independent lines of thought concentrating in one grand result, all these should be pointed out and their relation to each other and to the end aimed at, clearly comprehended. It is not always an easy work; but it is in all cases one which most richly repays him who does it for the labor put forth.

Thirdly, all books in English literature are more or less full of references and allusions to the political and military history of the times in which they made their appearance. There are, indeed, very few great works in our language, to the complete understanding of which a respectable knowledge of the era in

which they were produced is not essential. The student should be required to look up the meaning and furnish the explanation of all such references and allusions. The study of the literature thus becomes intermixed with the study of the history. It is here that one reason for reading English authors in a chronological order becomes manifest. A separate portion of the life of a nation is not wrenched out by itself and considered apart from what follows and what precedes, but is connected naturally with a past that has already been made the subject of investigation, and with a future for the investigation of which it paves the way. It is not too much to say that if the study of English literature is faithfully carried out, an indirect result of it will be, to give the student a fair degree of knowledge of the leading events of English history.

Directly connected with the foregoing is a fourth point. There are in every work allusions and references to incidents of past history, to stories of ancient mythology, to manners and customs long laid aside and frequently forgotten. The ordinary reader, when he meets these, usually pays no attention to them, if he is not previously acquainted with what they mean. But the student must be taught to feel that his duty is not done until he has exhausted every means at his command for the full comprehension of them, and can in consequence recognize the reason of their introduction by the author.

Fifthly, along with the works he is reading, the student should be compelled to make himself acquainted with that external history of literature, which with us is generally the only thing taught in this branch of learning, but which as now studied, can hardly fail to be regarded as a waste of time. For our present method of teaching this violates the order of nature: it is only by some such plan as here proposed that instruction in it can ever be successfully given. That knowledge which, under the system usually adopted, is learned with disrelish and forgotten with speed, will under changed conditions be sought for with avidity and retained with ease. For it is a marked characteristic of our minds that the interest we feel in any book is always carried over in a greater or less degree to its author. As soon as we become engrossed in what he says,

we wish to know all about him, his life, his character, his relations with his contemporaries, the influence of other writers upon him, the influence he has exerted upon the men and manners of his own time. Under the system of studying the works themselves of great authors, all that a large number of students will really need in the investigation of literary history, will be direction. Stimulus will be imparted by their interest in the author they are reading; and the facts they gather in regard to the external life of the man and his times, will be treasured in the memory, because associated with that positive knowledge of his character and inner life which comes from familiarity with his writings. But as in the method here proposed, it is not designed to leave anything to chance, this will form no exception. During the process of reading any particular work of an author, the literary history of himself and his times can be made to pass in review. The failures he made, the successes he achieved, the influence he exerted upon the writers of his own era, the school or style he founded or overthrew, the acts and lives of the most illustrious of his contemporaries, all these and kindred topics furnish a field for investigation which would be examined on their own account by some, but which should be required of all. Such matters, indeed, furnish the best and most legitimate subjects for those exercises in English composition which are everywhere made the object of so much attention in American colleges. It is hardly necessary to point out how important it is that under such circumstances the authors should be studied in the order of time.

Sixth and lastly, we come now to one grand division by itself, so broad, so vast, that only the merest outline of what is desirable, can here be given. We refer to the history of the language, its words, its phrases, its idioms, its grammatical forms, not less than the changing character of the influences which have affected diversely at divers times the style of those who have made use of it. For the sake of studying the language it is of vital importance that authors should be taken up in chronological order. It is by that method that changes in the meaning of words, that the giving up of old idioms and the adoption of new ones, the discarding of ancient forms of

expression and their cropping-out in other times and under other circumstances, in fine, those grand mysterious processes of life and death, of ruin and regeneration, which in ever-recurring cycles are constantly going on in the history of every language, that all these can be clearest observed and most vividly impressed upon the memory. To state the claims of this one department fully would require a separate Article ; we can do little more than mention it here. Yet it may be proper to say that in any system of study which sets out to give a genuine knowledge of the English language, Anglo-Saxon must be made compulsory. Not many years can elapse before this conclusion will be reached by all whose interest in higher education leads them to pay attention to this particular subject. Already, indeed, many of our institutions of learning have begun to recognize the inevitable change. A knowledge of our primitive tongue throws in fact so much light upon the whole internal structure of our present language, that it is even now the easiest and surest method of securing an accurate acquaintance with the latter, and the time cannot be far distant when the study of Anglo-Saxon will be regarded as an essential part of a complete English education. An indirect but most happy result of such a state of things will be the extermination of that vast and increasing swarm of so-called English grammars, which exasperate scholars and make life a burden to students. Every country school-master now feels called upon to lay down the laws of a language which, so far from writing elegantly, he cannot ordinarily write correctly, and finds plenty of men to publish and to praise the crude conceptions of his own and the unwarranted inferences and blundering statements he has borrowed from others as ill-informed as himself. Nothing but the ignorance of the public and the indifference of the educated, could have so long tolerated that almost inconceivable impudence which has prompted men to write grammars of our tongue without any knowledge of either Anglo-Saxon or Early English. With the latter the student of Chaucer must from the nature of things gain some acquaintance. But even for him it is not advisable to begin so late as this. The language is then in a transition state ; everything is confused, much is fragmentary ; the ancient order of things

as a whole is broken up, the ancient inflection is laid aside, while yet everywhere traces of the past remain. He is thus brought face to face with a revolution which is only partially completed. For him to understand its origin and the course it is taking, it is even more essential than for the student of later English, to make a full examination of our primitive tongue. And when once this need is felt by all, the general demand for them will supply speedily good text books for instruction, in which this branch of learning has confessedly been, at least until lately, exceedingly poor.

But right here lies one danger, which cannot be too sedulously guarded against. There can be such a thing as too close and exclusive an attention to grammatical and philological details. Our object is to give knowledge and appreciation of English literature; and care must therefore be taken that we do not yield to the too common tendency in education of substituting the sign for the thing signified, that we are not so occupied with the means that we forget the end. We study the language for the sake of the literature, not the literature for the sake of the language. Minute and microscopic investigations have an importance that cannot be over-estimated. But it would be exceedingly unfortunate if the standards by which they measure objects were to be extended to all cases of vision or if the excessive magnitudes they give us were to take the place of that natural and orderly proportion which is furnished by our unassisted eye-sight. No acquaintance, however minute, with verbal forms, no knowledge, however accurate, of points of detail, can be satisfactory to any clear-thinking man, if, in gaining them he has been forced to sacrifice keenness of appreciation or breadth of view. Philology is an interesting and important study; it is worthy of the sincerest devotion for itself; but it is not literature; and the study of the one must never be mistaken for the study of the other. The information furnished by the former will often be of incalculable value for the comprehension of the latter; but the value is in this case a subsidiary and not an independent value. Confine the attention of the student to mere grammatical and verbal details, and the noblest productions of prose or poetry will lose for him their highest and most legitimate charm, that subtle

fascination which in a healthy mind is so easy to be felt, but is so hard to be defined. The familiarity thus gained with the mere words and phrases of beautiful extracts is poor compensation for the loss of that keen appreciation, that freshness and glow, as lustrous but as evanescent as the bloom of fruit, which the rude grasp of philology often causes at once to fade, never to return. Instances of a like nature are not uncommonly remarked in our preparatory schools, where degrading associations frequently destroy for particular individuals all power of appreciating some of the finest passages of English prose and poetry. Especially has this been the case with Milton, whose *Paradise Lost* has been for many vulgarized forever by the profanation of parsing. A work so doleful and funereal as Young's *Night Thoughts* would not be an unsuitable one to be employed in so doleful and funereal an exercise, and no great harm might result. But the beauty and the majesty of Milton's verse sink in the mind of the scholar to the level of the baldest commonplace, and no after-study on his part can furnish enjoyment, or revive a glory really there, but which for him has faded away forever. No later devices are sufficient to restore the freshness and life once lost. The funeral-baked meats, as is ever the case, do coldly furnish forth the marriage tables.

But this is a danger belonging rather to the future than the present; in the existing condition of English scholarship there need not be much fear that any damage of this kind will be done. And, incidentally, it may be well to mention here one positive benefit which will result from the study of English literature as pursued in this manner. This is, that it will furnish in great measure a corrective to that widely-spread habit, born of newspaper and novel-reading, of running over the words of a book without gaining the least idea of its contents. This to some may not seem a matter of moment; but even the slightest experience in the teaching of English will convince any one that with a liberal estimate the average man, under ordinary circumstances, does not remember one-fourth of what he reads nor understand one-half. The fact that he knows the meaning of each of the individual words that go to make up the sentence, is to him sufficient proof that he knows the meaning of the sentence as a whole. His eye runs over the printed

page, his face is directed steadily toward it ; but his brain gets of its contents just the same intelligent comprehension that, it may be supposed, a cow, calmly standing on a summer day and contemplatively chewing its cud, gets of the beauties of nature—no less and no more. It is not meant to be asserted that in these days of multifarious reading a man is bound to make a mere lumber-yard of his memory, by storing in it every thing which he chances to come across : and every one of us knows personally some men who would be far greater ornaments to society than they now are, had they taken half the pains to forget what they have remembered that they have to remember what they have forgotten. Yet in spite of all this, it is hard to imagine a much better intellectual discipline for any young man than to be compelled, in going over an English author, to stop at the end of every sentence and ask himself if he really understands what he has been reading. If forced by external pressure to do this thoroughly in a few instances, there is hope that on other occasions, when the work is worthy of it, he may be induced to do it for himself.

We recognize fully that in such a course as is laid down here, the knowledge of the literature will be necessarily imperfect and incomplete. Still, it is knowledge, so far as it goes, which is far more than can be said of the method now generally pursued. And the greatest and most desirable result of all has been achieved, if the scholar has by it been taught how to study. For in at least three cases out of five, the student is not going to stop with what he has acquired in the school-room. His *ποῦ στῶ* has been secured. He is on firm ground from which to prosecute his investigations for himself, and the interest he may have gained in any particular man or in any particular era, will lead him to extend his knowledge far beyond the little that has been made the subject of direct instruction in the limited time given to it in his college course. But even granting that he does nothing more, granting that after his school-life is ended, he never again looks at the works of a single classic author, yet even in such a case he has already done more than perhaps a majority of professedly educated men at present do. Suppose that under the proposed system he has gained a thorough knowledge of one master-piece of Chaucer,

one of Bacon, of Spenser, of Shakespeare, of Milton, of Dryden, of Addison, of Pope, of Burke, of Wordsworth, and of Tennyson. How many of our college graduates can ever say as much?

Are we told that we propose too much; that the method recommended, however fine in theory, will not work in practice; Or that it will divert the attention of the scholar from other studies equally necessary, if not more important? As to the object proposed being too high, if that is a fault, it is at least a fault that leans to virtue's side. Believing with Sir Philip Sidney that he who shoots his arrow at the sun, though he may not succeed in reaching what he is aiming at, will certainly shoot far higher than he who aims at something on a level with himself, we should hold it a far safer course to set up a standard difficult if not impossible of attainment, rather than one which is no perceptible improvement upon the standard now in use. But there is in reality nothing difficult or impossible of attainment in the standard here proposed. It will not work in practice! Why not? It is nothing more, indeed, than what in the study of Latin and Greek every college in the land requires in theory, however imperfectly many of them carry out the requirement in practice. No more is proposed here than that English should be treated no longer with the indifference with which it is now regarded, that it should be lifted up from the degradation in which it is now sunk, and that in all our schools it should take its rightful place beside all languages, living or dead, that are made the subjects of special instruction. There is, in reality, no compromise possible in this matter, no question of degree. The study must be either taught completely, or practically it will not be taught at all. In this case, fortunately, a middle course, the everlasting resource of middling minds, is not feasible. Nor, as actual experience will demonstrate far better than any statements that can be made here, will it take up so much of the time of the college course as from the extent of the subject might be supposed. For the great difficulty which retards the student in the acquisition of other languages and literatures is done away with entirely in this instance by his previous knowledge of his own tongue. Moreover this is a study that is ca-

pable of indefinite expansion and contraction : and whenever the authorities of any institution find that the pupils entrusted to their care, are beginning to know more of English and to devote more time to it than is good for them, a short application of any ordinary manual of our literature is all that will be required to bring the very ecstasy of enthusiasm down to the most rational level of indifference.

In the course of this Article it has been frequently implied, though it has not been directly stated, that English literature studied as here proposed, will not only be interesting in itself, but that in many cases it will be apt to awaken the enthusiasm of students. But let no one delude himself with the vain idea that it will be equally interesting to all, or that it will not be distasteful to some. We know that there flourishes at present a class of advanced thinkers, who hold that all the ignorance now prevailing in Christendom is due to the study of Latin and Greek ; that once sweep away these relics of the dark ages, and the road to wisdom becomes on the instant effulgent with shining light ; once remove these stumbling-blocks from his path, and the youthful student will go up the hill of science on a run ; or rather that to him, lying on his back in the shade, without the labor of plucking on his part, the fruit from the tree of knowledge will of its own accord drop into his open mouth. In that good time coming when Latin and Greek are abolished, and mathematics are finished at least by the age of fourteen, when the young American studies only what is useful and practical, above all when he will not be forced to learn anything he does not care to learn, then, when all these things come to pass, it might be hoped that the department, whose claims are advocated here, might survive and even flourish amid the wreck of matter and the crash of colleges. But so long as education implies work, the innate laziness of human nature may be trusted to render the acquisition of it hateful to some, and more or less difficult to all ; and grievous as is the fact, a knowledge of English literature can no more be gained without labor than a knowledge of any other branch of study. To him, indeed, who hates the toil of thinking it will be often irksome and distasteful, more especially if he belongs to that

class in whom literary taste has neither been implanted by nature nor developed by culture.

With a brief reply to an objection that may not possibly be urged, we close this part of our subject. It may be claimed that a knowledge of English literature can be better acquired later in life, after the mind is completely matured and its faculties thoroughly disciplined; that then it can be pursued to the best advantage, and from it the best results can be secured. It is not necessary to assert in answer that there is no branch of learning to which the same remark will not justly apply. It is not necessary to point out the absurdity of the policy of leaving to later years the development of the chief agency in the cultivation of literary taste. But it is necessary to protest most earnestly against the narrow idea of the importance of this study which the objection implies. For English—we use the word in its widest sense as including both the language and the literature—is to us not only second to no other study in importance, but is superior to all. It is not a matter of which any one, whatever be his profession in life, can justly afford to be ignorant. To us it is not and never can be a special study. A knowledge of it is not simply the privilege, it is the duty and should be the pride of every man who boasts his birth-right as a member of the great race which speaks it, who glories in his heritage in the words and works of illustrious men which are the majestic trophies of its intellectual conquests. But for the majority, that familiarity with what it has achieved must be gained in early years or never gained at all. We must look upon men as they are, not upon them as they ought to be; we must judge them by what they do, not by what they ought to do. It is a significant fact that in any country the classic authors are the last and least read. Particular exceptions may sometimes occur in the case of one or two, as, for instance, in English, in the case of Shakespeare. But for all that even the average educated man knows ordinarily of the great writers of his language, they might as well have written their works in a foreign tongue. Dryden, for illustration, is a prominent name in English literature. Yet how many of so-called educated men have consciously read a single line of his writings, or how many can be said to be familiar

with a single one of his productions? The same is true of the minor works of Milton, and would have been true of his *Paradise Lost*, had not the grammatical exercises of the preparatory schools kept alive the poem, while they destroyed the poetry. Indeed, to suppose that any one, in the turmoil of business, in the strife of politics or hurry of life, will stop and turn aside to acquire information which, in the quiet and leisure of early years he was unable to gain, or to develop literary taste which he then neglected to cultivate, is a belief which, however creditable to our faith in the average man, is not based upon a very accurate knowledge of his character. We may rest assured that the great authors of our language must, under ordinary circumstances, be studied in youth, or they will never be studied at all; and that the taste for literature must be developed then, if it is expected to manifest activity in later life.

We come now to the consideration of another subject, which, though not directly included in the department of English literature, is inseparably connected with it in our system of instruction. By what means shall the student be best enabled to acquire a clear and correct, if not an elegant style? The marked difference between this and the foregoing inquiries must be kept clearly in view. To borrow the terms of political economy, the student, instead of being a consumer, must be taught to become a successful producer of literature. A problem difficult of solution in itself varies here its conditions with the character and circumstances of the individual. This is not the place to enter into the minor details of this question. But there are connected with it some general principles which, clearly borne in mind, will not only save us from common errors, but will give us a distinct perception of the proper course to be pursued. Before doing this, however, it will be necessary to clear away some of the rubbish which has collected around this whole matter; and in so doing, it will be equally necessary to ascertain the exact value of a study now generally pursued in the college course.

Logic is sometimes and Rhetoric is almost always included in the department of English. This is in a great measure arbitrary, for both studies being universal in their nature have

no special connection with any one language. The former has up to a very late period led a somewhat feeble life ; but the latter has always shown more vitality, from its supposed tendency to enable the student to acquire a finished style. The demand for text-books being great, the subject has naturally been a favorite one for authors ; and just as in our country, men who do not have money enough to found a college, found instead of it a university, so men who have not brains enough to write a grammar, frequently try their hand upon a rhetoric. Doubtless many of the treatises on this subject, which so constantly appear, are of value. Yet, as a general rule, it can safely be said that the great difficulty with them is, that those which are good for anything are not fit for text-books, and those which are fitted for text-books are not good for anything. But granting, what is not impossible, that a perfect work has been produced, and that it will be taught by a perfectly competent instructor, yet the knowledge thus acquired will not have a particle of influence in imparting a single positive excellence of style. It is right at this point that the whole subject becomes involved in a fog which completely beclouds the intellects of many who ought to know better, but who without thinking fall in with the prevalent popular ideas floating about them.

For there is certainly a wide-spread opinion that by some method not very distinctly defined, every student can be taught to have a clear, expressive and forcible style. Practice of the instructed and precept of the instructor must both so conjoin and work together that nothing but the most glaring and culpable neglect on the part of the pupil can save him from writing English, if not elegantly, at least perspicuously. This is an idea so prevalent that some attention must be paid to it, though the slightest reflection is enough to convince any thinking man that a quality so subtle, so intangible, so incapable of ultimate analysis as style, can never be made the subject of direct instruction. That may give him a knowledge of the names of different styles and of the various characteristics which go to make up the one which is perfect ; but the perfect style itself it does not and it cannot impart. Rhetoric may enable a man to describe in scientific terms

what he has been doing, but it will never help him to do it. Admitting that the rules which it gives him are the best possible rules, it does not and it cannot furnish the power of applying them, which is the one point with which he as a writer is concerned. A fallacy in reasoning will be no clearer to his mind and no easier of detection, after logic tells him that its form is that of a disjunctive hypothetical with the major false. A man is not going to walk any better or faster after being made acquainted with the fact that the two principal bones of his leg are the tibia and the femur, nor will he strike a harder blow because he has learned that in so doing he bends the flexor and straightens the extensor muscles of his arm. Power and skill and grace come from a different quarter, and are entirely independent of the knowledge thus obtained. We well remember a young man who, before beginning his commencement oration, sat down, and as a preparatory exercise, read through the whole of Whately's treatise on Rhetoric, yet after finishing it was profoundly astonished to find that he was able to write no better than he could before. Such mistakes would be ludicrous were they not so common. For to every man who looks back in his own career upon wasted opportunities and misdirected efforts, there cannot fail to be an element of sadness in every instance he witnesses of energies perverted and enthusiasm misapplied.

But there is a certain work which rhetoric and rhetorical instruction can do, which is an important work, though far from having the value which is sometimes mistakenly claimed for it. But it is of a negative character, and its exact use must be clearly borne in mind and its exact limitations understood. The teacher cannot impart positive excellence. He cannot communicate the subtle graces of expression which arrest and fix the attention. He cannot convey even the appreciation, far less the realization of that rhythmical modulation, that balance of periods, that ebb and flow of movement, so regulated that nothing shall seem abrupt, nothing dissonant, nothing wanting to complete the perfect harmony of the sentence. He cannot even impart that first and simplest requisite of style, perspicuity: for back of clearness of expression lies clearness of ideas, and clearness of ideas is something out of his power

to give. But if he cannot impart positive excellence, he can at least save from positive defect ; he can correct the countless errors of language, whose presence is a discredit though their absence can hardly be called a virtue ; he can not only show what is to be shunned, but he can direct the attention to what is to be sought for and to be imitated ; and varying materially with his character and circumstances he can stimulate those under him, by precept and example, to higher degrees of attainment. But in general, he stands merely like a guide-board to point out the road to excellence ; he cannot save anyone from the toil and trouble of the journey. His work is a humble, but it is in most cases a necessary work, and faithfully and skillfully performed will often be no mean agency in the development of critical taste.

The question now remains, How is positive excellence to be obtained ? If power and skill in expression do not come from the study of Rhetoric, where do they come from ?

The peculiar character of any style is doubtless due to the peculiar character of the individual, which education may modify, but can neither give nor take away. But as the mark and the result of culture, it is due to that imitation, sometimes conscious, more often unconscious, of the style of others whom the individual regards as his superiors. Right here lies the true way and the only way to impart to any student the highest qualities of expression. Composition either in prose or poetry, is an imitative art, and that very fact points out the proper course to pursue. Throwing out of view the consideration of excessive natural ability, which may take any particular case out from under the operation of general laws, a good style can be acquired best and soonest—for the majority of men it may be said only—by a careful study of the best English writers, just as elegant manners can be best and soonest acquired, not by studying books of etiquette, but by associating with refined and cultivated persons. To become thoroughly conversant with the writings of a good author, to imitate unconsciously his manner, to be influenced by his words and thoughts, to feel profoundly his power, is worth more for the development of expression than all the study of all the grammatical and rhetorical rules that were ever in-

vented. He who has sat at the feet of the great masters of English literature need have no fear but their spirit will inform the life, and touch, as with fire, the lips of their disciple. But just in proportion as such an influence in the development of expression is more important than any other, in just the same proportion is it likely to be overlooked and despised, because its effects are not apparent upon the surface, and often do not manifest themselves until after long intervals of time. Not unfrequently, in consequence, are these effects referred by the common mind to causes with which they have no real connection. But great writers have never failed to arrive at correct results in their own case. Spenser acknowledges his obligation to Chaucer, Milton to Spenser. Pope called Dryden his master. None of these ever thought of attributing his superiority to the study of rhetorical rules.

And here it is, and on this account it is, that we make our final appeal for the fuller study of the language and literature we have inherited but have too much neglected and despised. It may be said that this end is already provided for; that the works of the greatest authors are read in every school, the men whose productions exhibit graces of style which modern writers do not pretend to surpass or even to rival. The argument is a fallacious one. No foreign author can do the work here demanded or have the effect here required. Their superiority will not be imitated, because, though it may be seen, it is not felt. If a student understood Latin, for instance, as he does English; if its words were as familiar, and came to him as spontaneously as the words in which are recounted the thoughts of his mind, the feelings of his heart, and the acts of his life, then the assertion would have a force not now belonging to it. But no such thing does take place or can take place, except in exceedingly rare instances. The ordinary student has no conception whatever of the beauty of the Latin arrangement and style. The same thing is frequently true of even an accomplished scholar, not because he does not have an intellectual comprehension of it, but because he does not feel it; and so long as the mind is absorbed in the intricacies of construction, it is little apt to be influenced by beauties of expression.

The highest culture must, therefore, be based upon the study of our own literature. Any other foundation is too narrow for us to think to build upon it lofty and enduring achievement. For the culture derived from any other source reaches its culminating point speedily. It has no healing waters in which to renew its vitality; it knows no fountain of youth, whose life-giving properties enable it to go on from strength to strength. The power of expression does not keep pace with the expansion of the other powers. The results of ripest study, of widest observation, of profoundest thought, are stated in the language of the school-boy. Nor can such a state of things be changed, except by the introduction of agencies that operate upon the mind in early years. The institution of learning which neglects literature may turn out in abundance great scholars, lawyers, metaphysicians, and statesmen; but it will never, save by accident, turn out men of letters. The atmosphere in which they flourish is not created; the stimulus that springs from association and sympathy is denied. And the policy of disregarding, not to say despising, this study produces its legitimate results. The culture created, such as it is, is shorn of its due influence both on the present and on future times. For the achievements of scholars, however great, fade in splendor with every new achievement of those who follow them. The fame of lawyers is confined to their own profession, and is as transitory as it is limited. Systems of philosophy wax and wane. The idol of the people to-day is but the shadow of a name to-morrow. The audience of all these is few, for they appeal but to a class or to a time. But literature appeals to all classes and to all times; and that oblivion, which sooner or later overtakes nearly all mortal achievement, reaches it last of all.

It has not been asserted, nor is it meant to be asserted, that the criticism here made of existing methods is true of all institutions of learning. It is by no means impossible that there are some schools in which far better methods than the one here proposed have been long in operation. But if such exist, they are confined to particular places and are practised by particular teachers. No satisfactory system of

instruction in our literature has yet been adopted generally, though culture everywhere languishes under the neglect. In this, as in other things, our words and works display their usual inconsistency. We complain, and complain justly, that with us artistic taste remains either undeveloped or is developed imperfectly, because the masterpieces of painting and sculpture are not here to be seen and studied. Yet, what right have we to make such a complaint, when a kindred culture and taste suffers from the neglect of master-pieces that are accessible to all, and whose very accessibility causes them to be disregarded and despised? We now go through English literature like the night-traveler on a great railway line, who whirled rapidly through hamlet and village, and city, reaches his destination at last with no knowledge of the country he has been through; nothing indeed, left upon his mind but a vivid consciousness of the weariness of his journey, and a confused remembrance of names and stations. We ask that this shall not simply be reformed indifferently, but shall be reformed altogether; that the chief agency in the refinement of mind, the cultivation of taste, and the development of expression, shall no longer be left to random study or individual caprice; and if Milton, in a less enlightened age, could avow his conviction that Spenser was a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas, we may be pardoned for the belief that such seed, sown in youth, will in later years flower out into a broad and generous culture and a manly life.

ARTICLE III.—YALE COLLEGE—SOME THOUGHTS RESPECTING ITS FUTURE.

SECOND ARTICLE.

In the last number of the *New Englander*, we made some suggestions in respect to the peculiar and distinctive work of the new era, on which the friends of Yale College believe it to be about to enter. The limits of the Article, which was then published, allowed us only to consider this work in a single line, or in one of its departments,—namely, that of unifying the institution, so as to make it no longer a Collegiate school, with certain “outside” departments loosely attached to the central body, but a University of coördinate and coequal branches. Unless this end is accomplished—we believe we express the sentiment of every friend of the College, whose mind is not unduly under the influence of erroneous ideas derived from the past—a University, in the best sense of that word, cannot exist in New Haven. The time has come when a step forward in this direction must be taken, or the inevitable result will be, that the institution will fall backward, sooner or later, into an inferior place. It will belong rather to the class of mere colleges, than to that higher class which will, in the future, deservedly have the higher name. This work of unification is, also, the first work that should be undertaken and carried out. It is essential to the noblest growth of the institution, and it is essential that it be done at once. It is, therefore, most proper that, in any discussion respecting the coming era, this subject should hold the first and most prominent place. But it is—as we intimated at the close of our previous Article, and as all are aware—only one among a number of important things which need to be accomplished. We trust it will not be deemed out of place, therefore, if we ask the attention of our readers, at the present time, to another point connected with this most interesting subject—the work to be done in the future.

The suggestion which we would now make is with reference

to suitable provisions and arrangements for those "graduated" students, who are pursuing a general and non-professional course of study. This class of persons have peculiar claims on the care and interest of the governing powers of the institution, whatever may be the light in which we look at them. To those who think only of the collegiate or academical department, and believe the other schools to be of little or no importance, the young men, who, having just taken their first degree in arts, propose to continue their past studies, can hardly fail to be objects of regard. The existence of such a body of young men residing at the college is an honor to their instructors, as well as a continual inspiration to the undergraduates who are following them. To those, on the other hand, who have larger views and who wish for a university, such graduates are of still greater consequence. They form one of *the essential parts* of the university, without which its life cannot, by any means, be complete. And even to those—if any such there can be—who have no care for the character and form of our higher institutions of learning, but yet desire the progress of literature and scholarly refinement in the country, it will be a matter of no slight moment to give this class of students the greatest advantages, since on them must largely depend all hopes which go out toward this end. And yet it is not strange that they have been the latest class even of graduate students to be provided for. Our country has made but slow progress, in the past, toward the higher regions of literary refinement. Another and more fundamental work has been essential to its earlier life. The various learned professions have, indeed, long since become necessary, and, accordingly, provision has been made at our educational institutions for those who would enter them. But scholarship, in those other fields which are less immediately connected with the every-day work of life, has been left to the older nations. Its importance has not been appreciated as if it were a thing of present need. There has, consequently, been little demand for it in the public mind, and little or no facilities for attaining it have been offered, even in those colleges which have begun to develop themselves outward toward the university idea. Within the last few years, however, there has been a great

advance in this direction. We have begun to feel that our country must not be a place for the exercise of practical energy, merely, and that learning must not be limited to those alone who are lawyers or preachers, but that we must be a nation of the truest and noblest culture—that scholars must find their home here, and must be honored here, as truly as in Europe. The call for a higher education in this field has, therefore, begun to arise. Our universities must have a department not only separate from the collegiate school, but also from the professional schools, which shall draw into itself many of the best minds and carry them onward in their scholarly culture. It is one of the honors of Yale College, that its governors were among the earliest, if not the very earliest, in the country to hear this call. When it had come only from two or three, as it were, scattered here and there—when the great body even of our educated countrymen had no sense, as yet, of the need of any such thing—they organized a new branch of the institution for these higher liberal studies. The Department of Philosophy and the Arts was created in 1846. It opened the way for the pursuit of natural science in its various departments, thus meeting the demands of the times in this direction. But, at the same time, it offered more advanced instruction in philosophy, and philology, and history, and similar studies to the graduates in arts, and to others who might desire it.

Of what this Department, in what we may call its philosophical and philological branch, has already accomplished, very favorable testimony has been borne by the presiding officer of our sister university at Cambridge. Persons among our own graduates, who, in years past, have enjoyed the advantages it affords,—as one of the number, the writer of this Article—can bear, from their own experience, a witness which, if not as honorable, is, if possible, even more heartfelt. But how little, we must all say, has it done as yet compared with what could be desired. How great is the work which opens before it in the future. In organizing this Department of Philosophy and the Arts, the College authorities, as we intimated in our former Article, made the institution *complete in its parts*. They gave to the growing University the Philosophical Faculty of the German Universities. But they were

unable to do anything more than this—except in the Scientific section of it, where the wonderful developments and demands of the age have carried forward the growth very rapidly. The want of the necessary funds rendered it impossible to make this faculty altogether distinct from the academical, and the want of appreciation of high scholarship in these philosophical and philological studies made the number of students a very limited one. A quarter of a century has, therefore, passed away and we still see only the small beginnings—two or three young men entering this section of the Department from year to year, and no instruction except from professors who are overburdened with other work. All honor to the Trustees of the College, it becomes all its friends and all the friends of education to say, that they saw so early, and made so early provision for, the new needs of the country. All honor, also, to the instructors for what they have accomplished under circumstances no more favorable, than have been, as yet, enjoyed. But no one can fail to see that the work of this part of the institution is, mainly, a work of the coming era. Much more must be done, in the future years, than has hitherto been done, or the guardians of the interests of the University hereafter will, in this regard, prove unequal in wisdom and energy to those who preceded them.

But the great question, as we enter on the new era, is, *what* is to be its work. What then, *in this department* of which we are now speaking, is to be done, to promote its efficiency and to make it in reality what it already is in name? The first thing, as we conceive, is to provide further instruction. All that is now done is to offer assistance in their studies in the higher Philosophy, Mathematics and Philology, to such young men of proper previous attainments as may desire it. This assistance is to be given by Professors who have duties, which afford them abundant employment, in the academical or scientific schools. In the practical working of the matter, therefore, the necessary tendency of things is to make it as small as possible. *To a large extent*, at the present time, it does not amount to positive instruction, but is only a permission given to the student to call on and consult the professor, when occasion may require. Such a permission is a far smaller ad-

vantage than it might seem to be at first sight, for it must be remembered that the professors are known to be pressed with other work, and the students, having most of them just graduated from the college, and having thus hardly escaped their feeling of awe toward the older members of the faculty, will scarcely approach the instructors with the perfect freedom that could be wished. The Professor gives his invitation, indeed, but the student either knows, or feels, that it is given with a certain reservation. An overworked man, he says to himself, who sets me no particular time for visiting him—whom I may find, when I call at his room, occupied with other things, or even with other students—the necessity of whose life compels him, it may be, to do much outside of his own special sphere, in order to support his family—such a man cannot wish to see me often. He makes his offer of advice and help with as good heart as may be possible, under the circumstances. I do not doubt this—but he cannot but be glad to have the time, which I should take from him, unbroken. I will wait for another day. I will pass over the present need. I will get on by myself as best I can. It is almost inevitable that he will reason thus, not once, but many times. These thoughts will rise as a hindrance in his way almost as often as he feels the want of assistance, and the result will be that his visits to his instructor will become very infrequent—perhaps, even more and more infrequent, the longer his course of study continues. The offered aid will be unused, and the student will be left to himself. Now we do not say, at this point of our discussion, that anything better could have been done in the past. We have been in the early days—the beginnings—and it is enough that the beginnings have been made. We must not look for the full completion of the plan, as yet. But—with every allowance and with no disposition to find fault—it must be admitted that this condition of things cannot last, if the institution is to grow, and to become what it may be and ought to be. There must be not only the offer of advice and assistance, when it is sought for; there must be definite and regular instruction, with responsibility on the part of the student. There must be lectures or recitations in connection with these studies as regularly as in the theological and law

schools. There must be somewhat of systematic organization, or there will be no permanent and large success.

A much more regularly organized section of the university is the first thing which, as it seems to us, is required, if proper provision is to be made for the class of graduated students, to whom we are referring. We shall not, of course, be misunderstood as urging any prescribed course of study for all the students, or any abridgment of personal freedom. This we have no wish for, and, certainly, it cannot be regarded as essential. But the section, whether it has ten students or fifty, should have an organized life, and its instruction should be systematic and positive,—as much so as any other of the higher departments of the University.

In order to the accomplishment of this end, it is of the highest importance that new professorships should be established, the incumbents of which should have no duties outside of this particular section. If the time of a Professor of Greek is needed for the instruction of students in the undergraduate department, who are in the rudiments and the early stages,—surely, the graduates, who wish to enter more fully into the genius of the language, and to become real scholars, ought not to be compelled to help themselves altogether, except so far as they may snatch an hour or two from his scanty leisure. They ought to have the highest order of instructor whom the University can command—a man who should be devoted to them, as fully as they may need him. The leading Greek scholar in the whole institution should be with them. And so, in the case of the other branches of study. If we are ever to hope for the highest scholarship in this country—if we are ever to give to culture its own proper place—we must accomplish the end in this way. We must not linger in the lower regions and give our thoughts wholly to the younger students. We must make the more full and complete provision for those who are pressing further onward and are to do most in their work.

But it will, doubtless, be said, that, while all this is very good as a theory, it cannot be accomplished for lack of funds. Professorships cannot be established without money, and there is no money. We, however, are speaking of the future—of

the work of the opening era—and, as we have already stated, one of the great things to be done in that era is to get money for the whole University. If the officers and friends of this college are to sit down in despair, with the feeling that its pecuniary resources cannot be enlarged, they might as well abandon their work at once. This is the essential thing for future progress, and it can be obtained, if judiciously and earnestly sought. Our suggestions are made on the assumption that this vital necessity is to be secured; and we say, that, on this assumption, these new professorships are imperatively required. The instruction in the higher philology and philosophy, &c., cannot be left, always, to professors of the academical or other departments, who are assigned to this *extra* duty, in addition to the performance of all their other work. As well might the theological school hope to reach its highest growth with no professors of its own. The remnants of a man's time and strength, after his daily labor is ended, are not and never can be sufficient for the greatest work possible to his powers. And yet, we must, of course, freely admit that a time must intervene before these new professorships can be established. It may be, at the best, some years before the funds of the University can be thus largely augmented. A present necessity must, therefore, be looked at, and we must inquire how the efficiency of this section of the institution can, even now, be increased. The course already adopted at Harvard University, gives a hint, at least, as to what may be done. So far as we understand the Harvard scheme, it seems to us to be open to some objections in minor points, but its introduction is an evidence of the energy and wisdom of the President of that institution. As a recent writer in the "Nation" has suggested, courses of lectures by the leading professors at Yale might be established; and, we may add, familiar exercises in which the students should come into personal connection with these professors, and should discuss with them the topics of interest connected with their studies or reading. Other eminently-qualified persons might, also, to a certain extent, be called in from outside of the college, to aid in the work. The range of subjects might be a wide one, and such as would interest and stimulate a large number of minds. The fees for attendance on these lectures

might be fixed at such a sum as would not be burdensome to the hearers, and, thus, would not shut out those of limited means. In this way, some slight compensation could be made to the instructors—but we can hardly doubt that the satisfaction of seeing the enthusiasm of the students, and the growth of their numbers, would be a sufficient reward, until the time of more abundant resources should come. The gentlemen—at least, those among them who were connected with the University, and we should say that these ought to be the larger or the more efficient part—might meet together as a faculty, and encourage and help each other in this way. We are persuaded that—while entire success cannot be attained, until new professorships, as indicated above, are established—a great deal more can be done, than has yet been done, with the means already at our disposal. In a few years, with such arrangements and others which can be devised, we cannot doubt, that the number of young men who would enter upon these courses of study, instead of being two or three as now, would be ten or twenty times as many. They would be not only graduates of this college, but graduates of other colleges as well, who would gladly come here to carry onward their education in the midst of these higher advantages. They would be representatives of every class in the country, who wish to gain a culture which they have never yet gained and cannot gain elsewhere. Why should not this step be taken at once? The present is as favorable a time as can ever offer, for the first onward movement. If it is made, not only will great good be done to many individual minds, and to the University as a whole; but the manifestation of energy and the beginning of success will render the gathering in of funds for the future and for the more perfect work a thing both easier and more certain of accomplishment. Men love to see success, and to make it still more successful. To him that hath shall be given, is a principle of the widest application.

There are, however, some other things which may be done, besides the providing of further instruction. Encouragements and helps may be given to students, and, thus, the number of students may be increased. According to the present arrangement of things, no certain advantages are offered to young

men entering upon this course of study. The present aids of a pecuniary nature are less, even, than those afforded to undergraduates, while the prospects for the future are, by no means, so sure as those opened before the professional and scientific students. We think something may be done, and ought to be done, within a few years, with reference to both these points. At present, all which the college has, to give, in this section of the department of Philosophy and the Arts, is the income of three scholarships—the largest income of the three being only one hundred and twenty dollars. After the payment of the annual fee for instruction, the student who holds this best of the scholarships finds himself with only twenty dollars as the proceeds of it. Certainly, an aspiring and enthusiastic youth—whose means are limited—will not find much encouragement to continue his classical or philosophical studies from such a source as this. He will feel himself compelled to give up these studies of his choice, and enter upon some other course, which may either afford him greater assistance at once, or, at least, may compensate him by the larger rewards which it will secure to him in after years. The present inducements of this character we may, therefore, say are nothing. So far as our knowledge extends, no one has ever been led to remain at Yale College, after graduation, by these existing scholarships. But little competition has been known in the case of that one among them, the income of which has depended altogether upon continued residence at New Haven. It has been sought for only by those who, on other grounds, had determined upon this course, and has by them been regarded as a matter of not much moment. Twenty dollars or a hundred and twenty, in these days, are not worth much striving for—and the honor of obtaining that for which there is no competition, is not great enough to call forth any considerable effort or enthusiasm. The founders of these scholarships deserve the credit of their work, and, especially, of their appreciation of this great need of the University. But the coming era cannot be content with no greater things than these. The establishment of fellowships, which shall produce, according to the common phrase, ‘a living income,’ is a matter of the highest importance. The foundation of each of these fellowships

should be from ten to fifteen or twenty thousand dollars. The time of holding them, also, should be lengthened from two years, as in the case of the existing scholarships, to four—or even six years. They would, thus, become really valuable, and would be a powerful stimulus to many minds. Even one such fellowship, opening itself to competition in every year, would be of the greatest possible service. It would benefit not only the successful candidate, but others likewise. It would, in many cases, be the means of drawing both the unsuccessful and the successful ones into this section of the University. The means for such foundations should be earnestly solicited. They can be secured, as we believe, at no very distant day.

But here again we must admit, that there will be an interval of time before this result can be reached. Cannot anything be done in this interval? Perhaps not in the way of pecuniary aid. In other ways, however, we are sure that a beginning may be made at once. It appears to us, that the prospects for the future for this class of students might be rendered much brighter and more certain than they now are. At present, a young man in this department of study is in the most uncertain of all positions. He has not a fraction of the ground for confidence respecting an opening for the exercise of his powers in after life, which a lawyer or a minister may have. This, no doubt, is largely owing to circumstances beyond control. The age of scholarly culture is only just dawning, and the places for scholarly men are comparatively few. We do not see, however, why the Tutorships or Assistant Professorships in the college might not be regularly filled from students of this class. On the present system, the elections to the Tutorship are made from among the highest on the list of “appointments” at Commencement. Two or three years after graduation, the valedictorian or salutatorian of a class is called to this office of instruction, because he had such a rank as a scholar in his college course, and because the Faculty judge, from what they remember of him, that he will discharge its duties well. It can be no wonder, surely, if, on such a system, mistaken choices are sometimes made. Valedictorians are, now and then at least, not distinguished as real scholars, when

they graduate. They are, by no means, certain to be so three years afterwards—and even less certain to be good teachers. But if this important office of instruction is filled in the way we suggest, the candidates will be all of them persons who are known to be continuing their studies, and to be making real progress. They can be observed by the college authorities, as they go forwards. The best among them can be chosen. The appointment can become a reward, the hope of which will make all of them as good as possible. An arrangement of this character will tend toward beneficial results for the college itself, while it will, at the same time, encourage the students of the Department. It will encourage them, because these students, looking as they naturally will toward an academic or literary life, will hold such an official position in very different esteem from their college classmates who become doctors or merchants. They will find here a stepping-stone to a higher position, or a preparation for their chosen course of life. The authorities of the College might, also, systematically aid, so far as in their power,—and might let it be distinctly known that they would aid,—these students to obtain places as teachers, or other more purely literary posts, elsewhere. It cannot be doubted, that this is the class of men who ought to be teachers. The growth and needs of the country are such, now, that teaching is beginning to be as much a profession as the ministry is. Why should not the profession be filled, like that of the ministry, from those who have been specially educated for it?

If, in these ways, the prospects for the future of these graduate students could be made more certain than they now are, the influence of such greater certainty would be, undoubtedly, to increase the number of young men who would thus devote themselves to general studies. Our Universities must, it is true, wait for their highest success and most perfect development, until the demands of the country are greater. But they must educate the country, continually, toward the higher demands, by keeping steadily in advance of the present public sentiment. They must provide every inducement, which they can, even now, and must furnish all possible aid, if they are to fulfill their mission. It is thus, that they are to prepare the

way for the better future, as well as to be ready for it when it comes.

There is another thing, which, we think, can be done, and done immediately, for the growth and success of this section of the University. Students, if they are to enter upon these higher studies in philosophy, philology, &c., need not only the encouragements of present aid and future rewards. They need, also, *an inspiration* to make them ready to choose the course, which thus offers itself to them. They need, *in their undergraduate life*, to have *their love for the studies awakened*, so that they shall be glad to go forward in them. Especially is this the case in the classical languages. Young men, at the age of graduation, are somewhat prone to like mental and moral philosophy—studies which makes them realize, more than any others, the intellectual powers just maturing within them—while, in regard to the mathematics, the gift for these is a comparatively rare one and is usually accompanied, where it exists, by its own inspiration. The almost universal complaint, on the other hand is, that there is little enthusiasm for classical studies; and great numbers even of college graduates are declaring, largely on this account, we believe, that they ought not to be required in a collegiate course. We do not propose here to discuss the general question respecting these studies. So far as our present purpose is concerned, this question may be settled in either way. It is enough for us to take the general admission, that it is well to have a class of classical students, and, if so, to make them as ardent in their work as possible. But, if this be admitted, everything ought to be done in the Academical department of the University to awaken this ardor in such minds. If there are to be a goodly number of these students in the section devoted to the higher general studies, it must be thus awakened. But how shall this object be accomplished?

A step has been taken at Yale College, already, in connection with this matter, which is likely to be helpful to the end in view. The students are not compelled to go forward, as they were formerly, all together—and, thus, no faster or farther than the slower ones could advance. They are arranged in divisions, according to their scholarship, and the higher

ranks make correspondingly greater progress. The results of this experiment—which met objections from some persons of great wisdom, at its first suggestion—have been even more favorable, if we mistake not, than most of the college officers anticipated. But there are other steps which, we think, still need to be taken. The classical languages, as we conceive, are taught with too exclusive reference to what is called “discipline.” Now every body, who knows anything on this subject, knows that these languages, like all others, must be studied and understood in their construction and all their grammatical minutiae, if they are to be thoroughly acquired. All persons, also, agree, that one of the great advantages of the study of these languages, is the mental discipline which is gained from this sort of investigation of them. But a man will never love a language of which he knows nothing but the grammar. It is doubtful if even the celebrated German professor, who lamented that he had not devoted his life exclusively to the dative case, would have appreciated the beauty of such a study, unless he had learned something beyond this. And it is, by no means, strange, if young men in our colleges, whose minds have been so largely confined to grammatical points,—to analysis of words and similar matters—should, at their graduation, have little enthusiasm for the classical authors, or should, at that time, lay them aside, once for all. How much would men study or enjoy the modern languages of Europe, or even our own, if this were the aim of all their reading? In every other case, we study the grammar for the language, while, in this case, we reverse the process and make the language the means and the grammar the end. We cannot help believing, that there is a great mistake here, in the arrangements of our college instruction. The best scholars, even, while they are drilled in analysis and forms and rules, are most tryingly deficient in knowledge of the vocabulary of Latin and Greek. They have not learned to dispense, in any considerable measure, with the dictionary, though they may have the grammatical principles most perfectly at command. Only one-half of the work has been accomplished for them; and, so far as the matter of their enthusiasm is concerned, only that half which is least likely to awaken it. A person who

cannot lay aside his German lexicon, but must refer to it a score of times for every page he reads, will, almost certainly, like English better. The scholar in Greek or Latin is subject, according to his measure, to the same rule. We say, according to his measure, for we fully admit, that, in the case of Greek particularly, we cannot easily hope for such entire freedom from bondage, in this regard, as we often attain in German or in French. Nevertheless, we believe it to be possible that our students should know far more of the vocabulary of the classical languages, at the close of their college course, than they now do; and, just in proportion as they do know more in this way, will their interest in these languages be increased. And while no one believes in the necessity of grammatical study more than we do, we are ready to go so far as to say, that it is better, in every point of view, for a man to be able to read fluently, at graduation, a dialogue of Plato or a chapter of Tacitus, than it is for him ever to have been able to repeat all the forty or fifty exceptions to some minor rule of Latin prosody. Let us carry forward the grammatical studies as far as we can consistently with other ends—let us demand of the preparatory schools a more perfect drill in this department. But do not let us lose everything else in the pursuit of this one object.

The reading, then, of Greek and Latin, with a view to familiarity with the language as distinguished from the grammar, we believe to be a thing of very essential importance. Our college curriculum ought to include such studying of these languages as should deliver the young men, in some degree, from the bondage of school-boys, and should introduce them to somewhat, at least, of the freedom of real scholars. But not only should this be accomplished. In connection with it, another result should be aimed at, which, under the existing system, is very difficult to be attained. The mind of the student should be awakened to an appreciation of the richness of thought, of the grace, of the rhetorical power, of all that is beautiful in the style, of the words which he reads. These things vanish from the sight of him who is searching only amid dry details. They hide themselves in a higher sphere. If we could suppose a person to study the poems of Milton or

the writings of Burke, as our young men, in the colleges, too generally study the works of the ancient authors—that is, if he were to read but a page or two a day, with a laborious use of the dictionary, and with his attention almost exclusively turned to the derivation of words, or the construction of sentences, or the force of the smallest particles, how little could we expect him to know of that which gives these celebrated writers their fame! He must read long passages at once—whole poems or orations, it may be—in order that he may understand the authors' plan and thought, and may feel the force of what they say. He must read again and again, and try to possess himself of everything which, under the inspiration and direction of their genius, contributes to the accomplishment of their design. He must study their works as if he were to make them the models for his own imitation. He must enter into their spirit. To know the name of every rhetorical figure, and the history of every word as a mere word, in Shakespeare's Plays is not to know those Plays as one ought to know them. Certainly, to know them thus is not likely to awaken love for them. And this, not because grammar and all that belongs to it, or with it, is not useful or essential to the highest scholarship, but because there is something higher and freer and more inspiring than grammar. Homer might as easily, as it seems to us, have produced his wonderful poems by thinking only of the force of his own particles, as the student of Homer learn to know or love the beauty of those poems by thinking only of the same thing. It is the letter, here as elsewhere, that kills, and the spirit, alone, that gives true life. We press this point, with something of reiteration even, because we regard it as of so great importance. If our college graduates are to have enthusiasm for classical study—if they are to receive, in their earlier course, the impulse to go onward in these studies after their graduation—if the section of our University, of which we are now speaking, is to be filled with its due proportion of ardent lovers of these ancient languages—this higher, (or, if that word be objected to, this more love-inspiring,) part of the study must be much more largely cultivated in the undergraduate years. Young men do not love the classics, because they do not appreciate that

which is rich and beautiful in them. They do not appreciate this, because they are not, carefully and earnestly, taught concerning it. They are not thus taught, because the established system of teaching has been founded so largely on an opposite theory. In the case of English writers, they know the language so familiarly that they naturally study them with reference to style and thought, and, thus, they come to believe in, and to be enthusiastic for, English studies, while they depreciate Latin and Greek, and think them useless or a wearisome burden. The reason of the opposite feelings, and the means of bringing them to a greater similarity, are not difficult of discovery. There was a great deal of force, as we have often thought, in the remark of a foreign acquaintance of ours, on the comparative merits of Schiller and Shakespeare. He regarded the former, he said, as a greater poet than the latter, and, then, with great simplicity and candor, added, "And the reason is, because I understand Schiller and do not understand Shakespeare." Let us make our college students understand the beauties of the *Iliad* or the *Antigone*, as they understand those of the noblest English poems, and they will not be content to give up their classical reading. But they cannot thus understand them, if they study only grammatical rules.

We add still another thing, which we think may be done in the undergraduate course to create and increase enthusiasm for these studies, and, thus, may be to the advantage of that section of the University, of which, in this Article, we are speaking. According to the present system, as it seems to us, the student is confined too entirely to the work of mere recitation. He translates a passage of a few lines, or answers certain questions of his instructor, and this is all. He has little or no opportunity to ask questions himself, or to suggest points of discussion which may have interested his own mind. Only one half, therefore, of what is desirable is accomplished for him. We believe, that the other half is greatly needed. A young man in college, who knows that, in the recitation or lecture-room, he must be limited to those matters which, in carrying forward his own plan, the professor is dwelling upon, will learn to prepare himself for the demands made upon him, but he will not be likely to go beyond the routine of these

things. He will follow his teacher and depend wholly upon him, without the independent awakening of his own mind. He will lose the inward stimulus which comes from the knowledge, that every inquiry of his own suggestion can present itself for discussion and decision. But, on the other hand, if the instructor is ready to answer as well as to ask questions, and if time is given for the student to say what his own investigation impels him to say, it is almost beyond question that he will look at points which are outside of any mere routine. He will investigate the difficulties which he meets. He will inquire into this and that topic which, though not in the immediate line of the daily task set before him, are naturally suggested by it. He will be continually incited to raise questions before his own mind, and to try to answer them, because he knows that, if he cannot answer them after such trial, he will be aided by his instructor. He will be glad to learn new things connected with his study, continually, and, as he is learning them, his love for the study will constantly increase. We cannot help believing, that, under such a system as this, five minds would be awakened to enthusiasm, where one is, at present. And this is what we want. The ends of education are not attained, when a certain kind of mental discipline is given and everything besides this is neglected. The implantation in the soul of love for the study is, perhaps, better than all things else; such a love as will inspire the student to continue his work, in after years, and will make knowledge seem to be a thing infinitely to be desired—a reward compensating for every labor and bringing a most perfect satisfaction. Would that such love might be implanted in the soul of every student! It would be worth the loss, even,—if that were necessary,—of some mental discipline. But it can be gained, as we believe, without any such loss.

It may be said, indeed, that the time is wanting for the accomplishment of both these objects, and that it is better to secure one of them perfectly, than to make but half-way work with both. We admit that the time is very fully occupied. It is for this reason that we think a large increase in the number of instructors, in the academical department, is imperatively required. The students need to be divided into smaller

sub-divisions, where there can be freer opportunity for all of which we have spoken. But a beginning can be made, we think, even now. If even one exercise in each week could be taken from the ordinary recitation work and devoted to such discussion or questioning, or if one-fourth part of every recitation hour could be thus employed, the results would more than justify the outlay. At almost any sacrifice the results ought to be secured.

We are not here discussing this point, or the others of which mention has been made in connection with the undergraduate department, with reference to themselves and to their own importance. We have only in view, at the present time, the relation of them to the growth of the higher department of philology and philosophy. It is sufficient, therefore, to hint at what is needed, and to show what would be its bearing on the end to be desired. Another time and place would be more suitable for a full development of the whole subject. We would, only, add that we would not speak exclusively of the classical studies. The same thing may be urged, to a greater or less extent, with regard to every branch which is to be pursued in this higher department. More inspiration and enthusiasm need to be imparted in the earlier course, if there is to be any fullness of growth in the later course. The preparation of this character must be made in the part of the University where the education begins, in order that the part, where it is carried onward toward the highest culture, may be enabled to do its work for the greatest number and with the most perfect success. We wish it to be borne in mind, also, that we would not demand too much at once. The changes, which are needed,—if our views are correct,—cannot be made in a moment. The full and satisfactory accomplishment of them will require the progress of years and a large increase of means. A University cannot grow into perfection in a year or in a score of years. It cannot do with ten thousand the work which requires twenty thousand. It must move gradually, and must wait, often, for opportunities and possibilities as yet unrealized. No greater unreasonableness can be manifested than in the way of indiscriminate fault-finding. The men of the past generations could not do what we can, and we cannot

do, to-day, what may be an easy work for those who shall come after us. In our discussion, at this time, we are only endeavoring to show where work is needed and what early steps may be taken now. The coming era has its peculiar work. Its dawning is upon us. How are we to meet it? What courses of action shall we enter upon, and what shall we try to do in each one of them as we first enter upon it?

If we may divide the Department of Philosophy and the Arts into two sections, and, for the purposes of our present thought, call the section devoted to general studies, (not within the field of Natural Science), the Department of Philosophy—the great work of the coming years, of which we now speak, is the work of strengthening this department. It has had a name to live, thus far. It needs to live in reality. Even in its imperfect state, it has accomplished some praiseworthy results. It needs, with a more perfect organization, to do a larger and better work. *The university needs to grow into completeness, in this section of its life.* And, if it does, it will accomplish for American scholarship—for the refinement and cultivation of the people—in the future, more, perhaps, than any mind can measure or estimate.

We are aware that against all which we have said some persons may urge, that the attempt is useless—that such high education is best obtained in Europe, and that students will, certainly, go there, if they desire it. We believe this to be true, to a certain extent, and we believe that our young men ought to go to those older countries, for this object. But this need not prevent our doing all we can at home. If the Universities abroad are to be better than ours, for a hundred or five hundred years to come, or for all time even, there is still no reason why our own should not be made as good as possible, in every part. The more a young man knows when he goes to the European universities, the more good his sojourn there will accomplish for him. The longer he can study at home—within certain limits—the better it will be for his final success. All of us, who have been in Germany, know how many American students there lose one half, or more than one half, of what they go thither to gain, because of their imperfect preparation for their work. They have not made progress enough at home

to know what they need, and, much less, how to get it when they enter upon their course there. There is, as it seems to us, therefore, abundant work for this department of our own University. It will at least qualify its students to go abroad, if it cannot secure them what can be given abroad. It will do much to accomplish the result which we think must be hoped for in the future—name'y, to keep young men from entering upon the active work of life, before they have escaped their immaturity. The restless spirit which makes us impatient to be preachers or lawyers—to be “settled,” as we say, in some great business—as soon as possible after manhood commences, must, it would seem, give way as our nation grows older and more populous. When it does, men will be content to prepare themselves more thoroughly for their work. They will have a broader and larger education than they are now willing to wait for. The wide-spread want of confidence in every man who knows anything, in any department, which we see in our country now, will give way to a juster estimate of things. Even public office, it is to be hoped, will open itself only to those who are, in some measure, qualified for it. But all this is not to be secured without any efforts or means for securing it. The popular mind must be educated through the higher education that is given to the more favored classes at the Universities. The better influences must come from these higher sources. There is, then, as it seems to us, abundant ground for every effort to develop the department of which we speak. It is a way in which we are to move onward towards the completeness of the University itself. It is a way in which we are to gain for culture its true place in the national life. It is a way in which we are to give to many an ardent youth one of the greatest blessings that can be bestowed upon him. It is a way in which—if that result is ever to be attained—we are to put ourselves, at some future time, in this regard, on a level with the European world.

We have referred, in these pages, to this section of our University and to what should be done for it, not because we regard it as of more importance than the professional and scientific schools, or than the Academic department, but because it is the section which, as yet, is least perfectly developed.

Elsewhere, we have not only the form, but, in some measure, the actual and successful organization of the parts of the complete University. Here we have the form, but, as yet, little more. The entire working power has been from outside of the section itself, and the results have been very limited. Believing, as we do, that the work of the coming era is that of making the institution no longer a college with outside schools, but a university composed of coördinate and co-equal branches—it becomes us, in any more particular discussion of that work, to consider, at the outset, that branch which has attained the least completeness. If we are deficient, anywhere, in the *form* of the University, certainly, one of earliest works to which we are called is, to fill out the deficiency. If we have, in any part, the *form* without *the fullness of the reality*, we should, as soon as possible, attempt to reach that fullness. So the great end is to be accomplished. The weaker parts, also—as we have said in our previous Article—need the first thought and the most tender care. Do not let us neglect anything, whether it be weaker or stronger—but, while we give thought enough to that which is already moving on successfully, let us bestow especial attention on that which needs helping that it may move at all. This is the part of the wise general, or the wise statesman, or the wise guardian of any work, for the accomplishment of which the varied parts must move on together in a successful way. The officers of a university must obey the great general laws of human life, if they would honorably and usefully discharge their trust. Moreover this section is the one which, in a certain sense, seems to gather into itself, more than any other, the university spirit. Culture for its own sake, and not merely for its practical *uses*,—culture as a good in itself—this is one of the mottoes of a University. Not to despise—rather to glory in the *uses* of knowledge and its beneficial influence on mankind—but, at the same time, not to despise, but to glory in *knowledge as the enrichment of the man's own soul*, this is the spirit of the halls consecrated to learning. The section of the University, where the student is learning only for learning's sake—where his studies are, least of all, connected with the practical works

of life (except, indeed, the work of leading others to knowledge)—this section is the sanctuary, as it were, of this spirit, and ought to be guarded with jealous care, and adorned with everything that is beautiful, by those who watch for the welfare of the whole University. We hope and believe, that those who may have in charge the interests of Yale College will not lose sight of this great work of the coming era. It is one which may appropriately follow, or connect itself with, or even make a part of, that which we set forth in the last number of the *New Englander*, and without which, as we believe, the glory of the future will be lost.

ARTICLE IV.—MODERN JUDAISM.

What is Judaism? or a Few Words to the Jews. By Rev. RAPHAEL D'C LEWIN. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 90, 92, and 94 Grand street. 1870.

TAKING up casually the little volume that heads this Article, our thoughts have been drawn to the subject of God's ancient people, and to some new developments of modern Judaism that are not without interest.

The Reformation, with its broader light of reason and charity, did not bring with it more liberal and intelligent views in respect to the Jews; and it entirely failed to awaken the least right Christian sentiment toward this people, or to lead to a better treatment of them; and down to this day in Europe, Jewish persecution has continued, more silent than in the middle-ages, yet almost equally great, only substituting the written law for the violent hand. And yet it is a well-proved historical fact that the Jews, in no age since their dispersion, have been, unless stirred up by persecution, a troublesome people in the State; on the contrary, they have been an industrious part of the population, minding their own affairs, and, from fear and policy, scrupulously regardful of law. They have often borne Christian persecution with Christian patience. Children of a true faith but of a perverted hope, amid convulsions sufficient to have annihilated the strongest national life, they have seen vigorous nations die, and yet have preserved their individuality of race and moral characteristics; and, can we doubt, that they are kept for something greater and better? Intertwined in the past and the future with the religious destiny of the world, is not the Jew really a representative religious man? He was once recognized to be a child of God as a Jew; and may he not, in some sense, in the future, still be accepted of heaven, and be right in the sight of God, as a Jew? Judaism is held by its adherents to be the

very essence and substance of religion, as representing the foundation-principle of belief in "the one only God." This is true in regard to the pure religion of the Jews. Here is the substratum on which true religion is built. Let Christian and Jew dig down to their original foundations, and these will be seen to be composed of this same great underlying truth. The glory of the Jew is, that he preserved, more faithfully than all other peoples, the original revelation made to man of the unity of God. Ernest Renan makes this the theme of one of his eloquent but fanciful generalizations; and he thus portrays with facile pen, the Semitic character and religion, applying this description especially to the Hebrew race:

"Their character is religious rather than political, and the mainspring of their religion is the conception of the unity of God. Their religious phraseology is simple, and free from mythological elements. Their religious feelings are strong, exclusive, intolerant, and sustained by a fervor which finds its peculiar expression in prophetic visions. Compared to the Aryan nations, they are found deficient in scientific and philosophical ingenuity. Their poetry is chiefly subjective or lyrical, and we look in vain among their poets for excellence in epic and dramatic compositions. Painting and the plastic arts have never arrived at a higher than the decorative stage. Their political inability to organize on a large scale has deprived them of the means of military success. Perhaps the most general feature of their character is a negative one—their inability to perceive the general and the abstract, whether in thought, language, religion, poetry, or politics; and, on the other hand, a strong attraction toward the individual and personal, which makes them monotheistic in religion, lyrical in poetry, monarchical in politics, abrupt in style, and useless for speculation."

Max Müller justly criticises this analysis of Renan, and shows its unsoundness in some essential particulars; and especially he proves the falsity of Renan's theory that the monotheistic principle of the Jew, and of the Semitic nations generally, springs from a constitutional instinct; he shows the absurdity of the idea that the Semitic nations who have been at turns worshipers of Elohim, Jehovah, Sabaoth, Moloch,

Nisroch, Rimmon, Nebo, Dagon, Ashtaroath, Baal—the sun, moon, planets, and all the host of heaven,—were endowed above other nations, with a monotheistic instinct. The many and frequent lapses of the Jews into polytheistic worship, are also at variance with this theory. That mere natural instinct does not lead men to the belief in the unity of God, it might be proved from the fact that polytheism, or belief in many gods, even if it do not and cannot precede belief in a God, still may precede, and probably has often done so, belief in one only God. And that mere philosophy does not lead men to this belief in the unity of God, there is a curious illustration in the history of the Jews themselves, when, in the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes, the most learned men among the Jews and those most addicted to Greek philosophy, entered into a plot to destroy the worship of one God, and to introduce pagan rites.

But it is nevertheless true, that we owe to the Jew the preservation of the revealed truth of the One Supreme God, the Creator (not only the architect as Anaxagoras held, but the Creator) of the world and of men—the Father of spirits—besides whom there is no other God. This is assuredly the root-principle of religion, and to the Jews are we indebted for the conservation of this precious truth, perceived with inspired clearness by Abraham, and handed down through the patriarchs and prophets to the time of the fuller revelation of the nature and will of God in Jesus Christ, who himself, after the flesh, was a Jew. This belief in one God is the groundwork of morality as well as of religion; since polytheism could afford no standard of right action, though flashes of natural virtue are seen in all ancient religions; but Judaism, or the pure Judaism, clearly set forth the solid basis of the divine will, or law, of God, for Christianity, ethical and spiritual, to rest upon. Christianity does not repudiate (we call upon our Jewish brethren to note this) true Judaism, but rather builds upon it. Here is the moral foundation of a more spiritual religion. Christ did not destroy the law and the prophets; he confirmed their teachings, leading them up to higher developments of the nature and law of God, showing the true character of that law to be love, and, as exhibited toward man, to be human redemption from sin. The law came by Moses, but

grace and truth by Jesus Christ. We see the unity and at the same time the difference of the two religions. This grace and truth which belong to Christ's religion, belong to the individual heart, as the revelation and gift of God through Christ to it, whereas Judaism, even as we see it in the Old Testament, was more of a general and national, than a personal faith; to be sure the best spirits like David and Isaiah pierced through the theocratic to the personal truth; but it represented God as the law-giver of a nation, and every Jew as a member belonging to this national kingdom of God, and claiming its common privileges and benefits, rather than one, who in and by himself, was united to God by his own act of faith. Although, therefore, Judaism contained the germ of a higher faith, yet it was but the germ. In Christianity God is brought nigh the heart of man, and in his Son we may see the Father, and come to Him, and love Him, whereas in the Judaic system God was abstracted from the intimate fellowship of man—a king ruling in the loneliness of his terrible majesty, with “clouds and darkness” about His throne—a being of holiness and power, rather than of love and grace.

But we would speak especially of the modern aspects of this wonderful people and their religion, as far as we are acquainted with them. It were an invidious task to show that the ancient pure faith of the Jews, which the Saviour himself pronounced to be a standard of moral guilelessness, has, as a general thing, sunken in these days into many superstitious and gross errors, being brought slavishly under the influence of the traditional law, or of the Talmud and other Rabbinical scriptures, which exercise a minute and rigid despotism over every act, destructive of free will, and tend to make the Jew still more of a bigoted Jew in his intolerance and isolation. The Talmud, although an English writer has recently expended great powers of brilliant scholarship to establish its claims to an original authenticity, and an almost equal authority with the Old Testament, has, in the opinion of the most eminent Hebraists, by its assumptions and interpretations, gone far to destroy the spirituality of the law of Moses, and to introduce the most puerile and even vicious beliefs and customs—such

as prayers offered to saints and relics, the doctrine of Purgatory, the allowance of usury, the forbidding of agriculture, the repression of all sympathy with other faiths and nations, and the inculcation of a Jesuitical dealing with others than Jews, that have greatly corrupted the morality of the Jewish character. Not only has the veil been upon the heart of congregations where Moses is read, but it is to be feared that Moses is not much read at all ; and if he is, it is in the synagogues in the Hebrew tongue, which language is a dead language now to multitudes of the younger Jews, in England and our own country, who, if they are taught to read Hebrew, are taught to read or pronounce merely the character, without understanding its meaning.

On the other hand, the tendency among some Hebrew communities, is strong towards out and out infidel opinions, especially among the Jews of Germany ; and many of the most learned and acute opposers of supernatural truth, of late years, have been of the Jewish race.

But let us, before going further, endeavor to give some little idea of the number and extent of the Hebrew race at the present time, and the countries where they are principally to be found.

Berghaus, in his “ Physical Atlas,” quoted by Max Müller gives the following division of the human race according to religion :

Buddhists,.....	31.2	per cent.
Christians,.....	30.7	“ “
Mohammedans,.....	15.7	“ “
Brahminists,.....	13.4	“ “
Heathens,.....	8.7	“ “
Jews,.....	0.3	“ “

The number of Jews who are now upon the earth is commonly computed in round numbers to be six millions, which is somewhere about Berghaus’s estimate. Of these the greater part are in the East, in the Mohammedan portions of Europe, Asia and Africa. There are said to be not less than five hundred thousand of Jewish descent under the name of “ Falashas,” in Abyssina. The word “ Falasha ” means “ exile.” This people still preserve a kind of hieratic or sacred language

used in their devotions, which differs from the native "Amharic," and which is called the "Agaou," in which occur many Hebrew and Biblical words. The Jews are found in large numbers in Poland, and in all parts of northern Germany, where in their changed names and mental traits they have been powerfully assimilated by the strong German genius, and can hardly be discriminated from the native Teuton. There are also nearly five hundred thousand Israelites in Hungary, who have lately laid claims to be regarded as one of the legally recognized confessions; and there are some hundreds of thousands in the United States.

In many respects they are still a favored people. They are intellectually a highly-organized race. Every age reproduces in traits of mental fineness and power, the Bezaleels, Davids, Solomons, Ezras, Gamaliels, of ancient days. In philology, mathematics and music, the Jews have led the way in modern times. The university of Cordova at its greatest illumination, was but a reflection of Jewish mind; and the literature of Spain is more highly indebted than is commonly supposed to Hebrew genius. In philosophy there are such names as Spinoza, Moses Mendelssohn, and David Friedländer. We have only to mention an Augustus Neander, as an instance of the deep grasp which the Hebrew intellect is capable of in theology, and philosophy of history—a Felix Bartholdy Mendelssohn, in the musical art—a Heinrich Heine, a Berthold Auerbach, and a Benjamin D'Israeli, in literature—the Rothschilds, in practical fields of traffic. In the productive arts that are directed to the attainment of wealth (which was the original peaceful occupation of the Jew) this people are to a proverb unrivalled. Under the most grinding disabilities they have overcome competition, and money has flowed into their coffers; and thus, though studiously concealed, their influence, through their immensely ramified business resources, has ever been considerable in the affairs of men. They are the princes of *haute finance*. Auerbach says: "The Jews, scattered among all peoples, have become constituent elements of the traffic of the world." The Jew loves money as well as ever; he is a money-changer as of old; he incarnates the money-passion; but it is interesting, almost amusing, to read in the words of a Jew, such a strong, if it be half-ironical,

assault, upon a modern phase of financial wisdom and form of bonded money-capital that now prevails throughout Christendom,—as the following extract by the author last quoted, introduced in one of those remarkable fictions that search the springs of human action and society with subtle penetration, if not from the highest spiritual point of view:—

“Government securities are to-day the curse of our world. Whom can you lend millions to? Nobody but the government. If there were no government securities, there would be no one who could lend so much. Once, nobody could lend so many millions, for he could not invest so much; but now, there are these securities, and the whole world is living on usury; and usury is canonically prohibited. In old times the rich man had a quantity of real estate; a great deal of field and forest. Then he was a dependent on God's dear sun, and when all had reached its full time, and was ripe for the harvest, he gave a tithe to the Church. But now, wealth is laid away in fire-proof and burglar-proof safes; not dependent on sun, wind, and weather, not to be seen by the world, and no tenth of the produce to be given, and only a little premium, in the shape of coupons, to be presented at the banker's. The harvest of the man who holds government securities consists in cutting coupons; these are the sheaves which he houses in his granary. If the Lord were to come to earth to-day, he would find no temples from which to drive the traders and money-changers, for they have built temples of their own. Yes; the citadel of Zion to which the rich men and princes flee for safety to day, is the Bank of England! What will be the fate of humanity and governments, if this increases, or the national debt goes on at this rate? The whole earth will be one great hypothecation, pawned to whom? By him who lends long, but will some day demand his reckoning. A general conflagration will come, against which no safes are proof—a new deluge that shall swamp millions and millions of national-debt. I shall probably live to see the failure of the Bank of England.”

Who would have supposed that Christian civilization would ever have received a rebuke like this on the subject of usury from a Jew!

Modern Judaism seems to be principally represented, as far as we have learned, by two parties—the regular orthodox Jews who preserve to some extent the traditions and forms of the ancient Hebrew worship, though much under the corrupting influence of the Talmud and Rabbinical usages—and, in this country, by a more recently organized party called “The Reformed School.” There seems to be among the orthodox party (and this we conceive to be a hopeful sign) a strong desire for a more regular and efficient religious life, and a more distinct union of organization among themselves, which last idea has already been extensively carried out as far as their charitable institutions and efforts are concerned, but the

attempt at union has heretofore failed through the jealousy of ecclesiastical organization, or of a controlling and centralizing Church establishment, since the spirit of the Jewish religionists is decidedly inclined to independence in their congregational affairs.* Of late there has been considerable activity in the Jewish bodies, to secure for themselves religious immunities. Under the lead of the "Board of Delegates of American Israelites," a society for the protection and education of Jews everywhere, and one which is in coöperation with the "Universal Israelite Alliance" of Paris, they are contesting the proposed amendment to the constitution of the United States, recognizing Christianity as the religion of the land, and are endeavoring to secure amendments to the Sunday laws of the States, where such proviso is not already made, exempting from their operation those who keep the seventh day as the Sabbath, and conduct their business on the first day "quietly and not to public detriment." This society is also active in the publication of works connected with Hebrew literature and religion; and has, we believe, under its fostering care, Maimonides College, which was opened in Philadelphia in 1867, and also the Hebrew free schools in our larger cities.

The "Reformed school," which is one of the latest phases of Judaism, is, in fact, a modified form of rationalism, and is in strong hostility to the orthodox party. It sets forth a philosophical system of religion, recognizing indeed the existence, unity, and government of God, but having few religious rites, and explaining the old forms of Hebrew faith in a rationalistic manner.

The general tone, religious and ethical, of the "Reformed school" party in this country, may be gathered from the following extract of a letter written by Rabbi Wise of Cincinnati, setting forth the principles of the Rabbinical Conference held in Philadelphia in 1869:†

"The principles which the Conference authoritatively declared, were precisely the same which for the last twenty years were advanced, expounded, and defended by all liberal Israelites in America and Europe. That the Israelite of the nineteenth century expects not to return to Palestine, and construct a new government under a Messiah, Prince of the house of David, since the sovereignty of free-

* Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia. 1869.

† *Ibid.*

dom and the supremacy of justice are the realization of the sublime ideals connected with the Messianic doctrine of the fathers; that the dispersion of Israel was not a punishment, divine retribution being threatened only to the third and fourth generation, for it was the object of Providence that the children of Israel carry the pure word of God to all climes and peoples: that it is not a people whose redemption and salvation the Lord has ordained—it is the whole human family which is to be saved and united by the instrumentality of God's chosen people; that it is not the resurrection of the human body in which our hopes centre—it is the immortality of the soul, and God's grace and justice to His image, which is our work and salvation; that, although it is our duty to maintain the Hebrew language, in which the divine treasures were intrusted to our care, nevertheless, many Israelites not being sufficiently conversant with the holy tongue, it is necessary that the vernacular be introduced in the synagogues as much as possible.

“The resolutions were chiefly limited to the laws of marriage and divorce, some of which had come in conflict with the modern laws of civilized nations. These resolutions were based on the principle that it is every Israelite's religious duty to obey the laws of the land; that the synagogue therefore acknowledges no marriage lawful which has not the sanction of the law of the land; that it acknowledges the verdict of the public law in case of divorce as final and binding, and abolishes the ancient rabbinical form of divorce; that it concedes all laws, concerning the deceased brother's wife and concerning the sons of Aaron, as binding no longer. But that in all cases of marriage or divorce, in State or Territory not having reached the height of Biblical morals, the synagogue must adhere to the moral laws of the Bible, and the rabbis, before solemnizing the marriage of a divorced party, must investigate into the causes on which the divorce was granted, and none must solemnize a marriage contrary to the provisions of the Bible. Man and woman, according to the spirit of the Scriptures, are perfectly equal before God. Therefore, in the covenant of matrimony, husband and wife have equal duties, claims, rights, and privileges, which are to be symbolically expressed by the exchange of rings, and the proper formula of marriage. Although this is in advance of the laws of many countries, nevertheless it is in the spirit of the sacred Scriptures, and binding upon all Israelites.

“In regard to circumcision, it was declared as being an acknowledged law in Israel that the offspring of a Jewish mother is by virtue of its birth, one of Israel, with or without circumcision. In all these matters the conference only declared authoritatively that which was acknowledged by all American Israelites, and again has the only merit of giving it authority.”

Those who hold to this “Reformed” system, of which our author seems to be an exponent (we now quote his words), declare, that “the religious idea is capable of living without its material covering; and in regard to the Jewish ceremonial laws and statutes, as soon as Reason has decided that the time for the observance of them has passed, then the continuance of them is but a violation of those eternal principles which constitute pure Judaism.” They assert that “Sacrifice

is dead ; that the Jewish nationality as a separate political organization is overthrown ; that the belief in the restoration of Israel to the land of their fathers, and that the Redeemer will come to Zion, is an exploded theory." But even this body of the rationalistic Jews, still retain, in their worship, some of the peculiar features of the old Jewish ritual. They observe the Holy Seasons, which are the Sabbath, and the Three Festivals, Passover, Pentecost, and the Tabernacles ; and the ceremonies of the Two Great Holy Days, New Year and the Day of Atonement. Yet having emancipated themselves from the peculiar Jewish idea of exclusive nationality and of the literal restoration, they have become American citizens with a home feeling, have bought land, and built houses and "temples," as if for a permanent habitation. They seem, indeed, in some respects, in their freedom from superstition at least, though they are more highly educated, and more sceptical, to resemble the section of the Karaite Jews in the East, who reject the glosses and puerilities of the Talmud, who are more rational and simple in their faith, and who hold to the Old Testament as the only infallible law and testimony. Missionaries who labor among the Jews in Turkey and Asia, find many who recognize and love the high spirituality of the law of Moses, and who would gladly accept the fulfilment of it in Christianity, but who are staggered at the fact of the Messiah who has come.

The political condition of the Jews at the present day is brighter than in any age since the destruction of their own kingdom. Even in Mohammedan Europe and Asia, they are beginning to be allowed to share in the respect and even authority of the government ; for in Constantinople and Damascus, Jews have been selected as members of the higher councils and tribunals. In some of the kingdoms of Germany—where, in marked contrast to German enlightened sentiments in other respects, they have been exceptionally ill-used—even there the political disabilities and taxations under which they have labored have mostly been removed by the new State Constitutions. The state of the Israelites in the Danubian principalities is also mitigated through the intervention of other European governments, although intense bitterness still exists against the Jew in

Roumania.* In Servia they have better prospects under the new regime of liberty ; and even in Spain the establishment of religious liberty has raised the Jew from his abjectness, and we hear of efforts making to build a synagogue in Madrid. In England the comparatively recent "Jew-Bill" admits Jews to equal political rights and privileges with Christians ; but in this country alone the Jew is not, and never has been, a subject of civil persecution. Here "Israel dwells safely." And, the world over, the intelligent ask themselves—why despise men for their belief more than for their features and language ? Is not Christian revenge, love ? Did not Christ pray for his murderers' forgiveness ? And why, socially or otherwise, oppress a people, through whom we, as Christians, possess the word of God—"for salvation is of the Jews ?" The prejudice of the Christian toward the Jew has done much to make the Jew hate the Christian. There is a peculiar malignancy in religious hatred—because it is the sweetest thing turned bitterest, the best worst, the divine devilish. When will it be that even Christians shall love one another, and those of the same household shall strive to discover in what they agree, and not in what they differ ? Those who differ the least sometimes hate each other the worst. The old strife of Jew and Christian, of Roman Catholic and Protestant, is often outdone by the mutual contempt and jealousy of Christian sects living side by side.

The spiritual future of the world and of Christianity seems to be in some significant sense linked in with the future spiritual condition of this heretofore despised race of Israel ; although our friends of the "Reformed School" rationalize away even this truth, that is burned into the consciousness of those who hold to the inspiration of the Old and New Testament Scriptures. Greater developments of Christian truth to the world, await in some unknown way, and in connection with other future things, the renovation of the ancient people of God ; for if the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them (through their rejection of Christ), the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fulness (through their free acceptance of the full mercies of Christ). "If the casting

* Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia 1869.

away of them be the reconciling of the world, what shall the recovery of them be but life from the dead."

While holding to the yet unfolded richness of prophecy in regard to the Jews, we confess ourselves to be at one with the "Reformed School," in regard to the literal restoration. We hold to the old theological maxim "*prophetica non argumentiva* ; and we do not believe in drawing positive arguments, building up solid theories, upon the vague though inspired and true language of prophecy. The prophetic passages of the Old Testament, in reference to the restoration of the Jews, may have had, we also think, long ago their literal fulfilment ; each prophecy may have been fulfilled in the several actual restorations of the Jews to their own land, to dwell there for long periods in greater peace and glory, after the several captivities and dispersions of old time. Nevertheless, although this seems, to our own mind, to settle the question, yet we do also look forward for something greater to come ; we believe that every one of these prophecies contains a spiritual promise not yet fulfilled, or fully so. Prophecy comprehends both a literal typical fact, and a more hidden and undefined spiritual truth. While a literal event was predicted and was, perhaps, fulfilled, the language is not exhausted ; but it is the seed of a profound truth that shall slowly develop itself with the progress of Christianity, and perhaps, not altogether in time, for it belongs not so much to time as to eternity.

The prophecies in regard to the restoration, were they taken literally as applying to the future building up of the earthly Jerusalem, would be truly a lame conclusion. Insignificant would be the fulfillment of the pregnant words of Isaiah and Ezekiel, if they should end in the exodus of a few millions of modern Jews to the land of Palestine, and in their settling down there to be farmers, traders and vine-dressers !

This literal restoration would likewise involve a rehabilitation of the Hebrew ceremonial law, a renewal of the wearisome system of sacrifices and all the forms of the ancient temple worship. But this is positively done away in the very terms of the new dispensation of Christ, whose God and Father is worshiped, not merely at Jerusalem, but everywhere.

The physical argument even is against this view. When we

once saw a Syrian peasant ploughing on Mt. Sion, it certainly did not look like the literal rebuilding of the walls of Sion. Jerusalem is badly situated for a great modern city. It has no water to depend upon but the rain of heaven. The flinty mountains that surround it must be leveled to make a free communication to it from any quarter. It has a barren, volcanic region immediately about it, the Dead Sea within sight of it, and the Arabian desert stretching east and south of it. It will never be a large city again, unless God has decreed it, and will turn, not figuratively but absolutely, the rocks into springs of water and the desert into a garden. But we need not be pressed to such conclusions. Doubtless many things cluster about this spot. Jerusalem is the center of the earth in its high associations, and will always be so. With multitudes of other pilgrims from all parts of the world, the writer of this walked with bare and bowed head, and emotions not to be described, within its gate. He yields to none in feelings of reverence toward the soil once trodden by the sacred feet of Jesus. Without doubt, great numbers of Jews will return to the Holy Land, as great numbers have already done (and a most interesting class of Jews are some of those now dwelling in Jerusalem, for they are the enthusiasts of their faith, who go there to count the stones, to read the law in the shadow of the holy mount, to mingle their dust with the holy soil), who will carry with them great wealth and the means of restoring the fertility of the land, and of rebuilding the old cities; but even according to the prophecy, something *greater is to come than was ever in the past*; the prophecy looks to a greater consummation than any material prosperity, or any moral development that has yet taken place, viz: to the restoration of a spiritual theocracy, the establishment of a universal kingdom in the hearts of men, and in every individual heart that is a subject of it, of which the Hebrew theocracy was a type; and here the national or the governmental, form which the old Hebrëw faith assumed, becomes again highly significant and pregnant with meaning. This long-obscured, long-buried seed of the ancient Abrahamic and Hebraic faith in a true kingdom of God, in the real reign of God on the earth, will sometime burst forth into universal beauty and bloom, and fill the whole world with its

heavenly fruitage. Into this universal kingdom of righteousness and peace, of reason, light, and love, of which God himself is the prime head,—in this united brotherhood of man in the one great family of God—the seed of Abraham, the true “children of the kingdom,” whether Jew or Gentile, shall be gathered. “I will call that which was not my people, my people, and she who was not beloved, beloved.” Gathered in one in Christ, they shall “rejoice together in the heights of Zion;” and we cannot doubt but that the Jew, with his tenacity of purpose, industry, genius and skill, and his wonderful devotion to the religious idea, will have an important part in the final upbuilding and beautifying of this new kingdom and city of God. At home in all nations and all the world, representing a universal principle, he may become the leaven that shall quickly leaven the whole.

We would desire to say to our Jewish brethren, do not yield up your birthright in the promises, and hold fast to this grand truth which you have taught the nations, of the kingdom of God, of the real and universal reign of God on earth. Strive to be yourselves the subjects of this kingdom in spirit and in truth, for those who would share in this outward and realized kingdom of God must be its subjects inwardly and in spirit. Be willing to candidly examine the Scriptures of the New Testament, and see what there is in them of rich development and fulfillment of promises made to the fathers, and of spiritual blessings yet in store for the children. Think whether those things which you aim after, knowledge, true science, the reign of reason and the overthrow of superstition, the triumph of the universal principle, and of living for the universal good, the unity of humanity in the recognized unity of God, the freeing of the race so that it may walk on the high planes of reason, righteousness and light, have not been attained, or are not being approximately attained, far better and surer, through the silent agency of true Christianity—the gentle but powerful forces of its teaching and spirit—the enthusiasm of its humanity—the largeness of its reason—the energy of its self-sacrificing goodness—the divine power of its love—the perfect union of its human and divine elements,—than by any other known system, or by any philosophic system yet invented, or to be invented? In rais-

ing the one great temple of God, into which you would bring the whole human race in unity, freedom, virtue and light, refuse not the true "corner-stone."

Neander, whose spirit is now with that Lord whom like the beloved disciple he so much loved, and to whom he came from Philo and Plato as a child runs from its teacher's to its mother's arms, has set a bright example to his Jewish kinsmen in the flesh, the world over, of the glorious purity, humility, elevation and new power of the mind into which Christianity in all its fullness and life, has been received in the spirit of a little child. We quote his words, which since his death, have acquired new force and solemnity, and which, it is to be remembered, are the words of a Jew:—"Through strifes and storms, the Holy Spirit—the Holy Spirit going out *from faith in Christ, who was crucified for the sins of men*, who truly rose from the dead and ascended to heaven—the Holy Spirit that has proved itself the same since the first Christian Pentecost, at all times, among all people, learned or unlearned—the Holy Spirit is preparing a new creation in the Church of God."

V.—THE RESOURCES OF THE CHURCH AGAINST RATIONALISM.

THE universal Church is stirred to its depths by the inroads of Rationalism. Germany, having recovered in great part her clergy from the tone of skeptical criticism, now finds that her people have too well learned the lessons of their early apostasy to be willing to hear a Gospel of myths. France has called forth her ablest champions in both Protestant and Roman Catholic literature, to contest the influence of Comte and Renan. Italy finds herself liberated from Jesuitism only to be overrun with Infidelity. England has contended with pamphlets, lectures, reviews, Bishops' charges and Church courts against Rationalism in Church and University. And in the United States, the College, the Lyceum, the Pulpit and the Press, have been enlisted vigorously upon either side of this new controversy of Christianity with Unbelief. One good promised by the unaccomplished Ecumenical Council at New York was, a survey of the whole field of this discussion through the reports of competent observers from every part of Christendom; and it is earnestly to be hoped that the facts and inferences upon the Rationalistic controversy which have been gathered with such pains-taking ability, will be given to the public without waiting for a meeting of the Alliance in the now doubtful and perhaps distant future.

In advance, however, of these materials for a detailed review of this controversy, we may glance at the principles involved in it, and the methods by which it has been conducted, with a view to revise the errors of some and to fortify the faith of others. In some quarters the mistake has been made of meeting the spirit of Rationalism with a more intensified Ecclesiasticism or a more extreme Ritualism. We do the Pope the credit of believing that in so much of the Syllabus, now made dogmatic, as had respect to the prevalence of unbelief, he devoutly thought that the evils of skepticism grow out of liberty of conscience, and must be checked by a revival of ec-

clesiastical authority and discipline. Many an earnest Anglican has the same conviction, while differing as to the seat of ecclesiastical control ; and so sincere and intelligent a pastor as Dr. Morgan Dix, of New York, though he openly avows his distaste for "extremes in ritualism," and refuses "to be identified with anything inconsistent with the system of the Bible as his Church has received it," nevertheless regards the exercise of private judgment in the interpretation of the Scriptures as the source alike of sectarianism and of skepticism, and would remedy these evils by a true Church authority.*

Others again have sought to oppose Rationalism by the moral force of Christian union in testimony and in action. The Evangelical Alliance and the Pan-Anglican Council, are examples of this ; and no doubt the tendency toward Pan-Presbyterianism has been greatly stimulated by the desire to unite the Church against her foes. But a union within the pale of Ecclesiasticism and upon an ecclesiastical basis, tends to intensify the spirit of sectarian aggrandizement at the expense of moral union and co-operation with the whole body of Christ. This is already foreshadowed in the action of the Presbyterian Church withdrawing its support from the American Board, and for no fault or change in the Board itself, terminating the coöperation of more than fifty years. Neither Pan-Anglicanism, nor Pan-Presbyterianism, nor Pan-Evangelicism can bring out tully and fairly the resources of the Church against the unbelief of the times. Those resources lie in other directions, and call for recognition and use, rather than for development through organization. A study of the facts in the case in the light of Biblical principles and precedents, will show that however new phases of unbelief may awaken the sense of danger, they should excite no distrust of the strength of the Faith or of its final victory.

The present are simply *new phases* of the spirit of unbelief, so often vanquished under other forms. When Paul began to preach Christ he encountered this same spirit in the Ritualism of the Pharisees and the Rationalism of the Sadducees ; and

* See Dr. Dix's letter of Sept. 2, 1870, on the St. Sacrament Mission, and his Sermon on Christian Union preached in the Broadway Tabernacle Church, March 13th, 1864.

standing thus between Ecclesiastical Authority and Tradition on the one hand, and a Rationalizing Skepticism on the other, he took his position in the right use of Reason and the just authority of the Scriptures; and when prejudice and unbelief barred the synagogues against him, he obtained the use of the school of a Pagan philosopher, and taking his followers with him—openly separating from the Jewish communion—he there disputed daily with whoever came to inquire or discuss, whether Greek or Jew. Here is a very plain case of Apostolic procedure in dealing with unbelief, under the forms of an intellectual or a prejudiced opposition to the gospel. Not assertion but argument, not dogmatism but reasoning from the Scriptures, was the weapon that Paul used against the religious perversity and skepticism of his age.

In dealing with the skepticism of the present age, the Church of Christ should adhere closely to this Apostolic precedent; and when from this point of view we shall have estimated what Resources are at our command, and what Power is lodged with the body of Christ, for the conflict with modern Rationalism, it will appear that so far from being appalled at the alleged advance of infidelity, or disheartened by any seeming advantages of its later positions, we have grounds for the highest confidence in the actual resources of Christianity, and in the general unity and power of the Church of Christ, in wielding those resources.

We are far from conceding that the present age may be fitly characterized as the age of Infidelity. As compared with the corresponding period of the 18th century, the era of Frederic the Great and of the French Revolution, of Rousseau and Voltaire in France, of Lessing and Kant in Germany, of Gibson and Hume in Britain, of Priestley and Paine in America, an era in which skepticism ruled in literature, in philosophy and in politics, and over-ran the civilized world like an epidemic—an age in which power, genius, and fashion were openly arrayed against Christianity, when college students adopted the names of leading French infidels,* and the lips of the masses

* Most of the class before me in Yale College were infidels, and called each other Voltaire, Rousseau, D'Alembert, &c.—Dr. Lyman Beecher; *Autobiography*, vol. 1, p. 43.

derided the name of Jesus in ribaldry and song,—as compared with a period now marked as “the skeptical era of modern history,” this 19th century is not infidel but Christian. For what is a Strauss, a Colenso, a Renan, to a system that has outlived and outgrown the hostilities of the eighteenth century?

So far gone was Germany toward Atheism, that when the devout and eloquent Schleiermacher preached his moderate evangelicism, it was wittily said that he had once more introduced the Almighty into good society in Berlin.

Granting all that can be fairly claimed for the influence of Rationalism upon our literature, our theology, and the tone of our society, yet the moral characteristics of our age are not infidel, but Christian;—Christian philanthropy and reform; Christian revivals and Christian missions; the growth of Christian sentiment in jurisprudence, in politics and in international law. Beyond almost any previous age is this marked by the predominance of a practical Christianity, and by the respectful consideration shown to Christianity both in the public and in the private walks of life. It were unjust to history, it were unfair to truth, it were ungrateful to God, should Christians assume a despairing tone, as if infidelity were in possession of the field of thought, and they had nothing to oppose to it but a few scattered and enfeebled divisions, that suspect one another’s loyalty, and acknowledge no common head. Freethinking and Infidelity have ceased to be a terror to men who comprehend the Gospel and their age. If Infidelity still lives, Christianity is yet more alive; and at no period since the second century has the Church of Christ had a greater strength and union of resources against the common foe. The more we are made conscious of this, the more shall we realize the privilege and the power committed to the church of the living God.

The very activity of skepticism under its new phase, is a concession to the vital power of Christianity. The old sneering, scoffing Infidelity, that spit upon the Bible, that threw it into the fire, or used its leaves for lighting pipes, that made the name of Jesus and the virgin Mary the theme of ribald jests, has disappeared from civilized society. The decent garb

and studied speech of modern Rationalism, its garb of science, of criticism, of morality, are an admission that Christianity must be assailed with other weapons than those it has already vanquished.

Rationalism, instead of denouncing Christianity as an imposture, would rather extol it as a development of the religious genius of mankind,—disfigured it may be by legends of the supernatural, and now antiquated by science, yet venerable as both a reforming and a conservative power in history, and still to be admired for its morality.* For the essence of Rationalism does not lie in denying altogether the genuineness of the Bible, nor in repudiating its moral teachings, but in discarding the supernatural, whether in miracles or inspiration, and in making human Reason the ultimate test, the absolute criterion of truth. It would wrest from the Bible the excellences which are the admitted source of its power, and appropriate these to another authorship; it would steal from Heaven the stereotype plates of the book of Truth, and retaining their general form, bring out a revised edition, with the name of Reason on the title page for the name of God.

Now the form of this new skepticism, and its activity, instead of marking the progress of Infidelity, are a concession to the power of Christianity. A theory in physical science once exploded by evidence, dies, and cannot be resuscitated. But after all the assaults of Infidelity and its boasted conquests, the Bible still lives and must still be met, for it is still a power, and so great a power that it must be respected even in the act of assailing it.

In enumerating the resources of the Church for this conflict, we place first the power she has through the recovery for modern times, of the Apostolic principle, that right Reason and Revelation are in accord one with another. By this principle we meet the Rationalist upon his own ground. We do not put down his reasonings by dogmatism, nor insist that he shall submit his convictions of truth to be revised by the judgment of other men, or by any human authority, ancient or modern, ecclesiastical or secular. So far from denying the competence

* We speak here of the general tone of skeptical criticism, making no account of diversities of schools.

of reason to examine the evidences of the Christian religion, and to ascertain the meaning of the Scriptures, we submit those evidences to the test of argument, we interpret the Bible by the laws of language—insisting only that men shall reason fairly and interpret honestly, as becomes the gravity of the subject. The Infidelity of the eighteenth century was mainly the reaction of the human mind against that spiritual Despotism which survived the Reformation only to be made more odious and intolerable in its light. The assertion of ecclesiastical authority could not repress this revolt of Reason, nor could a blind faith in the past hinder the spirit of investigation, which the revival of learning had awakened and which the art of printing so greatly favored. Miracles, prophecy, the historical facts, the moral truths of the Bible, whatever pertained to the authenticity and the divine origin of the Scriptures, must needs be submitted to the criterion of evidence whereof the human mind can judge, since in the nature of the case the things contained in the Bible could not be received without evidence, and the mind must judge upon the nature and the degree of evidence requisite to its own belief. Here suppression awakens suspicion, authority is the parent of unbelief, dogmatism of distrust.

Now the Reformation, partial and imperfect as it was, had succeeded in recovering the principle of harmony between Reason and Revelation, which had been lost through the usurpation of ecclesiastical authority over the Scriptures themselves. The “Right of Private Judgment,” so-called—which means nothing more or less than the honest, modest, prayerful use of our own understanding in ascertaining what God requires of us in his word—was not an invention of modern Protestantism. It was the restoration of the principles and practice of the Apostles, and of that eldest Church which existed before either of the great sects dividing the East and the West, and which has no lineal successor in the Greek, the Latin, the Armenian, the Coptic or the Abyssinian.

It was the Apostolic way of propagating Christianity, to commend its truths to the understandings and the consciences of men. Among Jews, they used the Old Testament Scriptures as the basis of argument. Paul’s *manner* was, to go into

the synagogue, and whenever he had opportunity to reason out of the Scriptures, “disputing” or discussing, and “persuading the things concerning the kingdom of God.” Apollos “mightily convinced the Jews, shewing by the Scriptures that Jesus was Christ.” When among Pagans, as at Lystra and at Athens, Paul reasoned with them from the light of nature, appealing to common sense, and using against their idolatries the concessions of their own philosophers and poets. Peter exhorts Christians to be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh a reason of the faith that is in them—to be able to justify their faith to the intelligent conviction of other men. Hence we deny to the Rationalist any special prerogative in the use of Reason upon matters of Religion: that he has either refined upon Christianity or risen above it, by intellectual processes resulting in truth more spiritual and absolute; for the Religion of the Bible addresses itself to man as a reasonable soul; to the human mind in each and every faculty; to reason, to judgment, to conscience, with a view to bring the individual will into accord with the will of God. The founder of Christianity himself submitted, and still submits, the proofs of his divinity to the judgment of men. “If I do not the works of my Father believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works;” sift the credentials of my divine commission. And again He says, “If I say the truth, why do ye not believe me? Which of you convinceth me of sin?” His sinless character, the perfect accordance of his teachings with divine and eternal truth, and his works of divine power and love, are the evidences that Christ submits to our judgment, while he demands our faith.

The primitive Church, the church of the first three centuries, the church nearest to the Apostles, adhered closely to this principle. The writings of the champions of the Gospel which have come down to us from that period, show that they regarded Christianity as a rational system of faith, to be judged by its evidences and its fruits. Justin Martyr did not lay aside even the garb of a philosopher in becoming a Christian. His great defense of Christianity, written about A. D. 150, is an argument to prove the harmony of the Christian Faith with Reason; an argument which he enforces thus; “if in some things

we hold the same opinions with the poets and philosophers, whom ye honor, and in others entertain views more sublime and more worthy of the divine nature, and if we alone are able to *prove* what we say, why are we unjustly hated above all men?*" If what we have advanced appears to be reasonable and true, honor it accordingly; and if it appears folly, despise it as foolish."†

Athenagoras of Alexandria, wrote in the year A. D. 180 an argument for Christianity, based upon its moral purity and the sublimity of its doctrines, as compared with the teachings and practices of Paganism. In the course of this, he denounces the advocates of idolatry as "without learning, or knowledge of natural philosophy, or of theology."‡ A little later, Hermias published a satire upon the pagan philosophers, not for resting in reason, but because they accepted doctrines which were confirmed "neither by one manifest fact, nor by one sound argument."§ The fact and the argument were upon the side of Christianity.

Tertullian of Carthage (about A. D. 200) defends Christianity in an able and earnest argument for the truth and antiquity of the Scriptures, shows that by the light of reason, the soul itself is "naturally impressed with the truths of Christianity;" but "in order that we might approach to a more full and clear knowledge, both of himself and of his disposition and will towards man, God hath further given us his written word, that all, who desire, may inquire respecting God; and gradually proceed from inquiry to knowledge, and from knowledge to belief, and from belief to obedience."|| Coming down later, we find the same tone in Origen and in Augustine. "We ought," says Origen, "for the evidence of the words we produce in doctrine, to produce the sense of the Scripture, as it were confirming the sense that we expound." And again; "But afterwards, as is his custom, the Apostle confirms his teaching from the holy Scriptures, thus setting before the doctors of the church an example, that in those things which they speak to the people, they do not utter what is presumed upon in their own opinions, but what is strengthened by divine tes-

* c. 28.

† c. 90.

‡ c. 13.

§ c. 10.

|| c. 18.

timony ; for if he, such and so great an Apostle, did not believe that the authority of his words could be sufficient, unless he shows that what he saith is written in the Law and the Prophets, how much more we, the weakest of creatures, ought to observe this, that when we teach, we should not produce our own, but the doctrines of the Holy Spirit.”*

With the same manly regard for evidence, did that great father in theology, Augustine, yield his mind to the evidence of the earth’s rotundity, though many of his own and of the preceding age had denounced this new doctrine of geometry as a heresy.

If then, distrustful of our own wisdom, we would know what was the most ancient and the Apostolic method of maintaining the Christian faith, we find that in the Apostolic age and for centuries after, this was by the careful and diligent use of reason in defending and expounding the Scriptures. Nor can it ever be otherwise, since in the most essential point of divine authority, Reason must judge where to seek and how to ascertain the true Faith. If one may not trust his judgment in reading the Scriptures for himself, he yet must trust it in choosing who shall read them for him ; he must judge the historical and other marks of rival claimants ; he must at least choose the master to whom to submit his will, and choosing his master, can have nothing to confide in but his *private* judgment ; and if one must be able to trace his ecclesiastical pedigree back to the beginning without one flaw, he may have a harder task for reason than would be that of reading the Bible for himself, with no master but Christ, and no interpreter but the Spirit, enlightening his plain, honest, teachable common sense.

Some would send to a Church to ascertain the true meaning of Scripture. But Chrysostom sends all to the Scriptures to find the true Christ. “ For,” says he, “ there can be no trial of true Christianity ; and Christians which desire to know the truth, whereupon they may build their faith, have no other refuge, but to try and learn this by the Scriptures. For heretics have the counterfeit and likeness of those things which are proper to Christ. They have churches, they have the Scriptures of God, they have baptism, they have the Lord’s supper,

* In Matthew 25, and in Rom. iii.

and all other things like the true church ; yea, they have Christ himself. He therefore that will know which is the true church of Christ, how may he know it but by the Scriptures ? Therefore our Lord, knowing that there should be such confusion of things in the latter days, commanded that Christians which live in the profession of Christian faith, and are desirous to settle themselves upon a sure ground of faith, should go to no other thing but to the Scriptures. Otherwise, if they had regard to other things, they should be offended and perish, and not understand which is the true church.”*

Bishop Beveridge has well shown the absurdity of deferring our own judgment upon the Scriptures to the authority of others, however venerable, high, or learned. “What I see written, I am certain of, because I see it written ; but how can I be certain of any thing which is not written. Must I therefore believe it because others do ? Or can I therefore be certain of it because others are ? Then I must believe and be certain of whatsoever others believe or are certain of, and so that must be a necessary article of my faith, which is an article of any man’s faith, and so unless I believe what every one believes, I can never be saved. But what reason have I to believe one man more than another. Are they not all men ?”† And, as Augustine has said, “the judges or doctors of the church, as men, are often deceived.‡

We cannot throw away that tried weapon with which the Apostles and fathers contended against the unbelief of their times. Reason fairly exercised in and upon the Scriptures is our first protection against Rationalism. The God who gave the Bible made the human mind, and all his works exhibit the harmony of truth ; as the light to the eye, so is the Bible to the Reason of man ; and Jehovah, speaking by his inspired prophet to the most perverse and wilful of sinners says, “Come now let us reason together.”

A second resource for the conflict with Rationalism is furnished in the revival of the primitive and Apostolic doctrine, that the Scriptures are the ultimate authority in matters of re-

* Chrysost. in Matt. Hom. xlix.

† Beveridge on the 39 Articles, Art. vi. p. 195, Oxford.

‡ Lib. II., cap. ii.

ligious faith. Our modern Christianity agrees with the most ancient Christianity, in asserting the office of Reason in investigating and ascertaining truth. But to create itself the ultimate source and authority of truth does not lie within the province of Reason. Here is the false and dangerous assumption of the Rationalist; that Reason, which must needs judge of the evidences of truth, is also the sole and final arbiter of truth. This is true as between man and man, where both parties have before them the same means of judgment. Hence no interpretation of Scripture by Synod or Council, can have binding authority upon other minds; since this were to set up the judgment of one fallible man or company of men against the judgment of another; or to make the Reason of one age, as fallible, submit itself to the reason of another age as infallible. But when Reason finds evidence that God has spoken in the Bible, then ought it to submit to His teaching and authority. Faith is as truly a quality of the soul as is Reason, and in God's word we have a just and competent authority.

The Apostles reasoned out of the *Scriptures*, as their authority. The early fathers in discussions with Jews, or among themselves, always appealed to the Scriptures as final, and sought to magnify the Bible in the view of Pagans. This principle of the sole supremacy of the Bible in the sphere of religion, was recovered, not invented at the Reformation. The 21st Art. of the Church of England says, concerning general Councils, "When they be gathered together (forasmuch as they be an assembly of men whereof all be not governed with the Spirit and Word of God) they may err, and sometimes have erred even in things pertaining unto God. Wherefore things ordained by them as necessary to salvation, have *neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared* [made plain] *that they are taken out of Holy Scriptures.*" Bishop Burnet, whose exposition of the 39 Articles is a standard work in the Church of England, thus comments upon this Article. "The inference is justly made that whatever authority they [Councils] may have in the rule and government of the church, their decisions in matters necessary to salvation ought to be examined by the Word of God, and are not to be submitted to, unless it appears that they are conformable to the Scripture."

Bishop Burnet continues: "For the four general councils, which this church declares she receives, they are received only because we are persuaded from the Scriptures that their decisions were made according to them; that the Son is truly God, of the same substance with the Father; that the Holy Ghost is also truly God; that the divine nature was truly united to the human in Christ; and that in one person; that both natures remained distinct; and that the human nature was not swallowed up of the divine. These truths we find in the Scriptures, and therefore we believe them. We reverence those Councils for the sake of their doctrine; but do not believe the doctrine for the authority of the Councils. There appeared too much of human frailty in some of their other proceedings, to give us such an implicit submission to them, as to believe things simply because they so decided them."* Such is the voice of the Church of England, as declared in her 21st Art., adopted by the Convention of 1562, and as expounded a century later by one of her ablest Bishops, with the approval of Archbishop Tillotson, and many of the most eminent of her clergy.

The study of Church history can hardly produce veneration for the Councils of the Church as representative expounders of the faith. The most violent scenes in the American Congress in the days of southern domination, could not surpass the tumult of the great imperial Council of Chalcedon, in 451, when the officers of the crown had to silence the savage threats and outcries of the contending Bishops.† At the 2d Council of Ephesus, says Milman, "questions were carried by factious acclamations within, and the Council was overawed by riotous mobs without."‡ Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria, and President of the Council, struck Hecumenius, bishop of Constantinople with such violence that he died of his wounds. The learned and orthodox Bishop Gregory, of Nazianzen, in the 4th century, says: "I never yet saw a Council of Bishops come to a good end. I salute them afar off, since I know how troub-

* Exposition, pp. 272 282, Appleton's edition.

† Read this scene as pictured from the record by Stanley, *History of the Eastern Church*, p. 165.

‡ Hist. of Latin Christianity, I. p. 204.

lesome they are. I never more will sit in those assemblies of cranes and geese;”* a representation from an eye-witness, not adapted to inspire reverence for a general Council as an authority over our private reading of the word of God.

The learned Dean of Westminster, commenting upon the 21st Art. of his Church, says: “It is absolutely necessary to claim the freedom of criticism on which these words insist. With every disposition to honor these assemblies,—with every desire to make allowance for their weaknesses and to esteem the results of their labors,—it is impossible to understand them rightly, or even to do justice to their merits, without remembering that they were assemblies of fallible men, swayed by the good and evil influences to which all assemblies are exposed.”† The Council of Nicæa was not an exception; and its creed, which was meant to be a finality, was determined by the influence of the emperor Constantine. That Creed is so much modified in common use, that Dean Stanley has said of it: “Every time that the Creed is recited, with its additions and omissions, it conveys to us the wholesome warning, that our faith is not of necessity bound up with the literal text of Creeds, or with the formal decrees of Councils. It existed before the Creed was drawn up; it is larger than the letter of any Creed could circumscribe. The fact that the whole Christian world has altered the Creed of Nicæa, and broken the decree of Ephesus, without ceasing to be Catholic or Christian, is a decisive proof that common sense, after all, is the supreme arbiter and corrective even of Œcumenical Councils.”‡

* Quoted by Stanley, p. 164.

† Hist. of the Eastern Church, p. 168.

‡ Hist. of the Eastern Church, p. 246. The second creed in the Episcopal Prayer Book, is the Nicene, as revised and enlarged by the Council of Constantinople, A. D. 381. The original Nicene creed is as follows: “We believe in One God, the Father Almighty, Maker of all things, visible and invisible. And in One Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God begotten of the Father; only-begotten, that is of the substance of the Father; God of God, Light of Light, being God of very God, begotten, not made; being of one substance with the Father; by whom all things were made, the things in heaven and things in earth. Who for us men and for our salvation came down and was incarnate and made man, and suffered and rose again on the third day. Who ascended into heaven, and cometh again to judge the quick and dead. And in the Holy Ghost.”

It is this return to common sense, exalting the Bible, in its inapproachable majesty and sovereignty above all human symbols and authorities, that enables us to enter the lists with Rationalism, wielding the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God. How weak is church authority for such a conflict is evident in that the Church of England, with her Jowetts, her Essays and Reviews, her Colensos, is the very nest of Rationalism, whose offspring are shielded by the highest Court of the Church, while Dr. Pusey publicly laments, that her Creeds and her Prayers will no longer express a common faith, but the Church will be "a mere tower of Babel, having nothing in common but words." Yet the recent outbreak of Rationalism in that Church is only a reaction against Pusey's own doctrine of sacramental and patristic authority.

But we are not so weak and crippled for the conflict with Rationalism as these lamentations would imply. On the contrary we are the stronger, by so much the more that we realize how powerless are human forms to guard the truth, how weak is human authority to enforce it, and so are thrown back upon the primitive and Apostolic Canon, that the Scriptures alone are given by inspiration of God, and that only they can have authority in faith.

It is altogether a misapprehension of the doctrine of Private Judgment, that it leaves every one free to believe as he likes in religion. On the contrary, it holds every one to a strict personal accountability for his faith, and demands that he shall come to the Word of God with an honest purpose to receive its teachings and to obey its authority. And surely we should dishonor the Bible and God's own supremacy over conscience, did we suppose that these require to be supplemented by the formal judgment and authority of men.

"But what shall we then say of the fathers, Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Cyprian, &c.? What shall we think of them, or what account may we make of them? They be interpreters of the word of God. They were learned men and learned fathers; the instruments of the mercy of God, and vessels full of grace. We despise them not, we read them, we reverence them, and give thanks to God for them. They were witnesses unto the truth, they were worthy pillars and ornaments in the

church of God. Yet they may not be compared with the word of God. We may not build upon them; we may not make them the foundation and warrant of our conscience. We may not put our trust in them.”*

“They are learned; they have pre-eminence in the church; they are judges, they have the gifts of wisdom and understanding, yet they are often deceived. They are our fathers, but not fathers unto God; they are stars, fair and beautiful and bright; yet they are not the sun; they bear witness of the light, yet they are not the light. Christ is the sun of righteousness; Christ is the light which lighteneth every man that cometh into the world. His word is the word of truth. He is the day-spring which hath visited us from on high—he came down from the bosom of his father, he shall guide our feet into the way of peace.†”

Having thus recovered the primitive and Apostolic principles of the harmony of Reason with Revelation, and the ultimate and absolute authority of the Scriptures, we find another source of strength in the Unanimity of the Church of God in its fundamental faith. That general consent of believers in Christian doctrine, which is of no power as an authority, has much weight as a testimony. Like the general agreement of men of science touching a fact of nature or a discovery in the arts, this declarative testimony of those who have made proof of the matter, is entitled to great respect as an evidence for the truths of Christianity. Here comes in the true unity of Church—a unity as the Head of the Church contemplated and described it, a unity in which his prayer consecrating the fellowship of believers is answered, seeing that they all *are* one, openly, declaratively one in Him and in his Father.

That is a grave misconception of the prayer of Our Lord for the unity of His disciples, which would make this consist in ecclesiastical uniformity. There may be large diversity in the ecclesiastical form, while yet there is a visible unity in the religious spirit and in Christian doctrine. The spirit of loyalty is not dependent upon membership in a “loyal league,” and the spirit of Christ is not confined to forms of church organi-

* Bishop Jewell,—Treatise of the Holy Scriptures. Works, p. 1178.

† do. p. 1174.

zation. . Our Lord himself contemplated the spiritual oneness of his disciples in Himself as made visible through manifold forms. His beautiful conception of this unity is strangely marred by mistaking a *fold* for the *flock*. How long did the first disciples cling to their narrow Jewish prejudices; how prone were they to insist upon conformity to their ways as a condition of fellowship, if not of salvation. But see how our Lord rebukes this spirit, and with what breadth of love he defines his Church.

“I am the good shepherd, and know my sheep and am known of mine.” There is the bond of unity,—the mutual recognition between the renewed soul and its Redeemer. “As the Father knoweth me even so know I the Father:”—and—to the intent that I may bring wandering men to know the Father through me—“I lay down my life for the sheep.” And other sheep I have which are not of this fold; the seed of Abraham, the rite of circumcision, the ritual of the Jewish church, do not circumscribe and never will contain the whole flock of God. “Other sheep I have; them also I must bring,” seeking them by my word and by my spirit; bringing them, not to this fold, but to Myself; “and they shall hear my voice”—they shall be known as my sheep in that they hear and follow me—“And there shall be one *fold*” says our translation, missing the point and beauty of the whole figure; whereas our Lord changes the word of purpose, saying, “there shall be one *flock* and one shepherd.” No fold is co-extensive with the flock. Rightly does one of the foremost scholars of the English Church interpret it—there is “not one fold, but one flock; no one exclusive inclosure of an outward church—but one flock, all knowing the one Shepherd and known of Him.”* The Gentiles came not to the Jewish fold; but Greek and Jew, Barbarian, Scythian, bond and free, became one in each other by being one in Christ. To find this one flock of God we need not traverse the melancholy waste of centuries, nor search the folds where thieves and hirelings have entered to steal and to destroy; we need not go anxiously from fold to fold in quest of some divine mark upon the door; the mark is not upon the fold but upon the sheep. Each Sab-

* Alford.

bath day the chiming bells summon the flock together upon a thousand hills, and by the side of still waters. Many of Christ's sheep find shelter and refreshment in the aisles of grand old cathedrals, hoary with the piety of ages; others under the lee of walls built by the State; many gather in rude cabins upon the western prairie; some in the tent upon the blood-sodden field;—ONE FLOCK, they follow the voice of the shepherd, and He is the leader of them all, and he knows them all.

The Jew, speaking Spanish, Italian, German, Polish, Arabic, English, and varying in complexion from the lighter hues of northern Europe, through the deep olive of the south, to the black of Hindostan, is yet one race, marked by salient features, and by community of faith. And so in whatever tongue the believer cries Abba, Father, his faith and love witness his oneness with the whole church of God. And how grand the testimony of this one church of believing souls to the same fundamental and imperishable truths;—that there is one living, Almighty, holy God; that the Bible is his word revealed to man; that Jesus Christ his Son suffered on the cross for our redemption, and rose from the dead for our salvation. The self-same truths that Paul reasoned out of the Scriptures—that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that Jesus is the Christ, have been maintained from the Scriptures through all ages; and the church of God stands to-day before the world, with a unanimity of doctrine unknown in schools of science and philosophy, giving the whole weight of this concurrent testimony to prove the reality and the power of the Gospel. Oh holy Catholic Church!—One and Universal Church; the Church of apostles and martyrs, of fathers and confessors; in catacombs and in prisons, in deserts and caves of the earth, in palaces and cathedrals; in exile and in missions, in all ages the one flock of God, the Church of the Past, the Church of the Present, the Church of the Future, chanting ever the same faith, holding ever the same Christ, as it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end!

To right Reason, just Authority, and actual Unity, we may add an almost unlimited power in Christian Love;—the unity of Faith confirmed by unity of Charity. Christian fellowship

is a reality in every heart that loves the Saviour, though hindered much in outward manifestation, and often hindered by the very contrivances for giving it expression. It is more a matter of personal culture than of formal arrangement, of the inward spirit than of outward accommodations, and therefore is capable of being increased by whatever degree we grow into union with our Head and drink of the fulness of his love. There is no way of promoting Christian union so sure, so satisfactory, so scriptural, as simply to realize its existence as the complement of personal union with Christ, and to cultivate the faculty of discerning the spirit of Christ, under whatever form, and even through the intricacies of perverse logic and bad theology. Said a venerable father of another Church, "Come and keep with me the holy days of my Church, to show the world that we are one." "Nay, father, I like not holy days, but love all holy men; love you, for your life and works. We already show that we are one in faith by observing the Lord's Supper, that commemorates his death, and the Lord's day, that commemorates his resurrection; let us show that we are one in spirit by speaking kindly one of another and helping one another, whether we pray freely or by book, and preach in English, German, or Choctaw." Union comes not through uniformity. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is there is *liberty*:" but let brotherly love continue, till the world shall say, "Behold, how these Christians love one another."

The grand resource of the Church against Rationalism lies in the Power of a Holy Life consecrated to the good of man in the love of God. The practical fruits of Christianity in the character of its professors and in society at large, are a permanent and an ever accumulating evidence of its divine origin and spirit. Men believe that which they see; and the test "By their fruits ye shall know them," is applicable to systems of faith as well as to personal professions of piety. Here Christianity ought to challenge comparison with any and all other systems; yea, it should rise above comparison, in the resplendence of holiness in its professors. This the Master himself enjoined. "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven." This too was the apostolic injunction. "Dearly

beloved, I beseech you, as strangers and pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul; having your conversation honest among the Gentiles; that whereas they speak against you as evil doers, they may by your good works, which they shall behold, glorify God in the day of visitation; for so is the will of God, that with *well-doing* ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men." This was a great argument with the primitive advocates of Christianity. Because Christians refused to worship the gods of the pagans, they were accused of impiety. They answered by an appeal to their lives. Says Athenagoras, "among us you may find unlettered men, craftsmen, and old women, though they cannot by words bring defence to our religion, yet adorn it by their moral principles, for they study not fineness of words, but practice the solidity of virtue; when struck, they strike not again; they persecute not those who rob them; they are charitable to such as ask of them; and love their neighbors as themselves.

"Could we then exercise such purity of life, if we did not believe there was a God who presides over mankind? No, certainly; but being thoroughly convinced that we shall one day give an account of our lives and actions to the great Creator of us and of all the world, we choose such a gentle, meek, and generally despised method of life. Shall they who say of this life, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,' shall they be thought religious, and to have any regard for God? But we who despise this present life as of little and short value, and are led by *this* only, to know God and his Word, what the unity of the Son with the Father, and what the communion of the Father with the Son; what the Holy Ghost; what is the unity of these three; what the distinction of them who are one, the Spirit, the Son, and the Father; we who maintain that the life which succeeds this is greater than can be expressed in words, which is prepared for those who keep themselves unpolluted from all wickedness; we who have such a benevolence for all mankind as not only to love our friends but our enemies—shall we who are such, and lead such a life that we may escape a condemnation to come, be thought to live wickedly?"

In an age when sensuality was wrought into all forms of literature and art, was blazoned shamelessly in the decorations of private houses and enshrined in the temples of the gods, the contrast of a chaste and godly conversation in the Christian community witnessed for the redemptive and renovating power of the gospel. The exhortations of Apostles at once testify of this contrast, and urge that it be made emphatic. "Forasmuch as Christ hath suffered for us in the flesh, arm yourselves likewise with the same mind, for he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin—that he no longer should live the rest of his time in the flesh to the lusts of men, but to the will of God;"—this is the principle of Unity with Christ, unity in self-renunciation, in hatred of sin, in dying to the world, in living unto God. "For the time past of our life may suffice us to have wrought the will of the Gentiles, when we walked in lasciviousness, lusts, excess of wine, revellings, banquetings, and abominable idolatries; wherein they think it strange that ye run not with them to the same excess, if not speaking evil of you;" the life of the Christian is in such contrast with his former self, such contrast with a worldly, sensual, self-seeking manner of life, that he would feel it as a rebuke; they may carp at it, but they must admit its power;—and when it is further seen that this spirit of self-renunciation is not asceticism, that it has no tinge of gloom or bitterness, and no conceit of self-righteousness, but is self-denial for the good of others, then do men own the reality and the power of the Gospel. The Church must conquer unbelief by holy lives and blessed deeds; by an embodiment of Christ—ready unto every good word and work; giving the Gospel to the poor, caring for them that are in sorrow, doing all things possible for the elevation of our common humanity.

Then, with Reason to advocate the claims of God, and Revelation to assert his authority, with the united testimony of the Church to the faith in Jesus, with the spirit of holy Love, and with a zeal for suffering, dying men that never flags and and never yields, the Church shall *live* down the power of unbelief, and win back the apostolic day when mightily grew the word of God and prevailed.

ARTICLE VI.—RUSKIN'S NEW LECTURES ON ART.

Lectures on Art. Delivered before the University of Oxford, in Hilary Term, 1870. By JOHN RUSKIN, M. A., Honorary Student of Christ Church, Slade Professor of Fine Art. New York: John Wiley & Son. 1870. 12mo. pp. 202.

KEENNESS of insight, aided by the pure atmosphere and sweep of view which a generous culture gives, and a rich imagination combined with clearness and grace of verbal expression, give to Ruskin's writings deservedly their high place in the literature of the day. Living British authorship shows no superior in the charms of diction, or in the freshness, vigor, and suggestiveness of thought. A special commendation of his writings to a youthful mind, aspiring to high and true culture, is the practical spirit which animates and characterizes what he says. His conceptions of fine art are in the true spirit of all high culture; and his observations and criticisms are serviceable in every department of æsthetic training. Whether his desire be hint and impulse in the fashioning of manners or of character generally, or in the study of any special art—of discourse, of oratory or of poetry—equally as of painting or architecture,—the reader will not rise from the perusal of his works with the feeling that they contain nothing for him. He can hardly fail to catch a new inspiration of thought and generous culture.

These seven lectures, delivered in January, 1870, on his entering upon the duties of his new professorship in Oxford University, rank, perhaps, higher than any others of his published works in the richness and value of their teachings serviceable to true culture. The first lecture is Inaugural; the three following are general, treating severally of the Relations of Art to Religion, to Morality, and to Use; and the three closing lectures are specially designed to lead his classes

in their training in art by instructions in Line, Light, and Color.

In his Inaugural, he takes occasion to hail the new era in education, introduced by the founding of a professorship in Fine Art in each of the three great universities of England. In this step, he thinks, is signaled a vital change in the national mind respecting the principles on which education should be conducted, and the ranks of society to which it should extend. Instead of the discipline by the study of abstract branches of literature and philosophy, is now substituted a discipline by means of the study of what is to be of chief practical advantage in after life. And, besides, an option of studies to suit personal dispositions is now allowed instead of the fixed uniform course heretofore prescribed in common for all. He is careful however to emphasize the opinion that the object of university instruction should be not, primarily, attainment, but discipline;—not apprenticeship to a trade or advancement to a profession, but to make “gentlemen and scholars.”

We are sorry to see cropping out here a narrow insularity of sentiment, a little characteristic of British manners, as he commends to gentle England to aim at an ideal of national life which shall admit none of the ignoble occupations, but shall depute “to less fortunate and more covetous (?) races” all mechanical operations that are debasing in their tendency. It would seem that he restricts to Englishmen his application of “the law of noble life,” in another place, given by him as summed up in two of Pope’s lines which, he says, “are the most complete, the most concise, and the most lofty expression of moral temper existing in English words :”—

*“Never elated, when one man’s oppressed,
Never dejected, while another’s blessed.”*

This insular narrowness and partiality of view appears elsewhere in his antipathy to all mechanical forces, to all mechanical processes which save human labor and compete with manual skill. In the same spirit he condemns the use of iron in

architecture, and would have building exclusively of wood and stone.

Thoroughly British in this respect, indeed, is Ruskin's mind. The leading blemish in his writings is this one-sidedness and narrowness. His vision is clear and accurate ; it is too generally narrow in range. His generalizations of principle and rule are hence unsound and dangerous. The Christian view of all dutiful occupation so well and truly given in George Herbert's familiar lyric, which glorifies even servile labors, which hallows all toil and makes the meanest work divine, is too broad for Ruskin ; and the Christian doctrine of universal human brotherhood which ranges beyond narrow seas and makes the world its field of view and of effort, far out-reaches his mental grasp. But this very narrowness and particularity may help sometimes to a keener, minuter discernment, and bring into view what a broader range would confuse or dim. Even the unsound generalizations pushed in directions not generally observed to be open, are often suggestive.

This, in fact, we believe to be a characteristic feature of these lectures. The observations, the recognitions of fact, are the gifts of a vision eminently keen and accurate. His high attainments in art-skill and art-study, have lifted Ruskin to an eminence from which his patient, truth-loving gaze has been enabled to perceive what has transcended the world's eye hitherto. And his warm, sympathetic nature which prompts him to communicate to others what he himself has gathered of value, has put him on applications and extensions of his particular observations in ways and to fields of thought and practice which are rich and precious as they are new and admirable.

We propose to gather up these newer observations in art, and these applications and generalizations of them which appear to be of value, that we may help turn them to the best account for the benefit of science and of art, as also of general culture. We shall best accomplish our object as we distribute our gatherings into the three separate fields of 1. The proper nature and function of Art ; 2. The Relations of Art ; and 3. The Method in Art.

We should, however, precede this interpretation of the lectures before us with the indication of the special occasion and design which have prompted and shaped them. As already stated, they are the first lectures given from the new chair of Fine Art in the University of Oxford. The function of this new Professorship is stated to be "to establish both a practical and critical school of fine art for English gentlemen; practical, so that if they draw at all they may draw rightly; and critical, so that they may both be directed to such works of existing art as will best reward their study; and enabled to make the exercise of their patronage of living artists delightful to themselves by their consciousness of its justice, and to the utmost beneficial to their country, by being given only to the men who deserve it." But the peculiar condition and character of Englishmen impose limits on the field of art-instruction, in two specified particulars:—first, Englishmen can "never excel in decorative design," because "they have too much to think of, and they think of it too anxiously;" secondly, Englishmen can "never be successful in the highest fields of ideal or theological art," because of their characteristic "delight in the forms of burlesque which are connected in some degree with the foulness in evil." But Englishmen may hope to succeed in portraiture, which is ranked as the highest department of art, as "whatever is best in the great compositions depended on portraiture;" and also in representation of domestic life, of animal life, and of landscape. For accomplishing his aim Professor Ruskin proposes to arrange an educational series of examples of excellent art from which shall be severally excluded all second-rate, superfluous, and "even attractively varied examples," the greater number of which shall not be costly, many of them only engravings or photographs, and to induce the attendants upon his lectures "to give at least so much time to manual practice as may enable them to understand the nature and difficulty of executive skill."

I. The proper nature and function of Art.

We must not expect from Professor Ruskin the exactest precision in his definitions. A thorough logical training unhap-

pily is a sad defect as much in British schools as elsewhere ; and conclusions and generalizations must therefore be taken with some caution. Here indeed the greatest criticism on Ruskin's writings fastens itself. Principles are laid down as universal and necessary, which, thoroughly examined, are but partial. Every where this defect appears, as we shall sufficiently exemplify.

Art is formally defined to be "human labor regulated by human design." But this definition includes all rational endeavor, even the lowest industrial pursuit and most menial work. Fine art, which it is the special aim of the new professorship to cultivate and teach, seems to be restricted to "the production of beautiful things ;" while yet, in a vague way, that art is recognized as "properly 'fine,' which demands the full faculties of heart and intellect."

The fine arts, further, it is claimed, are "not necessarily imitative or representative, for their essence is being '*περί γένεσιν*'—occupied in the actual production of beautiful form or color." This recognition of the creative function of true art shows Ruskin's wide departure from the current teachings, and merits emphatic mention. The conception of art as only imitative, which seems to have originated in an erroneous interpretation of a rather loose remark of Aristotle in regard to poetry, we conceive, utterly mistakes the true nature of art, and degrades and hampers it. The error has been well-nigh universally prevalent, and even Ruskin himself is misled by it, as where he makes "likeness" an essential thing in the 'graphic arts' so called, and coördinate with skill and beauty. The truth is, that just so far as art is merely imitative, just so far as it merely repeats from a copy, it is as purely mechanical as photography, and is as wanting in that free creative power which enters into the very essence of true art.

Still further, Ruskin conceives of art as essentially *expressive*. And for this view of art, which pervades all his conceptions of it, we desire to render him our most grateful acknowledgments. No service he has rendered to art and culture, great and various as we deem it to be, can be compared with this of indicating and vindicating this feature as entering into the very essence of art. And we commend the following

sentence to every teacher and every pupil in every department of liberal culture as worthy of their profoundest and most careful consideration, as pregnant with meaning and fraught with the most important bearings on all teaching and study. "Not only with this, of which it is my function to show you the laws, but much more with the art of all men, which you came here chiefly to learn—that of language, the chief vices of education have arisen from the one great fallacy of supposing that noble language is a communicable trick of grammar and accent, instead of simply the careful expression of right thought." In like manner, "all right human song is the finished expression by art of the joy or grief of noble persons for right causes."

Once more, Ruskin's view of art is radically and thoroughly pervaded with the conviction that it is essentially an exponent of moral states. This moral element in true art his previous works, particularly his "*Modern Painters*," have nobly recognized; and to him eminently is due the glory of redeeming art from the low and most unworthy conceptions of it which Burke and Jeffrey have promulgated and made predominant in English literature;—the former resolving all beauty into sensuous impression, and the latter into mere accidental association.

In accordance with this view of art, as expressive ever of moral states, he insists that the arts are perfect exponents immediately of the mind of the workman, and then of that of the nation to which he belongs. He admits that "many of the strong masters had deep faults of character;" but he claims that "their faults share in their work." "All good has its origin in good, never in evil;" "the fact of either literature or painting being truly fine of their kind, whatever their mistaken aim or partial error, is proof of their noble origin;" "if there is indeed sterling value in the thing done, it has come of a sterling worth in the soul that did it." High, strong teaching is this; but it comes from a true observation, if that observation be, as it doubtless is, narrowed to but a part of the field. The truth observed is strongly set; even the manual execution, he claims, to say nothing of the imaginative design of a great painter which seems at first

view to involve more immediately and fully an ethical spirit in intimate sympathy with the truth of things as they are traced by creative goodness and purity, and bear the traces of his pure character—the execution of a great painter presupposes a physical soundness which can come only from a fine race, and an incorrupt, moral person. As he bids us realize the unfaltering, uninterrupted succession of movements of the hand in a great painter, “the muscular precision, and the intellectual strain,” the “muscular firmness and subtlety, and the instantaneously selective and ordinant energy of the brain, sustained all day long not only without fatigue, but with a visible joy in the exertion, like that which an eagle seems to take in the wave of his wings,” he forcibly asks us to consider “what sort of an ethical state of body and mind that means!—ethic through ages past! what fineness of race there must be to get it, what exquisite balance and symmetry of the vital powers!” and then “determine whether a manhood like that is consistent with any viciousness of soul, with any mean anxiety, any gnawing lust, any wretchedness of spite or remorse, any consciousness of rebellion against law of God or man, or any actual, though unconscious, violation of even the least law to which obedience is essential for the glory of life and the pleasing of its Giver.” “So far from art being immoral,” he insists, “little else except art is moral; life without industry is guilt, and industry without art is brutality; and for the words ‘good’ and ‘wicked,’ used of men, you may almost substitute the words ‘Makers’ or ‘Destroyers.’”

Pushing this view of art as essentially ethical in its grounds, and as the outgrowth not of underived, independent, individual excellence and achievement, but the exponent of a race or nation, he instructs his pupils as the things that he has first and last to tell them, “that the fine arts are not to be learned by Locomotion, but by making the homes we live in lovely, and by staying in them; that the fine arts are not to be learned by Competition, but by doing our quiet best in our own way; that the fine arts are not to be learned by Exhibition, but by doing what is right, and making what is honest, whether it be exhibited or not, and, for the sum of all, that men must paint and build neither for pride nor for money, but

for love—for love of their art, for love of their neighbor, and whatever better love may be than these, founded on these.”

“The beginning of art,” accordingly “is in getting our country clean, and our people beautiful.” “Agriculture by the hand,” not by machinery, “absolute refusal or banishment of unnecessary igneous force, are the first conditions of a school of art in any country.” Good comfortable dwellings in which men may learn to live and die, must be provided for all. And he fitly closes the inaugural series of his lectures with this noble teaching:

“Every seventh day, if not oftener, the greater number of well-meaning persons in England, thankfully receive from their teachers a benediction, couched in these terms:—‘The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Ghost, be with you.’ Now I do not know precisely what sense is attached in the English public mind to these expressions. But what I have to tell you positively is, that the three things do actually exist, and can be known if you care to know them, and possessed if you care to possess them, and that another thing exists, besides these, of which we already know too much.

“First, by simply obeying the orders of the Founder of your religion, all grace, graciousness, or beauty and favor of gentle life, will be given to you in mind and body, in work and in rest. The grace of Christ exists and can be had if you will. Secondly, as you know more and more of the created world, you will find that the true will of its maker is that its creatures should be happy; that he has made every thing beautiful in its time and place, and that it is chiefly by the fault of men, when they are allowed the liberty of thwarting his laws, that creation groans or travails in pain. The love of God exists and you may see it, and live in it if you will. Lastly, a Spirit does actually exist which teaches the ant her path, the bird her building, and men in an instinctive and marvelous way whatever lovely arts and noble deeds are possible to them. Without it you can do no good thing. To the grief of it you can do many bad ones. In the possession of it is your peace and your power.

“And there is a fourth thing of which we already know too much. There is an evil spirit whose dominion is in blindness and in cowardice, as the dominion of the Spirit is in clear sight and in courage.

“And this blind and cowardly spirit is for ever telling you that evil things are pardonable, and you shall not die for them, and that good things are impossible and you need not live for them; and that gospel of his is now the loudest that is preached in your Saxon tongue

“You will find some day, to your cost, if you believe the first part of it, that it is not true; but you may never, if you believe the second part of it, find to your gain, that also, untrue; and therefore I pray you with all earnestness to prove, and know within your hearts, that all things lovely and righteous are possible for those who believe in their possibility, and who determine that, for their part, they will make every day’s work contribute to them. Let every dawn of morning be to you as the beginning of life, and every setting sun be to you as its

close; then let every one of these short lives have its sure record of some kindly thing done for others, some goodly strength or knowledge gained for yourselves; so, from day to day, and strength to strength, you shall build up indeed by Art, by Thought, and by Just Will, an Ecclesia of England, of which it shall not be said, 'See what manner of stones are here,' but 'See what manner of men.'"

Turning to the products of the individual arts he finds the characteristics of perfection to be skill, beauty, and likeness, in graphic arts; and skill, beauty, and use, in the architectural arts. "You *must* have the three in each group, balanced and co-ordinate; and all the chief errors of art consist in losing or exaggerating one of these elements." He says the main nineteenth-century infidelity is in substituting "mechanism for skill, photograph for picture, cast-iron for sculpture." "You think you can get everything by grinding—music, literature, and painting. You will find it grievously not so; you can get nothing but dust by grinding." So "you must have the skill; you must have the beauty which is the highest moral element; and then, lastly, you must have the verity or utility, which is not the moral, but the vital element; and this desire for verity and use is the one aim of the three that always leads in great schools, and in the minds of great masters, without any exception. They will permit themselves in awkwardness, they will permit themselves in ugliness; but they will never permit themselves in uselessness or unverity."

If we inquire what Ruskin conceives as constituting this ethical condition of which all true art is the exponent, we find him recognizing as the two essential instincts of humanity, the love of order and the love of kindness. And the former he would carefully keep from being subordinated by the latter, or being overrun by it. He satirizes the rose-water philanthropy of modern criminal legislation. "We have taken up the benevolent idea, forsooth, that justice is to be preventive instead of vindictive; and we imagine that we are to punish not in anger but in expediency; not that we may give deserved pain to the person in fault, but that we may frighten other people from committing the same fault. The beautiful theory of this non-vindictive justice is, that having convicted a man of a crime worthy of death, we entirely pardon the criminal, restore

him to his place in our affections and esteem, and then hang him, not as a malefactor, but as a scarecrow."

But the imagination has a part in all true art-creation. Indeed Ruskin exalts it into lordship over all the passions. Even human selfishness, he seems to think, dies out and disappears at its will. "People would instantly care for others as well as themselves, if only they could *imagine* others as well as themselves. Let a child fall into the river before the roughest man's eyes; he will usually do what he can to get it out, even at some risk to himself, and all the town will triumph in the saving of one little life. Let the same man be shown that hundreds of children are dying of fever for want of some sanitary measure which it will cost him trouble to urge, and he will make no effort, and probably all the town would resist him if he did." So he leaves the conclusion with his hearers "that all you can rightly do or honorably become, depends on the government of these two instincts of order and kindness by this great imaginative faculty, which gives you inheritance of the past, grasp of the present, authority over the future."

In all this teaching certainly there is much that is fresh and rich and inspiring. It is exceedingly taking and plausible. It is yet, it must be confessed, partial, incomplete, onesided, and consequently, so far, unsound and dangerous. Let us, in few words, extract the new and true and put the partial teachings in their true relationship. They will give us, we think, a true, valuable, inspiring theory of art.

First, Art, Ruskin teaches us, is productive of beauty. The full truth is, all fine art, in so far as fine, is concerned with beauty, immediately, essentially, characteristically. All fine art seeks as its end, perfect form to be contemplated, admired, loved for its own sake. Just so far as we fasten our attention exclusively on the form of an object and so are absorbed with its beauty, just so far is it to be regarded as a thing of art, human or divine. And reversely, just so far as an object is recognised as one of fine art, it is beautiful. Art ceases to be fine just so far as it drops form, beauty from its aim and its work. Perfect art, divine art is ever beautiful, useful or good, and true, at the same time. Human art may give predominance to one or the other of these constituents that must enter more or less

into every rational endeavor, and so make its product predominantly beautiful or useful.

All art, further, is not imitative but properly creative. Art may sometimes follow copy; but its own freedom and originality must inspire and rule the work even if it be copy or it sinks into drudgery, machine-work, and ceases to be rational art. In other words, there is no true art-production where there is not a proper ideal or form in the mind of the artist which it is his aim to body forth in his work.

All art, still further, is expressive. Ruskin holds that it is expressive ever of ethical states; or rather he seems to hold this view, while he shrinks from saying expressly that it always expresses moral ideas, and he uses the vague term exponent;—art is ever exponent of ethical condition. But this is but partial truth and tends to mislead. It is not correct to say thus, that true art can express only moral ideas, except in the sense that all human effort is immediately expressive of moral ideas. It is true that man never drops his moral nature, when he ploughs or when he chats;—when he labors for bread or wages, or talks simply as pastime or for the coldest intellectual instruction. It is true, moreover, that the moral nature is man's highest, deepest nature; and that art when expressing its phases in fit form, yields its richest, most beautiful products. But we conveniently and rightly distinguish ideas of morality from ideas of truth and ideas of utility; and art may as legitimately express these latter as the former. We need therefore in order to a just appreciation of art to extend Ruskin's too narrow view, and embrace within its proper domain all rational ideas, whether of truth, beauty, or goodness, any of which it is its legitimate function to express. "Love of order and love of kindness," are not the exclusive instincts of humanity which may go forth in art, unless the terms are understood in a vague, indeterminate sense as inclusive of all that is intuitively associated with those instincts, that is, all that lies in the proper rational nature of man. The comprehensive coördinate instincts of humanity rather are three,—the love of knowledge or of the true, the love of the beautiful or of perfect form as that which may be most perfectly felt, the love of the good and right; and art may rightfully express any one of these ideas,

either predominantly or in any lower combination with the others. But this is the essential conception of all art, as that whose work is beauty, that it is expressive of idea; so that an object is beautiful, the perfect work of art, just so far as it is recognized as expressive of idea, and as form. In all beauty, in all true art, there must be idea; there must be expression of it.

But, once more, Ruskin recognizes the Imagination, as concerned in all fine art, as governing in fact in all. He pronounces it "the highest faculty of the human mind." It rules the instincts which are the roots of all human excellence. But its relation to art is obscurely or inexactly represented; his psychology seems to be imperfect or unsound. If however we recognize the imagination as the faculty or capacity of form; as the receptive or communicative attribute of the human soul by which it receives or communicates idea;—capacity of form as synonymous with sensibility, and faculty of form as synonymous with artistic creation, communicative energy; as having to do with the idea of the beautiful, as the intelligence with the idea of the true, and the moral nature with the right and the good, then all becomes clear in regard to its relation to art. The imagination is the art-energy in all art-production, for art is but the producer of form. Its perfection is two-fold, as it is both capacity and faculty. As capacity, its perfection lies in the loving tenderness and affectionate sympathy of its sensibility and whatever enters into a perfect receptivity; as faculty, its perfection lies in its power to fashion and to form; to idealize the attributes and elements which are most significant and expressive of the object which it would body forth, and to shape them out in truest, fittest form;—in its power, in short, to present idea most perfectly to other rational spirit. So most truly does Ruskin say, in respect to a single art, "the secret of language is the secret of sympathy, and its full charm is possible only to the gentle. And thus the principles of beautiful speech have all been fixed by sincere and kindly speech." Here he well observes we discover that which makes the art of language "the fittest instrument of a gentleman's education. To teach the meaning of a word thoroughly, is to teach the nature of the spirit that coined it."

Fine art, then, to sum up in a word our review of Ruskin's teachings, as we would correct them and fill them out in complete relationship, is conversant only with form, with beauty; this being its immediate and governing aim. It is creative, originative; it is imitative only in the large sense as representative of the artist's ideal of an object; it ever creates form, its product, so far as artistic, being not substance, not thing in itself, but thing in its form. It ever expresses idea, so that without idea revealed in its product, it runs into vanity and emptiness, and ceases to be rational art. As energy, it is the imagination, the faculty of form, to which corresponds the sensibility, as the capacity of form. All art is moral. is exponent of the ethical condition, only as the artistic nature is the rational nature, which is essentially moral; and hence the most perfect artistic energy is but the most perfect rational energy, viewed specially in respect to the form which it assumes in its outgoing, not in respect to the beneficent end which it reaches or the right direction which it takes, nor yet in respect to the relations between its essential parts or attributes or to other outgoings of rational energy. Art is characterized as fine in so far as its end or aim terminates in the form, not in the beneficent result, nor in the mere enlightenment; in so far as it addresses preëminently and predominantly the passive imagination or sensibility, not the moral nature or the intelligence; in so far, in fine, as its intended product is perfectest form in itself not good nor truth. We need to add, to prevent misconception, that perfect art, as outworking of a rational nature, must of very necessity be moral and be true.

But we have not in this summing up of a full theory of art, disposed of Ruskin's observation, that the graphic arts must have skill, beauty, and likeness, or truth; and the architectural arts, skill, beauty, and utility. All art must have skill; for skill is but intelligent power, or free and full energy working intelligently. All art must have beauty; for beauty is the one aim and end of art, as we have seen. And all art must be in accordance with truth, that is, must represent ever so as to preserve the identity of relationship between every object as a whole and its parts; for it cannot, unless fatally to itself, violate the intelligent nature to which it belongs. If its specific

object be, as in the graphic arts, to represent an object; it cannot do this but as it represents truly. But, what Ruskin and excessive pre-raphaelitism too often overlook, art represents not the object in itself, but only the artist's ideal of that object; and hence the truth which graphic art is to observe, lies not in the countenance or landscape in itself, but in this ideal of it. Further, all art, in the same way, must be beneficent, or useful, for the artistic nature is, as already observed, essentially moral, and cannot but in suicide ignore or belie its own nature. Architecture, and oratory, it should be remarked, however, are arts in which pure form is not, as it is in ideal sculpture and painting, the exclusive end or object; but an end of utility is combined with the pure artistic end which is ever beauty or perfect form. We find here, as everywhere in Ruskin's writings, very accurate and keen, but incomplete observation; partial, not entire apprehension; vivid insight, vicious generalization.

II. *The relations of Art*, as they are presented or suggested in these lectures, we may dispose of more summarily. Only the relations of art to its sources and its ends are regarded; and these are considered in the three lectures severally devoted to the relations of art to Religion, to morals, and to use. Repudiating the notion that the fine arts are "merely modes of graceful recreation and a new resource for times of rest," Ruskin claims that "all great arts have for their object either the support or exaltation of human life,—usually both," and "form one united system from which it is impossible to remove any part without harm to the rest." They "have had, and can have, but three principal directions of purpose or functions; first, that of enforcing the religion of men; secondly, that of perfecting their ethical state; thirdly, that of doing them material service."

We do not find as we should not look for logical completeness or logical consistency in his treatment of these relations; but we shall find original observations, and inspiring suggestions. We note at once a fatal omission in his enumeration of the generic functions of art; for certainly it is as truly a legitimate function of art to further science, to reveal truth, as to

subserve the interests of religion, or of morals, or of physical comfort. This indeed Ruskin expressly teaches. It is a very faulty classification of human wants ministered to by art into these three of religion, morals, and comfort.

But well and truly does he insist that all that art which, as having connection with religion is denominated religious art and so in its general and ultimate end aims to incite, purify, and exalt the religious spirit, must spring from a religious source. Most admirable is the sentiment in which this view lies couched:—"We *may* have splendor of art again, and with that we may truly praise and honor our Maker, and with that set forth the beauty and holiness of all that He has made; but only after we have striven with our whole hearts first to sanctify the temple of the body and spirit of every child that has no roof to cover its head from the cold, and no walls to guard its soul from corruption in this our English land."

His definition of religion is evidently strained to meet the demands of some theory or some special use. He says he uses the "word 'religion' as signifying the feelings of love, reverence, or dread, with which the human mind is affected by its conceptions of spiritual being." In his view, accordingly, as he expressly says, "there are many religions, but there is only one morality."

A like instance of logical weakness and viciousness, or of capricious use of terms appears, in this connection, in his opposition of the two Prides which he represents as the source of the "fatalest darkness" in the interpretation of religious symbolical art;—"the Pride of Faith, which imagines that the nature of the Deity can be defined by its convictions; and the Pride of Science, which imagines that the energy of Deity can be explained by its analysis."

In truth, his general treatment of the relations of art to religion are extremely vague, misty, illogical, and unsatisfactory, yielding, however, here and there, delightful fruits of just observation and feeling.

As in its relation to religion, so also to morals, true art must spring from a moral source. "You must have the right moral state first, or you cannot have the art." "Accurately, in proportion to the rightness of the cause and purity of the emotion, is

the possibility of the fine art. A maiden may sing of her lost love; but a miser cannot sing of his lost money." "With mathematical precision, subject to no error or exception, the art of a nation, so far as it exists, is an exponent of its ethical state." And so he claims that the "love of beauty is an essential part of all healthy human nature; though it can long cöexist with states of life in many other respects unvirtuous, it is itself wholly good;—the direct adversary of envy, avarice, mere worldly care, and especially of cruelty."

In the relation of art to use, he discovers a two-fold office;—"it gives Form to knowledge, and Grace to utility." The expression is a characteristic specimen of Ruskin's specious rhetoric; and indicates a remarkable blindness to the most vital relations in art. The essential function of art is to create form; and it gives form to knowledge in no other sense than to utility, as it also as truly gives grace to knowledge as to utility. And when he proceeds on the following page to emphasize his assertion "that the entire vitality of art depends upon its being either full of truth or full of use, and that however pleasant, wonderful, or impressive it may be in itself, it must yet be of an inferior kind, and tend to deeper infirmity, unless it has clearly one of these main objects,—*either to state a true thing, or to adorn a serviceable one*, he leads us into a fog and mist in regard to his whole theory of art, out of which we can discern no way of escape. He had repeatedly given forth in elaborated form of utterance that the three sole functions of art are to enforce religion, to perfect morals, and do material service; and now ignoring the first two functions, he restricts the entire vitality of art to the third—to use, which yet is here no longer mere material service alone, but promotion of knowledge also. Evidently he has no well-settled theory of art. He has never thought out its essential properties and its relations, and carefully distinguished them. He is, hence, ever mixing up the ideas which art expresses with the proper beauty which art produces, and this beauty, which is the sole, immediate end of art, so far as pure or æsthetic, with the remote end of art or the motive to art, which may be some utility; as also the ideas expressed and the beautiful forms given in the expression with the conditions of art-expression.

Thus, he says, as if characterizing fully the two classes of arts, that in the graphic arts you have skill, beauty, and likeness, which last element he afterwards calls verity, and in the architectural arts, you have skill, beauty, and use. Beauty, he seems to conceive of as a coördinate attribute with skill, as if there could be supposed beauty in art without skill. Either the imposing announcement is an empty truism or it is deceptive. If he simply means that all perfect, graphic art must have skill, that is, power to render, we need not be told that; nor that perfect art, whose sole function it is to produce beauty, must give beauty, if it produce at all; nor yet, that where it undertakes to imitate, it must imitate or produce likeness. But Ruskin intended something more than these bald truisms. If, however, the enunciation be taken as embracing, coördinately, all the essential characters of graphic art, the statement is incorrect. The truth is that all art consists in rendering idea, and its one comprehensive result is form. All idea is true, beautiful, and good, while it may be regarded for the time by us more or less exclusively and predominantly as the one or the other. While art properly has to do with form, it may so render the true in its form that the true shall prevail in its impression on the mind contemplating the product; it may so teach rather than awaken admiring emotion, and it is then preëminently didactic art. Or it may seek solely perfect form; it is then fine art, aesthetic art; and its legitimate effect is loving admiration. Or still further it may in its rendering in form seek some good; it is then useful art; its proper effect is beneficent. But didactic art must have form or beauty; and thus one contemplating mind may absorb itself with the beauty, while another may be taken up with the truth revealed. Just so with useful art. The arts thus are properly discriminated by the more immediate, specific end proposed or attained by the artist, or according as he proposes to make the true, the beautiful, or the good the more prominent idea. Yet the true cannot be, except as involving the beautiful and the good. All teaching art must, if perfect, please, that is, be in perfect form, be beautiful; all fine art must, also, instruct and also profit as well as please; and all useful art must be in truth and in beauty to reach the highest utility.

In the same manner, the elements of artistic genius are comprehensively the three so justly and philosophically enumerated by the Apostle Paul as making up the Christian spirit, "power, love, and sound mind;" for the spirit of piety, of art, of all rational culture is the same in its general, constituent elements, and they are of such close affinity, that perfection in one cannot be but in connection with the others.

There must be skill in all art, indeed, but skill is not the exclusive element of artistic excellence. There must be verity and utility in all art, but verity and utility are only the remoter incidental ends in fine æsthetic art, and all art must proceed alike in verity and result in utility.

III. We shall dismiss our notice of Ruskin's doctrine of method in art, with a specification of a most just and most important principle, applicable to all art, to oratory and poetry, to music and to sculpture, as to painting, to which it is immediately applied,—indeed applicable to all culture conceived as the formation of a perfect character. In its application to painting, it is thus expressed:—"arrange broad masses and colors first, and put the details into them afterwards." Or, to state the principle in its generic form and as applicable to all art and to all culture:—begin with the whole, proceed to the part. This method, Ruskin observes, is the reverse of the usual method; but he vindicates it as the natural method, and followed by all successful artists; as less irksome than the reverse method and more definite, and as facilitating and rendering more instructive the study of models. Its importance may be exemplified in the art of discourse. Here the principle requires that the orator or writer first conceive in definite outline the entire scope and object of his discourse, as well as the extent of his theme, before he enters upon the parts, or the filling up. To proceed in the reverse way of beginning with no conception of the total design, and going on from one part to another with no such notion of the whole, must ever hinder the highest achievement in any particular oratorical or literary effort; as the habit of thus writing or speaking must ever hinder growth in oratorical skill and power. So in culture, in the highest, christian culture, the beginning must be in the adoption of the whole spirit of piety and the progress be then in filling up the

details of Christian living;—conversion first, progressive sanctification in particulars afterwards. To begin with the adoption of one Christian virtue, although this is better certainly than not to begin at all, is to hinder perfect attainment, to have such attainment liable to failure. So in regard to each part of culture, the principle prescribes that it be taken up first as a whole and then the progress be in filling up and perfecting the details.

We have no space to exhibit the application of this principle to all art and all culture, or even to do more than indicate in this most general way its applicability and importance to any. But we deem it fundamental in all training; and place the inculcation of it among those many teachings of Ruskin which reach down so deep and are so suggestive to every thoughtful and aspiring mind.

ARTICLE VII.—A VOICE FROM "SQUASHVILLE:" A LETTER TO THE NEW ENGLANDER FROM THE "REV. MR. PICKERING."

Mr. W. W. Phelps, in his speech at the last commencement dinner, spoke of "Rev. Mr. Pickering of Squashville," as a clerical member of the corporation of Yale College, and described him as "exhausted with keeping a few sheep in the wilderness." He will not charge me with excessive modesty on the one hand, nor with any unreasonable self-esteem on the other, if I assume that I am the unfortunate individual thus referred to. If I am not, I do not know who is. Any one of the ten clerical Fellows has a right to assume that the courtesy was intended for him; and my right is at least as good as that of any of my nine associates.

When I heard Mr. Phelps on that occasion, I was not sure that I saw precisely the aim of his discourse; on reading and re-perusing what seems to be his own report of his speech, my perplexity is not entirely removed. He undertakes to represent "the younger alumni," and to express their dissatisfaction with "the management of the college." He admits that in scholarship it "keeps progress with the age," but he holds that in everything else it is behind the times. He "finds no fault with the *men*" who manage, but "much fault with the *spirit* of the management." The men with whom he finds no fault are "the President and Professors," whose "superiority to ordinary men" he recognizes with growing "admiration and love." He claims for President Woolsey what the Spanish orator said of Lincoln, "Humblest of the humble before his own soul, greatest of the great before the world." He "claims for Porter, Hadley, Thacher, and their noble associates" nothing less than "the highest moral and intellectual gifts unselfishly devoted to the cause of education." But—oddly enough—while the men who manage are so transcendently gifted and self-sacrificing, "the spirit of the management," without any fault on their part, is just that which does not "keep progress with the age."

Thus far the fault-finding, though it strikes expressly at every thing except the "scholarship" which that defective management produces, is not very specific. Mr. Phelps had indeed told us that "the spirit of the management" is "too conservative and narrow;" but in that proposition the subject ("spirit of the management") is indefinite, and the predicate ("too conservative and narrow") is equally indefinite. We, therefore, whose misfortune is to be Pickerings, and to live and labor in our several Squashvilles instead of flourishing under the municipal government of New York, expected that our friend would condescend to some specifications of the "too conservative and narrow" spirit in which our college is managed by the President and Professors. And what did he say? Here it is in his own words:

"The College wants a living connection with the world without—an infusion of some of the new blood which throbs in every vein of this mighty republic—a knowledge of what is wanted in the scenes for which Yale educates her children:—this living connection with the outer world—this knowledge of people's wants, can be acquired only from those who are in the people and of the people."

Is it so? Is there now no connection between Yale College (Mr. P. evidently means the Academical department) and the world without? One-fourth of all the students come into college every year fresh from the outside world; another fourth every year drop out of college into the same world; and for the space of three months in each year, every mother's son of them is quite cut off from cloistered life, and is tossing about in the same great world with Mr. Phelps and the rest of us. Surely the vital connection between the students and the interest and sympathies of their homes is never sundered by their being in college; and their homes, if they have any on this sublunar sphere, are in the world without. And what of the Professors? Do they not live in the world as really as other Christians? Are they nothing but mummied specimens of Mediæval, or, at the latest, Puritan humanity! When they go into the streets, do they wear the costume of some buried age, and stare like ghosts revisiting the glimpses of the moon? Do they go about like Johnny Look-in-the-air, stumbling into ditches because they cannot see what lies before them? They are citizens in a free commonwealth—householders, husbands, fathers; and is

not that connection with the outer world just as vital as if, instead of being professors, they were shoemakers or stock-jobbers? They read the daily newspapers; and though few of them have time to study all the fluctuations of Wall street, they have reason to know exactly, for they feel continually, the difference between gold and currency. They have dealings with butchers and grocers, like other heads of families. Their wives go a-shopping, and they pay the bills, like other good husbands. Being not only citizens but voters, they are interested in all public questions. They have opinions of their own not only about the war in Europe, but also about all sorts of matters nearer home, from the election of an alderman to the election of a President, the reconstruction of reconquered States, the payment of the national debt, the Alabama question with Great Britain, and the general American policy of protecting everybody's industry by oppressing the industry of everybody else. If they have not a vital connection with the world outside of their lecture-rooms, how can it be made out that any man has a vital connection with the world outside of his own warehouse or workshop? Mr. Phelps, no doubt, has a vital connection with the world of New York, but his connection with the world outside is somewhat defective if he does not know that one of our Professors was even talked of for Governor and has been defeated as a candidate for congress. At this moment one of the Academical Faculty holds an important office under the government of the United States, and another occupies a place of trust and honor (without much pay) in the government of Connecticut. I cannot see that, either on the part of the students or on the part of the Faculty, there is any want of a natural and healthy connection between the college and the great world of human society.

But I must not forget that our friend (for most heartily do I recognise him as a friend of his *Alma Mater*) gives another specification under his sweeping charge that the management of the college—or the spirit of it—is "too conservative and narrow." Speaking in the name of "young Yale," he affirms that the growth of the college is checked by the "utter absence" of "that worldiness which is not inconsistent

with godliness,"—in other words (as he explains it), "that recognition of human weakness and infirmity "to which all successful men "cater." He illustrates the importance of catering to human weakness by saying.

"Don't let Harvard, our great rival, alone have the benefit of it—let Yale condescend to be worldly-wise. The son of a President is about entering college. Yale says, it is worldly to secure him. We will make no effort to secure him. Saintly Yale folds her arms in true dignity of saintliness, and young Vicksburg goes to Harvard. The press, in a telegram, carries the fact to hamlet and prairie, and the fame of Harvard enters a thousand households for the first time. It is commencement time; Yale says, Learning, not festivity, is the true object of a college. We will not cater to the weaknesses of alumni by offering other attractions than the philosophical orations of its graduating class. Five hundred Yalensians, needing a very little impetus to gather them under the old trees, find nothing, and stay away. Five hundred Harvard men, needing the same impetus, pack their portmanteaus and go to Cambridge because Lord Lacklaw and the Hon. Mr. Blower, the distinguished senator from Alaska, will be on the platform. Harvard takes great poets and historians to fill its vacant Professorships,—Yale takes boys, who have proved their qualifications by getting their windows broken as tutors."

Excuse my making so long a quotation. I might have exposed myself to a charge of misrepresentation, had I attempted to give the substance of it in any fewer words. Here then we have the thing fairly set forth—that worldliness within the limits of godliness—that catering to human weakness and infirmity—which is the grand secret of success; and which abounds at Harvard but is utterly absent from Yale. See how blessed it is to have worldly wisdom! Harvard, after the fashion of a New York dry-goods jobbing house, sends out "drummers" to beat up for customers; and behold "young Vicksburg" goes to Cambridge, when, if Yale had only drummed loud enough, he might have gone to New Haven. Harvard makes her commencements attractive to the high culture of her alumni by obtaining the presence of Lord Lacklaw and Senator Blower; while Yale offers to her assembled graduates nothing more sensational than a discourse from the illustrious President of Princeton. Harvard puts great poets and historians into her vacant professorships,—while Yale generally takes for professors in her Academical Faculty young men whom she herself has trained in and for the business of college teaching. Admitting that all this about Harvard is true—which I do most

potently disbelieve—I will venture to say what we who live at Squashville think about the worldly wisdom which our friend esteems so highly.

1. This Mr. Worldly-wise-man (whom I do by no means identify with our friend his admirer) is a snob. In my particular Squashville, and in all the Squashvilles, we have a very high regard for President Grant; but we discriminate broadly between him and that respectable old gentleman Mr. Jesse Grant, and just as broadly between the President and that undoubtedly respectable young man his son, now supposed to be a Freshman at Cambridge. If President Grant's son is a good boy and a bright one, he is worth as much in a well-regulated college as any other boy of the same mental and moral quality—and no more. I venture to suggest that, especially in the United States, the university or college that attempts to thrive by tuft-hunting is making itself contemptible, and can be saved only by being cured of its snobbishness. The suggestion that the "management" of Harvard College has taken special pains to get President Grant's son under its tuition—though intended as a compliment—could hardly be accepted as better than an insult.

Mr. Phelps may regard it as a new proof of poor Pickering's incapacity, if I tell him frankly that in Squashville every tub is expected to stand on its own bottom, and not on the bottom of any ancestral tub however great or glorious. In our way of thinking, the value of a student is measured by what he is, and not by his father's official or social position, nor by the wealth which he is expected to inherit. The glory of a college is not in the parentage of the boys who go into it, but in the cultured manliness of the men who come out of it. For that reason I would rather that the young men who resort to Yale College should be the sons of middle class families, or even of families whose life is a struggle with poverty, than that they should be sons of millionaires, and if I were to choose between two young men equal in talent and in moral qualities—one the son of a President, or of a Secretary of State, or of a railroad king,—and the other the son of a Connecticut farmer, or of a working mechanic, or of a country pastor—I would say give us the young man who knows that he must be the architect of

his own fortune and is compelled to be frugal, and let the other go to Harvard or anywhere else, if he must go where he will be flattered because of his father's money or his father's position. Let our college be attractive to young men whose education is to be achieved by strenuous effort and more strenuous self-denial,—let the tone of sentiment in the college and the scale of necessary expenditure be determined by their influence; and every rich man whose son is worth having as a student will be in earnest to have his son educated at Yale, rather than at any college that sends out drummers to gather in young men from "the first families," and where the habits of the academic body are molded by deference to wealth and station.

2. As for the practice of appointing celebrated poets and historians to vacant professorships, it may suffice to say (without inquiring whether there is or has been such a practice at Harvard) that Yale appoints its professors in the Academical Department with the expectation that they will be efficient teachers, and will make teaching rather than the writing of poetry or history the business of their lives; and that therefore it rarely appoints one who has not served some sort of apprenticeship in the work of teaching. We in Squashville are not convinced that Brainerd, or Percival, or Willis, would have been worth more in a professor's chair than any one of our living professors, or of those whose names are starred in the catalogue. Perhaps Mr. Phelps could contrive some way in which a "great" poet (whose poetry is convertible into cash over the counter of his publisher at the rate of a gold eagle for every stanza) can be persuaded to doff "his singing robes" and bend himself to the prosaic work of teaching undergraduates;—or could tell how a historian (one who is already great and for whose not yet written volumes, printers and translators are impatiently waiting) can be induced to relinquish his unfinished life-work, and, instead of writing history for admiring nations, consent to teach in college class-rooms.

For this too narrow and conservative spirit in the management of the college, Mr. Phelps proposes a remedy which he is sure will be of sovereign efficacy. His plan is, for substance, to abolish the existing corporation and to place the legislative and appointing power of the university, and the custody of its

endowments, in the hands of a board or council chosen by the annual mass-meetings of Alumni. This plan of reconstruction is explained and supported by two writers in the "Nation," for Aug. 11, and Sept. 1, who profess to represent the genuine "Young Yale," that Mr. P. speaks of. One of them expresses the demand of "Young Yale" thus,—“As Mr. Phelps says, it wants the government of Yale College outside of the Faculty, the government that appoints the Faculty, lodged in some other hands than Congregational ministers of the State of Connecticut.” The other, representing “Young Yale’s real complaint,” says, “We think ministers are, as a class, men of second-rate ability, and that there are few of them who are not inefficient in thought, narrow-minded, and in the true sense of the word, uncultivated.” Again, “Ministers are, as a rule, inferior men—that, sir, broadly stated, is the position of Young Yale, and it is just as well that the real root of trouble should be pointed out.” The two communications have one signature, “Alumnus;” but we learn from the editor that the second Alumnus is not the same with the first.

Such, then broadly and frankly uttered at last, is the demand of those who call themselves “Young Yale.” I do not inquire how many they are, nor by what authority they assume to represent the graduates of recent years. It is enough that the demand has been made by one so responsible as Mr. Phelps, and so willing to take the responsibility. His contemptuous description of the Corporation was not a mere exhibition of bad manners, but as interpreted by the first “Alumnus,” and more expressly by the second, it demands that “the President and Fellows,” who have been for one hundred and seventy years the incorporated Board of trust must be got rid of because they are “Congregational ministers of the State of Connecticut,”—and because “ministers are, as a class [not only in Connecticut but generally] men of second rate ability,”—“as a rule, inferior men”—of whom few “are not inefficient in thought, narrow-minded, and in the true sense of the word uncultivated.” I propose to consider this demand as it appears to those who regard it from what “Young Yale” may call the Squashville point of view.

I. Respect for Mr. Phelps requires me to take some notice of what he suggests, (and what his supporters affirm more sweepingly) about ministers of the Gospel. It may be that our friend (I do not know where he goes to church) finds in the quality of the discourses which he hears in his attendance on public worship, and in the quality of the clergyman who has the felicity of ministering to him, some reason for his contemptuous estimate of the clerical profession. But let me tell him that there are thousands of intelligent men who do not agree with him in that estimate. "Ministers," quoth "Young Yale," as represented by these writers, "are as a class men of second-rate ability." A very obvious reply is that lawyers, *as a class*, are men of second-rate ability—that physicians, *as a class*, (especially if we must count in the Homeopaths, the Hydropaths, the steam-doctors and all pretenders to the healing art) are men of second-rate ability—that the same thing is true of journalists, *as a class*, of authors, of artists, and of capitalists. The first-rate men in every profession are the few; and their superiority implies a relative inferiority of the many. Some ministers are doubtless men of second-rate ability, while some lawyers, and some men in various other professions are men of first rate ability; but it is equally beyond dispute that while many lawyers, and many in every other profession, are men of second-rate ability, some ministers are men whose ability is as conspicuous as that of the foremost in any other profession.

If we put another construction on this contemptuous language, we find no more truth in it than when we take its most obvious meaning. That ministers as a class are inferior in ability to lawyers as a class, or to the aggregate body of other professional men, may be asserted by unthinking ignorance, but it need not be disproved till somebody shall have attempted to prove it. Yet in passing I may say to those who call themselves "Young Yale," that their rashness on this subject is not creditable to the college at which they profess to have been educated. They seem to assume that every man's "ability" is in proportion to the money that he gets in his profession—that because "Rev. Mr. Pickering of Squashville" lives very frugally on a small salary, and counts himself happy if by

much self-denial he can obtain for his children the highest and best education, while Hon. Mr. Tupman of Fiskville gets fifty thousand dollars for his services in a lawsuit, therefore Mr. Tupman is a man of first-rate ability, and Mr. Pickering is a man of second-rate, or perhaps of fourth-rate ability. I am sorry for the graduate whose *alma mater* has not succeeded in teaching him a more enlightened and liberal method of measuring the relative "ability" of men employed in liberal professions.

I will even say, for the benefit of the self-styled "Young Yale," that the profession which they ignorantly disparage is preëminently—as compared with other professions which require both general and special culture—the learned profession. And inasmuch as their flings are at Congregational ministers in particular, and more distinctly at "Congregational ministers of the State of Connecticut," I too may speak of those ministers particularly, without implying that they are, or that they are not, superior to ministers of other churches in learning and culture, or in mental vigor. Take the average of talent and of learning and culture among the lawyers in Connecticut or in the State of New York, or among members of the medical profession in either State (not counting the irregular practitioners,) or among the journalists, or among the mixed multitude of *literateurs* who make authorship a profession: and there need be no hesitation in affirming that the average both of talent and of learning and culture among the Congregational ministers of Connecticut is higher. There is no profession in which the ratio of college graduates to the whole number is so great, or which demands so rigorously of those who would become members of it a college education or its equivalent. A man may be admitted into a Law school or Medical school not only with less of the character which gives promise of diligence in study, but with less of general knowledge and culture, than would be requisite for his admission into any Congregational Divinity school in New England or elsewhere. Nor is there any other profession which requires of aspirants, in addition to that general culture, so long a term of special study. In a Law school, or a Medical school, the course of study for one who is already B. A., runs through two years,

while the course in a Divinity school is planned for three years. And what are the special studies introductory to these several professions? I will not say a word in disparagement of legal or medical studies as related to learning in general. Rightly conducted under broad-minded teachers—especially if the student has already been trained by academic discipline—they liberalize the mind and lead it forth into broad views of truth, while they sharpen the faculties for special service. But no professional studies are in their nature so fit to train the mind and to give it enlargement and elevation, as those which make up the curriculum of preparation for the ministry. Other professional students drop—shall I say forget?—their linguistic studies as soon as they hear with inward self-application the formula *Admitto te ad primum in artibus gradum*. The theological student begins his course by forming an acquaintance with the most venerable of extant languages—a language so different in its grammatical forms, in its syntax, in its idioms, in all its lights and shades, from every variety of Aryan speech, that he finds himself entering a new world of thought. At the same time he renews and extends his study of the Greek language—not for the mere sake of study, as when he was in college, but with an immediately practical aim; watching to detect the nicest turns of thought implied in mode, and tense or in prepositions and particles; and learning at once the science and the art of interpretation by learning to interpret that unique body of literature, the documents of the Christian religion. His study of the questions concerning the origin and transmission of those documents revives and enlarges his study of all ancient history. Meanwhile he has entered another field of inquiry—the relation of nature to its author and its end; or in other words the relation of all physical science to the knowledge of God. The study of God in nature and in the instincts and moral cognitions of the human soul, introduces him to the study of God in human history—the revealed God whom the monotheistic Hebrews worshipped of old, and whom the Christ of Hebrew expectation has revealed to the world. As he studies that revelation of God which centers in the mysterious person and history of Jesus of Nazareth and in his relations to the fact of sin and to redemption from sin—as he stud-

the nature and history of the spiritual community which recognizes Christ as its unity and its life, the kingdom in which Christ is king, and which is subduing the world to God by forces which are not of this world—he finds himself confronted not only with questions that reach through all the sciences of matter, but also with questions that bring the science of mind and the science of duty and all the departments of social science into an intimate relation with the government of God and with the hope of redemption. With all these studies he combines another sort of culture. From first to last he is learning to use his faculty of utterance. He studies not merely that he may know how to think, but not less that he may know how to make others think. The art which he is to practice in life is, the art of teaching and persuading, not only by the methods of public discourse, but in all the ways of intercourse with individual minds—the art of awakening thought, of guiding inquiry, of comforting sorrow, of touching the deepest sensibilities, and of bringing Divine realities into effectual contact with human consciousness; and all this must be in his doing of it, not art, but the purest spontaneity. Let me say to those who think they are Young Yale, that the profession which they contemptuously disparage is and always must be, in a Christian commonwealth, *the* learned profession. Old Yale knows this, and whoever calls himself Young Yale and does not know it, is “inefficient in thought, narrow-minded, and in the true sense of the word, uncultivated.”

If, thus vindicating my own profession, I seem to have “become a fool in glorying,” I say to the assailants, “Ye have compelled me;” and to others, let it be my apology that sometimes it is right and necessary to answer a fool according to his folly. I do not imply that Mr. Phelps is a fool; but only the scantiest courtesy is due to his backers in the Nation. The bearing of what I have said on the issue raised by them, about the intellectual competence of clergymen to be Fellows of Yale College, is sufficiently evident.

II. If anything may be safely inferred from the details suggested by Mr. Phelps in his fault-finding, the management of Yale College would not be greatly improved by the change which he proposes. The existing and ancient management,

under the constitution which the "Young Yale" represented by Mr. Phelps and his friends would subvert, has gained for the institution its present standing and reputation; has placed in the chairs of instruction men worthy of the eulogy lavished upon them by their grateful pupil in his speech at the commencement dinner; has so carefully husbanded the gifts of benefactors that, in one hundred and seventy years, nothing has been lost by carelessness or lack of judgment; has developed out of the mere college, with its four undergraduate classes and its unorganized handful of resident graduates, a university of five distinct faculties; and, in its Sheffield Scientific School, is giving to the country a better and more successful illustration of what may be done in the methods and for the ends of "the new education" than is given by any other institution, by whomsoever managed. What is it that the self-styled "Young Yale" would have that is better than this? I look to what Mr. Phelps has so gently and courteously told us; and I find that he wants something less "saintly," more "worldly," more "worldly-wise"—or, in an expressive word of student-slang, more *splurgy*. Let there be a virtual confiscation of the endowments by the making the alumni a corporation who shall elect a board of managers, and what shall we see? Looking to Mr. Phelps who favored us with his ideas on the subject, and who will doubtless have a controlling influence in the new corporation, I find that we shall see a new style of elections to professorships—the chairs of instruction offered not to young scholars who have had some experience in teaching, and who are invited and expected to make teaching their life-work, and to win their reputation by their skill and success in that business, but to men who have already achieved their celebrity in some other business, and whose impulses and aspirations are in a different direction. The old saintly policy which employs teachers to do the honest work of teaching—just as saintly people gifted with common sense employ physicians to do medical work and lawyers to manage a case in the courts—is to be exploded, and the new worldly-wise policy will offer the professorships to illustrious historians and world-famous poets, who will revolt as readily as Mr. Phelps himself from the hard and irksome work of teaching college-students. Whether the

expectation is that Pegasus will condescend to become a patient and slow-moving drayhorse, or that the scanty funds devoted to the payment of teachers will be expended in purchasing ribbons for the decoration of his mane and wings, we are not informed; but, be that as it may, the proposal does not convince me that this Young Yale (so-called) would manage the university any better than it has been managed hitherto by Old Yale, with ten Connecticut ministers of the gospel in its corporation.

But is there in the scheme no suggestion more worthy of serious consideration? Is this the great change of policy for which the governing power must be transferred from the existing corporation to the mass-meeting of alumni? Methinks I hear in reply an indignant *No!* What else, then, does Mr. Phelps propose? Two things only. *First*, more pains-taking to decorate the commencement platform with the presence of notable and betitled strangers—some spread-eagle senator from a pioneer state—some tomriddy of an English lord who, having come over by the last steamer for the sublime purpose of shooting prairie hens in Illinois, can be induced to wait a few days for the sublimer purpose of exhibiting his florid complexion and muscular limbs to the alumni—five hundred of whom (we are expressly assured) will rush to commencement for the gratification which the sight of so illustrious a stranger will give them. *Secondly*, more pains-taking to waylay the sons of distinguished fathers in the preparatory schools or under private tutors, and, when one has been secured for Yale College, to communicate the fact incontinently to the Associated Press and have it telegraphed to all parts of the United States, so that thousands of families who never before heard of Yale, shall inquire what it is and where it is, and shall be induced to send their sons also to an institution so distinguished. These two expedients are, in principle, one. Neither of them rises above the dignity of an "advertising dodge," though their ingenuity might be pronounced worthy of Barnum.

"I had a dream which was not all a dream." The desired change had been effected. Our venerable college had obtained "a living connection with the outer world." "The alumni from Maine to California" had "become Yale Col-

lege," and "the bounding blood of youth" was "throbbing in every one of its ancient members." Musing on the new era, I seemed to be present at a meeting of the Directors elected by Young Yale. They did not seem to be weighed down with over-much saintliness—there was no suggestion of any thing clerical in or about them; they were costumed like men of this world and of this generation—some in velvet jackets—some in gorgeous waistcoats; and the apartment was as full of tobacco smoke as the Graduates' Hall when the speaking has begun after a commencement dinner. Any body could see that they were smart men, familiar with the art of "catering to human weakness and infirmity"—men well endowed with "that worldliness which is" (or is thought to be) "not inconsistent with godliness"—men of the sort whose worldly wisdom (sometimes known as cunning) is all that can be consistent with godliness in the most liberal meaning of that word. They were busy with schemes of progress,—sending out runners to intercept ingenuous but verdant youth on their way to Harvard or Cornell and bring them safely to Yale, "cash on delivery"—sending out canvassers, like the canvassers of some book published by subscription that is to be tremendously popular—sending out bill-stickers and painters; and lo! I seemed to see, in staring letters, on rocks and fences, along the railways and the highways, outvying "Helmhold" and "Plantation Bitters," the spirit stirring words, "*Send your boys to Yale! Every graduate shares in the government.*" I awoke, and to my great relief—behold, it was a dream!

I am happy to believe that my dream would hardly come true in every particular, even if those who speak in the name of Young Yale could manage in their own way; but certainly the ideas propounded by Mr. Phelps look in that direction and have no other tendency. He is evidently under the impression that Yale College ought to be managed as Mr. Barnum manages his museum, or as Mr. Bowen manages his Independent. In his philosophy the *sine qua non* of success for a great and historic institution of learning, not less than for a great showman or a great quack, is tact and skill in catering to human infirmity. To assume that in this respect he is not a fair specimen of the party which he stands up to represent would

be disrespectful toward him. Therefore I am constrained to believe that there would be very little reason to hope for any substantial improvement or progress if the management of the institution were committed to him and those in whose name he speaks. If Mr. Phelps, instead of being indebted for his education to Old Yale, had graduated from an institution conducted on the principles which he propounds in the name of Young Yale, he would not have been half the man that he now is.

Let me say that, from the loopholes of my obscurity here in Squashville, I have been observing, through many years, the fermentation of opinions about college government and college studies, which goes on among young graduates and undergraduates, and among others who know less than they, and have thought less on the subject. There is hardly a journalist—though he be only half-fledged, just leaping from his stand in the composing-room to the chair editorial, like a young bird from its nest to a convenient bough—who does not feel himself far more competent to give “an opinion as is an opinion,” on all such matters, than President Woolsey and the entire Faculty of the Academical Department of Yale College. Mr. Phelps himself, with ten years over his head since his graduation, is hardly more at home than the most juvenile of graduates, or the most uninformed of journalists, in all this talk “about a living connection with the world without,” about “the new blood which throbs in every vein of this mighty republic,” about “what is wanted in the scenes for which Yale educates her children,” and about that superior “knowledge of the people’s wants” which is the peculiar endowment of those who are in the people and of the people.” With all becoming deference I must say that I have learned to distrust the judgment of men who deal largely in such phrases, and especially their judgment on questions about liberal education. Believing very heartily in the possibility of improvement and progress in the government of college students and the methods of college instruction—nay, suspecting sometimes that a little relaxation in the rigor with which students at Yale College are held to a high standard of proficiency might do no harm on the whole,—I cannot bring myself to believe that the men who use those phrases so glibly know very well what they

are talking about. Nor am I any more convinced of their superior wisdom when they descend from their sonorous generalities to the details of college reconstruction. When, after reading and hearing the crude notions which they throw out, I try to conceive the shape and guise which Yale College would take on under their management, I am compelled to think that the ends for which our venerable institution exists would be sacrificed instead of being promoted by placing it under their control.

And what kind of a college is it which—I will not say Young Yale, but Young America—is clamorous for? First of all, the marking system must be abolished. Nothing is more odious to Mr. Jefferson Brick, when he condescends to pen a leader on those mediæval and monkish institutions, American colleges. Away with all marks designed to register the student's proficiency in his several studies! Certainly, a freeborn American who is old enough to smoke, and who is full of the new blood which throbs, &c., ought to judge for himself, when he pays his term-bills, whether he is getting a satisfactory pennyworth of college learning. Away, too, with all marks of the other sort—marks for "sleeping over," for roosting on the college fence, for the gentlemanly sport of "hazing" a Freshman, for disturbing the peace of the city with midnight yells, or for any breach of college regulations. The free, high spirit of an American student ought not to be vexed with marks and college censures. Let him be governed by his own sense of propriety. Coördinate with this demanded reformation, and logically deducible from it, is another: abolish the Procrustean bedstead of a prescribed course of studies, which assumes that all students are alike in their talents and aptitudes, and are destined to the same employment in their subsequent years. Let every student decide for himself what he will study and how much; for is not such freedom essential to that pursuit of happiness which is one of his inalienable rights under the immortal Declaration of Independence on the fourth of July, 1776? Then follows another demand: Abolish all "compulsory religion" in colleges. Let there be no prayers in the college chapel; or if something of that sort is required by the present benighted state of public opinion, let there be no mon-

itor to note the absent or the tardy. Especially let no man be required to attend public worship on Sunday anywhere. Why should a promising young atheist who can talk about "protoplasm," and who has learned not indeed that he is no *body*, (quite the reverse of that,) but that his personality is no thing at all—or a "heathen Chineese" who already accepts and practices three distinct religions quite contradictory of each other—be required to defile his conscience by any religious observance? Then add one more reform: Abolish recitations and dry textbooks. Lectures are the thing for a university—attractive and brilliant lectures, not by plodding professors, but by distinguished lecturers, whose names, whenever they are announced, draw a full house—lectures by celebrated men whom all the world runs after—lectures fresh and lively from the outer world, and got up with a due regard to the fundamental principle of all human success—the principle of catering to "human weakness and infirmity."

I think I see what Yale College might become under the renovating sway of such reformers. Not that Mr. Phelps entertains all these wild notions of what a college should be; but his speech leads in that direction. His great desideratum is "a living connection with the world without," and a consequent recognition of "the people's wants;" and his remedy for all existing defects is, that the governing power shall consist of men "who are in the people and of the people." The very gist of his complaint is, that with an old foggy corporation, keeping up a succession of old foggy professors, the outside world is unable to introduce such changes as "the people" want. In brief, the end to be attained by the proposed revolution is nothing less than to make the annual meeting of Alumni a concourse for the agitation of all sorts of opinions, brought in from "the outside world," about college studies and college discipline. Very naturally, at no distant period, there might arise a division of the Alumni into parties and factions; for instead of meeting as now to revive old memories, to speak of the departed, and to brighten the chain of friendship that binds the survivors to each other, they are to meet in the collisions of debate and of business. They are to meet as a great constituency for the election of a legislative and

governing Board; and surely neither Mr. Phelps nor those whom he speaks for can expect that such an election will in any instance fail to be a contested election. Candidates must be nominated; and in order to this there must be consultation beforehand, and caucuses of one party and another representing various ideas and sympathies. Then think what scheming and struggling there will be to bring up voters on one side and the other. Who does not know that in such a body as the Alumni of Yale College there are and always must be wide divergencies of opinion? The tug of conflict in one of those elections may be between the administration ticket and the opposition ticket. Or it may be between the liberal ticket and the conservative; or between the ticket which represents a high standard of classical attainments, and another which promises a substitution of the physical sciences in place of the dead languages and the old literary culture. And while other great movements are coming in from "the outside world," like tides from the Atlantic in the Bay of Fundy, what is to hinder the political questions and partizanships that agitate "the world without" from surging into the Graduates' Hall on the day before Commencement, and even throwing their foam over the tables of the commencement dinner? Then we may have a Republican ticket, and a Democratic ticket, and a Women's Rights ticket coquetting with both, and an Anti-Masonic ticket, and a Maine Law ticket striving to detach a few votes from what happens to be the main issue. Then, too, we may have the anthracite and iron lords of Pennsylvania pouring out their greenbacks like water to secure the success of a Tariff ticket, while all who refuse to vote it are denounced in the New York Tribune as bought with British gold. Nay, let us not forget that in a closer connection with such an institution as ours there are other interests than those which I have suggested—interests reaching deeper into the foundations of society, and guarded by more jealous sensibilities. The issue may be a religious one—between tickets representing different religious bodies, or even between an Orthodox and evangelical ticket on one side, and an Anti-evangelical and anti-religious ticket on the other side. Does not the undisguised contempt which some of those who think they represent Young Yale express towards ministers

of the Gospel indicate the possibility of such an issue at an early day after the expected revolution?

III. There is, therefore, another view of this matter—a view which Mr. Phelps and his friends do not seem to have considered. How can the revolution be brought about? I do not forget the statement, made on the authority of Mr. Evarts, (whose opinion on such a point may safely be accepted as conclusive against any opinion not pronounced judicially from the bench,) that the change proposed is not legally impossible. But does that statement mean anything more than that a change in the charter of Yale College would not be illegal and void if made by the legislative power of the State and consented to by the existing Corporation? Nearly sixty years ago, an attempt was made on Dartmouth College, with a result which Mr. Evarts did not overlook in giving his opinion, and which even ministers in places like Squashville are familiar with, though "Young Yale" and Fiskville may not have heard of it. On that occasion, Young Dartmouth came to the rescue in the person of Daniel Webster; as in a like emergency for our *alma mater* (if it should now arise) Young Yale, or Middle-aged Yale would come to the rescue in the person of William M. Evarts.

Those who think that the constitution of Yale College can be changed by a vote in a commencement assembly, do not understand the case. For their benefit, therefore, if there are any such persons, I may be allowed to make some statements which, to readers better informed, may seem rudimentary. The institution about which the present question has arisen, was founded with some formality by ten Connecticut ministers, whom a common consent of their brethren had designated to perform that duty, each of them laying down a number of books, and saying, "I give these books for the founding of a college in this colony." By that act, prior to any charter, they became, according to the principles of Common Law, the creators of a trust, and the founders of the institution for which the books were given. The institution which they founded was a religious institution, not accidentally, but essentially; for the modern theory—a college in which religion is only tolerated, and a university which pledges itself to exclude the

knowledge of God from the circle of the sciences and to ignore the relation of the Bible to the culture of true manliness,—had not then been invented. At least they never had heard of such a theory, and if they had heard of it they would have rejected it with horror. Their avowed motive, expressed in their petition for a charter (as appears from the preamble to the charter granted in 1701) was their zeal for the “upholding and propagating of the Protestant Christian religion by a succession of learned and orthodox men;” and they represented themselves as “undertakers for the founding, suitably endowing and ordering a collegiate school, within his Majesty’s colony of Connecticut, wherein youth may be instructed in the arts and sciences, who, through the blessing of Almighty God, may be fitted for public employment both in church and civil state.”

The religious character, then, of the institution founded in 1700 and chartered in 1701, and the permanence of its usefulness as “upholding and propagating the Protestant Christian religion,” were what the founders, and those whose representatives they were, regarded as of primary importance. (Observe now in what method the charter, granted at their request, intended to secure and perpetuate the religious character of the college. Not by imposing upon students or teachers, or upon the Trustees and their successors, the yoke of subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. Not by requiring anybody to accept and adopt the Westminster Confession. Not by setting up any syntagma of Christian doctrines as a standard of orthodoxy, inflexible and immutable. The only—and in their view sufficient—guarantee for that feature of their institution which they deemed most important, was the simple provision in the charter that the Trustees (never to be fewer than seven nor more than eleven) should be “ministers of the Gospel, inhabiting within this colony.” Hitherto that guarantee has been sufficient for its purpose. Yale College always has been, and, save by some unfaithfulness on the part of its guardians or some violent subversion of its charter, it must always remain a religious institution. It was intended to have, and it has had till now, “a vital connection,” with the churches of Connecticut—especially the Congregational church.

es, by whom, through the agency of their pastors, it was called into being before any other church existed in the colony.

In consideration of the connection between liberal studies and the well-being of the State—and with an eye, doubtless, both to what students from Connecticut had been spending at Cambridge, and to what students from other colonies might spend at a college in Connecticut—the government of the colony became from the first, in such measure as that day of small things would permit, a chief patron of the college. A yearly subsidy of "one hundred and twenty pounds country pay" was granted in the charter, "until this Court order otherwise;" and from time to time other donations were made, without which the institution would have foundered. Out of such dependence of the college on the public treasury, there arose a disposition on the part of the Legislature to supervise the institution, and to control it at discretion. But "the President and Fellows," as they were styled in the new charter of 1745, resisted the attempt at legislative control, and their arguments (though they were only ministers) were too strong to be withstood.

At last when the college had lived almost a century, and the little colony had become an independent commonwealth, one of the United States of America under the Federal Constitution—all doubts and discussions concerning the relations between the corporation of Yale College and the government of Connecticut were brought to a satisfactory conclusion which I cannot describe in any other way so well as by a quotation from President Woolsey's "Historical Discourse" one hundred and fifty years after the founding of the college.

"In October, 1791, a committee was appointed to confer with the President and Fellows of the College in relation to its affairs and to report at the next session. In their report dated May 25, 1792, they say that they found the Corporation disposed to communicate without reserve every circumstance respecting the care and management of the institution under their government. They found that the number of students on an average was about one hundred and thirty, that the severity of the ancient Freshman discipline was almost done away, and that the literary exercises of the respective classes had of late years undergone considerable alterations, so as the better to accommodate the education of the undergraduates to the present state of literature. They further found that the state of the College treasury was in a much better condition than they had apprehended, and that the finances had been managed with great dexterity, pru-

dence and economy. After mentioning the amount of funds and of annual expenses, they stated that another building was wanted to accommodate and receive the students, about one-half of whom were obliged to furnish themselves with lodgings in the town for want of room in the College, for which purpose, as well as for additions to the library, for the support of a professor of mathematics, and for increase of salaries the help of the legislature was needed. This report, it is said, gratified the legislature; and an act was passed appointing commissioners to receive the balances of taxes laid for the discharge of the principal and interest of the State debt, and to pay over such balances for the use of the College at New Haven, particularly for the erection of a new College building containing students' rooms, and for the purpose of serving as a fund to be applied to the support of professors. The conditions of this grant were that of the sum collected in these balances the College authorities should pay or transfer in legal form to the Treasurer of the State fifty per cent. in some kind of public stock of the United States; and that eight members of the State government, the Governor, Lieut. Governor and six senior assistants in the council, should be *ex officio* members of the Corporation of Yale College, with full powers except as to filling up vacancies in the clerical portion of that body. This act, contemplating a modification of the charter, was accepted not unwillingly by the existing Corporation. With slight alterations, rendered necessary by the new constitution of the State, the relation to the State has continued as was then settled until the present time. The old jealousy of a corporation for educational purposes managed exclusively by clergymen ceased. The happy adjustment, that neither portion of the body should exercise any control over the election of members pertaining to the other, tended to prevent all jealousy between the orders and to promote union. The civilians infused knowledge of law and of public sentiment into the Board. Their annual election, by giving each predominant political party only a temporary share in the control of the College, really removes it from all undue political influence. In effecting this union Mr. Hillhouse, then and for forty years afterward the Treasurer of the College, had a considerable part. The assistance rendered by this act to the College was of the greatest advantage to its financial interests, perhaps we may say of vital importance; nor could the measures for the increase of instructors and for additions to the buildings, which were carried through in Dr. Dwight's presidency, have been thought of without these very seasonable supplies." pp. 86-88.

It will be observed that the original guarantee for the religious character of the institution, was neither abrogated nor impaired by the alteration of the charter in 1792. The "civilians" admitted to the corporation are to the ministers as eight to eleven; and I believe that hitherto some of them have always been in full religious sympathy with their clerical associates. But if at any time the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor and six senior Senators of Connecticut, should be, one and all, members of religious bodies not in communion with the Congregational churches of Connecticut—if they should be

irreligious men, or even anti-religious in the most malignant way—if by some revolution in political parties eight Roman Catholics should be introduced into the corporation ; or eight Jews ; or eight Socialists and Red-republicans ; or eight Mormons, or eight naturalized Buddhists ; the college would still be, as from its beginning, a religious institution, consecrated to "the upholding and propagating of the Protestant Christian religion by a succession of learned and orthodox men."

The *ex officio* members of the corporation are always welcome to their places without regard to their political partizanship, and without calling in question their religious belief or unbelief. Their presence is not an empty honor, like the coveted presence of "the distinguished Senator from Alaska" on a commencement platform, nor has it in any instance within my knowledge been felt to be a disgrace. No distinction is recognized between them and their associates in debating or in voting. Their practical sagacity as men conversant with public affairs is always appreciated. Sometimes their experienced skill, and sometimes their munificent friendship, is highly valuable to the finances of the institution. But if they should unite their strength to abolish the religious character of the college, or to frustrate the religious design for which it was founded, they would be powerless ; for the guarantee in the original charter is as effective in 1870 as it was in 1701. Now if those who call themselves Young Yale propose to substitute for these eight representatives of the old commonwealth of Connecticut, or for any of them, an equal number of men to be elected in the commencement meeting of graduates, let them try. Let them send in their petitions to the legislature. Perhaps Mr. Phelps will consent to appear as counsel for the petitioners, and to try his persuasiveness on the "Hon. Mr. Domuch of Oldport." Let them try whether the democracy of Connecticut will consent to surrender, in whole or in part, its purchased and stipulated right of having eight representatives of its own in the corporation of Yale College. Mr. Pickering of Squashville has no objections, and will make no opposition. Nay, I will assure those who are disposed to try, that all the Pickerings—every one of the ten—will refrain from opposing the change, whenever the State is found willing

to give up its connection with the university. But let the negotiators remember that the gifts from the State, which the university has received as the price of its consent to that connection, or by virtue of its relation to the State, are in no event to be refunded.

The assault, however, both by the two writers in the Nation, and by Mr. Phelps in his speech, is mainly directed against the clerical part of the corporation. The "ministers" are the sort of men who, because they are ministers, are incompetent to the trust which they have received from their predecessors. Let me ask what it is which these assailants propose to do? What they would do if they could is evident enough. They do not believe in men who are by profession religious men, students and teachers of the Christianity contained in the Bible; for men of that profession are as a class second-rate men. The problem which they have taken in hand is to get these men out of the corporation of Yale College, and my question is, "How do they propose to do it?" Do they expect to persuade the present corporation to abdicate their trust (if the legislature will consent) and to give over the entire university with all the interests involved, to the control of another Board differently constituted? Doubtless it would be easy to convince each of the ten, apart, that he as an individual is at the best only a second-rate man in comparison with "men who sit on the Supreme bench, or who control the cabinet of the executive," or with "successful men" in the city of New York. Doubtless any one of them might be persuaded to vacate his seat in the expectation of its being filled by a wiser and abler man. But to convince them all, or even a majority of them, that they are unfit to hold the great and precious trust simply because they are ministers,—will not be easy. Knowing something about ministers, and especially Connecticut ministers, I can say with great confidence that no insults on their persons or their profession will drive them from the trust transmitted to them by the Founders, and guaranteed by the original compact between the Founders and the commonwealth. Surely they who hope to succeed in such an enterprise by such means, cannot be reckoned higher than "second-rate men."

But let all this be forgotten, and let us suppose that the enterprise has been undertaken with a more sagacious view of the connection between means and ends. Let us suppose a courteous memorial addressed to the President and Fellows, subscribed by the names of the memorialists, and asking that the government of this venerable institution, instead of remaining where the Founders placed it, be transferred to the graduates dispersed over the world. The memorialists admit that, under the existing constitution, the college has prospered hitherto, and has had a marvellous growth; but they intimate that in some particulars, not easily defined, it is behind the times, and they are sure that the graduates, if it can be put under their control, will come up to its help with great enthusiasm, and will set it forward at a rapid rate. I can tell beforehand what the result would be of such a memorial. The President and Fellows would reply, Yale College was designed to be a religious and Christian institution; and we cannot surrender the only security for its religious character. You offer us only vague promises which may mean much in your intention and yet never be fulfilled, but if you would add to the endowments a solid million of money to-day on the condition of our putting the whole trust out of our hands into yours, our answer would be the same: *Non possumus*.

Whether right or wrong, the firm belief of the President and at least the ten clerical Fellows always will be that the confidence of the churches, and the munificence of men who hold that a college ought to be a religious institution, are worth more than any patronage that is likely to come on any terms, from those graduates, be they ever so rich and ever so lavish, who have an outspoken contempt for Christian ministers. I know not how many they may be for whom Mr. Phelps seems to speak, and who are represented by the two writers in the Nation; but if I were in confidential relations with them, I would frankly advise them to discharge their minds immediately of all expectation that the revolution which they are planning will be consented to by the corporation as it is. If they are to accomplish what they have undertaken, they must try some other method.

What then? Will they address themselves to the legisla-

ture of Connecticut? But Yale College is not a State university, nor is it under the control of the State in the same sense in which Harvard College is under the control of Massachusetts. Its charter cannot be violated by a legislative act so long as there is a Supreme Court of the United States. If Senator Sumner would frame a bill for an act of Congress to guarantee a republican form of government to the State of Connecticut, and would put into the bill a new constitution for Yale College,—and if the two houses could be persuaded to pass the bill, and the President to sign it,—and then if the Supreme Court would recognize the act as not contrary to the supreme law of the land,—the thing would be done. Can it be done in any other way?

I have intended, throughout this communication, to speak of Mr. Phelps much more respectfully than he spoke of me, for I learned long ago to "reverence the young," and he is not yet old enough to be undeserving of respect. Let me then, in all seriousness and good feeling, make one suggestion tending toward a solution of the difficult problem which "Young Yale," so called, seems unable to solve. The late George Peabody gave one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for a Museum of Natural History in connection with Yale College. Wisely, as I think, and much to the relief of the President and Fellows, he placed that princely gift in the hands of his own trustees to be managed and expended by them for the use and benefit of the university in conformity with directions recorded in his instrument of donation. In like manner, a wealthy gentleman in the city of New York left, in his last will, a legacy of fifty thousand dollars to remain in the hands of his son, and the income of it to be expended by him, at his discretion, for the benefit of Yale College. The son is discharging that trust not only with all fidelity, but also, so far as I know, with sound discretion. These two facts may illustrate the hint I will venture to offer. If Young Yale really wants to be represented in the management of the funds, and to have by its elected trustees or visitors a direct influence over the policy of the institution, there is a way in which that desire can be attained. Suppose an University Fund of half a million for objects connected with the whole institution, and

a board of trustees or visitors elected by the Alumni to superintend the application of it,—would that answer the purpose? I will also suggest that a hundred thousand dollars for the Law Department is a great desideratum, and that whoever will give the money may make his own conditions as to the use of it, and like Mr. Peabody may establish his own arrangements by compact with the corporation.

I might have subscribed this letter (which was commenced as a letter to the Editor of the Nation,) **ANOTHER ALUMNUS**; for I also am a graduate of Yale College, and so is every one of my nine associates; and we do not admit that the *Socii* lose any of the dignities or privileges belonging to the *Alumni*. But as my letter has become too long for insertion in a weekly journal, and must reach the public on the pages of the graver and more capacious *New Englander*, I accept the less dignified name proposed by Mr. Phelps, and being "exhausted by keeping a few sheep in the wilderness" subscribe myself, most humbly,

TIMOTHY PICKERING,
of Squashville.

Oct. 1, 1870.

ARTICLE VIII.—NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

JULIUS MÜLLER'S DOCTRINAL ESSAYS.*—The most eminent of the living German theologians, in the department of philosophical and systematic Divinity, is the Author of the great work on the Christian Doctrine of Sin, Dr. Julius Müller, of Halle. His classical culture—he is a brother of the late Ottfried Müller,—his philosophical acumen and learning, his thorough acquaintance with all branches of theological science, together with the fine mingling of conservatism, or rather of deep and earnest convictions, with liberal and catholic feeling and with a sincere, impressive spirit of piety, mark him out as a great teacher. His high position is recognized in Germany by scholars of all varieties of opinion. Rothe, while he lived, had an almost equal reputation; and Nitzsch was regarded as the leader among younger men who, like him, were eminent in the branch of doctrinal theology. The collection of dissertations which Müller has just given to the public are elaborate and very able discussions of several themes: the Relations of Faith to Knowledge; The Right of private judgment in the interpretation of Scripture; the question whether the Son of God would have become incarnate, if sin had not entered the world; the relation between the operation of the Holy Spirit and the efficacy of the divine word; the Invisible Church; a Comparison of the Doctrines of Luther and Calvin on the Lord's Supper; the Divine Institution of the office of the Ministry. Each of these essays contains, in a condensed and regular form, materials sufficient to form a treatise on the subject to which it relates. It is pleasant to know that the venerable Author, who has suffered from ill health for many years, has found strength to revise and collect these very valuable contributions to theological science.

ROTHER'S DOCTRINAL SYSTEM.†—The posthumous publication of

* *Dogmatische Abhandlungen* von Julius Müller, Dr. Bremen: C. Ed Müller. 1870.

† *Dogmatik* von Dr. R. ROTHE. Aus dessen handschriftlichem Nachlasse herausgegeben, von Dr. D. SOHENKEL. (1. u. 2 Abth.) 1870. pp. 315, 356.

Rothe's system of theology is an event which every journal that deals at all with theology, is bound to record. His ingenuity and originality have been equalled by few; and in the particulars in which he departs from received opinions, he knows how to clothe his own views in the most attractive form and to support them by impressive argumentation. Of all the German writers on the different problems of theology, Rothe, as we think, is foremost in the power of lucid, facile exposition. His style is fluent without being diffuse. He is a master in scientific method. The first part of the work relates to the doctrine of Sin, in which the peculiar theory of the Author as to the origin of sin and the fall—the theory of a gradual development of the soul into a purely spiritual form of being, by overcoming the sensuous side of our being—is fully unfolded. The readers of Müller's great work will remember how earnestly, and yet how courteously, this theory is there contested. The second part is on Redemption, and covers the various topics appropriate to this head, as far as the topic of the Church. Rothe does not adopt the Athanasian conception of the Trinity, although he holds firmly to the truth of the divinity of Jesus. He regards the death of Christ as a part of the necessary preparation of Him for His work upon the souls of men by the Spirit,—necessary in the divine order, which requires that the Deliverer shall successfully pass through experiences, which as far as sinners are concerned, have a retributive element, in order that He may be inwardly qualified to act upon men with renovating power. He is the head and representative of mankind.

HUNT'S HISTORY OF ENGLISH THEOLOGY.*—This work is a History of Doctrine under another title. The Author is of the Broad Church school. He writes with candor and with a fair, but not uncommon, degree of discrimination. He has read the works which he undertakes to sketch, and his citations are numerous and apposite. A history of English theology has long been needed, and although we cannot be certain that the present work will fill the vacant place, the first volume gives promise of a meritorious performance. The Baptists, the Quakers, the Independents, and other religious bodies outside of the Anglican Church, are fully con-

* *Religious Thought in England*, from the Reformation until the end of the last century. A contribution to the History of Theology. By REV. JOHN HUNT, M. A., Author of an Essay on Pantheism. London: Strahan & Co. 1870. Vol. I.

sidered and their peculiar tenets described. Students of historical theology will find in the work useful and agreeable reading.

LECTURE ROOM TALKS.*—This book is really a volume of “table-talk,” or talk around the domestic board of the household, by the head of the ecclesiastical family, in easy and familiar address, often apparently in answer to questions asked on the spot and therefore purely extemporaneous; very much, in truth, in the style of “homilies” in the Christian assemblies when they come together to hear and talk about Jesus.

It would not be well for every pastor to imitate this style of off-hand discourse since *his* experiences might not be so rich and edifying as those of the pastor of the Plymouth church.

The same marked characteristics that are found in all the productions of this distinguished divine are seen in these briefer “homilies,” though criticism is disarmed by their spontaneous genial nature. They are overflowings of a running spring. Among the most readable pieces are those entitled “Experiences Abroad,” in which some account is given of the orator’s subjective preparation for those well known speeches made in England during the war—“The unwritten words and deeds of Jesus”—“Praise and Prayer”—“Experimental Religion”—“Assurance of Salvation”—“Methods of conversion.”

Christian experience, communion, prayer, social intercourse, conversation, work, the need and fullness of Christ, are touched with accustomed vigor and personality. Like this preacher’s sermons, which are examples, not of the most philosophic quality of preaching, but the quality of skillful and powerful *popular* presentation of truth to the human heart and consciousness, these addresses are good food for all minds.

A TREATISE OF THE PREPARATION AND DELIVERY OF SERMONS.† There is a fashion in books as in other things. The call for a particular class of books soon creates a supply of them.

* *Lecture Room Talks.* A series of familiar discourses on themes of general Christian experience. By HENRY WARD BEECHER. Phonographically reported by T. J. ELLINWOOD. New York: J. B. Ford & Co., 89 Park Row. 1870.

† *A Treatise of the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons.* By JOHN A. BROADUS, D. D., LL. D., Professor in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Greenville, S. C. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., No. 23 North Sixth street. New York; Sheldon & Co., 500 Broadway.

The strong interest awakened a few years since in the study of English Philology, produced almost simultaneously a number of works on the English language. There seems to have been of late a similar working up of interest in the department of homiletical studies, attested by such works as those of Kidder, Shedd, and Hoppin, and others of a more popular character.

The work which we notice is one of the last we have seen of the fruits of this homiletical revival, and, to judge of it by a brief examination, good but not the best; we do not see that it adds very much to the literature of the subject. It shows a diligent reading of the works, and especially of the most recent works, on Rhetoric and Homiletics, but it contains nothing novel. It is written in a popular style, and its remarks are generally judicious, and made in a commendable spirit. The treatment of the subject of Delivery is appreciative and useful; its value however is not enhanced by an illustration like the following: "A really good man, in preaching at a University, once said, 'You shut your eyes to the beauty of piety; you stop your ears to the calls of the gospel: you turn your back,' &c., and in saying it shut his eyes, stopped his ears with his fingers, and whirled his broad back into view. Alas! for the good done to the students by his well-meant sermon. In 'suiting the action to the word,' he 'o'erstepped the modesty of nature.'"

Periods are sometimes carelessly ended with an "&c." or "etc.;" and the parts of a sentence which belong together, as the subject and its predicate, the substantive and its qualificative, are often separated unnecessarily, which blemishes of style should not occur in a work that specially treats of the methods of good writing and speaking.

HISTORY AND LITERATURE.

FIRST STEPS IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.*—We took up this book with the expectation and desire of saying a good deal in its favor,—partly, because we had seen it spoken of in high terms by journals in whose criticisms we ordinarily place confidence, and partly, because we are disposed to mention approvingly any textbook treating of this subject. Not that we have a lofty idea of

* *First Steps in English Literature.* By ARTHUR GILMAN. New York: Hurd & Houghton. 1870. 8vo. pp. 231.

Manuals of English Literature, or of the benefit that is to be derived from them. But in regard to this particular study, it seems to us that the public mind is passing through what for want of a better name may be called the Early English period, during which men will talk and act as if a knowledge of our literature could be gained by reading histories of it, and not by reading the literature itself. As the study of such histories is the quickest way of dispelling this delusion, we are disposed to welcome any addition to their number; and we accordingly hoped to find this work, though not of a good kind, yet so good in its kind as to prepare the way for better methods. But after a somewhat extensive acquaintance with manuals of English Literature, we are reluctantly compelled to say that this is the most thoroughly worthless one that has ever fallen under our observation. The student who uses it will take some steps in English Literature, it is true, but they will be steps backward and not forward.

This is harsh criticism, but it is unfortunately just. The book, as regards its contents, is nothing but a compilation of the ideas and facts contained in other manuals, the facts, in addition, being ill-arranged, and the ideas ill-expressed. The blunders of previous text-books are, in all cases where the space admits of it, carefully retained, and a legion of new ones inserted. There can not be found on a single page the least evidence of original investigation. Not only are the facts picked up at second-hand, but the criticisms are also, and generally they are taken from men whose critical opinions are in themselves worthless. Indeed, if there is anywhere anything peculiarly absurd that anybody has ever uttered, it is wonderful to see how successful the compiler of this manual has been in ferreting it out, and how careful he has been to incorporate it in his text.

The division of the language is probably original; the titles given to the subdivisions, and, to some extent, the subdivisions themselves, must certainly be so; for it required more ignorance than ordinarily can be brought to bear upon this subject to produce the ones here given. The language is divided into two great periods. "Immature English," extending from an indefinite time in the past to the year 1558, and "Mature English" extending from that year to the present day. The names given to the subdivisions of the former period are worth preserving as a curiosity. What most men are content to call Anglo-Saxon, our author, following a few late writers in Great Britain, calls Original

English ; though the same style of reasoning would lead us to call Latin and Italian by the same name. Semi-Saxon appears here as Broken English, Old English as Dead English, and Middle English as Reviving English. The subdivisions of the second period are in the main as misleading and incorrect as the titles applied to the first are absurd.

But vicious as is the plan of the work, the execution of it is far worse. The writer has no idea whatever of perspective, and in the confused jumble here presented no student could form an idea of the relative literary importance of any author, or of any period. Tried by a mathematical measurement, the account of Donne takes up more space than that of Shakespeare, and Isaac Watts has three times as much room as is assigned to Pope, though the latter here gives his name to a separate age. The book, moreover, swarms with the grossest errors ; hardly a page is free from them. Confining ourselves mainly to the more celebrated authors, the story of Chaucer's imprisonment and flight, always suspicious and now exploded, is here set down as a fact, and we have the additional information, not hitherto known to the world, that in religious matters the poet was much influenced by Wycliffe, and promoted his doctrines. In Spenser, it is stated that in the first book of his great poem we are introduced to the court of the Fairy Queen, though it would probably puzzle the author to mention the canto or verse where an account of this introduction is given. In Shakespeare, a fanciful idea of the Rev. Charles Wordsworth, that the Bible exerted the greatest formative and guiding influence upon the mind of the dramatist, is here laid down as an undoubted fact. In Milton, his two sonnets entitled, *The Nightingale* and *On the Late Massacre in Piedmont*, are spoken of as odes, while his noblest prose work, *Areopagitica*, or *Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing*, is represented as being two separate works, and in addition, *Areopagitica* appears, as *Areopagita*. In Dryden, *The Conquest of Grenada* is classed among his prose works, though there is not a single line of prose in both parts of the play, which are not only written in verse but in rhyme. In a similar manner his *Spanish Friar* and *Marriage a-la-Mode* are spoken of as prose, though they are prose in the same sense that the *Merchant of Venice* is—that is, poetry with prose conversations occasionally introduced. On the other hand, it may be well to state that the *Pericles and Aspasia* of Walter Savage Landor, which used to be

prose, has, according to this manual, become poetry. DeQuincey is said to belong to the Lake School, though it has been heretofore understood that Lake School was the designation of a school of poets, and not of prose writers. In the account of coffee-houses, Dryden is represented as seated in the chair by the fire-side, and surrounded by "such men as Wycherley, Gay, Addison and others of the wits of the time." As Dryden died in 1700, and Gay was born in 1688, the latter must have been an exceedingly precocious youth. But errors of this sort, and of all sorts, are so numerous, that the mind is embarrassed in selection by the very abundance.

A happy equilibrium has, however, been preserved between the sins of commission and those of omission. One of the leading, if not the leading author of the Old English Period, Robert of Gloucester, is not mentioned at all. Of later writers there is no account of Shirley, Webster, and Massinger among the dramatists, not to speak of numerous others; nor later still, of Sir Thomas Browne, of Robert Herrick, or Andrew Marvell. It may be said there was no room for all. But, then, why insert accounts of authors inferior to these both in ability and in reputation, especially when the names of some of those omitted appear in other parts of the work? Still, pardoning all this, what are we to think of an account of later English literature, which puts in Poe and leaves out Keats? We echo the question of Matthew Arnold, From what race of Hyrcanian tigers did our author spring?

It is in no spirit of unkindness that we tell the compiler of this manual that it will never do. Text-books, above all, should be accurate, and it would not only be unfair to the public, but it would in the end be no advantage to the author himself to speak of this in any other manner than it deserves. A trustworthy account of English Literature can never be produced except at the price of long years of toilsome research and careful thought; and the smaller the scale the more difficult will it be to execute it well. The time has gone by, if it ever existed, when text-books of this kind could be pitch-forked together, as this has been, at the cost of a few weeks or months of labor. We commend to the author the following extract from his own work, which may be taken as a fair sample of his style, and upon which no comment is needed:

"The march of intelligence in the United States during this period has never been paralleled, and could hardly have been conceived by the wisest of any previous century. This remarkable increase of intelligence has caused a notable increase in the number of readers, and in the average knowledge of the people in France, England, and the United States during the present period. There has also been an increase of the number of thinkers in these lands, but the latter class by no means increases in an equal ratio with the former. It is necessary to bear this fact constantly in mind as we scrutinize the development of our age in literary affairs."

There is included in this manual a bibliography of the "best editions" of English authors. No more need be said of it than that it is a fitting companion-piece to the account of the literature. It will be a very safe guide, however, wherever only one edition of a work has been published.

MANUALS OF ANCIENT HISTORY.* A sufficiently copious, accurate, and well-digested history of the great empires of antiquity, anterior to Greece, which shall also include what is known of the Sanscrit-speaking Hindoos, has long been a *desideratum* of the student. In German, there is the learned work of Duncker, in which are summed up, with clearness and fairness, the results of scholarly investigation in this broad field of oriental research. The course of ancient history is distinctly traced by this Author, so that the student has before him the condensed products of modern study in this department, to the different branches of which so many zealous students have been, of late, devoted. In English, we have no work corresponding in merit to Duncker; none to rival it in critical ability or in judgment or erudition; although all of *his* conclusions are, by no means, to be admitted, especially when he treats of Hebrew history. Smith's Ancient History is a work of considerable value. Rawlinson's "Five Great Monarchies" is one of the more recent fruits of English scholarship; and now we have from Rawlinson a briefer "Manual of Ancient History," extending from the earliest times to the division of the Roman Empire. It is based, as to plan, upon the meritorious work of

* *A Manual of Ancient History.* From the earliest times to the fall of the Western Empire. By GEORGE RAWLINSON, M. M., Camden Professor of Ancient History in the University of Oxford. Oxford: 1869. 1 vol. 8vo., pp. 568.

A Manual of the Ancient History of the East to the Commencement of the Median Wars. By FRANCOIS L'ENORMANT, sub-librarian of the Imperial Institute of France, and E. CHEVALLIER, member of the Royal Asiatic Society, London. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1870. 2 vols. pp. 895.

Heeren. Its bibliographical information is valuable to the student ; but here we notice striking defects. For example, there is no mention of Duncker, so far as we have observed ; and from a passage respecting Heeren, in the preface, we should conclude that Duncker is unknown to the Author. The chief defect of the work is the failure to distinguish, in Egyptian and Assyrian history in particular, between what is established and what is disputed or fairly disputable. A writer in the July number of the *Edinburgh Review* has taken Rawlinson to task for his inaccuracies, but has pushed his charges somewhat beyond the bounds of justice ; or, rather, writes from the stand-point of an extreme historical skepticism. At the same time it is to be regretted that Rawlinson does not bring a more accurate criticism to those portions of ancient history which most of all require this treatment. The work of L'Enormant and Chevallier is full, readable, and probably, in the main, trustworthy ; yet not free from the fault just pointed out in Rawlinson. In the English translation of L'Enormant, the Arabians are left out, on account of objections to this portion of the work which proceed from the school of Rawlinson. This, we think, was unwise. It leaves the book incomplete. The type in which the American edition of L'Enormant is printed is inconveniently and inexcusably small.

THE LIFE OF ARTHUR TAPPAN.* This is "a round unvarnish'd tale" of the life of "one who feared God and eschewed evil." It does not praise, for in such a life deeds only are eloquent. Arthur Tappan belonged to a class of simple-hearted, self-centered men, who do not seek reputation but seek to do right at whatever cost. We have entered into the fruits of his labors, who were perhaps not always ready to recognize his worth. The subsoil plough that has ripped open the hard earth and made possible the precious harvest, is too often cast aside and forgot. The story of his life is familiar to all, certainly in this region. Its details are few, but in the view of late events and of truth, truly grand. The sum of his gifts to philanthropic objects is modestly told by one who knew best ; and to him belongs the praise, in the words of Gerrit Smith, of being the first man in this country "to make use of money in large sums for benevolent objects." And he was first in many good things. He was president of the Amer-

* *The Life of Arthur Tappan.* New York: Hurd & Houghton. Cambridge: Riverside Press. 1870.

ican Anti-Slavery Society; he helped found the Colonization Society (which he was first to leave when he thought it left first principles), the Bible Society, the Tract Society, the American Education Society, Oberlin College, the N. Y. Journal of Commerce, and other good things, which, though they have not all followed precisely in the direction which he gave them, have been great powers in the country and the world. His gifts during the years of his business prosperity flowed like fructifying streams in all directions, often with a noiseless flow, making glad but concealing their source. The great lesson of his life was *courage to do right* whatever the consequences. The clear grit of the man was told in the short answer he gave to his business friends who were solicitous to aid him out of his heavy pecuniary difficulties. "You demand that I shall cease my anti-slavery labors, give up my connection with the anti-slavery society, and make some apology and recantation—*I will be hung first!*" Those who have seen him in his later years as a courteous and gentle old man, reticent and grave it is true, but living tranquilly in the shade of an affectionate home circle, shrinking from notoriety, and evidently dwelling in daily communion with God and higher thoughts, could hardly believe that this was he who was branded and mobbed, who was despised and hated, who sacrificed fortune and had a price set on his head, in the days of anti-slavery agitation.

The narrative of his early days, and of the quaint and rigid manners of old Puritan society, as well as glimpses of later years, through the sketches of his daughter, are highly interesting. Letters of Whittier, Schuyler Colfax, and William Lloyd Garrison, especially the last (on p. 399), are valuable additions, and speak well for the writers.

THE COUP d'ETAT OF NAPOLEON III.* M. Tenot has written what seems a trustworthy narrative of the events attending that usurpation of power on the part Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, which had the effect to stifle freedom in France for the last twenty years, and to inflict an injury upon the intellectual and moral life of the French people, for which no amount of material prosperity can compensate. Now that the career of the successful adventurer

* Paris in December, 1851, or The Coup d'Etat of Napoleon III. By Eugène Tenot, Editor of the "Siècle," &c. Translated from the 13th French edition, with many original notes, by S. W. ADAMS and A. H. BRANDON. New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1870. 8vo. pp. 350.

who has ruled France for almost a generation, has been brought to a stop by the war which he precipitately kindled, a fresh curiosity is awakened in regard to the steps of perfidy and cruelty by which he attained his elevation. M. Tenot writes in a dispassionate tone, and apparently without any attempt to give a party coloring to his recital. Incidentally, as well as directly, he conveys much information respecting the public men who have figured prominently in French politics for the last forty years.

MRS. WILLSON'S "ADVENTURES OF THE 126TH REGIMENT NEW YORK STATE VOLUNTEERS."*—We welcome every instance of seasonable care taken to collect information in a permanent form regarding the late war, and to perpetuate the memory of the men by whose endurance and valor it was carried on to success. Besides those conspicuous facts which will find a place in formal history, numberless incidents of the struggle and personal details which deserve to be recorded, as growing more significant and interesting with time, are now within the reach of compilers, as they cannot be a few years later. The traditions, associations, and partialities of particular regiments furnish motives and facilities for such works relating to their own services and members. The volume before us is an admirable example of what may be done in this direction. We congratulate the 126th Regiment N. Y. S. Volunteers, on having such a memorial of their three years' service, and on the spirit that must have pervaded them as a body, first to make their career worthy of this record, and then to issue a record so worthy of their career.

The first half of the book is a history of the services and fortunes of the Regiment from its organization till it was disbanded at the close of the war. Mrs. Willson's accomplished pen was already known to us in other productions, and here it has been used in a patriotic and loving labor. The narration is clear and lively, and the style graceful. The military movements described are made the more intelligible by pictures and drawings of their localities. Portraits of some of the officers are interspersed. We happen to have been cognizant of the pains the author has conscien-

* *Disaster, Struggle, Triumph.*—The adventures of 1000 Boys in Blue, from August, 1862, to June, 1865. By MRS. ARABELLA M. WILLSON, author of "Lives of the Mrs. Judsons" &c., &c. Dedicated to the 126th Regiment of New York State Volunteers. With an Appendix containing a Chronological Record of the principal events in the History of the Regiment. Albany: 1870. 8vo., pp. 590.

tiously bestowed in studying and arranging the mass of materials furnished by the "historical committee," especially soldiers' journals and letters. She has herself properly described her task in this department:—"For more than a year we have followed the fortunes of this Regiment, examining for the purpose every document, printed and manuscript, within our reach; sparing no labor of research; writing and re-writing again and again, as fresh materials came to hand, the simple story, which we now, with mingled hopes and fears, commit to the public."

Besides the elements of interest in all military history, one of an exciting quality is made prominent in the fortunes of this regiment. "Disaster," as well as "struggle" and "triumph," might well be expected among the vicissitudes of war, but in their case disaster seemed premature and peculiarly disheartening. In the outset, as yet inexperienced, it was their misfortune to be stationed at Harper's Ferry, and to have part in the insufficient defence of Maryland Heights. The remembered surrender of those places was not only disastrous but discreditable to our arms. This was one of the regiments then made prisoners and paroled. Thus early they had to spend two months in inactivity at Chicago before being exchanged. Worse than this, they had to bear the aspersion, from certain witnesses, and even from superior governmental authority, of panic and flight on Maryland Heights, without an opportunity of being heard in their own vindication. It seemed incredible to those who knew the good material of this regiment. Of course we cannot go into such a question here, but the reader of this work, we think, will find reason for discrediting those witnesses, and for putting the responsibility for the surrender of these places on "the stupidity or faithlessness" of Col. Miles, who there commanded this and other regiments. He will find proof too that these men, recruited as they were, did good service even in that field, and need not be ashamed of their record when fully exhibited. And it would seem as if a censure which they felt to be unjust the more stimulated their zeal on many subsequent occasions. At Gettysburg, and in many a sharp action, as part of the "Army of the Potomac," they made their name beyond doubt honorable and created a regimental pride which has produced this memorial. Their losses of officers and men make a record for them at once sad and glorious.

The latter half of the volume, in smaller type, is occupied with the "Chronological Record" and "Biographical sketches" pre-

pared by the Committee of the Regiment, whose diligence and patience in gathering and arranging so great a mass of materials are above all praise. These condensed pages are really so many "Soldiers' Monuments," with the most ample inscriptions, both for the fallen, and for their surviving comrades. We commend them to all who study the literature of the war, as showing how much an intelligent and spirited regiment may do in honor of its members. To those families who find here the history of their dead, there is no need of our commendation to make this history a household book.

The mechanical execution of the volume is most suitable and attractive, particularly Mrs. Willson's narrative, which is in a type that these "Boys in Blue" will like to read when they become veterans. We wish there may be many like contributions to our national history.

DANTE GABRIEL ROSETTI'S POEMS* come to us heralded by the applause of eminent poets and practiced critics as worthy of the admiring homage of all who shall read them. They are anything but common place imitations of any of the modern schools. There is great power of diction, clearness, and daring imagery and intensity of passion, and earnestness of devotion. All these are so conspicuous in single poems as to compel our admiration. We should not dare to assert that the diction is never abrupt and obscure—that the imagery is not extravagant—that the passion is not sustained, whether it takes the form of sentiment or serious desire—and that the religion drags heaven nearer to earth more than it elevates earth to heaven. With these suggestions we add our testimony, to that of other admiring critics.

* *Poems.* By DANTE GABRIEL ROSETTI. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1870.

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